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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the relationship between religion and politics in contemporary 
(post-1974) Greece, and the implications o f this relationship for the secularisation, 
democratisation, and westernisation o f Greek society. In Part One, the thesis uses an 
institutional and historical analysis o f Church-State relations to explain how tensions and 
contradictions rooted in earlier historical experiences have paved the way for relations between 
Church, State, and political culture since 1974. Part Two presents three case studies of 
contemporary Church- related movements that have affected both relations between Church and 
State and today’s Greek political culture generally. Overall, the thesis will explore the major 
connections between the Greek-Orthodox Church and the political establishment, and determine 
to what degree they are affecting the process of modernisation. The main problems highlighted 
are: (a) the secularisation o f Greek society and politics, and the ability of the Greek-Orthodox 
Church to resist or influence this process, especially within the context of the secularising 
policies of the government, Church-State separation, the contemporary resurgence o f religion in 
public life; (b) the implications o f Church-State separation for the democratisation process in 
Greece. The role of Orthodoxy in Greek politics is explored with the focus on foreign affairs, 
especially concerning the so-called “national issues” within the context of the modem Greek 
cultural and religious identity; c) the attitude of the Greek-Orthodox Church and its off-shoot 
movements towards westernisation, EU integration, and the increasing globalisation of the 
contemporary world. The main conclusions o f the thesis concern the ability of the Greek- 
Orthodox Church to influence government attempts at secularisation, as well as those 
Eurocentric modernisation efforts that conflict with the deep nationalistic undercurrents of 
Greek society. In addition, future research areas of investigation in Greek political culture will 
be identified, mainly in the direction o f a more systematic study o f what seems to constitute the 
essence o f Greek political culture, as well as o f a more thorough analysis o f the role o f religion 
within that culture.
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Introduction
Today’s resurgence of religion in Greece’s political culture is a phenomenon 
with far-reaching consequences. The concept of political culture is here identified 
with the growing interest in the irrational character of political systems -  essentially, 
the role of the unconscious in politics to the detriment of reason. Political culture is 
used as a conceptual tool so as to enhance our understanding of important but little 
explored aspects of both western and non-western political systems focused on values, 
symbols, and beliefs.
Forces as distinctive as the recrudescence of Islamic fundamentalism and 
Orthodox nationalism have shaped the politics of developing or recently emerged 
countries. The pervasive vitality and dynamism of religion in the constitution of 
political culture has created a new challenge for sociologists trying to understand the 
affinity between religion and political transformation, and for politicians attempting to 
manage the tension and turmoil around this dynamic affinity.
Changes in the conceptualisation of both religion and politics have generated a 
renewed interest in the meaning of secularisation and modernisation, the sacred and 
profane sources that inform and articulate national culture, and the impact of the 
interpenetration of the religious and political spheres on social change.
This thesis will explore how the integration of political culture and religion, 
specifically Eastern-Orthodox Christianity, has affected the modernisation process in 
post-1974 Greece. Despite the widespread resurgence of nationalist politics and 
religiously defined conflicts in the Balkans since the end of the Cold War, Eastern 
Christianity has remained terra incognita in most analyses dealing with social change. 
The region is simply relegated to the category of late-developers with few prospects 
for successful democratic modernisation.
Both US and EU policy making institutions have largely ignored the possibly 
constructive ways in which the Orthodox Churches might contribute to democratic 
modernisation, and use a pejorative discourse that explains the putative non-European 
nature of the Balkan societies in terms of the Byzantine Orthodox legacy, which is 
considered an inherently non-democratic religious tradition. This hypothesis is 
analysed and tested throughout the thesis in terms of both its theoretical 
presuppositions and empirical reality.
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Part One of the thesis furnishes the historical background of the Greek- 
Orthodox political culture, and then analyses Church-State relations during the 1980s 
and 1990s.
Part Two examines and evaluates the above historical and theoretical 
presuppositions in the context of three case studies of contemporary Church-related 
movements that have influenced relations between Church and State as well as Greek 
political culture generally.
The main objective has been to show some major connections between Church 
and politics in post-dictatorship Greece (since 1974). Most politicians and 
commentators with only superficial knowledge of Christian Orthodoxy contend that, 
due to its continued close collaboration with the State, the Greek Church has not been 
able to assume an independent political stand against the secular authorities, and that 
the State, through constitutional provisions and historical precedent, has exerted such 
pressure on the Church as to render it almost politically subjugated. While it is true 
that these pressures have reduced the power of the Church as an official political 
institution, they have not eliminated the Church’s indirect influence on Greek politics. 
In fact, because of its resources and its unique position in Greek society, the Church is 
now re-emerging as a powerful and extremely popular institution demanding to play a 
major role in Greece’s future within Europe.
This study will revolve around the capacity of the Greek Church to affect, both 
constructively and negatively, the socialist PASOK government’s initial aspirations to 
implement radical changes towards secularisation, as well as the ostensibly 
Eurocentric orientation of Greek foreign policy. The converse of this situation is the 
government’s inability to present a consistent and uniform strategy with respect to the 
Church’s role in Greek political culture. Its ambivalent dual strategy of tolerating and 
even enhancing the Church-nation-State connection at the same time as upholding the 
country’s condition as a secular EU democracy underscores the main problematic 
investigated by the thesis.
Basic Conceptualisations
The history, theory, and empirical reality of the relationship between Church 
and politics in Greece will be examined in terms of three basic analytical concepts. 
The first is secularisation, with the main focus on the ability of the Church to control 
the secularising policy of the government, and on the major political forces relying on
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Church support in return for propagating anti-secular political convictions. The chief 
political development encapsulating the secularisation debate relates to Church-State 
separation. The wider concept of secularisation is connected with this through the 
socialisation/nationalisation of Church property, liberalisation of the Civil Code (e.g. 
introducing civil marriage), and reforms towards a more secular education.
The second basic conceptualisation concerns the correlation between Church- 
State separation and democratisation. This will be explored at three levels: (i) the 
reaction within the Church and Church-related movements concerning the 
government’s intention to implement changes to upgrade the role of the laity, and 
promoting gradual autonomy from the State and a generally more inclusive internal 
Church; (ii) external democratisation affecting Church tolerance towards religious and 
ethnic minorities; and (iii) the purely political dimension of democratisation in terms 
of political interference in Church issues and vice versa.
The third approach relates to the position of the Church and Church-related 
movements towards westernisation, which will again be examined from three 
viewpoints: (i) the complex issue of modem Greek cultural and religious identity as 
shaped by tradition and modernity; (ii) the position of the Christian-Orthodox political 
culture vis-a-vis EU integration and the wider issue of globalisation; and (iii) specific 
foreign-policy issues (the so-called “national issues”) and in how far the Orthodox 
element plays an important role in Greek political culture, whether the Orthodox 
political culture presents serious obstacles to the country’s political orientation (re 
Greece’s commitments within NATO and the EU).
Despite some partial overlapping, these three areas are analytically distinct and 
may vary independently. So Church-State separation is not an essential precondition 
for democratising the Church, and vice versa. Also, westernisation does not inevitably 
lead to the marginalisation of religion from politics; in contemporary Greece the links 
between religion and politics are reflexive and mutually transformative, with the 
interpenetration of religion and politics strongly evident in informing and articulating 
cultural concepts of collective identity.
A note on Secularisation
From both an anthropological and a sociological perspective, religions 
produce social stability. If not always the core element, they are indispensible for the 
organisation of human societies, offering stability and cohesion on the social level,
and a meaningful interpretation of reality for the individual. In traditional 
communities, religion both asserts and reinforces the well-defined and organised 
system of mutual dependencies that form society, and at the same time attempts to 
rationalise and control the adverse impact of natural processes beyond human 
manipulation (natural catastrophes, illness, death). In this context, technological and 
scientific progress has been seen as contributing to the weakening of religious belief 
as more and more of these natural processess are understood and partially controlled.
The related notion of secularisation is the process by which the sacred is made 
profane, belief in the supernatural because belief in only the natural, i.e. in what can 
be physically observed and rationally and scientifically explained. Secularisation and 
the debate around it is a phenomenon considered as having been developed in the 
West and relevant to other societies in direct relation to their perspective level of 
westernisation. It is seen as both a result of, as well as an impetus to modernisation, 
and in non-western contexts both constitute indicators of westernisation. Modem 
capitalism, with its immoral reverence for and pursuit of profit and its glorification of 
the meaningless and wasteful consumerism that has become almost an end in itself, 
has also been perceived as contributing to the secularisation of western and 
westernised societies.1 In the case of England, for instance, Alasdair MacIntyre 
attributes the secularisation of society to the Industrial Revolution and its concomitant 
effects on the traditional social and moral fabric.2
David Martin,3 on the other hand, although also perceiving urbanism and 
industrialisation as adversely affecting religious institutions, does not consider the 
process of secularisation as an inevitable axiomatic development, but rather as a 
phenomenon dependent on the cultural, social, and historical background of the 
societies potentially affected by it. Martin sees inevitable secularisation as more of an 
ideological construct than a theory based on solid observable facts, and goes as far as 
to state that “the word secularisation should be erased from the sociological 
dictionary”. Perhaps it would be better to adopt Nikos Kokosalakis’s differentiation 
between the secularisation thesis as referring to the recognised and accepted 
marginalisation of religious institutions in industrial societies, and a concept used to 
argue a broader axiomatic decline of religion in the contemporary
1 Wilson 1976.
2 MacIntyre 1967.
3 Martin 1969.
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western/westernised world.4 Casanova claims that the latter postulate is “... a notion 
which has proven patently false as a general empirical proposition...”5 We should also 
keep in mind that scepticism has been a persistent feature of the western mind, taking 
many forms such as modernism in religion, scientific humanism, naturalism, 
rationalism, determinism, agnosticism, etc.6 Most importantly, however, when 
refering to secularisation, a clear distinction should be made between “...three very 
different, uneven and unintegrated propositions: secularisation as differentiation of the 
secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, secularisation as decline of 
religious beliefs and practices, and secularisation as marginalisation of religion to a
n
privatised sphere.” These distinct aspects of secularisation should not be conflated 
but separately treated and examined.
According to Wilson, one of the main exponents of the theory, secularisation 
is the dominant trend in contemporary western societies and religion is on the decline. 
As modem notions of economic and technological progress, rationality, globalisation, 
consumerism, and individualism supplant religious values as the dominant values of 
the western world, religion is on the way to gradual extinction. He contends that since 
changes in religion reflect social changes, “secularisation relates to the diminution in
o
the social significance of religion.” It should also be noted in this respect that in most 
cases the established churches of Europe (historically protected as they were from 
dissent and divergence through their association with the state), within the framework 
of a secular state, were unable to maintain the necessary levels of popular support that 
would prevent their decline.9
Wilson considers the proliferation of new religious movements and growing 
western interest in Eastern religions as manifestations of individualistic consumerism 
that cater to the existential and moral gap that western capitalism has produced, and 
which are not to be seen as signs of a true religious revival countering the 
secularisation process. Membership of such movements tends to be individualistic and 
ephemeral, and as there is no integration into the mainstraim of the societies in which
4 Kokosalakis 1993a, 81:133-48.
5 Casanova 1994, p.7.
6 Radhakrishnan 1940, p.267.
7 Casanova 1994, p.211.
8 Wilson 1982, p .149.
9 cf. Madeley 2003a.
10
they operate, they are devoid of wider social significance or impact.10 Moreover, as 
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan has observed, “Mysticism has a deep appeal to the 
spiritually minded. Science cannot minister to the needs of the soul; dogmatism 
cannot meet the needs of the intellect.”11
Wilson’s arguments have been eloquently reaffirmed recently by Steve Bruce
19 •in his uncompromisingly titled book God is Dead. However, as we shall see later in 
this thesis, the pivotal role the Greek-Orthodox Church and Christian-Orthodox 
religion play in Greek politics and society indicate that God may not yet be quite dead 
after all, at least not in conditions such as prevail in countries like Greece. The Greek- 
Orthodox Church, seen by the State and most political parties as an indispensable 
source of legitimation and power to the point of often becoming an instrumentum 
regni13, is an institution that few politically aspiring individuals or organisations will 
dare to antagonise, so testifying to a situation of tacit approval of church influence.
Wilson also believes that the effects and challenges of secularisation have led 
the various Churches to concentrate on themselves and on ways to affect a 
rapprochement among the different denominations: “In an age when Christianity has 
been demythologised ... ecumenicism becomes a new faith -  something to believe 
in.”14 Given the association of nationalism and religion in contemporary Greek 
politics, it is hardly surprising that the leadership of the Greek-Orthodox Church is 
vehemently opposed to any such rapprochement with “heretics”, to the point of 
dissapproving even the ecumenical orientation and initiatives of the Istanbul-based 
patriarchate, the purported spiritual centre of the Orthodox world.
In the context of the national mythmaking of modem nation-states Martin 
groups Greece, with those countries where religion has been closely identified with 
nationhood following a traumatic external domination. Such an association is 
strengthened when the country shares a border with one of a different dominant faith 
that is traditionally perceived as a threat.15 Following the national awakening 
however, the Greek-Orthodox Church increasingly promoted the lay and enlightened
10 Wilson, op.cit., ref. 1.
11 Radhakrishnan, ibid., p293.
12 Bruce 2002.
13 Makrides 1991, p.291.
14 Wilson 1969, pl51.
15 Martin 1978, p.107. Also see Madeley 2003a.
Hellenic values of the newly developed neo-Hellenic identity. This resulted in the 
triple secularisation of the Greek Church by: (a) identifying with the nation, (b) 
through secular power and corruption, and (c) via the promotion of Hellenism.16
Even if in respect to Greece the secularisation theory is generally accepted, we 
must note what, according to Bryan Wilson, is one of its main indicators, namely the 
level of political power of the Church. As he says: “Taking European societies at 
large, the first evident sign of secularity is the diminution in the political influence of
1 n
the churches.” As this thesis will demonstrate, the ability of the Greek-Orthodox 
Church to affect both Greek politics generally as well as specific governmental 
policies is not only not diminishing but has actually been increasing, due to factors 
and circumstances to be expounded in the course of this thesis.
Plan of Chapters
To assess the above hypotheses, Chapter One will give a historical review of 
the relationship between politics and Orthodoxy. When tracing the complex 
relationship between Orthodoxy, politics, and the West back to Byzantine and 
Ottoman times we shall find some of those past historical events and traumas are still 
reflected in Greece’s political culture today. It will also be seen how the Greek- 
Orthodox culture gradually became estranged from its western and Latin counterpart, 
how religion affected the constitution of other institutions such as the State, and the 
way religion was manipulated to cement social order and promote nation-building.
This first chapter will trace the rise of religious and ethnic nationalism during 
the Ottoman period, present the conflict between Europhile modernists and Orthodox 
traditionalists during the Greek Enlightenment, and examine the position of the 
Church vis-a-vis the official western orientation of the Greek State after 
independence. It will end with a brief history of Church-State relations in the 
twentieth century and the cultural identity debate (western or Orthodox) during the 
same period.
This historical introduction to Church-State relations and to the issues of 
cultural identity and the State’s religious policy will pave the way for the issues of 
secularisation, democratisation, and westernisation within the context of a detailed 
study of Church-State relations in post-dictatorship Greece.
16 Martin, ibid, pp. 262-263.
17 Wilson 1981, p.3.
12
Chapter Two will focus on the socialist PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement) government’s religious policy and its attempt to implement changes in 
Church-State relations towards secularisation, democratisation, and EU integration. 
State policies during that period can be understood as a move toward separation of the 
political and religious spheres by liberalising the traditional social legislation on 
matters such as civil marriage, abortion and adultery, and restructuring the 
organisation of the Church along participatory, democratic lines designed to empower 
the laity.
It will be shown how the party’s secular policy was only partly realised as a 
result of the confusion due to PASOK’s socialist-versus-populist ideology and 
strategy. The party’s catch-all political tactics strove to combine profound changes 
towards socialism with keeping intact Orthodoxy’s pivotal role in the national 
constitution of Greek society. This created confusion and misunderstanding in 
Church-State relations and a legitimacy crisis for both institutions.
Chapter Three examines how this legitimacy crisis has developed since 1995, 
and the spectacular change in the leadership of the Church that coincided with a 
change in the leadership and orientation of the government towards a more 
Eurocentric strategy. The emergence of a charismatic new Archbishop, who gained 
unprecedented popularity and became able to defy the government’s antagonism and 
overtly advocate his nationalistic political ideas, underscores the political power of the 
Church to influence Greek public life.
His uncompromising tactics have shown the precariousness of the balance 
between the differing conception of collective identity for Greece’s State and Church, 
her two most important Greek institutions. This has resulted in a profound re­
examination of the meaning of national identity in contemporary Greece. In short, 
PASOK’s modernisation and Eurocentric stance engaged the religious leader in an 
extensive debate over his right to express political views, and the need for reforms 
within the Church towards democratisation, modernisation, and harmonisation with 
the rest of the EU. At the same time the Archbishop’s successful resistance to 
Eurocentrism and secularisation has proved useful in showing how modernisation and 
Europeanisation in Greece cannot avoid the involvement of religion, and cannot 
disregard the privileged position of Orthodoxy in the people’s consciousness.
Having examined Church-State relationships in Part One, the thesis evaluates 
these observations in three case studies of Orthodox-related movements that have
13
affected Church-State relations and, more generally, the Greek political culture. Part
Two then studies the impact of religion on shaping the political culture and collective
1 8identity. The fundamentalist, Neo-Orthodox, and cosmopolitan versions of the 
Orthodox political culture that will be examined aim to demonstrate how the activism 
of religiously inspired movements exert an important influence both on the official 
Church as well as on the agenda, processes, and outcome of politics.
The historical development of political culture in Greece points to Church and 
State as the foremost institutional determinants of the national culture and, 
specifically, of what it means to belong to the national collective. Given the 
contradictions between the two competing worldviews, PASOK’s Church-State policy 
became a struggle over the boundaries of secularity and Orthodoxy in Greek civil 
society and, most crucially, over establishing the legitimacy of the institutional arbiter 
of collective identity under conditions of modem democracy.
Chapter Four underscores the impact of religious fundamentalist groups on 
specific political developments in contemporary Greece. Both this and the other two 
case studies revolve around the threefold conceptualisation running all through the 
thesis, accounting for the two protagonists’ positions vis-a-vis democratisation, 
secularisation, and westernisation.
The chapter first examines the liaison between the fundamentalist brotherhood 
Zoe and the junta dictatorship (1967-1974), and then provides examples of 
contemporary fundamentalist activism and their interactions with mainstream politics. 
It concludes that, due to interrelated factors such as the unprecedented popularity of 
the Archbishop’s Eurosceptic nationalism, public insecurity regarding globalisation,
18 ‘Fundamentalism’ is a polysemic term with differing connotations according to 
context. For western Christian fundamentalists who introduced the term, 
fundamentalism takes a positive connotation and refers to a movement aiming to 
return to the fundamental principles of the Christian faith, as contained in the Holy 
Bible, which should be strictly adhered to. In relation to Islam, and other religions, on 
the other hand, the term has acquired a more sinister connotation and has come to 
refer to a fanatical belief in a righteous cause, based on the possession of an absolute 
religious/cosmic truth, in defense of which extremist actions are not only readily 
justified but in many cases also an imperative duty. For the purposes of the present 
thesis, the term is used more in this latter sense to refer to the most reactionary or 
strict/fanatical interpretations of Greek Orthodoxy.
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EU cultural integration, and a large influx of non-Orthodox immigrants into Greece, 
fundamentalist politicians and religious groups ceased to identify with the extreme 
Right, and have been incorporated into the mainstream political and cultural picture as 
the “patriotic” social faction that cuts right across the political spectrum. This has 
introduced a totally new dimension into Greek political culture, in that it obliges the 
traditional parties, ideologies, coalitions and rivalries to reshape their stand on the role 
of the Church in Greek politics, and the role of Orthodoxy in foreign policy.
Indeed, the integration of political culture and religion in Greece means that 
identity issues and cultural dilemmas are entwined with ideological and political 
issues such as foreign policy. Inasmuch as the Archbishop and the (reactionary) 
patriotic political faction manage to attract popular support and media attention, 
forces allied to political Orthodoxy will inevitably influence relations between Greece 
and the West. Fundamentalism thus constitutes one part of the wider patriotic front 
that opposes the government’s secular policy and its Eurocentric political and cultural 
orientation.
Chapter Five examines another contemporary Orthodox movement that 
belongs to the broader Hellenocentric political and cultural faction. The so-called 
Neo-Orthodoxy evolved from a marginal intellectual endeavour in the early 1980s to 
determine the relation between Orthodoxy and Marxism, into a full-blown political 
critique against the government’s policies of westernisation and secularisation. Under 
the Archbishop’s leadership and the patriotic political umbrella, the Neo-Orthodox 
intellectuals provided support and legitimacy for opposing the prevailing government 
attitude to compromise on national issues (e.g. with Turkey over Cyprus, or to close 
the “Macedonian question”) and to abandon the nationalistic and populist tactics of 
the late 1980s/ early 1990s that had jeopardised Greece’s relations with its western 
allies.
The chapter will show how leading members of Neo-Orthodoxy and their 
ideas were gradually incorporated into left-wing politics. Civil-society organisations 
like the influential “Network 21” also adopted Neo-Orthodoxy and welcomed its 
advocates into an alliance for jointly promoting patriotic political intervention.
The chapter will also look at an alliance vindicating the contention that Greece 
is a prime example of the interpenetration of religion and political culture. This 
alliance resulted from the transformation of the hitherto internationalist communist 
party into a section of the patriotic Hellenocentric faction. Neo-Orthodox politicians
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and thinkers were the mediators of this transformation, being able to combine a 
critique of the western paradigm with a leftist quest for independence and a nationalist 
quest for a pure authentic culture. As a leading member of this coalition, the 
Archbishop has cultivated strong ties with Neo-Orthodoxy, and did not hesitate to 
unite with communists, nationalists, and anarchists in an “unholy” front against 
westernisation and globalisation.
Chapter Six examines a different aspect of the Orthodox political culture, one 
that does not adopt a negative stance towards the West and fosters a positive 
appreciation of the Church’s role in a largely secular and multi-cultural environment. 
The Orthodox Academy of Crete (OAC) operates on Greek soil but belongs 
spiritually and administratively to the ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople; 
independent of both the Athens Church hierarchy and the State, it maintains close 
cooperation with the World Council of Churches and the Council of European 
Churches.
As regards secularisation and democratisation, the OAC encourages lay 
participation in its activities and widely cooperates with civil society on matters of 
ecology, science, education, and gender equality. It advocates the theological concept 
of reconciliation as an antidote to nationalism, which it strongly condemns. The 
Academy organises annual inter-faith dialogues, as well as providing a 
communication platform between the Orthodox Church and representatives from 
major European political parties. In short, this case study presents a different aspect of 
the Orthodox political culture, one that is embraced by the Eurocentric political and 
social forces and endorsed by the leading members of the government.
As a result of the PASOK’s catch-all strategy, however, this version of 
Orthodoxy is less influential than the one championed by Archbishop Christodoulos. 
Fear of political costs and the clientelist structure on which the electoral objectives 
and power expediencies of most politicians rely, means that any Orthodox activism 
that does not rely on the Church-nation-State triad, remains without the political 
support needed for it to be effective.
Finally, the concluding Chapter Seven compares features from the case studies 
and the analysis of Church-State relations, with a view to examining any new 
theoretical implications in the relationship between the Greek-Orthodox political 
culture on the one hand, and democratisation, secularisation and westernisation on the 
other. The main question here is the extent to which the conclusions are relevant to a
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general theory of secularisation, and whether this will enhance the understanding of 
the nature of modem Greek democracy, as well as the possible affinity between 
religion and Greece’s democratic deficit. In this chapter the concept of “critical 
juncture”, which Collier and Collier define as “a period of significant change ... which 
is hypothesised to produce distinct legacies”19 and “...a polarising event that produces 
intense political reactions and counter reactions...”,20 is introduced, as a particularly 
useful and relevant research tool for analysing the causal links of the subject matter 
examined.
The most important theoretical implications for the Greek case are:
(1) rejection of the secularisation and modernisation thesis, (2) the primary 
importance of the concept of political culture, (3) the need for a rigorous analysis of 
the role of religion in Greek political culture, (4) the relevance and limitations of
91Huntington’s civilisation paradigm, (5) Greece’s alternative path to modernity.
The bulk of writings on post-dictatorship Greek politics and history tend to 
endorse the assumptions of the secularisation and modernisation paradigm, viewing 
the western developmental experience as a model to emulate. Directly relevant to this, 
indeed to any discussion concerning modernisation, is Eisenstadt’s important 
contribution to the field with the notion of “multiple modernity”. Eisenstadt refutes 
the assumption that the modernity cultural program and institutional pattern arising in 
the West will gradually prevail all over the world, claiming that: “The actual 
developments in modernising societies have refuted the homogenising and hegemonic 
assumptions of this Western program of modernity. While a general trend toward 
structural differentiation developed across a wide range of institutions in most of these 
societies -  in family life, economic and political structures, urbanisation, modem 
education, mass communication, and individualistic orientations -  the ways in which 
these arenas were defined and organised varied greatly, in different periods of their
99development, giving rise to multiple institutional and ideological patterns.” The 
West cannot claim a monopoly on modernity as there are multiple paths to it as 
different societies develop according to their specific cultural and historical 
backrounds and pecularities.
19 Collier and Collier 1991, p. 29.
20 Ibid., p. 37.
21 Huntington 1996.
22 Eisenstadt 2002, pp. 1-2.
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Most authors are agreed that Orthodoxy and the Church did not greatly affect 
the nature of Greek modernity and democracy. Modernisation is taken to equal 
secularisation and the concomitant marginalisation of religion, to emancipate society 
from religious and irrational control over human reason by marginalising traditional 
values and replacing them with rational concerns, as well as efficient, meritocratic and 
specialised forms of social life. With its rational structural and functional 
differentiation of the social system, secularisation renders faith a matter of individual 
choice among a wide range of worldviews and belief systems.
Implicit in the secularisation thesis is the assumption that secularisation and 
the decrease in Church authority are brought about by politics and the growth of civil 
society. However, it will be argued that in Greece conditions of secularity and 
modernity do not lead to the peripheralisation of religion from politics. Instead, the 
historical and contemporary affinities between religion, the State, and political culture 
have initiated a process of dynamic transformation resulting from their mutual 
interpenetration.
Moreover, by jointly participating in the construction of a concept of collective 
identity that includes unresolved inconsistencies (related to the imperfect coexistence 
of secular and sacred aspects), any attempt by either institution to alter its role vis-a- 
vis the other could be seen as destabilising those psychological, emotional, and 
cognitive bonds that constitute the collectivity. The most contentious episodes in 
Church-State political cultural relations under PASOK were interpreted precisely in 
these terms by principal actors in each group, which helps to explain the failure to 
bring about institutional change, and underscores the determinant capacity of culture 
on politics.
Methodology
Before explaining how evidence was obtained and the research skills employed in 
the methodology of the thesis, and before focusing on a justification of the specific 
selection of case studies, it should be stated why the author chose this particular field 
of research. The reasons for the choices made were as much personal-subjective, as 
they are practical and theoretical. They relate to personal biographical influences, to a 
specific interest in sociology, as well as to more practical issues like research access, 
evidence availability and, most important, compatibility of the case studies with the 
main conceptual tools of the thesis.
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Why did the author embark on this specific research area? The answer to this is 
that the research was a product of broad questions raised in the course of studies in 
sociology and social anthropology. The specific field of interest during the author’s 
studies was the critique of ideology and identity from the post-Marxist perspective of 
critical post-modernism (e.g. Pierre Bourdieu’s influential notion of the habitus). The 
intellectual genealogy of this approach can be found in the work of Max Weber, later 
developed by Gramsci, the Frankfurt School and others. This sociological framework 
addressed the issue of ideology from a perspective that gave increasing primacy 
(“relative autonomy” in post-Marxist terms) to the role of culture, traditional values 
and everyday life beliefs, which were previously marginalised as mere epiphenomena 
of an omnipotent class struggle.
In his undergraduate dissertation the author accordingly endeavoured to touch on 
the complex ramifications of the historical construction of the Greek national identity 
and how this has affected the politics of modernisation. He clearly showed that 
nationalism has been a quintessential ingredient of the Greek political culture. In this 
context, religion was seen as an important element consistently subjugated to politics 
and secular interference. In other words, most commentators recognised the 
importance the Orthodox Church had in the construction of the modem Greek identity 
and political culture, but attributed to it a passive role confined mainly to the narrow 
boundaries of a cultural resource, a spiritual heritage, and a Church structure strongly 
manipulated by the state for purposes of nation-building. While this was true indeed, 
it was all too clear that this approach does not allow for the possibility of a more 
active and creative intervention of religion and the Church to politics. There was little 
mention of the possibility that Church-State interpenetration was not a one-way-street 
of Church subjugation and State control, but a mutually transformative dynamic that 
assigned a crucial role to the Church, particularly inasmuch as it concerned the public 
legitimacy of the government and the politics of national identity and collective 
belonging.
If this deficit was tme in mainstream Greek historiography, it was even more 
noticable in modem approaches to Greek politics that were strongly positivistic and 
deterministic, and focused on a general understanding of Greek political culture in 
terms of emulating or rejecting what was “happening in the West”. This approach 
ignored more subjective and creative accounts of how different segments of Greek 
society were reacting towards the massive influences of secularisation, westernisation,
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consumerism etc. On the other hand, various commentators in Greece and abroad 
constantly referred to the idiosyncrasy that Greek institutions and political culture 
have had and continue to have serious difficulties once they encounter the values and 
implications of Greece’s western orientation.
This tension and turmoil between the Greek political culture and the values and 
institutional implications of secularisation and westernisation was not properly 
analysed nor systematically approached. During the 1990s, Greece witnessed 
profound challenges (EU integration, a massive influx of foreign immigrants, the 
Macedonian question, the Bosnian and Kosovo wars) that fuelled an unprecedented 
interest from politicians, intellectuals, the Church, civil society and the mass media, 
concerning the fate of Greek identity and Orthodoxy in late modernity and in western 
institutions. In the above context, religious sentiments and sensitivities appear in 
every single opinion poll as the strongest ingredient in the Greek collective identity.
The dialogue was superficial, however, and its sentimental and partisan character 
resulted in anathemas and simplistic conclusions -  contending, for instance, that 
religion was mechanistically associated with an inward-looking cultural logic 
allegedly detrimental to Greece’s European prospects. On the other hand, for the 
Hellenocentric political and cultural forces it was the modernisers with their poor 
knowledge of the wisdom entailed in the Greek-Orthodox way of life and their futile 
emulation of western systems having no resonance and appeal to the Greek people, 
who received the lion’s share of the blame.
These profound shortcomings caused the author to embark on a systematic 
examination of exactly what constitutes Greek modernity and political culture, and 
how different actors in the religious, political, intellectual and civil-society spectrum 
stood vis-a-vis the identity dilemma of Greek modernity.
During the first year, the research focused on the history of philosophical ideas 
and affinities between the Enlightenment and its heritage in the context of a Europhile 
indigenous political and intellectual discourse, juxtaposed with more inward-looking 
political and cultural forces affiliated with Orthodoxy. This was extremely instructive 
for addressing questions on the genealogy of the larger picture of contemporary Greek 
political culture. Although initially the grand narratives of the relationship between 
the Enlightenment and Orthodoxy were much more appealing to the author than a 
detailed empirical analysis of Church-State relations, it soon became very clear that 
the latter reflected and demonstrated all the traditional cleavages entailed in the long
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intellectual struggle among traditionalists and modernisers in their inclusive or 
exclusive definition and control of what it means to be Greek Orthodox and the 
dynamics in Church-nation-State relations. To recapitulate: the main reason that 
prompted the author to undertake this particular research was the realisation that any 
analysis of the political situation in modem Greece that discounts the significance of 
the religious factor will fail to account for the realities of the current developments.
This need to engage with the linkages between political culture and the Greek- 
Orthodox collective identity was further fuelled by the author’s subjective experience 
as a Greek living eight years abroad in the potent environment of the British version 
of western culture, coupled with the equally formidable ambience of multicultural 
London. It is certainly tme that most of the enquiries that led to the decision to 
undertake this particular research endeavour were influenced by the fact that, in 
addition to the academic stimuli gained through his studies in London, the author was 
thus provided with the the distance and objectivity necessary for confronting issues 
that touched on sensitive parts of his personal identity and patriotism.
Given the abstract and elusive nature of a topic dealing with the complex 
relationship between tradition and modernity, investigation of the empirical reality 
required a flexible research methodology. Since the main objective has been to 
demonstrate the interpenetration of political culture and religion, the thesis 
deliberately avoids focusing exclusively on a detailed study of formal religious 
organisations through stmctured interviews and quantitative analysis. Instead, a 
research methodology was preferred that is flexible enough to permit looking at the 
whole picture of the complex ramifications involved in interactions between the State, 
the Church, and political culture. Evidence and information were obtained in the 
following ways.
The thesis includes the results of an extensive review of secondary literature 
and the media. Coincidentally with the research, Church-State relations and issues of 
cultural identity became one of the most important subjects in Greek public life, 
capturing the attention of virtually all Greeks and daily producing headlines. With the 
enormous rise in interest in the subject, Greek editors, journalists and writers have 
published extensive texts and facilitated the presentation of the intellectual debate 
between Eurosceptic and Europhile thinkers.
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The thesis incorporates a detailed study of the work of intellectuals associated 
with the case studies. Especially the Neo-Orthodox movement has produced a highly 
sophisticated, indigenous critique of the western paradigm based on Orthodox 
theology and Marxist politics, the study of which was imperative for a thorough 
understanding of the affinity between culture and politics in Greece.
Methodological emphasis was given to participatory observation of events 
organised by the groups involved in the case studies selected. This included 
participation in formal and informal discussions, seminars etc., including two weeks 
at the Orthodox Academy of Crete (OAC), attendance at most of the “Network 21” 
meetings, at many political panel discussions of Neo-Orthodox thinkers and 
fundamentalist politicians, and at demonstrations organised by the official Church 
against the religious policy of the State.
Participatory observation aimed to engage in highly differentiated, even 
antagonistic milieu, from neo-Marxist intellectual elites to hard-core fundamentalists 
and from devout conservatives to Christian anarchists. This demanded a modified 
form of participation, of openly attending as an observer and researcher, watching and 
listening and questioning over a certain amount of time. This role affords considerable 
scope for discovering phenomena and their interconnections, and at the same time it 
flexibly allows investigation of different contexts. Indeed, the research required 
meeting with many different people to secure evidence not just for the case studies 
(chs 4, 5, 6) but also for a contemporary analysis of Church-State relations (chs 2 and 
3).
Throughout the long course of study, the research benefited from many 
different acquaintances and working relationships, from religious prelates and 
politicians such as the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Archbishop, Prime Minister Simitis 
and a number of ministers, to many more politicians, clergy, journalists, academics 
and other laymen associated with one way or another with the subject matter of the 
work. Of course it was not always possible to engage in thorough-going discussions 
with all of them, but it was all part of a continuous familiarisation process that paved 
the way for the conclusions.
A strong component of this modified form of participatory observation is 
informal but intensive in-depth interviewing. Formal interviews and tape recordings 
were avoided because a detailed and permanent record being made tends to render the 
informant reluctant to express other than theologically and politically “correct” views.
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With some of the individuals involved in the case studies it was possible to meet 
several times and exchange views so as to gain a fuller understanding of the subject.
Finally, much of the evidence was secured through collection and analysis of 
primary sources, such as minutes of events organised by the case-study groups, 
pamphlets and other documents distributed by them, evidence from the official 
archives of the Church of Greece, and personal notes from events.
What were the reasons for selecting these particular case studies and what 
difficulties were encountered along the way?
The purpose of the present case studies is to show how far the attributes of 
these Greek movements, agree or disagree with the observations made in the analysis 
of Church-State relations, and how different versions of the Orthodox political culture 
(fundamentalist-entrenched, Neo-Orthodox syncretic and cosmopolitan- 
communicative) are situated with respect to the main conceptual tools employed in 
the thesis (modernisation, secularisation, westernisation).
For reasons of the thesis’ consistency and scope, no attempt was made to 
engage comparatively and exhaustively with the wider theoretical questions that are 
associated with the sociology of modernisation, secularisation, and westernisation. 
Instead, the thesis employs such theoretical tools as best illuminate the specific Greek 
case. As will be seen, the case studies were selected for examination because each one 
develops attributes that are notably absent from the pertinent literature on Greece and 
the Orthodox world, or least inaccessible to commentators not speaking Greek.
As a result of their different places in the political conjuncture the three case 
studies exemplify the political culture of the post-junta period (after 1974), which 
culminated during the 1990s. The three studies constitute a continuum extending from 
the fundamentalist-entrenched political culture to the soft-universalistic one, and 
cover all possible variations. Accordingly, the subject-organisations and affiliated 
groups of all three case studies were affected by the same dilemmas and issues as 
faced in the Greek political culture during this period (modernisation, secularisation, 
westernisation, consumerism, urbanisation, massive influx of foreign immigrants, 
etc.), as well as by the same internal political developments (transition to democracy, 
PASOK’s ascent to power, the Left’s wavering between patriotism and 
internationalism) and “national” issues (E.U. integration, the Cyprus and Macedonian 
questions, the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo).
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The common Orthodox/religious origins of the three case studies provided a 
framework for illustrating the differences and similarities in their shared strategic 
dilemmas. The political and cultural outlook of all three was built around a core of the 
same strategic dilemmas, but the answers are different in each case. A detailed 
account is given of how the common cultural background (Orthodox) and a mutual 
desire to resort to politics led to the articulation of different political and cultural 
identities. This shows that each of the three cases is not simply a product of its 
contextual setting, but also a partial producer of its chosen trajectory.
Moreover, these specific case studies were chosen because their ideological 
profile and main advocates were seen to be most relevant to the subject of the thesis 
and the conceptual tools employed. With respect to their compatibility with the 
work’s basic conceptualisations (secularisation, democratisation, westernisation), 
fundamentalism, Neo-Orthodoxy, and cosmopolitanism are three broad movements in 
the Orthodox political culture that demonstrate a proactive position both politically 
and ideologically in terms of our three basic concepts and Greece as a whole.
These types correspond to a methodological approach that is laid out in 
accordance with the degree to which the three movements foster a cultural logic that 
is either positive (cosmopolitan cultural logic), negative (entrenchment cultural logic), 
or syncretic (catch-all cultural logic) vis-a-vis secularisation, democratisation, and 
westernisation.
Working through a twofold research framework, the thesis addressed 
questions dealing with the complex issue of cultural identity and political culture, 
approached through the perspective of a more pragmatic and detailed analysis of 
Church-State relations. Bearing in mind this twofold approach and the overriding 
conceptual tools, the cases were chosen in accordance with their heuristic value -  
namely, because they could provide valuable information and data relevant to the 
main questions addressed in the thesis.
It was decided to select as case studies two broad movements attracting a wide 
range of groups and sympathisers, and as a third (that of the OAC) a formal 
organisation affiliated to a movement. The fluidity of Greek political culture during 
the 1990s being a prime target of the thesis, It was considered that the most accurate 
examination of such fluidity of movements and political-cultural alliances in the 
1990s would be by means of studying groups that were themselves subject to fluidity 
rather than by comparing specific, singled-out and perfectly comparable formal
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organisations. Such fluidity renders any theoretical and methodological endeavour 
extremely difficult. However, on the other hand this twofold approach of furnishing 
case studies of movements and organisations allows a narrower focus on the 
organisations of the Greek-Orthodox political culture and makes the specification of 
attributes somewhat more feasible and reliable. On the other hand, the “movement 
dimension” introduces into the analysis larger historical and political accounts of 
wider networks that interplay in the Greek political culture.
Another criterion decisive in the final selection of case studies was geographic 
consistency. The intention was to move from the local to the national scale and to 
furnish examples of nation-wide importance, seeking case-study examples that 
represent the whole of Greece rather than a specific local group.
At a time when Neo-orthodoxy’s human resources and ideology were debated 
every day from mainstream politicians, and civil society, the author was faced with an 
unprecedented opportunity to surpass the narrow boundaries of an isolated group of 
people, (as it had been the case in the early 1980s when Neo-Orthodoxy was still a 
marginal intellectual endeavour examining the affinities between Marxism as an 
emancipatory discourse and Orthodoxy as a revolutionary spiritual call), and address 
larger political questions.
The overall picture that unfolded during the 1990s, especially following 
Archbishop Christodoulos’ enormous success and impact, presented a unique 
opportunity to examine how the official Church, powerful civil-society groups, 
political parties from the whole spectrum, media, and intellectuals were situated vis-a- 
vis Neo-Orthodoxy’s positions on secularisation, democratisation and westernisation. 
Consequently, the selection of case studies prompted a research approach that was 
rather more inclusive, and other possible case study options were included in umbrella 
case studies. Obviously, a rigorous presentation of a different selection of case studies 
would perhaps have presented a more straightforward story. For all that, the research 
did not disregard other options, but attempted to put them together under umbrella 
movements like fundamentalism and Neo-Orthodoxy. For example, the powerful 
civil-society organisation “Network 21” was the subject of thorough investigation 
with many informal interviews, participation in events and public lectures, and 
examination of their written material. But rather than focus exclusively on this 
specific group, it was decided to put it with other examples in a more inclusive and 
representative picture (i.e. the Neo-Orthodox movement). Similarly, some
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considerable effort was spent examining the fundamentalist publication “Orthodox 
Press” by participating in their scheduled weekly meetings etc., but eventually it was 
the political connections of this group and its affiliation with the political-culture 
dimension of the study that captured the attention.
To recapitulate: the research methodology of the thesis employed a 
combination of primary and secondary sources. The primary material and the 
interviews gave access to the participants’ views and strategies. The secondary 
sources enhanced the process of unifying fragmented information into a coherent 
framework. The research was obstructed to a certain extent by the absence of 
collective archives and the lack of detailed historical accounts of the organisations, 
movements, and groups involved. In some instances (the OAC and the Neo-Orthodox 
movement) the lack of previous research made access to personal records, contacts, 
and literature the only means of obtaining information.
Last but not least, an issue that affected research access and penetrability to 
the various sources of information relates to the author’s surname. His father, 
Constantine Moskoff, was a public figure and known to most of the individuals 
approached by the author. He was generally considered a romantic Marxist historian, 
poet, politician, and diplomat who approached the politics of emancipation and class 
consciousness from the point of view of the particularities of Greek history and the 
sensitivities of Orthodox identity. Particularly concerning the Neo-Orthodox and 
cosmopolitan movements, he was one of the first to see the complex affinities 
between Marxism and Orthodoxy in the early 1980s. This gave the author privileged 
access to informants. For instance, six months of sharing a flat with the Neo-Orthodox 
key figure and famous media personality Kostas Zouraris was virtually fieldwork 
around the clock and benefited the research process enormously.
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CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1.1 Introduction
Historical processes from the 4th century AD onwards have continually 
modified the relationship between Church, State, and political culture in Byzantine, 
Ottoman, and modem Greece. Alongside the issue of relations between Church and 
State the westernisation debate has developed, namely the struggle of competing 
modernist and traditionalist cultural and intellectual forces to interpret and shape the 
orientation of the nation’s political culture (traditionally eastern and Orthodox versus 
secular westernisation).
Religious worldviews like the Byzantine Symphonia or the Ottoman Millet 
system and the modem constitutional model each represented an attempt to 
institutionalise a vision of social organisation according to the prevailing views of 
religion and politics. While study of them shows that the origins of contemporary 
culture in Greece are rooted in historical belief systems whose actualisation was 
primarily guided by Church and State interaction, they also demonstrate that the main 
conflict between the two institutions concerned the issue of collective identity. What 
this meant in each historical period depended on how Church and State claimed the 
right to define and protect it, and their developing interrelationship lead to the 
emergence of contradictions and inconsistencies in the political culture over this issue.
1.2 The Roman Era, the Great Schism, and Byzantine Hellenism (313-1453)
The conversion of Constantine the Great (in 313 AD) and the occupation of 
the imperial throne by a Christian emperor are momentous and crucial events in the 
history of Europe. This conversion ended the age of martyrs and persecution, and the 
Church of the catacombs became the Church of the empire. In 324 AD, Constantine 
decided to move the capital of the Roman empire from the Italian peninsula to the 
shores of the Bosporus. On the site of the Greek city of Byzantium he built a new 
capital and named it after himself, Constantinoupolis. His motives were partly 
economic and political but also religious. Old Rome was too deeply stained with 
pagan associations to be the centre of the Christian empire that he envisaged.
By the end of the second century, the western world had gradually become 
conscious of its association with Rome. Western Christianity spread from Rome, and 
most of the western churches regarded the Roman church as the mother church from 
which they received the traditions of their faith and apostolic succession. While at
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this early stage the church of St Peter was the object of special respect in the East, 
early theological and organisational disputes already showed a tendency towards 
formation of a separate socio-religious identity.1 In the words of historian S. 
Runciman, the two attitudes to theology and culture were essentially contradictory: 
“The East enjoyed speculation and argument ... and avoided doctrinal 
pronouncements and condemnation ... the West had a simpler, stricter and more 
legalistic and logical concept of right and wrong beliefs.”
Church-State relations in this first period provide an apt example of how 
rivalries springing from early theological disputes exercised a profound influence on 
the institutional structure of the two worlds as it developed in the long history when 
the concepts of “development” and “progress” acquired different meanings in the 
intellectual discourse of the two arms of Christendom. The Byzantine concept of 
Church-State relations was based not on any concordant or juridical circumscription 
of power, but on faith in the Christian Church, which the emperor first and through 
him the empire recognised as a truth superior to all else.
From the sixth century on we can clearly perceive the progressive 
orientalisation of the empire in its culture, psychology, art, and court ritual. The 
Byzantine mission developed eastward and, although the East was still connected by 
organic succession with Rome, a new Byzantine world developed, while the Roman 
West plunged into those dark ages from which Roman-Germanic Europe would later 
emerge. It was at this time that the Hellenisation of Byzantium took place. This 
development can be seen in official terminology (where Greek terms replaced Latin), 
the appearance of Greek inscriptions on coins, and the change of the legislative 
language from Latin to Greek. At the same time the triumph of Islam defined the 
geographical and cultural boundaries of Byzantium in the East.
The estrangement of Eastern and Western Christendom was a long and 
complicated process, conditioned by cultural, political and economic factors 
manifested entirely on theological grounds. For example, as a result of the iconoclast 
conflict, Rome and Constantinople had to establish other alliances with third parties to 
confront the Islamic threat in the South and that of the Barbarians from the North. 
Pope Stephen, cut off from Byzantium in 754 and in need of help, turned northwards
1 These disputes concerned Arianism, the celebration of Easter, and the question of
baptism.
2 Quoted by Ware 1983.
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to the Frankish ruler Pepin - the first step in a decisive change of orientation that 
eventually brought Rome increasingly under Frankish influence. Half a century later, 
on Christmas Day in the year 800, Pope Leo III crowned Charles the Great, King of 
the Franks, as Emperor. When Charlemagne sought recognition from the ruler in 
Byzantium he was rebuffed. The Byzantines adhering to the principle of imperial 
unity regarded the Franks as intruders and the papal coronation as an act of schism 
within the empire. Matters were exacerbated by linguistic differences. By the year 
450 very few people in the West could speak Greek, and after 600, although 
Byzantium still called itself the Roman empire, it was rare for one of its inhabitants to 
speak Latin. Greek East and Latin West, no longer drawing upon the same sources or 
reading the same books, began to interpret their officially common Christian tradition 
in increasingly divergent ways.
Cultural and political estrangement easily led to ecclesiastical disputes and 
general prejudice. When Charlemagne was refused recognition by the Byzantine 
emperor, he retaliated with a charge of heresy against the Byzantine Church. He 
denounced the Greeks for not using the filioque in the Creed, and declined to accept 
the decisions of the seventh Ecumenical Council.3
The greatest difficulty came from papal claims to extend Rome’s jurisdiction 
over the East. The Greeks assigned the pope primacy of honour, but not the universal 
supremacy which he regarded as his due. The pope viewed infallibility as his own 
prerogative, while the Byzantines held that in matters of the faith the final decision 
rested with a council representing all the bishops of the Church. Cultural and political 
divisions combined to bring about an increasing estrangement, but there was still no 
open schism. In the long transition from estrangement to schism three incidents are of 
particular importance: the quarrel between Photius and Pope Nicolas I, 4 the crusades, 
and the Frankish occupation of Constantinople in 1204.
The dispute between Photius and Nicolas I was clearly over the papal claims. In 865 
Nicolas wrote that “the Pope is endowed with authority over all the earth, that is over 
every church”, but this precisely the Byzantines would not accept. Open dispute 
broke out over who (Rome or Constantinople) was responsible for missionary activity
3 Originally the Creed ran: “I believe... in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver of Life, 
who proceeds from the Father.” This is recited unchanged by the East to this day, but 
the West inserted an extra phrase “and from the Son” (in Latin, filioque).
4 Usually known as the Photian schism.
30
among the Slavs, and over the precise teachings by the missionaries.5 This dispute 
was essentially one that involved heightened geopolitical interest. Rome and 
Constantinople alike were anxious to bring the Balkan peninsula into their sphere of 
jurisdiction. The year 1054 was a critical juncture for the unity of the Church.6 The 
Normans forced the Greeks of Byzantine Italy to conform to Latin usage; in return, 
the Patriarch demanded that the Latin churches of Constantinople should adopt Greek 
practices, and when they refused closed them down. Pope Leo IX and Patriarch 
Michael Cerularius excommunicated each other leading to an official schism between 
the two Churches. Ordinary Christians in East and West, however, were largely 
unaware of the geopolitical and ecclesiastical disputes. It was the crusades that 
eventually made the schism definitive: they introduced a new spirit of antagonism, 
bitterness, and prejudice, and brought the conflict down to the level of the people. 
Antioch was captured from the Turks in 1098 and the crusaders proceeded to set up 
Latin patriarchates despite the already existing Greek one. The Greeks in Antioch 
were unwilling to recognise the Latin patriarch, and the two rivals divided the 
Christian population between them.
Worse was to come in 1204, when Constantinople fell to the knights of the 
Fourth Crusade. The crusaders were originally bound for Egypt, but let themselves be 
persuaded by Alexius, the dispossessed emperor, to turn aside to Constantinople to 
restore him to the throne. This western intervention in Byzantine politics exacerbated 
the situation, and the crusaders, in their hunger for gold and disgusted by what they 
regarded as Greek duplicity, sacked the city and set up a short-lived Latin kingdom, 
which ended in 1261 when the Byzantines recovered their capital. Eastern 
Christendom never forgot those appalling days of pillage, even the Saracens were 
considered merciful and kind compared with the men who bore the cross of Christ on 
their shoulders. The long-standing doctrinal disagreements and differences in cultural 
and intellectual outlook were now reinforced on the Greek side by an intense feeling 
of resentment against western aggression and sacrilege. After 1204 there can be no 
doubt that Christian East and West were divided.
Despite the recapture of Constantinople, the territorial integrity of the empire 
had been irreparably damaged by the Fourth Crusade and the establishment of 
Frankish rulers throughout the Eastern empire. However, with the gradual decline of
5 Filioque, rules of fasting, married clergy and, etc.
6 cf. Madeley 2003a.
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the empire as an autonomous State, the lasting legacy of bitterness and distrust began 
to coincide with an intellectual and political desire to restore East-West relations, 
either to confront the rise of Islam effectively or from intellectual admiration for 
western cultural developments. This marked the beginning of an intellectual and 
political debate that has imbued the development of the modem Greek intellectual 
identity and culture with ambivalence and confusion ever since.
As early as the thirteenth century, the long history of disunion 
notwithstanding, the Byzantine emperors realised the need for western support if they 
were not to lose more territory to the Turks. The mass of the population however, 
remained steeped in anti-Latin prejudice and remained true to Orthodoxy as the only 
true faith. On many occasions in Greek history these profound convictions were at the 
root of a particular kind of social dissent felt by the Orthodox population against the 
elite’s western propensities.7
When the emperor Michael VIII, in an effort to avert a threatened invasion by 
Charles of Anjou, pursued a pro-westem policy which culminated in his submission to 
Rome under the Union of Lyons (1274), he provoked a bloody conflict between 
Unionists and anti-Unionists which further undermined the cohesion of the realm. 
Although it was by now clear that the final eclipse of the eastern empire was 
imminent, the intellectual and artistic life of the last dynasty (the Paleologoi) 
displayed remarkable vigour. Under the patronage of emperor Andronikos II there 
was a considerable revival of interest in the culture of ancient Greece, despite its 
pagan connotations. Nor were intellectual developments in the West ignored. Dimitri 
Kydones’ translation of St Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles into Greek in 
1354 was an important milestone in Greek history, because it marks the beginning of 
a progressive shift of intellectual emphasis towards the culture and civilisation of the 
West. Kydones’ admiration for Aquinas’ theology led to his conversion to Roman 
rites. His translation of the Summa Theologia is the first sign of a Latinophile 
tendency among Greek intellectuals, although mainstream Byzantine education 
continued patristically to use the ideas and language of the Church Fathers.
In western Europe this was replaced by Scholasticism -  the great synthesis of 
philosophy and theology that employed new categories of thought, a new theological
n #
Later, Orthodox criticism was launched against the Enlightenment in the 17th and 
18th centuries and modernisation in the 19th and 20th centuries, both considered to 
entail a Western bias and to be alien to Greek culture and identity.
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method and new terminology to rationalise religious thought, and which paved the 
way for the scientific view of morality culminating in the Reformation and the 
Enlightenment. In the briefest possible terms, Scholasticism has been described as a 
“technology of truth”, a methodology of theory and practice that emphasises the 
absolute simplicity and non-differentiation of the divine essence and truth.
In other words reason although still divine in character, came to be the 
absolute truth, guarded by the Inquisition and the austere blessing of God. In contrast
thto the absolutist nature of the scholastic approach to progress, the 14 century saw the 
revival of an eastern mystical doctrine known as Hesychasm (Greek for quietism). 
Here we have the first example in Greek intellectual history of a debate between 
tradition and change. This revival of Eastern mysticism found its most determined 
advocate in Gregory Palamas, a monk on Mount Athos who later became 
metropolitan of Thessaloniki. Some Byzantine theologians, particularly the Greco- 
Italian monk Barlaam of Calabria who essentially represented the Latinisers, attacked 
Palamas for failing to justify in meaningful and tangible terms a cosmology suitable 
for the common people and so helping to cement a unified culture.
The mystical tradition of Hesychasm embodies the apophatic teaching, that 
God cannot be properly comprehended by the human mind, nor can we recognise his 
truth in absolute rational terms like those of Scholasticism. Intellectual debates such 
as the one between western Scholasticism and eastern apophatism were crucial for 
preparing the historical and intellectual ground on which the West developed a 
philosophy of political culture based on rational pragmatism, whereas the East 
developed a more idiosyncratic notion of progress based on subjectivity and a 
personal relation with God’s truth (and by extension on any authority that can claim a 
legitimate monopoly of the “truth” (theological or secular).
If Orthodox culture was undergoing a severe crisis by being drawn to the 
West, its power as a unifying bond for brotherhood was strengthened by the 
emergence of a specifically Greek-Hellenic (as opposed to merely Greek-speaking) 
Orthodox or Byzantine consciousness. As the Ottoman Turks advanced on the very 
heart of the empire, some of the inhabitants came to look upon themselves as the 
descendants of the ancient Hellenes. This particularly applied in the Morea where,
tViduring the early 15 century, despot George Gemistos Plethon stressed the historical 
continuity of the inhabitants and even changed his name so that it would resemble that 
of Plato. In contrast to the eastern theologians who interpreted the empire’s decline as
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a sign of the demise of Orthodoxy -  through either cultural subjugation to the West, 
or total defeat by Islam -  Gemistos Plethon adumbrated a comprehensive scheme of 
social reform heavily influenced by Platonic ideas and the Hellenic ideal. He clearly 
perceived that the political stability of the State depends on the strength of its 
religious and spiritual foundations.
But no schemes for reform could stem the irresistible decline. Emperor 
Manuel II decided to visit western Europe (1400) to ask for support. He travelled to 
Venice, France and England, and met with considerable sympathy but little concrete 
help. In 1438-39 a council was held in Florence and a formula for reunion drawn up, 
but the emperor could not proclaim it publicly in Constantinople since only a minute 
fraction of the Byzantine clergy and people accepted the council decrees. Grand- 
Duke Lukas Notaras, echoing the popular sentiment, remarked: “I would rather see 
the Muslim turban in the midst of the city than the Latin mitre”. On 7 April 1453 the 
Turks began to attack Constantinople by land and sea. Outnumbered by more than 
twenty to one, the Byzantines maintained a brilliant but hopeless defence for seven 
long weeks. In the early hours of 29 May, a united service of Orthodox and Roman 
Catholics was held in the great church of St Sophia. The emperor, after receiving 
communion, died fighting on the walls. It was the end of the Byzantine empire.
1.3 Ottoman Occupation and the Emergence of Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment 
(1453-1821)
The Turkish occupation definitely did not involve the persecution of 
Christians. On the contrary, the Turkish ruler clearly meant to strengthen and 
ornament his empire with Greek culture, and one of his first acts after victory was to 
allow the Greeks to elect their own Patriarch. For the Turks, who were not religious 
fanatics, Christianity was simply the faith of the Greeks, and they made no distinction 
between secular and religious society. While Islam for them defined the entire civil 
structure of Mohammedan society, State, law, etc., it did not apply to non- 
Mohammedans.
Accordingly, the Christians in the Ottoman empire were accorded the status of 
a national/religious minority, the patriarch became their leader, and the higher clergy 
became the civil administrators of the Christian population. Theoretically, the 
Christian Church became a sort of State within a State. This historical period of 
Orthodox culture was marked by two interrelated phenomena: the consolidation of an
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intellectual establishment that was profoundly influenced by developments in the 
West, and an unprecedented rise in religious (and later ethnic) nationalism.
The first breach in the universality of Christianity in the multi-cultural Roman 
and Byzantine worlds had been the division of the Christian empire when Byzantine 
patriotism was gradually transformed into a rejection of everything alien. As the 
national Greek element in its ideology increased, Christian universalism became 
Hellenism -  which was not only condoned by Ottoman rule but gave unprecedented 
secular as well as religious authority to the ecumenical patriarch.
Although the empire had lost its geopolitical integrity, the task of the 
patriarch was to safeguard the faith and Hellenism. Paradoxically, the rise of 
Hellenism as a nationalist discourse was informed and articulated by Orthodox 
thinkers and elites who were profoundly influenced by western cultural achievements 
or belonged to the Greek diaspora. The first Patriarch elected under Turkish rule, 
Gennadios Scholarios (1405-1472), exemplified this intellectual movement.8 
Mohammed II would never have agreed to give him such a position had he not been 
persuaded of his hostility to union with Rome,9 although Gennadios’ intellectual 
orientation was profoundly unionist and influenced by western cultural achievements. 
His command of Latin was fluent, and his main interest was the theology of St 
Thomas Aquinas, most of whose works he translated, adopting the basic axioms of 
Scholastic philosophy.10
After the fall of Constantinople many Greek intellectuals found refuge in Italy, 
teaching the Greek language and philosophy at universities or translating classical Greek 
philosophers into Latin.11 Between 1572 and 1600 more than twenty Greeks were 
teaching at the University of Padua. Another group of Greek thinkers was centred on the 
Patriarchal Academy in Constantinople, founded by Gennadios.12 The main
8 Runciman 1968.
9 Mohammed needed to break any friendly relationship between Greeks and the 
West, so no western military aid could jeopardise his conquest.
10 Scholasticism interpreted the ancient Greek writers in terms of the teachings by the 
Orthodox Fathers.
11 Such 15th and 16th century Greek intellectuals of the diaspora were Theodoros Gazis 
who taught at Ferrara and Rome, and Andronikos Kallistos in Bologna, Rome, Florence, 
Paris, London, and elsewhere.
1 9 In the context of an independent Greek State.
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personalities at the Academy had all been educated in the West and adhered to the Latin 
orientation established by Gennadios. The diaspora and the Patriarchal Academy shared 
the same objectives: they sought to attract western interest and military intervention for 
the liberation of eastern Christendom from the Turks. Although at this stage such 
aspirations did not take the shape of a specific nationalistic discourse, they formed the 
intellectual background of an ideology that fully emerged with the Greek intellectuals of 
the Enlightenment (17th -18th century).
Europe in the 16th century witnessed the conflict of the Reformation, and in 1540 
the Pope founded the Society of Jesus for the dissemination of counter-Reformation 
ideas. Before long, Jesuit missionaries operated within the Greek-speaking areas of the 
Ottoman empire. With the consent of the Patriarchate they set up and developed a 
number of institutions whose influence in the 17th and 18th centuries helped to 
consolidate a Greek intellectual orientation that imported the ideas and values of western 
culture. In 1577, the Jesuits founded the Greek College of St Athanasios in Rome. It 
was directed by five cardinals, who offered advanced education to the Greek youth of 
the diaspora as well as to students from occupied mainland Greece whose families could 
afford to send them abroad. Thousands of Greeks eventually graduated from the school 
and contributed to the formation of an intellectual elite profoundly sympathetic to the 
ideas of the West. By the end of the 16th century, the Jesuits had similar establishments 
in Constantinople, Thessaloniki, Smyrna, Athens, and -  indicative of the degree of 
Orthodox consent to such developments -  after 1635 even on Mount Athos, the heart of 
Orthodox monasticism.
Notwithstanding this admiration for the West by the occupied Orthodox Greeks, 
very few were actually converted to Catholicism (2-3%) possibly because the majority of 
the population remained either ignorant of or hostile to the West and its culture.13
tBDuring the 17 century the Academy of the Patriarchate became the leading 
centre of Greek culture within the Ottoman domain. Its director, the Aristotelian 
philosopher Theophilos Korydalefs, was the perhaps most influential figure in occupied 
Greece’s spiritual and intellectual life for more than a century. It was under his
13 However, there are some impressive examples of elite Orthodox clergy who converted 
to Catholicism. Among them were the metropolitan of Sparta (1625), three patriarchs of 
Ochrid (between 1624 - 1658), and the metropolitan of Rhodes (1645).
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administration of the Academy that the emphasis shifted from the traditional mystical 
and apophatic heritage of Orthodox theology towards western Scholasticism and science.
Under Turkish rule education was confined to the elite, not available to the broad 
masses. The faithful received instruction in Church services whose formalistic and 
xenophobic character preserved the general spirit of Hellenism. According to a Russian 
traveller, the consequence was “pedantry and pomposity resulting from a ridiculous 
desire to use ancient Hellenic phrases in simple conversations in vernacular Greek. The 
teachers prefer to explain the state of the country two thousand years ago, instead of its 
contemporary situation.” Contrary to educated westernised Orthodox and secular elites, 
the Orthodox lay Greeks were polemically opposed to all foreign ideas, particularly 
Latin and later Protestant ones. But as the whole period was marked by escalating Latin 
propaganda, this proselytising injected new venom into the division between the 
Christian worlds.
The poor educational facilities resulted in a sharply divided culture, with a 
westernised elite, and a confused Orthodox laity further disorientated by an undefined 
and pretentious Hellenic ideal. Most important of all, during the Reformation -  a period 
of review and re-evaluation of traditional values in the West -  the Orthodox world was 
mute and could only entrench itself and preserve. It certainly could not engage in a 
constructive dialogue between tradition and change. The resultant sense of inferiority to 
everything western either led to imitation (by the elites), or entrenchment (by the laity). 
Nationalist sentiment, formalistic education, xenophobia and a sense of inferiority were 
aspects of this period in the history of Greek political culture that are persistent even 
today. They account for the difficulties encountered by any social policy trying to 
implement modernisation and introduce supra-nationality.
1.4 Church-State Relations in the Byzantine and Ottoman Periods
For more than sixteen centuries, the Greek Church and State played a central role 
in public life, defining the relationship between politics and religion. Both the 
Symphonia and the later Millet models reflect a worldview that envisioned a dynamic 
role for religion in public life.
1.4.1 The Byzantine Symphonia System
The putative goal of the Symphonia system was to create a Christian kingdom on 
earth where society would be structured according to Christian beliefs and ideas.
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Similarly, the objective of the Millet (= nation) system was to model a society organised 
according to the tenets of Islam. The religious worldviews that informed Church-State 
relations offered an all-encompassing system of meaning to interpret historical events. 
Where Church and State subscribed to the same worldview (as in the Byzantine 
Symphonia model) their mutually reinforcing interpretation of historical experiences 
generated a coherent set of ideas and values that was shared by all members of society. 
However, in the Turkish Millet system, the Ottoman State and the Orthodox Church 
interpreted historical experience according to antagonistic worldviews, with society 
divided into separate ideas and beliefs.
In Byzantium, the patriarch and emperor were the respectively spiritual and 
secular ministers jointly responsible for ensuring that the Church-State Symphonia 
functioned correctly to achieve the universality of religion and empire. Because the 
creation of a Christian world through empire expansion rested on the State’s ability to 
safeguard society against both external threat and internal fragmentation, the Church 
was necessarily subject to the legal and administrative framework built by the State. 
The emperor being entrusted with maintaining the ecclesiastical organisation and 
preserving doctrinal order for the Church within the empire, he enjoyed ecclesiastical 
prerogatives in non-doctrinal matters. The most important of these was his influence 
over the process of patriarchal succession by direct nomination and appointment, and 
his mandate to preserve the unity of the Church by calling ecumenical councils.
On the other hand, Symphonia made the Patriarch responsible for the spiritual 
welfare of Byzantine society, including matters of State and its leadership. Although 
the Church surrendered the management of its external affairs and administration to 
the State, it always considered this surrender contingent on the State’s own 
submission to divine law. On the one hand the State recognised the Church as a 
powerful force for imposing cultural unity on the heterogeneous peoples under State 
control and the Church’s missionary work as an effective precursor to direct political 
penetration and military conquest. On the other, the Church relied on State protection 
to pursue its mission of spreading Christian-Orthodox values to the whole of society, 
and capitalised on State support to consolidate the ecclesiastical structure.
With the progressive decline of the empire the Church’s purview was 
reinforced. Arab and Turkish victories in the East were not simply military matters, 
but being waged in the name of Islam, the Byzantines increasingly defined themselves 
and their counter-struggle in religious terms. Moreover, given the State’s failure to
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protect the geopolitical community, the Church stood alone in moral and spiritual 
authority over Byzantine society.
1.4.2 The Ottoman Millet System
Under Ottoman occupation, the Orthodox Church played a central role in the 
organisation of the Christian society over the next four centuries. Ottoman policy gave 
the Orthodox Church official political status as the legal representative of the 
Christian Millet (nation), of which Greek, Slav, and Arab Orthodox Christians were 
all considered members. The Islamic worldview effectively equating religious 
communal identity with collective political identity or nationality, and the Islamic 
State making no distinction between the spiritual and temporal realms, the Millet was 
both religious community and political entity.
By virtue of the Church’s role in the Millet, religious, political, and 
increasingly ethnic identities were conflated. The Patriarch of Constantinople was the 
leader of the largest and most important colonised nation in the Ottoman empire, and 
as ethnarch charged with overseeing a civil jurisdiction corresponding to his 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Ottoman State, by institutionalising a range of tax 
obligations and other measures aimed at consolidating the Church’s subordinate 
status, contributed to the emergence of cleavages within the Christian strata. An 
increasing proportion of the Greek population could not understand or endorse the 
Patriarchate’s close collaboration with the Ottoman administration, nor the subtle 
manoeuvrings of Church-State interaction. For them, Church-State relations became a 
symbol of spiritual decay and of the humiliating Ottoman overlordship.
These tensions in Church-State relations under the Turks contributed to the 
outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821. By virtue of the legal 
recognition accorded to the Orthodox Church as the political and spiritual 
representative of the Christian population, the Millet model made of the nationalist 
struggle a religious one. Regardless of attempts by Greek nationalists to define the 
independence movement in terms of a community with a common language and 
historical continuity, under the Millet system the objective experience of subjugation 
to Ottoman Turks was interpreted in terms of the religious Orthodox collective.
The Symphonia and Millet arrangements, therefore, underscored a central 
contradiction and inconsistency evident throughout the course of Church and State 
political-culture affinities: namely, a historical and deeply structured definition of
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Church-State relations as a political arrangement, with all the antagonism and 
corruption that this implies. Given the interventions of the Byzantine emperor and 
later the sultan, in the patriarchal selection process, and the Church’s pragmatic 
support of the State’s empire-building in return for economic benefits, the Church 
became increasingly factionalised as ordained and lay strata developed differing 
perspectives on how it should pursue its missionary strategy within the context of 
Symphonia.
The role of the Orthodox Church in the independence struggle against the 
Turks must not be underestimated however, although the endemic corruption among a 
hierarchy ambivalent on the question of nation-statehood, and determined to keep its 
privileged status within the Ottoman structure, intensified the antipathy of Greek 
nationalists towards it.
1.5 Westernisation and the Greek Enlightenment
Virtually all western sources attest to the striking intellectual contrast among 
Greeks in the 18th century. Those who had contacts with western Europe thought of 
statehood in terms of nationalism, centralisation, bureaucracy, and perhaps 
constitutionalism. For the indigenous elements, the oriental structures of the Ottoman 
State or Orthodox theocracy were quite satisfactory as long as they were dominated by 
Greeks.14
George Aspreas, an 18th-century historian, regarded the intellectual contrast of 
his contemporaries as a conflict between a western secular and an inward-looking, 
traditional element.15 Generally speaking, the former were drawn from Greek merchants 
within the Ottoman empire and the diaspora, graduates of European universities and the 
Patriarchal Academy, and the professions; the latter, which constituted the bulk of the 
population, and many of the lower clergy were traditionalists wishing to preserve a way 
of life that was being challenged.
The Enlightenment was the ideological expression of a modernity that emerged
thfrom the intellectual and political rifts marking European civilisation in the 18 century. 
Its liberalism regarded the intellectually and morally autonomous and responsible 
individual personality as the basic unit of the reconstructed society which symbolises the
14 Kitromelides 1994.
15 Ibid
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emancipation of human consciousness from authority and tradition.16 Philosophically 
formulated by Kant, Descartes, Rousseau, Bentham etc., the movement aspired to the 
liberation of human thought from superstition and prejudice, from the fetters of 
traditional religion and established intellectual conventions.17
In areas of Europe outside France and Great Britain, forms of regional 
Enlightenment resulted from the interplay between local conditions of social change and 
intellectual influences from the cultural centres. No contrast could be more instructive 
for our study than that between western Enlightenment and the fate of the new 
philosophy in the Southeast of Europe. In the West, the Enlightenment was generated in
an environment prepared for it by the experiences of Scholasticism, the Reformation, the
18development of science, together with growing secularisation and economic growth.
thIn Greece the Enlightenment transmitted during the 18 century collided with 
deeply entrenched social structures and mentalities completely inimical to the values and 
implications of the new philosophy. Despite the elite’s much more positive attitude, the 
eventual destiny of this regional Enlightenment was shaped by the conditions of 
Byzantine and Ottoman Greece. Reconsideration of the basic social and cultural 
problems confronting local society led to a re-interpretation of its history and a 
visualisation of its political future in terms of the new ideas. It is this pattern of 
ideological manipulation and change that essentially constitutes the Enlightenment in 
Greece.19
Eugenios Voulgaris (1716-1806), a prominent member of the Orthodox clergy, 
was a central figure in the awakening Greek response to the Enlightenment. His concern 
for eastern Orthodoxy was combined, however, with hopes for a rejuvenated Hellenism 
through the ideas and values of the new western ideas. His interests and expertise 
ranged from logic, mathematics, physics and astronomy, the Greek and Latin classics, to 
Byzantine and later Greek Church history as well as contemporary western political
16 Ibid
Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism is the classical work 
expounding this line of thought.
18 Thus in Scotland or British America, 17th-century socio-economic growth, combined 
with appropriate spiritual traditions, provided an ideal contextual configuration for the 
reception and integration of the new ideas and values. See Batalden 1982.
19 It is the period of Greek history that stands between the ancient and the modem.
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90  •history. He sought to build bridges between the new philosophy of the Enlightenment 
and Orthodoxy, a task hindered by the prevailing Scholasticism of his time (initiated a 
century earlier by Korydalefs), the xenophobia of the Orthodox population, and the 
traditional mystical apophatism of the old patristic theology and culture. He recognised 
that the legacy of the Patriarchal Academy had been antithetical to the Byzantine 
tradition of the East that he thought should be preserved as an integral part of Greek 
intellectual history to inform and articulate the character of an enlightened national 
education.21
If Voulgaris was a seminal figure in the revitalisation of secular Greek thought 
and learning, he was also deeply involved in what he perceived to be a dangerous subtle 
threat to eastern Orthodoxy: the Jesuit and Protestant advance in the Christian lands of 
the Ottoman empire. Basic to his involvement was his growing realisation that defence 
of the faith rested on preserving its ideological purity, and for this he sought financial, 
political, and later militaiy support from Orthodox Russia. His essays on Greek-Russian 
relations presented the first systematic conceptualisation of the Greek predicament 
within the framework of international relations 22
In his essay, “Reflections on the present critical State of the Ottoman Empire” 
(1774), Voulgaris discussed the role of the Ottoman Empire and Russia in the European 
States system in terms of the 18th century theory of balance of power. Showing great 
political realism, he suggested to the Russians that only by weakening the Ottomans 
could the international balance of power be restored.23 Turning to an analysis of the 
Greek predicament, he suggested the partition of the European provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire and the creation of an independent Greek principality as conducive to the 
preservation of the international balance of power.
Voulgaris combined political pragmatism with a unique knowledge of his 
culture. His aspiration for the resurrection of Greek civilisation and his fight against 
Ottomans and Jesuits should not, however, make us consider him a nationalist; his views
20 Batalden 1982
21 This process started about a century later with the foundation of the modem Greek 
State.
99The essays included a translation of Muratori’s Moral Philosophy (1761), 
Reflections on the Ottoman Empire (1774), Nicolem (1779), Pedagogy, Theory of 
Geography (1780), Apology (1780) and Physiological Notes (1784).
23 Kitromelides 1994.
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were moderate, respecting both the cultural achievements of western Europe and the 
local tradition of Orthodox Byzantium. Above all, he was a realist, seeking to contribute 
to Greek nation-building with pluralistic education and a rational political strategy to 
cultivate international alliances.
Iosipos Moisiodax (1725-1800) was another leading figure of the Greek 
Enlightenment. As both student and teacher he worked in major educational centres in 
Greece and Italy.24 Like Voulgaris he opposed ideology that focused on philosophical 
disagreement and abstract cultural criticism, and his understanding of social and 
economic factors transformed cultural into social criticism. Moisiodax advanced the 
wholly pro-westem argument that remedying the “shame of Hellas” required the whole­
hearted acceptance into Greek culture of the ideas and values of the Enlightenment. 
Educational and cultural models should be imported from Europe, which “had surpassed
9 ^  •even ancient Greece in the lights of learning.” If Ottoman influence was to be driven 
from Hellas, cultural reform had to be combined with profound and far-reaching changes 
in social attitudes and customs, behaviour and values. His view of these involved 
replacing arbitrary despotism with the rule of law in a republican regime.
Despite his commitment to the ideas of Hellas and the urgent “needs of the 
nation”, Moisiodax too was not narrowly nationalistic but advocated the cosmopolitan 
humanism of the Enlightenment, which he saw as a non-nationalist, intellectual 
phenomenon with striking affinities with the ecumenicism established much earlier by 
the Orthodox Church. He hoped that, as an alternative supra-national cultural 
configuration, it might carry on the role of Christian Orthodoxy as the region’s 
intellectual heritage. This hope was pre-empted by the inexorable rise of nationalism, 
which in the 19th century destroyed both the universal humanism of the Enlightenment
9 f \and the ecumenicity of the Orthodox spiritual tradition of south-eastern Europe.
tViThe foremost personality in the Greek cultural revival of the late 18 and early 
19 century was Adamantios Korai's (1748-1833). After his medical studies at 
Montpellier he went to Paris in 1788 and commented on the French revolution while 
working on ancient Greek medical texts. From 1805 until the end of his life, he
24 Ibid
25 Ibid
26 Sherrard 1959.
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published of classical texts with long prolegomena of his own. His aim was the cultural
2 7and moral preparation of his compatriots for their liberation from the Ottoman yoke.
Korais has been called the prophet of modem Greece because his ideas not only 
promoted the Greek War of Independence (1821) but also dominated the intellectual, 
cultural and political life of the new Greek State.28 He envisioned the revival of the 
Greek nation in terms of a cultural classicism bom in ancient Greece, preserved through 
the Hellenist and Roman periods, submerged in the Christian middle ages, then reborn in 
Italy with the Renaissance and invested with the Enlightenment ideas and liberal spirit of 
the 18th century.29 To allow Greece to assume her rightful place among the nations of 
the civilised West Korais advocated the country’s emancipation in terms of the secular 
liberalism and humanist Enlightenment of contemporary western philosophers such as 
Bentham, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.30 With his faith in the civilising influence of 
education, Korais made it his lifelong concern to extend throughout Greece a secular, 
utilitarian education which relied on reform of the Greek language of his day -  the 
“cleansed” Greek or katharevousa.
Korais saw no value whatsoever in indigenous culture, railed against the eclipse 
of civilisation in the Byzantine era, was bitterly hostile to fundamental elements of 
Christian-Orthodox spirituality such as monasticism and apophatism, and opposed 
Orthodox ecumenicism because he thought the Church should be the servant of the 
State. His aspirations for the Greek nation were to shape its life, laws, and institutions 
along the lines of the contemporary West.
The 18th-century neo-Hellenic Enlightenment met with considerable resistance, 
associated largely with the so-called Kollyvades. Although the confrontation was initially 
an internal and purely ecclesiastic one, by the end of the century it had become a general 
conflictual cultural reaction to the ideas and values imported from the West. The leading 
figures of the Kollyvades movement were Athanasios Parios (1721-1813), Makarios 
Notaras (1731-1805) and Nicodemos of Mount Athos (1749-1809), all of them
27 Sherrard 1959 and Kitromelides 1994.
2 8 On the impact of Bentham’s ideas and their correspondence see J. Bentham and 
Korais, in Kitromelides 1994.
70 Sherrard 1959. Korais was following the Romantic philosophers of late 18th 
century (Herder, Fichte) and their movement of romantic nationalism.
30 Sherrard, 1959.
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Orthodox clergy. This movement is considered to have provided the intellectual legacy 
of today’s reactionary “patriotic” political and cultural forces.
The traditionalists clashed with the Enlightenment innovators who wanted a 
Greek nation-state because they believed that if Greek influences attacked the heart of 
the Ottoman empire from within they would emerge as the dominant force, with the 
Greeks then becoming co-rulers of a multi-racial State and so realising their own 
liberating political dream of the Greek nation in an Ottoman State. This line of thought 
was obscure but very widespread both among the Greek population and the
T1administrative Church aristocracy that had evolved in Constantinople. In the final years 
before the revolution (1800-1821), Korais dubbed those who professed such views as 
Greco-Turks.
1.5.1 The 19th Century
The uprising of 1821 was not solely a matter of armed insurrection. This war for 
national independence also had to face the dilemma of the religious concept of belonging 
versus the secular social and political entity of the nation-state. The Greek world, 
including the church, was forced to choose and take sides.
The January 1822 declaration of Independence and a provisional constitution of 
Greece in both Greek and English asserted the emergence of a self appointed nation-state 
that claimed to be European: “... Descendants of a generous and enlightened nation, 
witnesses of the happiness which the sacred aegis of Law secures to the civilised nations 
of Europe...strong in these principles, and wishing to advance as equals with (the rest of 
our brethren) the Christians of Europe in the paths of civilisation ... [our] sole and 
immutable object is the establishment ... of that civilisation which sheds its blessings 
over the States of Europe ...”
The Greeks' assertion that they were European initially supported plausibility of 
their claim to independence from Moslem Turkey, and subsequently their territorial 
expansion. The armed struggle finally ended in 1830 with the creation of an independent 
Greek State. The status of this new Greek State was mediated by conditions of military, 
economic and political dependence on the West after military aid from the Great Powers 
(England, France and Russia) had played the decisive role in the final victory. The 
Treaty of London (6 July 1827) granted military support and at the same time legitimised 
the Great Powers’ subsequent interference in pursuit of their respective geopolitical
31 Varouxakis 1995.
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interests. The so-called independence loans (1824 and 1825), required by the desperate 
need to build a military and administrative infrastructure, laid the foundations on which 
the Greek economy has developed since.
In 1833, Otto, son of King Ludwig of Bavaria, arrived in Greece as the State’s 
first monarch. He governed Greece as an autocrat until 1843, and as a semi­
constitutional monarch until 1862. As the representative of foreign interests he was never 
accepted by the people, and various interest groups showed their dissatisfaction through
• 32political factions or parties that had come into being by the end of the revolution.
The main national issues of the time were the Megali Idea, and the Idea of 
Europe. The Megali Idea was essentially political romanticism, which envisioned the 
recapture of Constantinople from the Turks and the creation of a large Greek State 
reminiscent of the Byzantine empire. By mid-century there were two views on how this 
“Great Idea” was to be implemented. Kolettis of the French party saw it as a panacea for 
the nation’s foreign and domestic ills,33 and the king was prone to follow this line in his 
foreign policy. The opposing view, held by the English and Russian factions, insisted 
that Greece must first deal with her internal economic and administrative problems 
before embarking on the hazardous path of irredentist expansion. Regardless of these 
differences, the Megali Idea was a catalyst for national unity (and ghostly tatters of it 
still persist).
Meanwhile Europe continued to dominate the Greek intellectual mainstream in 
the 19th century. The most characteristic example of this is Markos Renieris’ English- 
language article entitled “What is Greece? Orient or Occident?”34 For Renieris, an 
eminent historical philosopher, this was the most important of all questions generated by 
the resurrection of the Greek nation in the 19th century.
If Greece is East, he argued, her national character is Eastern also and so 
“opposed and adverse” to western civilisation. But by receiving her institutions from 
western Europe, Greece was “committing political suicide, renouncing her national 
character and adopting alien features, the end result being that Greece would henceforth 
live a borrowed life.” If on the other hand Greece is West, western civilisation would 
mean her “familiarising herself with her own patrimony; not relinquishing her national
32 There was a Russian contingent led by Metaxas, an English and a French one under 
Mavrokordatos and Kolettis respectively.
33 Both views are summarised in Campbell and Sherrard’s Modern Greece.
34 Varouxakis 1995.
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character but complementing it, developing rather than committing suicide, progressing 
rather than regressing.” Far from being merely academic, this issue divided the nation. 
Supporters of the first view advocated that Greece should look to Russia as her 
archetype, those of the second believed she should turn to England and France.
Renieris maintained this was a pseudo-dilemma, since Hellas had herself given 
birth to the very distinction between East and West, she being the West and assuming 
the westernisation of the East as her “mission”. He attributed the gradual shift in “the 
nature” of ancient Hellenism to barbarian invasions, the “Slavish spirit that emanated 
from the Byzantine court”, and to the “oriental customs regulating the relation 
between the subjects and monarchy.” Then, after the conquest of Greek lands by 
western princes, Greece for the first time had the privilege of being initiated into the 
“institutions and manners” of the West. The subsequent Turkish conquest plunged 
Greece into darkness again. Finally, the modem regeneration of Greece was achieved 
thanks to the appeal of western ideas for young Greeks who had gone to the west for 
commerce or study. The “repulsion for the West” felt by the “few adherents to 
Byzantine ideas”, Renieris argued, was the result of religious fanaticism.
Meanwhile, in January 1844, leader of the French party and future Prime 
Minister, I. Kolettis (1844-47), told parliament that it was Greece’s role to receive 
civilisation from the West and transmit western “light” to the East.
The so-called international nationalists, represented by Andreas Rigopoulos,
tVieven subscribed to the romantically vague 19 -century ideas for European unity. It 
was asserted that natural harmony would prevail among the people of Europe once 
they were liberated from the grip of multi-ethnic empires. In an evocative speech 
delivered before the Greek parliament in 1886, Rigopoulos anticipated the creation of 
a United States of Europe similar to that of America. His main aspiration was for an 
independent and powerful Greece to participate on equal terms in the European 
federation.
The poet Kostis Palamas severely criticised both the ethnocentric intellectuals 
and the Europeanists, as well as religious anti-European views.
He introduced a distinction between “Frankism” and “Europeanism”, wherein 
the former was degenerating and degrading for the Greeks, and the latter an 
indispensable ingredient of Hellenism. He was equally interested in patriotism and the
35 This exposition of Korais’ ideas was also shared by other scholars of the time, such 
as Koumoundouris, and Armenis (cited in Varouxakis 1995).
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“national tradition”. In 1896 he argued that his countrymen should make their 
patriotism the basis for all their conscious endeavours, and defined patriotism as a 
quest “to perceive the idea of the homeland more deeply and organically, relating it to 
all areas of our spiritual and social actions.” (my italics)
In practical terms, Palamas was greatly concerned over the lack of individuals 
with modem leadership potential. He was incensed with politicians pandering to the 
people’s emotions by proclaiming that the country was destined to recapture the 
grandeur of Byzantium and the artistic achievements of classical Greece.36 This could 
only destroy true patriotism and result in chauvinism, he argued.
Meanwhile a long and passionate debate raged between the “Demoticist” and 
“Purist” camps over the appropriate source of inspiration for the nation, its language 
and literature, the “true” nature and identity of the Greeks, the prospects for the “race” 
and, above all, Greece’s relation to western European influences. The Demoticists 
championed the use of the vernacular, and opposed the use of the purified 
katharevousa language and the cultural classicism of Church and State. From the 
1880s to the 1920s these issues preoccupied Greek intellectual life with an astonishing 
urgency.
During the last two decades of the 19th century, negative attitudes towards 
Europe held sway, largely due to the views expressed by Psycharis and his followers. 
Juxtaposing European influences to folk culture, the demotic (vernacular) language 
and the cult of Byzantium, the “Psycharists” associated Europe with linguistic 
archaism and the exclusive veneration of ancient Greece at the expense of Byzantine 
and modem Greek popular life and culture. However, the Enlightenment legacy of 
Korais and those defenders of Europe who had the support of the Church, State and 
Royalty, the intellectual mainstream of the time, effectively marginalised the ideas of 
this influential group. An article that Palamas published in O Noumas after the 
Patriarch of Constantinople deprecated the literary ability of “demoticists”, incurred 
the wrath of both Church and State. Palamas’ defence of the demotic cause led to a 
heated debate in Parliament about the propriety of a public official supporting such a 
movement, and Palamas was suspended from his post as Secretary of the National 
University.
36 This generation was influenced and embittered by the lost war between Greece and 
Turkey in 1897.
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Palamas’ view was that both ethnocentric traditionalists and Eurocentric 
modernisers were mistaken in their assumptions. The two traditions in conflict with 
one another could offer little in the form they had adopted. He implied that something 
new must arise from these two worlds, they should not merely destroy one other. 
Ancient Greek culture would journey to the West and there spring up anew. The 
dichotomy could only be resolved through a blending of the two traditions. This 
would result in a synthesis to form the basis for a new culture. Arid imitation and 
preservation of traditional forms would merely result in an impoverished, sterile 
formalism. Only when the past was combined with the enlightened spirit of creative 
individuals, could the modem Greeks expect to have a culture of any consequence.
With ethnocentrism, the reaction against Europe culminated with those who 
are referred to as “the generation of 1897”. So Pericles Giannopoulos held that 
Greece’s Byzantine legacy was as objectionable as the centuries of Turkish mle. He 
was disillusioned with the new Greek State, which seemed to him to possess elements 
that fostered mistaken, and even harmful attitudes in society. Contrary to the attitude 
of many westward-looking intellectuals, he felt that there was little that his 
countrymen could learn from Europe. Europeans could never recreate the spirit of the 
ancient Greeks because they lived in a different world.
Giannopoulos said his nation’s circumstances were humiliating, since Greece 
was not able to compare with the economically and militarily powerful nations of 
Europe that could impose their will on it. He noted that while the west used “all small 
States as cesspits for its commercial and industrial constipation”, the Greek 
government were xenomaniac worshippers of everything foreign.
Ionas Dragoumis, another representative of the “generation of 1897”, rejected 
westernisation much more soberly. His criticism less of Europe and her civilisation 
per se than the process of his country’s Europeanisation, which he deemed futile and 
naive. He emphatically placed the burden of guilt on the 19 -century Greeks who 
had created a disorientated, mixed-up society. Life under Turkish mle had sustained 
uniformity in Greek society, an eastern way of life with a large measure of influence 
in public affairs and education given to the Orthodox Church. The revolution had 
reoriented Greek culture towards the West and its Enlightenment, classicism and 
archaism.
37 P. Giannopoulos, “Literature and Patriotism” (in Greek), Estia 1899.
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He noted that westerners had initially looked favourably on Greek efforts to 
identify themselves with the ancients, but Philhellenism was only a pretext for the 
pursuit of their geopolitical interests in the area. Dragoumis feared that westernisation 
would cost the nation its identity. As evidence he cited the new educational system on 
the German pattern, the administration no longer of self-sufficient communities but 
through a centralised western bureaucracy, and growing materialisation. Dragoumis 
did not believe that materialism, science and rationalism could solve mankind’s 
problems, but held that the emotions, passion and irrationality were an integral part of 
human nature whose antinomies and contradictions are inevitably reflected in the 
structure and culture of a society.
1.6 Church-State Relations since the Foundation of the Greek State: The 
Constitutional Period (1821-1974)
Apart from the above secular intellectuals, many 19th-century Christian- 
Orthodox thinkers criticised the westernisation of Greek culture and the ecclesiastic 
authorities who had decided to establish an autocephalous Church under the aegis of 
the Greek State. The attempt to modernise the Church according to western concepts 
of public administration was instigated by Korais, and implemented by king Otto’s 
administration in 1833. It met with considerable opposition from those who regarded 
the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople as the one and only spiritual and 
administrative authority. Two central intellectual figures are associated with this
• tVireaction in the 19 century, Constantine Economou and Christophoros Papoulakos. 
Both were representatives of the traditionalist view, launching relentless attacks on 
the nationalism of the modernists as a threat to the ecumenicity of the Patriarchate.
The decision to establish the autocephalous Church of Greece without the 
patriarch’s consent was seen as the first step in dismantling the Patriarch’s religious 
commonwealth. For many Orthodox thinkers, such as Economou and Papoulakos, it 
was the first disruptive consequence of the Greek revolution whose success had owed 
so much to Orthodoxy. Under the monarchy, the Church of Greece now constituted 
merely one department of the secular State. Most importantly, the government now 
appointed the bishops of the synod. It was not until 1850 that the patriarch, 
represented in Athens by Economou, agreed to issue a special synodal Tome, in which 
Economou attempted to re-establish some of the authority of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate. The Tome stipulated that the Church of Greece should be ruled by a
50
permanent synod presided over by the metropolitan of Athens, but that in important 
matters the Patriarchate should be consulted. This attempt to deal with a reality that 
for all practical purposes had slipped out of patriarchal control proved to be an 
awkward move.
From 1833 onwards, State policy for religion followed its overall pattern of 
modelling matters of administration, education, and of course Church-State relations 
on European lines. In 1833-34 this resulted in the closure of 412 monasteries, and 
caused great resentment and frustration in a society that profoundly respected the 
monastic tradition. The confiscation of Church properties and an attempt to reduce 
the number of clergy contributed to popular dissent, when the people could not 
understand the official consent of the Church to these moves.
The constitutional model of Church-State relations was in every respect 
designed to achieve the legal subordination of the Orthodox Church, eliminating its 
ability to challenge the legitimacy of the State on the basis of rights granted it under 
the Millet system. The monarch was appointed the highest authority for the Church’s 
external affairs, including administrative and juridical aspects of ecclesiastical 
organisation. Synod procedures were invalid without the presence of the government 
procurator, a layperson appointed by the State. Further, the State decreed the 
formation of an ecclesiastical treasury, which paid out the proceeds from 
expropriations as emoluments to the ordained members of the Church, so making 
them civil servants.
Although the modernist State officials had envisioned the Church-State 
constitutional model as a mechanism for reducing any sense of collective belonging 
defined strictly in terms of religious Orthodoxy, they nevertheless tried to manipulate 
the Orthodox Church in such a way as to make the State and the national imagery co­
terminous. In this process of national-identity construction, the irredentist dream of 
the Megali Idea relied to a great extent on traumas inflicted by the infidel. Here lies 
the main ambiguity and inconsistency in the Church and State political-cultural 
relationship in the modem constitutional period. The Great Idea tried to re-establish a 
community defined in terms that preceded the nation-state, including Greeks resident 
in the Byzantine and Ottoman territories. This meant that the ostensibly secular policy 
of the modem Greek State in fact relied on a historically continuous Orthodoxy that 
far preceeded any secular conception of modem Greek nationhood.
51
Because it was the Church that had been the legitimate representative of the 
community which the Megali Idea was seeking to recreate, the State’s political move 
to unify the nation acknowledged a competitor in the definition of the collective 
image. Rather than subordinate religion to politics (a central feature of the 
constitutional model of Church-State relations), the State’s domestic and external 
projects of collective-identity formation offered the Church an opportunity to use its 
constitutional privileged status (as the established religion) to participate in political 
life.
1.6.1 The 20th Century
The period from World War I to the end of the colonel’s seven-year 
dictatorship in 1974 was one of striking political, social and economic change, in 
which Orthodoxy and the Church played an important role. Factions and reform 
movements within the ordained and lay strata offered different interpretations of how 
the Church should negotiate the modernisation process. It was also a time marked by 
State intervention in ecclesiastical affairs in order to ensure Church co-operation in 
the State’s domestic and foreign nation-building policies. Certain internal Church 
reform movements were in response to constraints imposed on religion by politics.
The evolution of institutional Orthodoxy is best understood in terms of the 
socio-political and economic context within which the Church was operating at the 
time when its status was that of a department of the Greek bureaucratic 
administration. Budget problems, fiscal mismanagement, and State bureaucracy were 
largely responsible for producing an anachronistic religious-education training system 
of poor quality, and undermining the Church’s dynamism in public life. The status of 
parish priests as poor civil servants reinforced the decline in an activist, spiritually 
committed clergy. Earning a mere subsistence salary, priests relied on discretionary 
fees in return for sacramental and pastoral services, and their parishioners resented 
this. The result was growing alienation between the clergy and laity, and deepening 
antagonism among the simple clergy for the wealthier prelates. Although many of the 
complaints against the higher clergy were well founded, its response to intra- 
ecclesiastical problems was severely compromised by direct State interventions in the 
affairs of the Holy Synod. These interventions intensified during nearly three decades
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• ooof disintegrative politics in Greece, the fractiousness of which spread to the 
ecclesiastical arena as alternating regimes ousted archbishops and synods. However, 
the importance of religion for the cultural dimensions of nation-building was well 
understood as evidenced by the State encouraging the ex-communication of Prime 
Minister Venizelos in 1916 for pursuing anti-Orthodox policies.
These constraints were aggravated by episcopal apathy arising from the 
bureaucratisation of the higher clergy. Some elements in both the laity and clergy 
interpreted this apathy as indicative of the hierarchy’s unwillingness to sustain the 
message of Orthodoxy. This generated formal and informal efforts within the Church 
towards reforms to adapt Orthodoxy to the conditions of political and social 
modernisation while adhering to the concept of the dynamism of Christianity’s 
Orthodox religious message. By far the most organised response to what seemed like 
ecclesiastical deficiency came from the religious brotherhood Zoe (Life). The 
formation of Zoe 39 openly engaged the Church in a process of reformation. Its 
emphasis on the need for impeccable morality, piety, and obedience to the nation­
state gave the movement a fundamentalist tone. The response of the Church hierarchy 
was to adopt a conservative interpretation of tradition, with institutional changes 
being guided by leaders wishing to conserve and protect the essential meaning of 
Christian Orthodoxy in the fluid context of Greek politics.
The imposition in 1936 of a politically extreme-Right dictatorship headed by 
General Metaxas and endorsed by King George II represented an attempt to prevent 
the intra-bourgeois competition for control of the State from being decided by an 
increasingly radicalised working class represented by the Communist party. The 
Metaxas regime drove the communists underground and severely polarised the 
country.
During the dark years of WWII the Church was not exempt from the effects of 
the Fascist occupation and then the civil war that bled Greece for almost all the 1940s. 
Under the leadership of Archbishop Damaskinos, the Church, supported by Zoe, 
mobilised effectively in the face of external invasion and internal disintegration. He 
adroitly managed the Church coordinating with all segments of the political spectrum 
to bring humanitarian aid and assistance to the people while avoiding identification
1R •The political climate was uninterruptedly beset by crises, from the conflict of 
Liberals and Royalists over World War I until the start of World War II.
39 Founded in 1907.
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with any particular ideological tendency. In fact, the progressive breakdown of State 
services in most of rural Greece left the Church as the only institution with a 
functioning infrastructure capable of providing relief.
After the withdrawal of the occupation forces Archbishop Damaskinos of 
Athens and All Greece held the position of Regent from January 1945 to September 
1946. This regency was a tactical decision by the Allies to facilitate domestic peace, 
and ultimately restore the pre-war political order. However, despite Archbishop’s 
efforts to appear as a national protector and to establish Church priority over the State, 
the political Left soon denounced the Church as a puppet of the Right and a lackey to 
western imperialism given that Damaskinos was formally appointed by the 
govemment-in-exile, and in view of his refusal to condemn British and U.S. 
interference in the civil war. The intensification of the resistance movement’s 
stridently communist agenda obliged all levels of the clergy to become openly anti- 
Left, and by the end of the civil war (August 1949) the institutional infrastructure of 
both the official Church and the Zoe movement was devastated.
After the civil-war defeat of the Left the post-war political system was 
constructed in absolutist ideological terms, reinforced by Greece’s frontline status as a 
NATO ally in the cold war. The rapid reconstruction of a country that had faced the 
1950s in a state of utter economic collapse and societal exhaustion was due to a 
massive influx of Marshall Aid managed by an anti-communist State apparatus that 
included the armed forces, the monarchy, and the parliamentary Right. Like the 
political leadership, the ecclesiastical leadership also favoured conservatism. As intra- 
hierarchical struggles intensified during the 1960s, the focus of the Church was 
mainly on its organisational survival.
In 1948 Archbishop Spyridon brought the Church of Greece into the World 
Council of Churches and responded positively to the ecumenical movement for 
reuniting all Christian denominations, but his tentative moves in this direction were 
soon marginalised by the practical challenges of reconstruction. The Church’s need 
for large amounts of financial assistance, for training new clergy and to rebuild 
churches, and the fact that the State controlled those financial resources, partially 
accounts for the higher clergy’s willingness to endorse the State’s anti-communist 
ideology.
This pragmatic approach to ecclesiastical reconstruction reflected the failure 
of the Church to develop a coherent policy to respond to the political exclusion and
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societal fragmentation of almost half the Greek population. As a result of this Church 
acquiescence vis-a- vis state authoritarianism, Greek society was split even further, in 
that people excluded from egalitarian citizenship were also implicitly excluded from 
the religious community. The alienation of those lay strata who viewed the blatant 
politicisation of the Church as a perversion was aggravated by the process of cultural 
transformation associated with modernisation. At a time when accelerated economic 
development and political re-ordering were calling into question the beliefs, values, 
and ideas with which the people had organised their lives, the Church’s position 
seemed to defy modernity, and to identify religion with a culture formulated on 
exclusivist modes of social interpretation. Meanwhile Zoe and similar brotherhoods 
merely offered an even more fundamentalist view of modernity, based on highly 
moralistic and puritan notions.
The colonels’ military coup of 1967 imposed an authoritarian regime that 
resulted from disillusionment with the existing parliamentary institutions designed to 
circumscribe participation by non-Right political forces, and the expansion the of the 
petty bourgeoisie that was looking for non-traditional political formats to address the 
structural imbalances generated by Greece’s post-war economic development.
The colonels explicitly stated that they intended to “restore to health” the 
country’s political and social system until such time as a democratic regime could be 
reinstated. As part of their programme for rehabilitating the institutional foundations 
of the anti-communist society, they quickly and extensively intervened in the internal 
affairs of the Church in a deliberate attempt to use religion to reshape notions of 
national identity as well as to ensure Church-State co-operation.
The junta ordered the compulsary retirement of Archbishop Chrysostomos, 
replaced the existing Holy Synod with one selected exclusively by itself, and installed 
a new Archbishop. Paradoxically, the new Archbishop Ieronymos was at first 
regarded as an excellent leader of the Church. His intellectual rigor as Professor of 
canon law at the University of Thessaloniki, and his record of social activism during 
and after the war, suggested that he would give the Church the dynamic leadership it 
needed for its social reform in terms of inclusive notions of community. However, 
because of his association with the dictatorship his tenure was marked by intense 
polemics.40
40 The Archbishop’s programme for ecclesiastical reform included improvement of 
educational standards for the clergy, the development of an ecclesiology of broader
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The shortcomings of Ieronymos’ leadership lay in his inability to oversee the 
modernisation of the Church while dissociating himself from the repressive measures 
of the junta. His autonomy from the regime was substantially weakened by the 
departure of King Constantine into self-imposed exile in the wake of an unsuccessful 
coup against the colonels. The announcement of a new ecclesiastical charter with 
organisational changes in line with Ieronymos’ objectives brought an open split of the 
synod. The charter was eventually passed -  more than a third of the synod’s bishops 
had been appointed by the colonels -  but after four years of internecine fighting the 
anti-Ieronymite faction succeeded in overturning it.
In the wake of this public rupture within the Church, a coup d'etat by a hard­
line faction within the military government in late 1973 reflected cleavages within the 
junta over the regime’s persistent failure to achieve legitimacy. The victorious 
colonels decided to snub Ieronymos by asking metropolitan Serapheim to administer 
the oath of office to the new government instead. They hoped by this to gain the 
support of the anti-Ieronymite faction then on the ascendant within the Church.
The above events show the Ieronymos period as one of factionalisation, 
fragmentation and cleavage within the Church. The junta’s slogan “A Greece of 
Christian Greeks”, and the extremist approach to spiritual renewal through mandatory 
Church attendance for children identified Orthodoxy with social coercion and political 
authoritarianism. The illegitimacy of the junta culminated in the foreign-policy 
debacle that led to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974. This precipitated the 
dissolution of the authoritarian regime and the transfer of power to a democratic 
government headed by Constantine Karamanlis.
1.7 Summary
Different intellectual discourses in Greek-Orthodox history have tried to 
address the westernisation dilemma in Greek political culture, and the state co-opting 
a religious and national identity. A historical review of Church-State relations clearly 
shows that due to the constant interaction between politics and culture these relations 
cannot be satisfactorily dealt with through a legalistic, technocratic and reductionist 
conceptual framework. There is always the question to what degree historical, cultural
participation through strengthening the catechetical school programme, and achieving 
economic independence of the Church from the State.
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and ideological factors have influenced the formulation, reception, and outcome of 
both State and Church policies.
Historically, State and Church have come to stand for specific formulations of 
community and collective identity. The relationship between these two leading 
institutions created a balance of power in Greece for stabilising the delicate consensus 
on the origins, meaning, and future of both the collective identity and political culture. 
Despite the marked changes in the political, economic, and cultural conditions of the 
Greek people under the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, relations between the 
Christian Church and the State functioned throughout as the driving force for social 
organisation. The continuity of this dynamic role for religion in public life is a point 
that emerged in the religious and political debates of the 1980s and 1990s.
Considering the history of the Greek Orthodox Church, three main critical 
junctures can be discerned: a) The 1054 schism, b) The dissolution of the Byzantine 
Empire and the Church’s institutionalisation within the Ottoman administrative 
system, and c) The Greek national revolution and subsequent formation of an 
independent Greek State (in 1832). An immediate repercussion of the latter was the 
sudden dichotomy between the universality of the Greek Orthodox Church as 
expressed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the much narrower 
concept of a strictly national Greek Church as expressed by the Autocephalous 
Church of Greece created in 1833. An ideological gulf developped that continues to 
have a distinct religious and political significance to this day.
A second pattern generated by Church-State arrangements in the Byzantine 
and Ottoman times was the disintegrative impact of politics on the internal cohesion 
of the Church as a religious institution. On the eve of the formation of the Greek 
nation-state, both the Symphonia and the Millet systems left the Church with a mixed 
legacy of legitimacy in Greek society. Given the regular interventions of the 
Byzantine emperors in the patriarchal selection process, as well as the Church’s 
strategy of lending its public support to the State’s policies in return for economic 
benefits, the institutional reality of the Church became increasingly polarised and 
factionalised as ordained and lay strata developed differing perspectives on how the 
Church should pursue its missionary strategy within the context of the Symphonia 
accord. Moreover, while the Church’s role in the independence struggle against the 
Ottomans must be appreciated, the endemic corruption amongst a hierarchy with 
manifest ambivalence towards the question of nation-statehood had demoralised
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important segments of the clergy and laity, and had intensified the antipathy of Greek 
secular nationalists towards the Church. Nevertheless, as the development of parties 
and a party system is a slow process that requires time,41 the fact that at the time of 
independence the Church was the only well established existing “Greek” institution 
with direct administrative and social functions affecting everyday life, further 
strengthened the association bettween the Church and the emerging modem Greek 
state.
During the modem period of the Greek nation-state, the constitutional model 
of Church-State relations was part of the overall project of political modernisation 
directed by the Bavarian Regency and that group of Greek elites whose interpretation 
of nation-statehood was defined according to western European prototypes. Since this 
model reflected the interests of the modernist segment of Greek society it excluded 
the political and cultural approaches of more traditionalist groups. This deliberate 
break with the Symphonia and Millet arrangements had a profound effect on the 
Church-State power balance. The religious dimensions of collective identity that had 
been entrenched during the Byzantine and Ottoman experiences were now shaped 
according to the modernist aim for statecraft and the construction of a national 
homogeneity.
The constitutional model promoted the formation of a secular society in 
Greece, since one of the essential conditions of secularity is the relativity of 
worldviews concomitant with the secularisation of society. Moreover, by stripping 
the Church of its political prerogatives the constitutional model of the State intended 
to stress the secular elements of Greek nationhood, such as the continuity of language 
and the aura of Greece’s classical past.
By making Orthodoxy the established religion of Greece and by providing the 
Church with an official and privileged status, the constitutional model circumscribed 
the kind of religious and cultural pluralism that characterises secularity. The dual 
logic of the model, therefore, was that by perpetuating the distinctive character of 
Orthodoxy in society and by perpetuating the historical claims of the Church as the 
purveyor of collective identity, it weakened the State’s ability to control the definition 
of political culture according to western criteria of secular modernity. Insofar as the 
Church participated in public life through its official support for irredentist policies 
aimed at incorporating the Greek-Orthodox populations on the Turkish coast into the
41 Lipset and Rokkan 1967, p.34.
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new nation, it remained a competitor to the State as the sole purveyor of collective 
identity in modem Greek political culture.
The most obvious feature of the last sixty years that form the immediate 
background of a more detailed study of today’s Church-State political-culture 
relationships is the dynamic engagement between the doctrinal and institutional 
reality of the Orthodox Church on the one hand, and the political manoeuvres 
necessary to handle the delicate needs of a Greek society in the throes of 
modernisation on the other. Archbishop Damaskinos’ aspirations to modernisation 
were severely compromised as a result of the political crisis that emerged out of 
World War II and the civil war. The prevailing conservative tendency within the 
Church saw the political-ideological and cultural aspects of post-war social flux as a 
threat. Those of the higher clergy who, despite the State’s ideological exclusion of 
large segments of society from political life, had endorsed a co-operative relationship 
with the State during the reconstruction years, upheld the idea that the Church’s 
survival depended on its ability to avoid antagonism vis-a- vis the State. After all, the 
State controlled the financial resources that were absolutely essential to the Church’s 
own reconstruction project.
This passive civil servant mentality prompted a reaction from the Zoe 
movement that advocated a more active engagement of the Church in public life. 
Modernity being seen as a threat to religion, the remedy was to support Church 
reform, but in such puritanical and moralistic form that it ultimately undermined the 
ability of Orthodoxy to serve as an integrating force in society.
This demonstrates how the historical experiences of the 1940-1974 period 
have contributed to the conflation of sacred and profane notions of collective identity 
by generating a deep confusion towards both Orthodoxy and nationalism as they came 
to be defined by Church and State. The tacit Church endorsement of the State’s anti­
communist ideological policy undermined the unifying nature of the Church, and 
suggested that the religious conception of collectivism was as exclusivist as the 
secular definition of nation. As a result, both religious and secular definitions of 
community became unacceptable for large segments of the Greek population. 
Christian Orthodoxy came to be seen as a source of contradictions and confusion in 
Greek culture, rather than as a source of integration of the ideas, beliefs and values by 
which people gave meaning to their history.
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PART ONE
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS: 
Secularisation, Democratisation, and Westernisation
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CHAPTER 2
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 1981-1998
2.1 The 1975 Constitution
In order to analyse and assess Church-State relations for the period 1981 to 
1998, a brief look at the ruling PASOK party’s political ideology may be instructive. 
In contrast to the essentially Eurocentric way in which political parties had articulated 
their cultural perspectives in modem Greek history, Andreas Papandreou founded 
PASOK in 1974 to realise a new social order understood from a cultural perspective 
that was neither western nor traditionalist. Unlike the other contestants in the 1974 
first post-dictatorship elections,1 PASOK occupied an entirely new place in the 
political arena as a moderately left-wing party accommodating a variety of different 
groups, and representing a cross-section of interests united mainly by their rejection of 
the post-war system of guided democracy with its conservative overtones.2
Papandreou claimed that its multiple facets gave the party strength by creating 
unity in diversity. The most important aspect of PASOK’s radical strategy and 
cultural potential was that its intention to restmcture relations between State and 
society, and its criteria for national unity, were contrary to the prevailing social order. 
The September 1974 founding declaration reinterpreted the country’s political and 
economic problems in terms going beyond but incorporating elements of the existing 
modemist-versus- traditionalist critiques, and presented a new concept of modernity.3
The declaration established PASOK’s ideology as based on Marxist 
dependency theory, explaining Greece’s structural imbalances as a replication of the 
international political-economic order whereby the capitalist centre exploits the 
dependent periphery and semi-periphery. He emphatically rejected the strategy of 
westernisation and argued that the logic of the capitalist centre had consigned Greece 
to a permanent state of economic underdevelopment, political authoritarianism, and 
cultural inferiority. The prospects for building a “socialist democratic Greece” 
depended on achieving the strategic goals of national independence, popular
1 Founded by Karamanlis in 1974, the conservative New Democracy Party (ND) won 
the elections that year and remained in power until 1981. Between 1981 and 1998, the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) won four elections (1981, 1985, 1993 and 
1996), interrupted by an “ecumenical” coalition government (1989-90), and a New 
Democracy government from 1990 to 1993.
The three groups that made up PASOK were the Panhellenic Liberation Movement 
(PAK), the Democratic Defence (DD), and the Panhellenic Liberation Front (PAM).
3 Prodromou 1993, p.225.
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sovereignty, social liberation, and democratic procedures.4 Realisation of these goals 
required socialisation of certain sectors of the economy, the creation of agricultural 
co-operatives, socialisation of the education system, the complete separation o f  
Church from State, and a host of legislative changes designed to ensure gender 
equality. Papandreou articulated a vision of modernity that was based on a mixed 
economy, participatory democracy, and secularity.5
Promulgation of the post-junta constitution on 9 June 1975 was an essential 
factor in shaping the cultural and institutional features of the emergent democratic 
regime. The constitution stirred up heated debates and provided the arena for 
delineating the radical versus moderate cultural perspectives towards modernisation. 
Although its provisions on religion were not Papandreou’s main objections, they 
provided a vital insight into how the transition from dictatorship to democracy 
involved a unique opportunity for redefining the role of Orthodoxy.6 The religious 
provisions in the 1975 draft constitution underscored the regime change as an 
opportunity for “pioneering modifications in Church-State relations”, with significant 
repercussions for the organisation of the Church.7 The draft constitution contained 
three Articles (4, 16 and 33) whose overriding principle was the separation of Church 
and State. While these provisions reflected Karamanlis’ New Democracy 
conservative vision of the role of Orthodoxy in a constitutional Greek democracy, the 
positions advocated by PASOK expressed the radical character that marked this early 
period of the party’s ideology vis-a-vis modernisation and Orthodoxy. Konstantinos 
Zeppos, ND’s minister of education and religion at the time, confirmed his 
government’s gradualist approach to the issue of Church-State separation: “I have 
indeed argued in favour of a system that separates Church and State ... however, in the 
present circumstances, and given the traditionally close relationship between Church
o
and State, it is difficult to abandon the system existing at the present time.”
Papandreou’s response epitomises PASOK’s early radicalism: “We believe in 
the complete separation of Church and State. This will be beneficial for both... the
4 Ibid., p. 226.
5 Ibid., p.227.
6 Papandreou opposed the draft constitution mainly concerning the role of the 
president.
7 Prodromou 1993, p.239.
8 Karragianis 1997, p. 182.
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Church must cease to be a department of the State, without however becoming a State 
within a State.”9
The conservative government proposed constitutional changes for a gradual 
move towards the legal separation of the two institutions, and articulated this 
framework in terms of the Enlightenment values of religious pluralism and individual 
rights. The 1975 constitution acknowledged the Orthodox Church of Greece as the 
established Church, meaning that Orthodoxy is the religion of the majority of the 
country’s population. At the same time, the provisions confirmed religious pluralism 
by stating that “enjoyment of individual and civil rights shall not depend on the 
religious convictions of the individual”, and prohibited all kinds of religious 
proselytising.10 The draft also shifted sole responsibility for matters of education to 
the State, and cancelled the State’s responsibility for ensuring that the education 
system upheld the values of the so-called “Greek-Christian culture”. The 1975 draft 
provisions also eliminated the invocation of the Holy Trinity, traditionally placed in 
the introduction to the constitution. The ties between Church and State were further 
loosened by removing the stipulation regarding the president’s membership of the 
Greek-Orthodox Church and his official oath of allegiance to the Church.11
It was implicit in ND’s gradualist strategy, however, that the final draft of the 
1975 constitution could not become law without the State reaching consensus with the 
official Church as represented by the Holy Synod. A memorandum from this body 
suggested introducing the system of Synallilia, a mode of contact based on the 
principles of co-ordination or co-operation. It may be defined as a relationship of 
equal partners, with neither able to dictate to the other. The synod argued that the 
system of Synallilia “embodies the traditional relationship between the Church and 
State in Greece, while also corresponding to the spirit of the times and modem 
ecclesiology.”12
At stake for the synod was not only the legal aspects of a Church-State 
separation, but an end to the identification of Orthodoxy with the Greek nation. The 
synod’s arguments were based on the long years of Ottoman occupation, when it was 
above all the Orthodox Church that was able to perpetuate the Greek identity, both
9 Ibid., p. 182.
10 Prodromou 1993, p.240.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p.241.
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religious and secular (it is interesting to note that such close association of religious 
and ethnic identity is characteristic of Eastern Orthodoxy).13 They also noted that the 
legal separation of Church and State implied separating “religious freedom 
prematurely from its central place in the national consciousness of the Greek people, 
which may be highly dangerous not only to the Church but to the State itself.”14
In stark contrast to the conservative government’s gradualism, PASOK 
demanded a clear and definitive separation of Church and State so that “the 
administration of the Church ... will remain completely free and beyond any sort of 
official State imprint.”15 The question of the ecclesiastical administration’s autonomy 
was also a major item in the approaches of ND and PASOK. The ND government 
stipulated that the Church administration “is by the synod of the hierarchy, as defined 
by law”, and that the constitutional charter of the Church be voted on by parliament.16 
Criticism of this stipulation rested on its imprecise wording. In the strict 
interpretation, the constitutional charter of the Church would be a secular law of the 
State, the parliamentary decision-making process having precedence over the 
ecclesiastical one. Such a reading creates significant latitude for State interference in 
internal Church affairs. Conversely, according to a more flexible interpretation of the 
clause, the State’s ratification of any constitutional charter would be understood as 
endorsing a set of changes autonomously determined by the Church according to 
internal procedures grounded in canon law. This reading rejects State prerogatives for 
interference in the internal affairs of the Church, and was, of course, consistent with 
PASOK’s emphasis on full administrative separation of Church and State.
There is no doubt that the PASOK proposal for a radical break with the past 
system of Church-State relations stood in contrast to the gradualist approach of the 
ND government, and moved well beyond the Synallilia arrangement proposed by the
1 7synod. However, the PASOK perspective on Church-State relations was rather less 
radical in one key aspect. Although Papandreou argued strongly in favour of radical 
changes in the administrative relationship of the two institutions, he deliberately
13 Madeley 2003a.
14 Ibid.
15 PASOK’s position on the 1975 constitution was put forward by a group of scholars 
supervised by the former Prime Minister, K. Simitis. See Konidaris 1989, p.26.
16 Prodromou 1993, p. 242.
17 Ibid., p.243.
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omitted references to matters such as the Church’s bond with the nation, the people, 
and the traditional view of Christian Orthodoxy as the quintessence of Hellenism. 
Thus, even in this early pre-govemmental period of PASOK ideology, Papandreou 
was well aware of the shortcomings of a radical approach that would challenge the 
Synallilia arrangement proposed by the synod. As radical change involves inevitable 
political cost, Papandreou was very careful to acknowledge a historically informed 
position for the Church in Greek culture and the collective imagination. Such tactical 
political manoeuvres show that PASOK understood the relationship between Greek 
political culture and Orthodoxy, but while encouraging administrative changes 
towards democratisation, the party was reluctant to secularise Greek national identity.
The final version of the constitution emphasises New Democracy’s gradualist 
approach and suggests the ongoing ability of the Church to affect political outcomes. 
While official Church influence on the constitutional provision seems at first glance to 
be quite limited, the contradictions in ND’s gradualism suggest otherwise. The 
invocation of the Holy Trinity was reintroduced at the beginning of the constitution 
and into the oath sworn by the country’s President and members of parliament, 
implying an implicit elevation of Christian Orthodoxy over other religions. While it is 
true that the new constitution had to take into account the nation’s historical memory 
by acknowledging the Church’s capacity for affecting political decisions, its 
ambivalent compromise between Synallilia and legal separation meant that, in effect, 
neither Synallilia nor complete legal separation was achieved.
With respect to the clauses on education, the new constitution revealed a 
peculiar and confusing formalism, in that although mandated as the responsibility of 
the State, education was given the task of ensuring the development o f the national 
and religious conscience. Another compromise was that the constitution recognised 
the Orthodox Church as the established church of Greece (epikratousa). This 
recognition preserved the position of Orthodoxy in Greece, constituting a de facto 
acknowledgement of Orthodoxy over other faiths, and avoiding any de jure separation 
of Church and State. The ND minister of education and religion explained his 
government’s decision to forego the option of definitive constitutional separation in 
terms of “ ...the critical nature of the circumstances in the country following the 
seven-year dictatorship, the need for ensuring the religious unity of the people, and 
the possibility of correcting the relevant provisions through a review of the
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1 Rconstitution, as well as because of the reaction by the Church.” The minister’s 
remarks echo the Church arguments about the State’s need to account for the impact 
of historical memory on the national conscience, and to acknowledge the Church’s 
ability to affect political decisions.
The reaction by the Church against constitutional changes towards religious 
pluralism was strongly affected by its internal organisation at the time, which to a 
great extent had been embittered by the relationship during the dictatorship. 
Archbishop Serapheim’s appointment by the colonels’ regime had further weakened 
the credibility of the Church, and factional infighting between the members of the 
synod who still claimed allegiance to the dispossessed Archbishop Ieronymos and the 
Serapheim clergy over lay participation and administrative reform,19 was largely 
unknown to the vast majority of the laity. With the organisational dissension and 
contradictions within the Church at the time of the transition from junta to democracy, 
the hierarchy regarded the possible restructuring of Church-State relations as 
imposing some kind of societal competition, for which the Church was unprepared. 
So while acknowledgement of the Church’s ability to influence the ND government’s 
already gradualist approach to religious policy satisfied the immediate concerns, the 
result was a constitutional arrangement that effectively increased the State’s ability to 
circumscribe Church autonomy, both within the Church itself and in society 
generally.20
When the revised constitutional charter of the Church of Greece was passed in 
1977 this set a precedent for State interference in internal Church affairs. The changes 
were ratified by parliament, thereby rendering the document a product of State 
legislation rather than of ecclesiastic determination. The new law reflected not only 
the failure to meet the Church proposal for Synallilia, but made it uncertain whether 
or not the 1975 constitution had in fact abolished the system of a State-dominated 
Church established and controlled by the law of the State, or merely covered it up 
with legal recognition of the Orthodox Church as the established Church of Greece. 
For even as the 1975 constitution had created the possibility for “new terrain in the 
relations between the nation’s two leading institutions that might be free from friction
18 Prodromou 1993, p. 244.
19 See sub-chapter 4.4 for details of the Ieronymos and the Serapheim factions within 
the higher clergy.
20 Prodromou 1993, p. 245.
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and shocks”, the ambiguities in the constitution and their incorporation into the 
ecclesiastical charter of 1977 “tipped the balance towards a system of Caesaropapism
2  i
and so proved to be a move in the wrong direction.”
What went wrong with PASOK’s unique potential to act as the vehicle for 
reconciling the two main sources of contradiction in Greek political culture (i.e. 
tradition versus modernity)? In the early, pre-government stage (1974-1981), 
Papandreou has offered an alternative view of modernisation which accounted for the 
domestic political-cultural factors and international constraints specific to Greece’s 
path towards democratisation. His demand for change (allaghi) held out the promise 
of resolving the problematic relationship between the State and society through an 
inclusive integrated collectivity.22
The party’s failure in this early period as a radical political force to realise its 
potential for religious change can be attributed to several factors. Each of them points, 
on the one hand, to the interaction between the religious dimensions of Greek culture 
and the wider socio-cultural and geo-political processes of the time and, on the other, 
to the ideological syncretism, formalism, and populism that characterised 
Papandreou’s strategy.
Thus in the relations between religion and political culture, Papandreou had to 
conform to the established religio-political discourse of Synallilia. Following the ND 
government’s successful discourse which identified democracy with national unity in 
the face of the threat of a Greco-Turkish war over Cyprus, Papandreou wanted to 
establish PASOK as an equally if  not more credible patron of the national ideals. He 
pursued this ideological strategy by combining several cultural strategies with respect 
to the question of national identity. For the above reasons of internal legitimacy, he 
had to avoid an overtly Marxist interpretation of the Cyprus crisis, but consistency 
with his iconoclastic image required a radical explanation of the crisis that was 
different from ND’s without, however, disrupting a de facto commitment to progress, 
development, and Hellenism (its Orthodox associations included). Papandreou’s 
rejection of Karamanlis’ claim that “Greece belongs to the West” was indeed
21 Ibid., p.246.
Change (allaghi) was the catchphrase of Papandreou’s campaign and encapsulated 
what he felt Greece needed in order to modernise. Indicative of the radical-maximalist 
character of PASOK’s early period are the party’s foundational documents. See 
Konidaris 1991, p.33.
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consistent with PASOK’s interpretation of the Cyprus crisis as a political problem 
demanding an ideological strategy that would be legitimate in terms of Greek political 
culture only if it resorted to a combination of several discursive strategies. As a result 
of US plans for incorporating Cyprus into the western security net, PASOK’s view of 
the crisis was indeed consonant with Papandreou’s nationalist ideas about certain 
aspects of the Greek historical experience that were incompatible with the western 
archetype of development and progress. In so far as PASOK’s nationalistic 
interpretation of the Cyprus emergency touched on the country’s non-western identity, 
it embroiled Orthodoxy, nationalism, and a moderate Marxism with its perception of 
the foreign-policy crisis, so reiterating the confusion over the religious versus secular 
sources of national identity in post-dictatorship Greece.
The advantage of this kind of populist strategy for electoral objectives was that 
it operated above class contradictions. It made it possible for several heterogeneous 
groups to identify themselves with the people on the basis of a definition that was 
negative simply by virtue of its opposition to the privileged P  In addition, the 
populism that generated such oppositions as the privileged versus the non-privileged, 
also constructed a malevolent West with which the Greek political identity 
supposedly, had little in common. The problem with this kind of logic is not so much 
whether it is sound or not, but rather that putting the blame on factors operating 
outside the ideological space of the Greek political culture fosters a defensive and 
narcissistic nationalism, that does not contribute to a positive attitude to the country’s 
political and cultural identity.
Within this framework of interaction between PASOK ideology and Greek 
political culture, it is not surprising that Papandreou’s anti-western sentiments evoked 
rather idiosyncratic notions of the Eastern-Orthodox dimensions of Greek collective 
identity. It was no coincidence that in the same period the so-called Neo-Orthodox 
movement began to articulate its anti-westem critique of Enlightenment rationalism, 
basing itself on a quasi-Marxist, quasi-theological discourse.24
The debates on the religious provisions in the country’s first post-junta 
constitution can be seen as PASOK’s first attempt to resolve the religious aspects of 
the cultural contradiction in Greece. While these debates contributed to a more 
general discussion concerning the role of Orthodoxy in Greek political identity,
23 Prodromou 1993, p.249.
24 See chapter 4 for details on the Neo-Orthodox movement.
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PASOK’s strategy actually perpetuated the long-standing cultural inconsistencies it 
sought to challenge. The party’s emphasis on the need for full separation of Church 
and State, with a simultaneous emphasis on the indivisible bonds between Church and 
nation, failed to create a rational political discourse and a quest for a democratic 
society that would be modem, secular, politically and culturally pluralist and at the 
same time exclusively Orthodox.
Paradoxically, PASOK’s inconsistent strategy to resolve the country’s cultural 
contradictions only prolonged them. Its unsuccessful attempt to clarify the role of 
Orthodoxy within an all-encompassing Greek modernity was further undermined by a 
concentration of power and decision-making prerogatives in the charismatic figure of 
Papandreou. That, as well as populist demagogy in the handling of the tension 
between modernists and traditionalists, may well account for the confusion in Church- 
State relations at the time PASOK came to power in 1981.
2.2 Church-State Relations 1981 - 1985
Any examination of Church and State interactions in Greece today must take 
into account that there are four main areas of overlapping interest between these two 
institutions.
(i) Secularisation, including sections of the Civil Code as they relate to the family 
(marriage, divorce, abortion, etc.), religious teaching in Greek education, religious 
freedom, tolerance, and cultural pluralism.
(ii) Church lands and property, the financial affairs of the Church, and remuneration 
of the clergy.
(iii) Democratisation and Church-State separation, including State involvement in 
Church administration through the ministry of education and religion, the appointment 
of bishops and especially the Archbishop of Athens, Church involvement in secular 
politics and foreign affairs, and democracy within the Church allowing reduced 
participation of clergy and lay in the decision-making process.
(iv) The Westernisation dilemma with respect to cultural unity and homogeneity in 
Greek society, the modem Greek identity, and the increasingly debated position of the 
Greek Church in the forging of a supra-national European culture (i.e. the EU 
integration policy).
The sections below will concentrate on Church-State negotiations during the 
two PASOK administrations of 1981-85 and 1985-89. This requires an understanding
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of PASOK’s religious policies within the context of the cultural dimension of the 
modernisation debate. By examining how Church and State interpreted the legal- 
formal separation, we hope to broaden the overall problematic of the religious and 
secular features of Greek identity. The question of institutional control over the 
definition of Greek identity may also allow consideration of whether Church ability to 
influence State legitimacy in this matter entails any serious implications for 
conceptualising Greek modernity in the 1990s.
2.2.1 The Socialisation/Nationalisation of Monastic Properties, and
PASOK’s Dual Religious Strategy
Two issues consistently mentioned in PASOK’s statements were the 
separation of Church and State and socialisation of monastic lands. These 
pronouncements were consonant with Papandreou’s demand for structural changes, 
including the need to reduce institutional concentration of power. Due to the long 
history of the Orthodox Church taking a leading role in the network of institutions 
mediating between the people and the State, it is not surprising that Papandreou’s 
policy was based on enhancing Greek civil society through democratisation of the 
Church as its main institution. However, when the new elections approached, his early 
radicalism gave way to a more ambivalent interpretation of what the country needed. 
In his increasingly more populist discourse socialist modernisation and Orthodox 
traditionalism managed to coexist. For reasons of political expediency, Papandreou 
put forward a dual concept of Church-State separation based on a clear institutional- 
cultural distinction. In terms of the former the Church would have complete autonomy 
in administrative matters, but in cultural terms would retain its vital role in cementing 
the bonds between the Nation and the People?5 The socialisation of monastic lands 
into agricultural co-operatives came to be tied to the larger question of how to handle 
this vast real estate so as to benefit the landless peasants while simultaneously 
maintaining the Church’s administrative autonomy.
Implicit within PASOK’s dual approach to the role of Orthodoxy in Greece is 
its rejection of modernity based on Eurocentrism. Papandreou and his associates 
proclaimed the party’s election to power in 1981 not only as a popular decision in 
favour of change, but as an affirmation of his new paradigm for modernisation.
25 Prodromou 1993, p.279. and Karagiannis 1997, p. 183.
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The constitutional feature of this new, more inclusive modernisation was 
“popular participation”, which inevitably involves the quintessential Greek institution 
of religion. PASOK envisioned enhanced relations between Church and nation.26 
This pro-Orthodox side of PASOK’s religious policy found expression in the 
reconstruction of religious education, which aimed to enable the Church to respond 
positively to the rapidly changing character of Greek society in the early 1980s. The 
then-minister of education and religion Kaklamanis emphasised the government’s 
hope for co-operation between the State, the Church leadership, and academic 
theologians to transform Greek society along “progressive, socialist and democratic” 
lines.27
2.2.2 Secularisation of the Civil Code and the National Education System
At the opposite pole of PASOK’s dual strategy, the government’s proposed 
major revisions of Greek family law had already begun the institutional separation of 
Church and State. These revisions provide a clear example of how the three main 
actors (Church, government, and opposition) are situated vis-a-vis the question of 
modernisation, and of the catch-all strategy underlying PASOK’s approach. The 
Church adamantly rejected the revisions, considering them an assault on the moral 
foundations of Greek society. The ND opposition announced that these changes in the 
Civil Code were actually the outcome of ND policies expressed in the 1975 
constitution. This confirmed ND’s pro-western concept of modernisation as having 
the objective of marginalising the Church and its eastern, non-Enlightenment
2 9onentations.
26 Ibid., p.281.
27 Ibid., p.282.
28 Opposite in the sense of promoting reforms towards secularisation which risked 
being perceived by the Church as anti-Orthodox, anti-religious, etc.
29 The fact that between 1975 and 1981 the ND governments had been unwilling to 
change the family law drawn up in 1946 further confirmed their strategy of 
gradualism. Indeed, had ND taken a decisive stand against the Church at that time, 
this would have jeopardised the party’s ideological legitimacy as a significant number 
of its voters identified with conservative and traditionalist ideals. As a result of this 
gradualist and conciliatory policy, the Church and ND had no serious dispute between
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The challenge for PASOK, therefore, was to remain consistent with its image 
as a progressive social movement ready to take responsibility for changing obsolete 
elements in the Civil Code, while simultaneously ensuring that the necessary changes 
would not offend the Orthodox sensitivities of Greek society.
As might be expected, PASOK’s proposals for the legalisation of civil 
marriage and the decriminalisation of adultery reflected the duality of Papandreou’s 
vision of Church-State separation and the Church-nation connection. PASOK 
proposed a radical change, whereby individuals who wanted the religious sacrament 
could exercise that prerogative, but that the prior civil ceremony would be the legally 
binding act. Under this proposition the separation of Church and State is achieved 
through a clear distinction between religious and secular matters, consistent with the 
notion of modem religious pluralism and the right to individual choice. The proposed 
legislation, however, was not merely aimed at institutional separation. Indeed, 
epitomising PASOK’s dual policy, Papandreou and his associates described the new 
legislation as enhancing the appeal of Orthodoxy in contemporary society. The 
Church, by abolishing obsolete and authoritarian rules, would no longer be perceived 
as an obstacle to the exercise of individual civil rights. Accordingly, the proposed 
changes would be a positive element in the Church-nation connection, since both 
Church and nation would benefit from loosening the legal-formal interdependence 
between Church and State. At the same time the Church’s image would be 
modernised by justified democratic changes.
The reaction of the higher clergy, represented by the Holy Synod, was 
consistent with its inward-looking traditionalism. The synod accused the government 
of depriving Orthodox Christians of the spiritual essence of the ecclesiastical
1979 and 1981. The party’s western orientations, however, sometimes obliged ND to 
confront the Church, political costs notwithstanding. One of these rare occasions was 
in 1979 when the Karamanlis administration established diplomatic relations with the 
Vatican as a prerequisite for Greece’s entry into the EEC. See Karagiannis 1997, 
p .187.
30 The PASOK ministry of justice preliminary report on revisions of family law made 
the case for the necessity of these changes to “take into consideration not only 
contemporary social developments, needs, and ideas in Greece, but 
also...(preserve)...tradition within the present social reality and (reinforce) continuity 
in the future.” See Prodromou 1993, p. 283.
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ceremony and argued that giving priority to the civil ceremony was anti-Christian.
Political expediency led to a compromise and the modification of the final legislation,
so that the civil and religious ceremonies were of the same legal force. With respect to
adultery the protests of the official Church were overridden, and PASOK
1
decriminalised adultery by removing Article 357 from the Civil Code.
The Church-State mistrust generated by these revisions was deepened by 
government decisions on two other matters related to the issue of separation. The first 
concerned changes in education proposed by Kaklamanis’ 1984 draft legislation. The 
Church condemned the proposed religious-education reforms as anti-Christian, 
particularly objecting to the use of textbooks with Darwin’s theory of evolution as
9^ •well as Marx’s historical materialism and his theory of social change. Yet again 
PASOK’s radical aspirations had to be severely curtailed due to political expediency. 
The ministry’s working group on religious education concluded that the proposed 
reforms would not be implemented unless the Church consented to them, and 
emphasised that the educational system would enhance “Orthodox perception in the 
instruction of our youth.”33
The second issue that sharpened antagonism between Church and State was a 
bill dealing with “questions of monastic property.”34 However, with elections set for 
June 1985, both issues were left pending. During this first period of PASOK 
government (1981-1985) mutual suspicion had infiltrated the Church-State 
relationship as a result of conflicting notions of tradition and modernisation. The 
PASOK government tried to implement its policy of Church-State separation through 
a discourse on modernisation via nationalism, deliberately creating an atmosphere of 
inseparability between Church and nation. Papandreou kept stressing that the
31 Justice Minister Alexandris, stated adamantly “the State will not negotiate the 
legislative authority.” The issue was central to democratisation and as such not 
negotiable. Karagiannis 1997, p .188, andProdromou 1993, p.284.
32 Prodromou 1993, p.289.
Indicative of PASOK’s decision to employ a dual modus operandi is the fate of 
former education ministers who opposed the Church in support of their reform policy. 
In 1977, G. Rallis’s attempt, despite Church opposition, to establish the vernacular- 
demotic language at the expense of the purist-archaic katharevousa, almost cost him 
his seat in parliament. See Karagiannis 1997, p. 187, and Prodromou 1993, p.290.
34 Prodromou 1993, p.289.
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proposed changes concerning family law, education and monastic land-holdings were 
not intended as an attack on the Church, and that positive relations between Church 
and State were essential “for the good of the nation.” The higher clergy however, 
perceived such changes as bringing impermissible confusion ... to the hierarchy.”35 In 
effect, with Papandreou’s electoral expediencies and the imperative to keep political 
costs as low as possible, as soon as PASOK came to power the radicalism of its pre- 
government phase (1974-81) gradually gave way to a more ambivalent interpretation 
of social change.
2.3 Church-State Relations 1985-1989
When PASOK began its second term in office after winning the elections of 2 
June 1985 its twofold orientation towards the Church was basically unchanged. The 
party remained focused on creating a modem secular society with minimal legal- 
formal ties between religion and politics while attempting to strengthen the bonds 
between Church and nation.
In collaboration with the Church hierarchy, the government eventually passed 
a law on national education. In stark contrast to PASOK’s initial radicalism, Article 1 
of the law emphatically stated that one of the purposes of the reform was to restore 
“the original element of the Christian-Orthodox tradition.” The education minister 
went so far as to declare that PASOK was re-orientating the educational system 
towards Orthodoxy, strengthening the bonds between Church and nation.36
Once again PASOK used its dual political logic to pass further revisions of 
family law at the same time, and provoked intense opposition from the Church. The 
new dispute was over the decision to legalise abortion. Despite Papandreou’s 
intention to re-establish and sustain Orthodoxy as a unifying bond of Hellenism,37 the 
conflict over abortion put the two institutions sharply at odds, and exposed the main 
shortcomings of PASOK’s Janus-faced political strategy. Much confusion and 
ambivalence was generated when Papandreou resorted to a populist discourse on 
nationalism while trying to give legitimacy to his program of modernisation of Greek 
society along secular lines. His reasoning brought together elements as diverse as 
Orthodoxy, socialism, modernisation and westernisation (i.e. EEC and NATO
35 Ibid. 1993, p.285.
36 Ibid. 1993, p.292.
37 Presumably rejecting ND’s western and gradualist strategy towards modernisation.
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membership) in an idiosyncratic and uneasy coexistence. Each of these elements 
seem equally democratic, but taken together, and mediated by conditions of traditional 
statism and clientelism, only lead to ideological confusion and manipulation.
For the first time in post-authoritarian Greece, it became clear to both 
institutions that their opponents were willing to mobilise every means at their disposal 
to obtain their political objectives. The Synallilia doctrine was nearly finished with, 
and matters soon deteriorated further on the most controversial issue of Church-State 
relations under the two PASOK administrations of the 1980s.
2.3.1 Conflict over Law NS 1700
At the beginning of his second term as minister of education and religion, 
Kaklamanis introduced a Bill (NS 1700) into parliament “On Regulating Questions of 
Monastic Property.” The objective of the Bill was to transfer the vast majority of 
Church lands to the State agricultural co-operatives PASOK had introduced in 1982. 
The government declared that the State’s responsibility in the question of Church 
property was both legally sound and economically necessary.
Kaklamanis argued that, since it was the State that shouldered the bulk of the 
financial burden of the Church’s operating expenses, in order to fulfil its fiscal 
responsibility it was legitimately responsible for resolving the property question, 
restructuring the financial apparatus of the Church, and placing the ecclesiastical 
organisations on a solid economic footing.39 The basic intention of the Bill was to be 
consonant with PASOK’s commitment to democratisation of the main institutions of 
Greek society, and to reinforce the ties between Church and nation.
At a formal and superficial level, this restructuring would ideally allow the 
Church economic self-sufficiency and autonomy from the State payroll. At a more 
practical level, however, the main shortcoming was that implementation of NS 1700 
was predicated on the acceptance of the traditional tacit joint jurisdiction, which 
implied that the government still regarded the Church as a department of public
3 8 The transfer process was a large-scale undertaking, which included resolution of 
outstanding ownership questions, issue of new title deeds, compensation to the 
Church, and finally, restructuring of those ecclesiastical organisations responsible for 
managing Church properties and associated financial matters. Prodromou 1993, p.294.
39 Ibid., p. 294
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administration.40 PASOK’s dual concept of legal-institutional separation between 
Church and State and cultural connection between Church and nation was not only 
inconsistent with the party’s statements during the debates on the 1975 constitution, 
but also responsible for ideological confusion. This confusion was an unavoidable 
result of the party’s inconsistent logic that kept up a formalistic discourse of 
separation consistent with the party’s left-wing orientation, while avoiding the equally 
important discussion of more historical and holistic issues related to ethnic identity 
and nationalism (e.g. the bond between Church and nation). In these circumstances it 
is not surprising that the legal, institutional interdependence of Church and State 
remained largely intact, while suspicion, mistrust, and confusion continued to plague 
their relationship.
The Holy Synod replied to the NS 1700 proposals in terms similar to those 
implied by PASOK’s tacit approval of the joint jurisdiction rationale. It underscored 
the Church’s desire to facilitate the government in meeting its social and political 
responsibilities, but also reminded the State of its obligations to support the Church 
carrying out its “sacred objectives” in Greek society. The prelates warned that “the 
one-sidedness of the Kaklamanis Bill contains the danger of friction between Church 
and State, which the Church not only does not want, but rejects.”41 In place of the 
Bill, the synod called for some co-operative action by Church and State to resolve the 
question of the monastic lands.42 The Church objected strongly to what it perceived as 
an attempt to alter the existing status quo in the State’s favour.
The rising tension between the two institutions prompted Papandreou to 
replace Kaklamanis with Tritsis, who served as minister of education and religion 
from April 1986 until his resignation in April 1988. Tritsis’ account of the 
institutional and cultural dimensions of the Church-State relationship was consistent 
with the dualism of his predecessors. Addressing the Sixth Panhellenic Conference of 
Theologians, Tritsis followed Papandreou’s syncretic reasoning, advocating a 
symbiosis of tradition, nationalism and modernisation in a populist model of
40 For more on Church manipulation by the State see Konidaris 1991, p.45.
41 Prodromou 1993, p.295.
42 The hierarchy’s letter suggested some preliminary alternatives to the Kaklamanis 
proposals, particularly regarding the method for classifying properties as acceptable 
for transfer of ownership and the proposed compensation to the Church in these cases. 
See Prodromou 1993, p.295, and Karagiannis 1997, pp. 189-90.
77
socialism. He outlined a modernity concept with positive articulation and inherent 
compatibility between Orthodoxy, democratic-socialist modernisation, and the 
Hellenic identity. He described Orthodoxy as the “portentous meeting point between 
Christianity and Hellenism”, arguing that the Church’s activities throughout Greek 
history expressed a “perpetually revolutionary” message of “brotherhood, justice, and 
peace.”43 Just as Enlightenment philosophers had associated freedom and truth, 
Tritsis discussed the Christian-Orthodox struggle in terms of a social vision of 
freedom, which was both uniquely Hellenic and compatible with PASOK’s policy of 
change.
Having constructed a positive atmosphere of mutual concern for building a 
democratic Greece, with a public role for Orthodoxy, Tritsis urged the Church to 
grasp the dynamic essence of the Orthodox tradition “by democratising itself’ through 
the creation of “organs of popular participation.”44 He invited the Church to move 
with the State beyond outdated elements whose “anachronistic conservatism has 
nothing in common with Greek tradition.”45 Anticipating a new round of potentially 
bitter disputes over NS 1700, Tritsis finally claimed that the modernisation of the 
Church would re-establish the link between Orthodoxy and the people, clarifying the 
relevance of Orthodoxy to the definition of a contemporary national identity. Despite 
his tactical manoeuvres, the centrepiece of Tritsis’ proposals expanded the scope of 
the Kaklamanis Bill, suggesting that the Church’s vast urban and commercial 
holdings might come under the purview of the Monastic Properties Bill.46
In the synod’s view, Tritsis’ adjustments suggested that the State intended to 
curtail the Church’s economic autonomy by depriving it of its landed properties and 
so of a major source of income. In a countermove, the prelates voted for the transfer 
of certain Church properties to the State, but excluded its urban properties from 
consideration.47
43 Prodromou 1993, p.297, and Stavrou, 1994.
44 Ibid., p.298.
45 Ibid.
46 The Kaklamanis Bill restricted the property question to the Church’s rural holdings. 
Prodromou 1993, p.299, and Konidaris 1991.
47 This was consonant with the Church’s decision in September 1984 to offer 360 
square acres to accommodate poor families. Konidaris 1991, p.39
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2.3.2 NS 1700 and Democratisation
The various rounds of proposals and counter-proposals culminated with Tritsis 
laying the final version of NS 1700 before parliament for discussion.48 The most 
critical revision of NS 1700 had meanwhile shifted the emphasis from the issue of 
property towards reform and democratisation of the Church’s administrative structure. 
The crux of the changes presented by Tritsis was re-instatement of the Church’s 
conciliar structure, with a membership comprised of elected-lay representatives 
working co-operatively with appointees of State and Church. The ministry of 
education and religion was entrusted with sole responsibility for drawing up the 
electoral lists of lay candidates.49
The synod response was prompt and defensive. It claimed that by removing 
the Archbishop from the presidency of the Organisation for the Administration of 
Ecclesiastical Property (ODEP) it became a State organ with unlimited powers for the 
disposal of ecclesiastical property. This was an act “astonishingly provocative ... anti- 
canonical ... anti-ecclesiastical; an expression of a Protestant worldview imposing 
populist power over the Church and abolishing episcopal authority.”50 Bishop 
Christodoulos of Demitriada, as spokesman for the Committee of Bishops, maintained 
that the synod was opposed to neither the modernisation of the Church per se nor to 
examining democratic revision of the Church’s existing administrative structure. But 
on the Tritsis Bill, the Church expressed its outright opposition as a matter of 
principle. The Church was resolutely against the State interfering in internal 
ecclesiastic affairs over which it had no legal or theological purview.51 Bishop 
Christodoulos criticised PASOK for producing pretexts for modernising and 
democratising changes in the ecclesiastical structure which would, in fact, destroy any 
semblance of democracy within the Church. He concluded that the Church did indeed 
have a moral responsibility to the Greek nation, namely, to oppose what was actually
48 As suggested by its title, the Tritsis Bill was significantly different from the 
Kaklamanis Bill, in that the latter’s scope was restricted to “monastic” properties as 
opposed to the much more inclusive term “ecclesiastic” property.
49 Prodromou 1993, p.303.
50 Ibid., p.304.
51 Ibid.
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a State-engineered effort to politicise the Church in such a way as to prevent 
Orthodoxy functioning as a force for democracy.52
PASOK’s dual approach and the Church opposition to the Tritsis Bill were 
reflected in the civil-society groups mobilised to support the respective views. Most 
vocal in support of the Bill were the lay theologians of the Theologikos Syndesmos 
(Theological League). The initial suggestions from this group were presented at an 
open conference in Thessaloniki of ordained clergy, politicians, academic theologians, 
non-theological academics, and laymen. In its review of Church-State relations, the 
group argued for the revitalisation of the Church and its role in Greek society under 
the new circumstances of modem democracy. The conference posited two changes as 
absolutely essential to achieve these objectives: (i) the revitalisation of the lay and 
clerical roles at every level of ecclesiastical administration, and (ii) the legal-formal 
separation of Church and State which, however, should in no way weaken the link 
between Church and nation.53 The participants at the conference announced that their 
decision to form a tactical alliance with Tritsis and the PASOK government on 
questions of Church-State reform was based on the fact that the “government has 
demonstrated its interest in [seeing] the most decisive possible impact of the Church 
in the realm of Greek society.”54 Equally important was the lay-intellectual’s 
perception of Tritsis as a creative thinker, appreciative of the dynamism of Orthodoxy 
as a force for progressive social change, and of the links between Orthodoxy and the 
collective identity.55
This working alliance between the Theological League and Tritsis may well 
account for the vehemence of the official Church reaction. In television debates, 
Church liturgies, and massive demonstrations in Athens and Thessaloniki, the official 
Church called on the Greek public to protect Orthodoxy against State intervention and 
NS 1700.56 Nevertheless, NS 1700 was voted into Law on 8 April 1987. The ND
52 Ibid., p.305.
53 Ibid., p.306.
54 Ibid., p.308.
55 For more on Tritsis’ relations with Syndesmos, see Prodromou 1993, p.307.
56 The Church hierarchy’s intense reaction is evidenced by its appeals to the UN, the 
World Council of Churches, even the Vatican, and by the absence of the higher clergy 
from the liturgies and parades during National Independence Day. Karagiannis 1997, 
p .192.
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opposition party abstained from voting and denounced the Bill as “fraudulent, anti- 
ecclesiastical, anti-constitutional, and nationally dangerous.”57 The official Church 
categorically refused to co-operate in the implementation of NS 1700.
In the wake of the ratification NS 1700, Tritsis announced the establishment of 
the Committee for the Study of Religious Issues (Epitropi Meletis Ekklesiasticon 
Thematon - EMETH). Its mandate was to formulate a new constitutional Church 
charter, which would be submitted to the Committee for the Study of Church-State 
relations (Epitropi Meletis Scheseon Politias-Ekklesias - EMSPE). According to 
Tritsis, EMSPE’s composition would include the four members of the Committee of 
Bishops, so as to provide a balanced perspective between the higher clergy, lay 
representatives of the Church, and the State.38
EMETH in due course presented Tritsis and EMSPE with a set of “general and 
specific principles” for a new constitutional Church charter, which was seen as the 
logical concomitant of the impending implementation of Law 1700. The proposals 
reduced the decision-making purview of the ministry of education and religion, and 
limited the Church’s hierarchical control in favour of greater lay and clergy 
participation. This was consonant with EMETH’s objective of revitalising the 
Orthodox Church as a dynamic agent for the modernisation of Greek society along 
democratic lines of pluralist participation. EMETH’s long-term goal was the 
administrative separation of Church and State by “an extended process of freedom 
and democracy in the Church.”59
The events that followed the formal submission of the proposals to EMSPE 
well illustrate the main problematic discussed in this chapter. The example of Church- 
State relations shows very clearly how -  due to historical, cultural, political and 
economic reasons -  PASOK had evolved from a radical socialist party with a 
maximalist strategy for the structural modernisation of society, into a catch-all party 
with a populist ideology and an increasingly hierarchical, clientelistic approach to 
decision-making. Events demonstrated the Church’s detrimental yet powerful role,
57 ND president Mitsotakis declared that “...not even Mohammed the Conqueror in the 
course of our long-lasting enslavement contemplated enslaving the Orthodox Church 
in the way the PASOK government is doing.” Karagiannis 1997, p. 192.
58 Prodromou 1993, p.312.
59 Ibid. 1993, p.312.
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and how far political expediency had penetrated the Church higher clergy and posed a 
real obstacle to the modernisation of Greek civil society.
The prelates’ representatives on EMSPE refused to even consider the EMETH 
proposals and a parliamentary vote was avoided. The key participants disregarded the 
existing framework and moved to the most senior level. Archbishop Serapheim 
bypassed EMETH, EMSPE and Tritsis, and arranged a private meeting with Prime 
Minister Papandreou.60 This meeting brought a turning point in what had become a 
public confrontation between Church and State, Papandreou targeting his criticisms at 
Tritsis, gradually distancing himself from the controversy and adopting an 
increasingly apparent conciliatory stance towards Church demands for the abrogation 
of Article 8 in Law 1700. Tritsis submitted his resignation.61 He was persuaded to 
withdraw it on Papandreou’s assurance that the discussions with the Archbishop had 
not deviated from the EMETH proposals. Following yet another round of meetings 
between Papandreou and the Archbishop the government issued an official statement 
that a preliminary agreement satisfactory to both Church and State had been 
reached. Tritsis’ promptly resigned from both his post and the PASOK party on 9 
May 1988, and was replaced by the Prime Minister’s son G. Papandreou. In August 
1988 Parliament passed a “Special Accord on the Holy Monasteries Conceding 
Agricultural and Forest Land to the Public.”63 This effectively emasculated Law
60 On 1 March 1987 the Archbishop wrote to Papandreou requesting a meeting. In this 
letter he urged Papandreou to intervene “at the eleventh hour” before it was too late to 
avoid the obvious danger to relations between the two institutions. Konidaris 1991, 
p.57.
61 Article 8 concerned ousting the archbishop from his decisive position in ODEP (see 
above), and the re-instatement of the “conciliatory structure” with mixed 
participation. Prodromou 1993, p.314.
62 Papandreou’s reconciliatory attitude emerges from his comments after the final 
meeting: “The archbishop, who is a personal friend, discussed with me issues 
concerning Church-State relationships, and we are in total agreement.” Karagiannis 
1997, p. 194.
63 Prodromou 1993, p.314. More generally, it may be argued that, as in the earlier 
crisis over Cyprus, both Church and State had to adjust their positions in the light of 
geo-political developments. On this occasion, the Church-State conflict over NS 1700 
coincided with a “hot episode” in the Aegean concerning Greece and Turkey. As the
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1700, by officially cancelling the property concessions stipulated in the Tritsis law, 
and indicated Papandreou’s consent to suspend the democratisation endeavours of 
EMETH.64
2.3.3 Open-ended Questions for the 1990s
The dual approach to Church-State relations by the 1980s PASOK 
governments reveals that, despite the partial secularisation and modernisation of 
Greek society in accordance with a rather idiosyncratic concept of socialist 
democracy, the Orthodox Church continued to play a significant role in public life. 
Although PASOK’s initial radicalism was able to effect the social changes necessary 
to resolve historical contradictions over the meaning of modernity in Greece, the 
internalisation of these long-lasting contradictions in the ideological-discursive and 
organisational structure of the government turned this radicalism into a catch-all 
strategy. Its electoral success notwithstanding, this meant that in order to mobilise its 
heterogeneous base of popular support PASOK had to rely on symbolic successes to 
reinforce the party’s image, sometimes at the expense of democracy itself. In other 
words, the government’s idiosyncratic policy-making framework meant that it had to 
be all things to all people, while simultaneously engaged in the extremely difficult 
task of modernising the Greek economy. The revisions in Greek family law epitomise 
the government’s ability to gain symbolic capital by presenting the social legislation 
as a modernising victory over the forces of conservatism. Despite granting significant 
concessions to the Church on the civil-marriage issue, PASOK, at least partially, 
achieved its target of secularising Greek society with a civil-marriage option, 
decriminalising adultery, and abortion legislation.
Similarly, the decision to replace Kaklamanis with Tritsis during the crisis 
over NS1700 was part of the party’s image policy to appoint individuals with radical 
anti-establishment credentials to positions where the tension between tradition and 
change is susceptible to symbolic manipulation. However, once Tritsis’ iconoclastic
Archbishop wrote to Papandreou, politicians and priests should resolve the issues 
between them so they could return to their posts close to the people to “boost the 
morale of the nation in the light of potential danger”. Konidaris 1991, p.60.
64 This was clearly welcome to the Prime Minister. In an address to his ministers 
Papandreou asserted, “If there is disagreement between Church and State, then we 
always have the Prime Minister.” Karagiannis 1997, p. 187, and Konidaris 1991, p.35
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attitude threatened to cause a public rupture between Church and State, Papandreou 
resorted to an organisational tactic that undermined both PASOK’s target of 
modernising Church-State relations, and the democratic procedure itself. In view of 
broader electoral considerations, Papandreou did not hesitate to marginalise Tritsis 
and so undermine the credibility of a member of his own cabinet as well as the latter’s 
policy achievements.
PASOK’s apparent inconsistency over Church-State relations is a reflection of 
wider dynamics that might be understood as part of a legitimacy crisis in the Greek 
State. It is particularly instructive to situate this legitimacy crisis in the context of the 
conflict between Church and State that is grounded in different conceptions of the role 
of religion in the definition of collective identity in the modem democratic Greek 
polity. Between 1975 and 1988, PASOK’s politico-ideological legitimacy relied on a 
number of different discursive strategies concerning modernisation and traditional 
Orthodoxy. Its leadership’s endorsement of the legal-formal separation of Church and 
State may be viewed as acceptance of the central premise of the modernisation theory. 
Specifically, that modernity required a reformulation of the legal arrangement 
between Church and State if it was to reflect the relativity of religious worldviews, 
and to reinforce the principles of rationality and pragmatism whose archetype can be 
found in the individual institutional make-up of the secular West.65
The party’s understanding of Church-State separation, however, also seemed 
to be built on a flexible and realistic interpretation of the role of religion in a modem 
pluralistic democracy. The underlying logic of this strategy evolved from a 
maximalist/radical interpretation of Church-State relations into a rather syncretic one. 
The emphasis on the links between Church and nation reflected an awareness of the 
historical importance of Christian Orthodoxy in Greek culture, and aimed to forge a 
platform of communication and legitimacy between Orthodox sensitivity and the 
socialist collective imagery. Despite Papandreou’s firm convictions concerning the 
imperative of Church-State separation, by replacing the Church-State dyad with that 
of Church-nation, he clearly rejected a rigid equation of secularisation with the 
marginalisation of religion.66
65 This view was strengthened by the fact that, prior to PASOK, Church-State 
Synallilia was strongly influenced by the political Right, culminating with the 
dictatorship of the colonels’ junta.
66 cf. Casanova 1994, pp. 16-17: “Those versions of the theory of secularisation which
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In contrast to PASOK’s position, the Church’s stance on legal-formal 
separation and, by extension, on the secularity-modemity problematic, was one of 
entrenchment. The prelates’ support for Synallilia remained largely intact, based as it 
was on privileged constitutional treatment for the Greek-Orthodox Church. This view 
implies a logic that considers the European integration values of cultural pluralism 
and secular modernity as undesirable, seeing them as a threat to the vitality of religion 
in Greek society.67 PASOK’s gradual modification from a radical-maximalist to a 
syncretic-populist party resulted from a conscious decision to reduce the possibility of 
a legitimacy crisis arising from the divergent views of religion and modernity.
PASOK’s ideological legitimacy could hardly afford the political cost of an 
open confrontation with the Church over which of the two strategies for modernising 
Greek society was more legitimate. Papandreou’s claim of an indissoluble bond 
between Church and nation perpetuated a major weakness in the legitimacy of the 
Greek State in terms of its ability to stand as the leading modem institution 
responsible for defining and protecting the nation. The State’s weakness as the 
purveyor of national identity was rooted in the peculiar legal-constitutional 
relationship of Synallilia which, paradoxically, had been established precisely to 
avoid such a problem (Synallilia being a co-operative relationship between Church 
and State). However, as a result of attempts by successive regimes to manipulate the 
message, symbols, and heritage of Orthodoxy for the exclusive use by the State in 
constructing the ethnic-national imaginary, the legitimacy of the two institutions
begin precisely with such an unfounded assumption and conceive the process of 
secularisation as the progressive decline of religious beliefs and practices in the 
modem world are indeed reproducing a myth that sees history as the progressive 
evolution of humanity from superstition to reason, from belief to unbelief, from 
religion to science. This mythical account of the process of secularisation is indeed in 
need of desacralisation.”
67 It is interesting in this respect to consider Grace Davie’s questioning on how the 
EU, seen as a social entity, can contribute to the construction of an integrated 
European identity, considering the diverse role of the religious factor, at the one end 
leading to efforts at rapprochement, and at the other strengthening the entrenchment 
of some Orthodox and Protestant groups towards what they perceive as the threat of a 
mostly Catholic Europe. See Davie 2000.
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became intertwined, rendering each vulnerable to the other’s veto. Because the long- 
lasting legal-constitutional arrangement between Church and State had added to the 
State’s legitimacy problem concerning national identity, PASOK’s commitment to the 
complete institutional separation of Church and State was a sine qua non for any 
successful prospect of building a stable pluralist democracy where State and civil 
society existed as autonomous, yet complementary spheres of activity.69 PASOK’s 
failure to achieve this separation, due to its deteriorating economic performance 
highlighted the State’s inability to legitimise itself on the basis of its dual policy, and 
meant that Papandreou could hardly afford to challenge the Church in a struggle that 
could easily escalate to include questions over whether either institution could claim 
exclusivity in the matter of representing the people or the nation.
The legitimacy question is related to yet another aspect of Church-State 
relations. The concentration and personalisation of power in the leaders of both 
institutions illustrates how institutional factors define the overall nature of the
70relationships between religion and politics in public life in Greece. Both Church 
and State claimed to be making decisions on behalf of “the people” who, in fact, were 
ignored or marginalised in a dialogue restricted to the senior levels of both 
institutions. In the disputes over the revision of family law, Church property, and 
democratisation, the leadership of both institutions justified the institutional power 
struggle in ideological terms grounded in respective visions of how to organise 
society. Yet society itself remained apart, oscillating between the Church which 
charged the State with trying to impose ideological criteria on the ecclesiastical rights 
of the laity, and the State charging the senior clergy with obstructing full participation 
of “the people” in the life of the Church. With the exception of a few televised debates 
and two Church-orchestrated demonstrations, exclusion of that very collective that 
both Church and State claimed and pledged to protect has severely compromised the 
credibility of either leadership with regard to legitimate authority over the regulation 
and definition of the Greek collective identity. The compromise by Prime Minister 
Papandreou and Archbishop Serapheim was in fact a sensible tactical manoeuvre by
A good example of this manipulation of Orthodoxy is the junta regime’s slogan of a 
“Greece of Christian Greeks.” The association of Church and junta contributed to a 
legitimacy crisis for both the Church and the State.
69 Prodromou 1993, p.330.
70 Ibid. 1993, p.331.
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two problematic institutions to retain a joint, however imperfect, mandate over the 
definition and protection of the identity of the collective.71
Shifting the emphasis away from the legitimacy question, it seems equally 
requisite to assess the importance of the need, expressed by popular ordained elements 
of the Church, to re-negotiate the meaning and realisation of the religious message of 
Orthodoxy. The lay-reformist tendency represented by the Syndesmos-EMETYi 
factions argued that the social message of Orthodoxy was becoming irrelevant to 
public and private life in modem society because the prelates had managed to obtain a 
monopoly over its interpretation. This view was not necessarily novel and indeed, 
throughout modem Greek history several religious groups have expressed their 
discontent regarding Church-State interpenetration.72 The lay-reformist opposition to 
the conservative clerical factions was unique, however, in that they conceived 
Orthodoxy and modernity as complementary. Unlike other factions (e.g. the 
theological brotherhood Zoq),73 which in the past had tried to affect political change 
through the conservative means of Church-State interpenetration, they understood the 
religious message as meaningful for transforming the country’s contemporary social 
reality in terms of pluralism and democracy.
From this perspective, the Theological League decision to co-operate with the 
Greek State assumed a reflexive relationship between religion and politics beyond the 
problem of Church-State interpenetration. The fact that the ideological vision for 
democracy-building and popular participation was caricatured by State patronage and 
hierarchical meddling does not diminish the importance of the reformists’ decision to 
embark on civil-society politics so as to revitalise the popular voice in the Church. 
Nonetheless, the failure of both Tritsis as a representative of the radical remnant of 
PASOK, and of the reformist intellectuals representing Orthodoxy’s popular strata to 
shape the debate in democratic terms shows the persistence of organisational and 
ideological constraints that are typical of the “democratic deficit” in Greece during the 
1980s.
71 Ibid. 1993, p.335
72 The Neo-Orthodox faction, for instance, attempted to criticise the Church’s 
subjugation to the State as a “spiritual deficit” for which Greek Orthodoxy had been 
suffering since it became “just another department of public administration.” Neo- 
Orthodoxy, ch.5 is one of three case studies to follow.
73 The fundamentalist brotherhood Zoe is discussed in chapter 4.
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What was the outcome of Church-State interactions under PASOK in the 
1980s, and which open-ended questions emerged for Church-State relations during the 
1990s?
First, PASOK’s election with a huge majority, on the basis of its platform for 
democratic transformation through institutional restructuring of society, gave the 
government a broad mandate for reformulating the roles of Church and State. On the 
other hand, the dualism and purely formalistic results of PASOK’s religious policy 
suggest that the party leadership was ambivalent about how to use that electoral 
mandate to define Church-State relations within the context of a modem democracy. 
Did the subsequent ND administration from 1990-1993 adhere to this dual logic? 
Have the much hailed post-Papandreou PASOK governments taken any fresh steps to 
modernise its relations with the Church?
Secondly, during the 1980s Church influence on State religious policies took 
both an oppositional and a co-operative form. The conflicting stands by the higher 
clergy and lay theologians suggested fragmentation within the Church. Different 
actors pursued different strategies and goals for the Church but, remarkably, they all 
shared a mutual willingness to enter politics in order to use State power to achieve 
ecclesiastical goals.
Is the prospect of a possible change in the leadership of the Church Hierarchy 
likely to seriously affect the continuing negotiations with the State? Are there other 
currents within the Orthodox Church that deviate from the logic of conservatism? 
Given that in the 1980s both State and Church linked their institutional roles in the 
public sphere to their respective concepts of the collective-national identity, what is 
their stance regarding the increasingly Europeanised official political strategy of the 
1990s? Moreover, does the widely acknowledged resurgence of a religiously informed 
nationalism in Greece and elsewhere affect the country’s emerging role in the 
transitional context of democracy-building in the Balkans during the 1990s?
Our methodology for addressing these issues relies as much on an analysis of 
the government’s policy vis-a-vis the legal-constitutional separation of Church and 
State, as it does on the cultural dimensions of the relationship, particularly concerning 
secularisation, nationalism, and European integration. It is quite remarkable that none 
of those involved in the Church-State dialogue during the 1980s ever questioned the 
government’s emphasis on the link between State and nation. Has this attitude 
changed in the 1990s? How does absorption into the European Union and the new
modernisation agenda of Prime Minister Simitis relate to Orthodox culture and 
identity?
Throughout this work much importance is given to historical analysis for an 
understanding of culture as a subjective order of meanings, cognitions, and values that 
have a determinant impact on politics; by the same token, politics shapes the 
reconstruction of culture.74 The mixture of secular-political and sacred-religious 
precepts that formed Greek culture were reinforced and perpetuated by the 
interpenetration of Church and State. PASOK’s dual religious policy during the 1980s 
can be understood as an attempt to supersede both the religious and secular 
inconsistencies and contradictions in Greek culture, and resolve the power struggle 
between Church and State for control over the construction and reconstruction of 
national identity. The government’s underlying strategy was to establish the 
unrivalled legitimacy of the State for defining and protecting national identity, while 
insisting on the institutional separation of Church and State as a prerequisite for 
modem pluralist democracy. By dissolving the constitutional bond PASOK implied 
that the Church could become like any other institution or interest group in Greek 
civil society.
The Church’s ability to successfully mobilise political power to block the 
government objectives not only reinforces the implication of PASOK’s policy that 
Christian Orthodoxy is an inalienable component of the Greek national identity, but 
also that privileged constitutional treatment has preserved the Church’s claim to 
participate with the State in the definition and protection of that identity.75
This questions the State’s legitimacy as the undisputed arbiter of the nation in 
the Greek collective identity. Any explanation of the Church’s ability to affect the 
State’s religious policies during the 1990s must, therefore, account for the mutually 
determined relationship between politics and culture.
2.4. The Situation in the 1990s (1988 -  1998)
2.4.1 Historical and Theoretical Perspectives
Overshadowed by the tension and turmoil of the 1980s, Church-State relations 
between 1988 and 1998 went through a phase of relative stagnation, precipitating
74 Prodromou 1993, p.366.
75 Ibid. 1993, p.368.
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another modernisation challenge as the Greek Church prepared to face the new 
millennium under a new leadership. Based on four issues (secularisation, 
democratisation, the question of ecclesiastical property, and westernisation), the 
chapter examines more recent developments in the following order: (i) the fate of NS 
1700 (property), (ii) the faction of the Ieronymites (democratisation); and (iii) the 
Church vis-a-vis European integration (westernisation).
A salient feature of all societies is the tension generated by the interaction of 
local cultures and global processes. In sociological terms, this phenomenon has been 
discussed within the modemity/post-modemity framework. While certain
7 f\commentators maintain that religion still has a significant cultural role to play, 
others77 claim that religion in late modem societies should be understood primarily as 
a form of cultural resource rather than an autonomous social institution. Both 
approaches are particularly instructive for our own study of the correlation of Greek- 
Orthodoxy as a social institution and/or cultural legacy, and of contemporary social 
change in a modem democratic culture.
Earlier in this work a historically-oriented interpretation of Greek-Orthodox 
political culture was given in terms similar to the cultural logic of syncretism: by 
occupying an ambivalent position between the rational cultural forces of western 
Enlightenment and the mystical apophatic tradition of eastern Orthodoxy, the political 
cleavages and cultural resources which shaped the main Greek institutions have failed 
to resolve the tension between tradition and modernity and perpetuated long-standing 
cultural inconsistencies. Moreover, the interpenetration of Church and State, the 
Church’s association with the national identity and its identification with the 
(conservative) ideological projects of the State, have contributed to a legitimacy crisis 
of the two major Greek institutions and to an extensive democratic deficit in Greek 
society.
To recapitulate, there are four basic areas of overlapping interest between 
Church and state in contemporary Greece: (i) cmcial parts of the Civil Code as they 
relate to the family (marriage, divorce, abortion, etc.); (ii) the contentious issue of 
State involvement in Church administration through the ministry of education and 
religion, and the appointment of bishops, especially the Archbishop of Athens and All 
Greece; (iii) the financial affairs of the Church, emoluments of the clergy, and the
76 Bell 1976; Robertson 1986 and 1987; Kokosalakis 1995c; Roberts 1995.
77 Beckford 1989; Huntington 1996.
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question of ecclesiastical property; and (iv) the cultural unity and homogeneity of 
Greek society, which involves the sensitive issue of the cultural constitution of 
modem Greek identity, religious and cultural pluralism and the awkward area of the
70
ideological legitimation of the Greek nation-state and of political ideology. Each of 
these overlapping areas of interest will be examined below in contexts of specific 
examples from Church-State negotiations between 1988 and 1998.
In more general terms it must be stressed that PASOK’s dual strategy of 
modernisation via nationalism remained unchanged during the 1990s, despite the 
succession of different governments and the challenge of the European Union’s 
integration policy. This confirms the view that the Church-State and Church-nation 
association in contemporary Greece has always been manipulated by both institutions 
in order to cement social order and cohesion, and to legitimise their pursuit of policies 
which at times were completely inimical to the values and implications of Orthodox 
culture. For example, when the conservative New Democracy party returned to power 
in 1989, it followed liberal-capitalist, almost Thatcherite policies and an austerity 
program of economic stabilisation that primarily affected the lower and middle strata 
of the population. These policies, which were congruent with global capitalist 
developments, once more acutely posed the problem of social inequality and injustice 
in Greece.79 Prime Minister Mitsotakis, when announcing his program to parliament, 
found it necessary to stress the importance of Church and religion in the context of 
global socio-economic change: “In our country religious freedom is guaranteed by the 
constitution, and we Greeks have confirmed in our history that we respect all religious 
faiths. Orthodoxy, however, is the bedrock of the nation. Orthodoxy can and must 
play a significant role, especially today in the context of the cosmogonic changes 
taking place around us in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union. It 
is a spiritual force of global dimensions and surely supports the State in our ethnic 
concerns. This relation of Church and State must be both smooth and undisturbed.”80
Given this close connection between Church and State, Orthodoxy frequently 
becomes an ideological tool in the hands of politicians from whatever part of the 
political spectrum, for purposes that have little or nothing to do with the spiritual
78 Kokosalakis 1995b.
79 Ibid., p. 260.
80 Minutes of Parliament, 24 April 1990, Ibid., p.260.
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ideals and vision of Orthodox Christianity.81 Both Papandreou and Mitsotakis adhered 
to the dictum that a political leader must always publicly exhibit religiousness to 
bolster his public image. So while PASOK constitutionally introduced and promoted 
the option of civil marriage, Papandreou, true to his party’s dual logic and political 
tactics in 1989, remarried in Church according to Orthodox tradition. In August 1990, 
while out of office, he also visited the bishop of Fiorina, an uncompromisingly 
fundamentalist upholder of the Orthodox tradition.82
Given the long legacy of Church-State interpenetration for reasons of each 
side’s political expediency, it is not surprising that there should be increased emphasis 
on Orthodox symbolism in pre-election periods. The opportunism that made PASOK 
abandon its initial position on Church-State separation because of prohibitive political 
costs persisted throughout the period between 1988 and 1998. In the election 
campaign of 1990 the ND party categorically denounced the abuse of Orthodoxy by 
the PASOK government. The political motivation behind this is obvious, at a time 
when PASOK was accused of anti-Orthodox policies (re NS 1700). Just before the 
1990 election, the leaders of both PASOK and ND met separately with Archbishop 
Serapheim and stated they would not interfere with Church administration in the 
future by violating its “autonomy”. Such declarations are of course pure rhetoric. It 
suffices to remember that only just below this apparently smooth surface lay the shaky 
construct of NS 1700 which had been voted into law by parliament a few months 
earlier. Full implementation of even this modified version of the ecclesiastic Bill was 
to generate a new round of open confrontation between Church and State, which 
could hardly be prevented by the standard pro-Orthodox discourse of the politicians. 
Such formalism contributed to the general confusion surrounding the meaning of 
Orthodoxy in Greek political culture, and confirmed once again that nationalism (i.e. 
association of Church and nation) is an indispensable ideological device in the hands 
of Greek politicians and the priesthood, regardless of any consolidation of Greece’s 
orientation in the EU.
Throughout the thesis this unsatisfactory situation has been assessed in relation 
to the notion of a political and cultural populism. Further substantiation requires 
investigating how populism manifested in Church-State relations. One prime example
81 This is not an exclusively Greek phenomenon. Makrides 1991b (p.291) cites a 
contemporary example from Israel. See Davis 1989, pp.483-95.
82 Makrides 1991b, p.292.
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of the populist tactic has already been identified and examined in PASOK’s dual logic 
during the 1980s. Within the Greek political culture, this strategy towards Orthodoxy 
operates at two levels, abstract and concrete. In the first, Orthodoxy is idealised as a 
cultural entity closely related to the historical development of the ethnic identity and 
the future of the Greek nation. It is not viewed as a religious tradition proposing a 
specific way of life and requiring absolute faith and obedience, but simply as one of 
the basic components of contemporary Greek culture.83 In this way, “Orthodoxy is set 
free from its essential religious foundations and used as an instrument for various non­
religious purposes (for the control or legitimation of the social system; for social 
integration, as a common core of values helping to maintain social order). Greeks 
belonging to this category are not necessarily Christian-Orthodox believers.”84 The 
second, more concrete operational level derives from an understanding of Orthodoxy 
as a specific religious tradition and the only authentic expression of Christianity. 
“This naturally implies faith in Orthodoxy as the sole true religion and as dictating a 
specific way of life within the secular world. Such viewpoints are not generally 
accepted by Greeks seeing Orthodoxy at an abstract level, who express the dominant
O f
cultural consensus.”
Apart from a few notable exceptions,86 Greek politicians usually belong to the 
first category. It is in any case not easy to combine the expediencies of a secular State 
with the requirements of a fairly conservative religious tradition. Yet both for the 
idiosyncratic socialist modernisation of Papandreou during the 1980s and in the 
Thatcherite ideology of ND (1990-1993), and indeed under the post-Papandreou 
PASOK governments,87 the Church-nation connection consolidated and enhanced its 
already privileged position. This demonstrates the crucial role of Orthodoxy for the
83 Ibid., p. 294.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Papathemelis, a prominent figure of the so-called patriotic faction in PASOK and a 
former cabinet minister, is strongly Orthodox and emphasises in particular the 
Church-nation connection. This prompted him to disagree openly with his party’s 
Church policies.
87 This period stressed the need for modernisation, rationalisation, pragmatism, and 
EU integration, and the struggle against the “old” ideological devices of despotism, 
populism, clientalism, and formalism.
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Greek State, and shows that changes at the level of Church-State relations (e.g. their 
separation) are very difficult to implement in a political culture that is highly sensitive 
and over-protective towards Orthodoxy and strongly stresses the association of 
Church and nation.
Traditionally, the political exploitation of Orthodoxy has generally been much 
easier for the Right, which has consistently profited from the fear of communism 
among Orthodox believers. Ceaseless propaganda and active canvassing now extend 
across the entire politico-ideological spectrum, with all sides in favour of 
Papandreou’s “socialist” appropriation of the discourse of nationalism and Orthodoxy 
(previously reserved for the conservatives). This tendency manifests even beyond the 
ideological confines of political culture and can now be observed in a more general 
“patriotic” turn in Greek popular culture towards the re-appropriation of a variety of 
discourses that have been hitherto limited to certain groups of people with a common 
ideology or an exclusive cultural background.88 In the context of the present study, 
this proliferation of Orthodox symbolism to an ever wider network of cultural and 
political forces is aptly exemplified by Neo-Orthodoxy. The objective of this current 
of Orthodox theologians, left-wing intellectuals, and lay believers was to make the 
rediscovered cultural heritage an instrument for emphasising the Orthodox tradition in 
modem society. They searched for the spiritual source of the nation in order to 
enhance their quasi-Marxist, quasi-Orthodox critique of the hegemonic capitalist 
West, and to identify it as the foundation of Greek values rather than imported foreign 
ideologies of emancipation.89
Another aspect of cultural confusion is the fact that, as a result of some of the 
aforementioned processes, in modem Greece there is neither separation nor 
bifurcation between the private and the public domain as far as Orthodoxy is 
concerned. A sacred/profane dichotomy does not exist. The fact that the Church-State 
and Church-nation dyads still go together in their public assertion of Orthodoxy 
proves that this tradition permeates all of Greek society, at the popular as well as the 
official level, and ritualises all social and individual life.90 As a result, secularisation
88 An example is the glamorisation of Rebetika and other forms of Greek folk music 
previously confined to marginalised groups or the working classes.
89 More details on this in chapter 5 on Neo-Orthodoxy, and in the chapter on historical 
background.
90 Makrides 1991b, p. 299.
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is not as uncomplicated as in some of Greece’s partners in the EU. In theory, 
secularisation presupposes that religion loses its previous pivotal role in modem, 
functionally differentiated, increasingly specialised and rationally organised societies, 
and becomes simply a subsystem or a “cultural resource”. In the Greek case, however, 
due to the long association of Church, nation, and State the differentiation of society 
and the institutionalisation of its various sectors neither led to a complete 
disappearance of religion from the political sphere, nor did it debase its social 
message into mere rhetoric: “The fact alone that the attitude of the State on this issue 
is ambivalent -  since on the one hand it tries to limit Church influence, and on the 
other there is no serious evidence of their impending separation -  shows the 
complexity of the issue under discussion.”91
The discussion of developments in Church-State relations during the 1990s 
that follows will pave the way for an empirical investigation of three modem Greek 
organisations concerned with the relationship between Orthodoxy, the State, and the 
nation. On the one hand there are the religious fundamentalists and other strict 
believers who, due to their enthusiasm for the Church-nation-State triad, are more 
influenced by the Synallilia model and seek the closest possible collaboration and 
alliance with State power (for them, the State means primarily the armed forces or the 
police, rather than the government).92 On the other are the members of the Orthodox 
Academy of Crete and the movement of Neo-Orthodoxy, whose orientation is 
characterised by reformism, selectivity and fragmentation. Just as the fundamentalists 
project their ideological conservatism in a dogmatic interpretation of Orthodoxy, the 
reformists rationalise Orthodoxy in whatever way best meets their need to criticise the 
status quo and denounce the impact of state patronage. Nevertheless, such reformist 
zeal does not attack the Church-nation connection, which has remained largely intact 
or is even enhanced.
This increased emphasis on the Church-nation-State alliance, which
• • cnculminated in the 1990s, may also be seen as an aspect of the globalisation process.
91 Ibid.
92 It would be interesting to examine how such fundamentalist circles share similar 
nationalist visions with the extreme Right (e.g. the collaboration between Zoe and the 
junta), and particularly whether the idiosyncratic modernisation during the 1980s and 
1990s meant any serious disruption of this connection.
93 When Prime Minister Mitsotakis visited Mount Athos (Sept. 1990), he stressed that
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According to Robertson, globalisation means making the world into a single socio­
cultural space because “all societies have become increasingly subject to global 
constraints” which largely originated in the West. Religious traditions felt obliged to 
offer some answers to these radical developments. Some Orthodox organisations are 
more oriented towards a global-pluralist society and try to adjust to the new situation 
(e.g. the Orthodox Academy of Crete). Other groups interpret developments more 
negatively, mainly because they feel threatened by the idea of a unitary world. This 
defensive reaction can be understood if we take into account an important 
consequence of globalisation (in the Greek case, EU integration): the perceived threat 
which emanates from the dramatic proliferation of western culture at the expense of 
traditional, ethnic, and cultural identities.94
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Church of Greece officially expressed its 
scepticism regarding these developments, and that anti-European trends became quite 
common in the 1990s among several of the country’s religious organisations. Finally, 
the excessive sensitivity concerning the persistence of the Greek national identity, 
shared by both clergy and politicians, presents a serious challenge to the westernising 
strategy of certain modernisers who regard a separation of Church and State as a 
panacea and automatic solution to the problem of cultural confusion. Perhaps such a 
rupture in the historical consciousness of the Greek people would create even greater 
problems. In previous chapters we discussed how former ruptures of this
iL
consciousness, e.g. the forced and mechanistic Europeanisation in the 19 century, 
created tensions between tradition and modernity that are still largely unresolved, as 
was so clearly manifested in the 1980s’ conflict between Church and State over NS 
1700. Similar to what happened during the second PASOK government (1985-1988), 
the State in the 1990s continued the same policy and shifted its emphasis from the 
maximalist strategy of Church-State separation towards an amelioration of more 
specific contentions by means of compromise and a logic of gradualism.
Orthodoxy can help the Greek nation in the present harsh times, and underlined his 
intention to bring religion and God back to the schools to instill sound principles into 
the young. He also added: “Orthodoxy will not die. Orthodoxy will survive.” 
Makrides 1991b, p.303.
94 Ibid., p.304; and Robertson 1985, pp. 31-42. Also Beckford and Luckmann 1989, 
and Robbins and Robertson 1987, pp. 39- 51.
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However, the assessment below of the fate of NS 1700 in the 1990s shows that 
even this modified version of the ecclesiastic Bill could not be implemented unless 
certain vested economic and political interests in both Church and State were 
seriously challenged. In this manner the Church could secure greater economic and 
administrative independence from the State -  an undoubtedly positive step. However, 
this solution required bringing in a state attorney, as several cases of financial fraud 
and unlawful deals were revealed.95 Since the human,96 economic, and political cost 
of such serious allegations would inevitably have had repercussions on the electoral 
objectives of both PASOK and ND, let alone the credibility of the Church hierarchy, 
it is not surprising that the whole process ground to a halt. At the same time, both 
politicians and clergy remained secure behind the nationalist Church-nation-State 
discourse, which enjoyed unprecedented legitimacy and popularity during the 1990s.
2.4.2 The Fate of NS 1700
During the crisis over NS 1700, a number of monasteries appealed to Greece’s 
highest legal body of civil justice and administration (the Council of State), 
concerning certain Articles of the Bill proposing the nationalisation/socialisation of 
several monastic properties. Their main legal argument was that the Article would be 
in clear violation of the constitutional right of religious institutions to operate freely 
and manage their finances independently.97 The Council of State rejected the 
monasteries’ appeal, and upheld the constitutional legitimacy of NS 1700 in terms of 
the dual logic that “...in her capacity as the dominant religion as established by the 
constitution, the Orthodox Church (along with several secular institutions) is an 
integral part of the State infrastructure and devoted to the highest service of them all, 
the law of morality and ethics... This constitutionally guaranteed jurisdiction, 
however, may not be extended to issues of administrative legislation and legal 
authority, which are determined according to modem exigencies of Greek society, in 
the light of new perceptions for the mutual benefit of Church and State.”98
95 They concerned management of the Church’s vast property.
96 The human cost involved the prosecution and imprisonment of prominent members 
of both State and Church who had profited from scandalous deals.
97 Ramiotis 1997, p.29.
98 Ibid., pp.29-30.
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The ratification of the Bill by the Greek courts and parliament prompted an 
unprecedented act on the part of the Greek Church. Bypassing the long-lasting legacy 
of Synallilia, which would have permitted recourse to negotiation and compromise in 
the two top hierarchical levels," and ignoring the negative consequences for the 
image and unity of the Church-nation-State concept, eight Greek monasteries laid the 
matter before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on 5 June 1990. On 
9 December 1994, the European Court finally reached its decision. Whereas it 
rejected the suit of three of the monasteries on the basis of their legal-formal contracts 
with the State prior to NS 1700, the Court vindicated the remaining five, and 
acknowledged that with NS 1700 the Greek State was violating Articles 1 and 6 of the 
Treaty of Rome concerning human and property rights.100 The implication of this 
ruling on the property rights of monasteries extends far beyond the purely legal 
argument, and once more acutely questions the State’s legitimacy to stand as the 
undisputed arbiter of the nation in the Greek society and collective identity. As the 
Greek courts are obliged by international and national law to comply with the 
Strasbourg decision, the Church gained a symbolic victory over the secular authority 
of the State in the matter of protecting the human rights of the Greek citizens and, 
most importantly, did so by secular European legal means. In other words, the Church 
managed to discredit the overriding rationale of NS 1700 which had attempted to 
legitimise the proposed changes by associating secularity with “catching-up” with the 
rest of Europe and facilitating Greece’s EU integration.
The Strasbourg experience further slowed down the already gradualist pace of 
developments in the matter of Church-State separation.101 In fact, even 10 years after 
the Bill was introduced, the situation was still pending for should the State have 
decided to implement it after all, a total of seven trillion drachmas (about 20.5 billion 
Euros or 13.5 billion pound sterling) would have been payable in compensation to the 
five monasteries.102
Given the seriousness of the allegations of financial fraud and scandalous 
misconduct in the management of its vast property,103 it is not surprising that the
99 Cases in point were the Papandreou and Serapheim meetings in 1987.
100 Ramiotis 1997, pp.276-82.
101 See section 1.1 above for gradualism.
102 Karagianis 1997, p. 196.
1 OT This implicated members of the clergy, prominent politicians, and other state
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Church too is relatively content with the current stagnation. This “latency phase” also 
owes something to the fact that between 1990 and 1996, Greece had four different 
governments.104 On the one hand, there was never enough time to implement a stable 
political program, and on the other, once a party had come to power it gave priority to 
amending the resolutions made by its predecessor.
The catch-all strategy of dualism (modernisation via nationalism) was thus 
perpetuated by the Archbishops’ and politicians’ public pronouncements concerning 
the abstract concept of separation, while both were acutely aware of the underlying 
issues that could very well jeopardise their own threatened legitimacy. So for example 
Archbishop Serapheim argued: “Personally, I am in favour of the separation between 
Church and State ... but this issue requires a great deal of consideration ... there are 
pros and cons.... but we would rather separate a hundred times than suffocate in the 
State’s embrace and intervention. The Church is afraid of nothing and nobody. There 
are always enemies of the Church. Even if we should separate we are not going to 
disappear.... But let us not discuss it at the present time... it demands a lot of thinking 
and discussion.”105 In another interview he said: “For so many years Church and State 
have walked side by side. Let us not forget that the Church has always been the 
protector of our people. Its role is still important today. It is a liberating, spiritual, 
national, social, cultural, and philanthropic role. Such decisions should not be reached 
in the heat of the moment. If, however, this would protect us from the kind of problem 
we are facing, I personally am in favour of separation.... on condition, of course, that 
the role and importance of Orthodoxy will be safely assured, for I see so many more 
people today deeply involved and affected by the Church.”106
In summary: Dualism and gradualism vis-d-vis Orthodoxy and Church-State 
separation informed the governments of both PASOK and ND between 1988 and 
1995.107 In consequence, the changes set out in NS 1700 have not yet been
officials.
104 After the so-called “ecumenical” coalition government of 1989-90 came that of 
ND’s Mitsotakis (1990-93), Papandreou (PASOK 1993-95), and Simitis (PASOK 
since 1995).
105 Interview in the Sunday newspaper To Vima, 11 July 1993.
106 Karagianis 1997, p. 184.
107 During 1989 there was a coalition government (“ecumenical”) between ND and a 
coalition of the Left.
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implemented, despite the significant intellectual input from lay academics, clergy, and
1 08politicians in the specially drawn-up committees of the 1980s.
2.4.3 Democratisation I: Church-State Separation through Constitutional
Amendments
A new opportunity for democratisation arose when Konstantinos Simitis 
succeeded the late Papandreou as Prime Minister. Simitis epitomises the modernising 
trend within PASOK and did not hesitate to confront the “presidential” faction that 
adheres to the old, largely populistic socialism of Papandreou. Confident of his motto 
“Modernisation now” and “Battle of the new against the old”, Simitis managed to 
gain election within his own party (a few days after Papandreou’s death) as well as the 
national vote in Sept. 1996. He pledged that no political cost would make him shy 
back in his struggle against the parochial and obsolete logic and practice of populism, 
despotism, clientalism, and statism. The chief aim of his program was rationalisation 
of the public sector and State infrastructure, by means of the extremely difficult task 
of dealing pragmatically and meritocratically with the economic deficit produced by 
the so-called “problematic” State-owned corporations entrenched behind powerful 
trade-unions. Concerning foreign policy, Simitis promised to handle the “national 
issues” soberly and realistically so that alongside a stable economy and an increase in 
foreign investments, the country’s negative international image would be rehabilitated 
and Greece’s proper integration with the EU ensured.109
The fact that between 1995 and 1998 the Church-nation-State association 
remained intact notwithstanding Simitis’ iconoclastic campaign against traditionalism, 
proves that Orthodoxy is still a sine qua non in the Greek political culture, and the 
indispensable element in the fabric of Greek nationhood that the majority of 
politicians have considered one of their best card in the ideological game of 
establishing and sustaining public legitimacy and social consent.
108 See sections 2.2 and 2.3 on EMETH.
109 This policy stood in stark contrast to Papandreou’s nationalistic Euro-scepticism, 
which had prompted Huntington (1996) to characterise Greece as an anomaly within 
western institutions because of her support for Serbia, sanctions against the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, her uncompromising attitude towards Turkey, the 
Balkan Orthodox alliances, etc.).
100
Simitis’ gradualist political strategy with respect to Church-State 
interpenetration is aptly exemplified by PASOK’s tactics on certain amendments to 
the constitution debated in parliament in 1995 and 1996. Although the party reopened 
the question of separation, it did so merely to suggest an amendment (of paragraph 1 
of Article 3) “in the direction of the gradual consolidation in the Church’s self- 
governance.... which will facilitate the separation of Church and State.”110 The 
gradualist logic of this proposition would imply that the inalienability of the bond 
between Orthodoxy and nation does not permit the removal of additional Articles 
from the constitution so as to expedite complete separation. Evangellos Venizelos, 
professor of constitutional law and a leading adviser in the post-Papandreou party was 
quite outspoken on this. As the then-minister of Press he commented that a relevant 
amendment of the constitution “should not challenge religious feeling, sensitivity and 
tradition, but merely rationalise the institutional relationship between Church and 
State.”1"
The ND party remains adamantly opposed to any changes and would wish to 
consider the position of the Church hierarchy before arriving at any firm conclusions. 
Among the smaller parties only the KKE (hard-line communists), and the Coalition of 
the Left (moderates), support complete separation. The position of the Church was 
expressed by a specially appointed committee of five bishops,112 which found that the 
hierarchy opposes a separation of Church and State, and that the proposed 
constitutional amendment of Article 3 should not go forward.
The government’s response to the synod decision reflects an understanding of 
the situation that is clearly affected by the imperative to avoid an open rift between 
the two institutions. The experience of the conflict over NS 1700 in the 1980s and the 
Strasbourg verdict of 1994 have strengthened the position of the Church and a new 
round of bitter disputes over constitutional amendments would potentially be highly 
detrimental to the government’s social legitimacy, hi these circumstances PASOK has 
adopted ND’s position and withdrawn all its propositions, even including the 
minimalist amendment to Article 3. Officials of both State and Church have mobilised 
all means at their disposal to present their agreement in such a way as would enhance 
their respective public image. In a televised ceremony held at synod headquarters,
110 Karagianis 1997, p. 185.
111 Ibid., p .186.
1 1 Among them was the future Archbishop Christodoulos.
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upper clergy and prominent politicians from the two main parties sealed the 
agreement with mutual embracings and pompous pronouncements about the 
inalienable bond of Orthodoxy and Hellenism.113
The text of the synod’s statement clearly illustrates that the rationale 
underlying this compromise involves the ideological struggle for legitimacy of both 
Church and State as it relates to the secular and sacred-religious aspects of the Greek 
national identity and consciousness: "... The Holy Synod considers the separation 
between Church and State.... a catastrophe for the future of both institutions, 
inconceivable for the Greek-Orthodox conventions, at odds with our long-lasting 
spiritual and cultural heritage, and nationally detrimental for the survival of the entire 
Hellenic nation. In a time of imperative need for the consolidation of the unity of 
Hellenism, the separation ... may prove in effect extremely hazardous, ... lead to 
loosening our people’s spiritual cohesion, to the fragmentation of ecclesiastical unity 
... with the final consequence of dividing Hellenism.”114
2.4.4 Democratisation II: State Interference in Church Affairs, and
Church Interference in Politics (the Ieronymite Conflict)
Before considering the second major conflict in Church-State relations during 
the 1990s, we must first briefly look at the doctrinal and institutional aspects of 
Orthodoxy. The doctrinal dimension is understood as the message of the Christian 
religion. The institutional dimension is the Church, comprised of ordained and lay 
strata.
The account below of the Ieronymite conflict makes it clear that the 
fragmentation of the doctrinal and institutional dimensions of Greek Orthodoxy, and 
particularly the discord within the institutional strata, was part of the broader 
interpenetration of politics and religion that has operated ever since the colonels’ junta 
of 1967. This fragmentation is seen in the lack of cohesiveness between the ideas of 
the religious doctrine and the institutional structure intended to realise them. The main 
reason for the doctrinal-institutional incongruity has to do with the State intervening
113 Karagianis 1997, pp. 186-87.
114 Ibid., pp.230-31.
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in ecclesiastical affairs in order to ensure official Church co-operation in its domestic 
and foreign politics of nation-building.115
The 1967 junta’s immediate intervention in the Church occurred by virtue of a 
State decree, thereby setting a precedence for State decision-making in the internal 
structure of the Church. In addition to ordering the mandatory retirement of the then- 
Archbishop Chrysostomos, the State replaced the existing synod with a “meritocratic” 
one, mandated to elect a new synod and an Archbishop whose final approval still 
remained subject to the State.116
The State’s approval of Ieronymos as the new Archbishop of Athens and All 
Greece reflected the colonels’ belief that the new Archbishop’s earlier activist history 
(during World War II and the civil war), as well as his roots in the fundamentalist 
brotherhood Zoe, and his position as the long-time chaplain of Greece’s royal family, 
made him the ideal candidate for the State’s project for “the moral regeneration of 
society based on devotion to ... nationalism, anti-communism and the Orthodox
117Church.” Because of Ieronymos’ association with the dictatorship, assessments of 
the Church’s evolution under his leadership and the impact of his tenure on the 
Church’s public role have been marked by intense polemics.118 The discord began 
with Ieronymos’ emphasis on the financial autonomy of the Church from the State, 
and brought an open split of the synod into Ieronymite and anti-Ieronymite factions. 
Given that over one-third of the bishops in the synod were junta appointees, it took 
four years of internecine fighting among the ordained, and the eventual involvement 
of the Council of State before the anti-Ieronymites succeeded in having a set of 
episcopal appointments by Ieronymos overturned. These events are relevant for the
115 The doctrinal-institutional fragmentation and the period of the junta will be further 
discussed in the chapter on the fundamentalist brotherhood Zoe (4.2.3).
116 For a summary of changes see Frazee 1969, pp. 148-49, and Prodromou 1993, 
pp. 155 and 183-84.
117 Frazee, p.148, and Prodromou 1993, p .155.
118 Chapter 4 will return to the matter of Ieronymos’ reformism. Despite his liaison 
with the junta, some considered him a suitable choice because of his intellectual 
sophistication and record of social activism. Yannaras a leading member of the Neo- 
Orthodox group, confirmed this view in an interview with the author on 10 Jan. 1998. 
See also Yannaras, 1983.
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1990s with respect to the attitude of Archbishop Serapheim (1974-1998) and the new 
democratic regime towards the prelates elevated during Ieronymos’ tenure.
Once democracy was restored, the way Prime Minister Karamanlis and the 
new Archbishop dealt with the Ieronymite prelates illustrates how power-politics 
permeate the whole fabric of Church-State relations, as well as how public sentiment 
against the authoritarian regime was manipulated in the interest of private ambitions, 
political expediency, and the overall strategic game of legitimation. Both the 
government and the Church were set on improving their strategic position concerning 
the legitimate authority for defining and controling the nature of the new democratic 
regime and its effect on the modem Greek identity. Each realising that Ieronymos’ 
aspirations for the administrative and financial autonomy of the Church were 
detrimental to the complimentarity of Synallilia, Church and State joined forces to 
eliminate the Ieronymite faction from the 77-member synod. The fact that the 
Archbishop had collaborated with the hated dictatorial regime provided an ideal 
pretext.
The new status quo included a State decree depriving the Ieronymos-appointed 
bishops of their constitutional right to appeal to the Council of State, and the 
appointment by Serapheim of new “loyalist” bishops, which assured him a majority in 
the synod. In this way several well-known and popular bishops were obliged to seek 
refuge outside Greece.119
This situation remained unchanged throughout the 1970s and 1980s, although 
on a number of occasions lay people campaigned in unruly demonstrations (involving 
clashes with riot police) in favour of the deposed Ieronymite bishops. This again 
shows that PASOK’s socialist modernisation during the 1980s could not afford to take 
effective measures towards democratising Church-State relations. Finally, under Laws 
1816 (15 Dec. 1988) and 1877 (9 March 1990), the Ieronymite bishops were granted 
their constitutional right as Greek citizens to appeal against their deposal in the 
Council of State.120
This did not, however, indicate any wider changes, nor any significant lay 
participation in Church-State relations. It simply underscored the powerful role of
119 Among them was Anastasios the current Archbishop of Albania, who found refuge 
in the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, and has been among the 
Ieronymites acknowledged for their broad views and extensive diaconal mission.
120 Karagianis 1997, p. 196.
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personal relations and religious clientelism in the Greek political culture. So the 
protagonist of the promotion and implementation of Law 1877 was I. Palaiokrassas, 
finance minister in the coalition government of 1990. As a member of the brotherhood 
Zoe (whose president was Ieronymos), and financial administrator of ODEP during 
Ieronymos’ years in tenure,121 Palaiokrassas served in ND’s post-junta government 
and as a Commissioner of Greece in the EEC.
The higher clergy’s reaction against Palaiokrassas was immediate and 
defensive. Archbishop Serapheim gave his own version of the events that led to Law 
1877: “ ... The State, through Palaiokrasas, passed a law which took the Church by 
complete surprise... The arrangement was made so the minister could fulfil his 
personal obligations. The time has come for the people to know that Palaiokrassas 
was a close friend of Ieronymos; they both came from the Cyclades and Ieronymos 
had appointed him director of ODEP ... It seems that the man could not forget his 
kinship with those (deposed bishops) who belonged to religious brotherhoods. All 
who were elevated by Ieronymos had been members of similar organisations: Zoe, 
Sotir, etc...”122
The minister’s reply to the Archbishop avoided the issue of his connection 
with Ieronymos and the brotherhoods and emphasised instead the democratic and 
constitutional nature of the decree: “... under a State decree introduced by the junta, 
the twelve bishops who were deposed by the Archbishop [Serapheim] were also 
deprived of the right to appeal against their deposal in the Council of State. I consider 
this State decree, the only one still in force from the junta period, as clearly anti- 
constitutional. Every Greek citizen should have the right to appeal to the Council of 
State”. '24
121 •ODEP, Organisation for the Administration of Church Property (Organismos 
Diekisis Ekklesiastikis Periousias).
122 Karagianis 1997, p. 198.
123 This refers to the period from November 1973 until the fall of the regime in 
August 1974 when, as a result of an internal coup within the military government, the 
new leaders decided to shun Ieronymos and invited Serapheim to administer the 
Church. A detailed analysis of that period is given in chapter 4 on Zoe.
124 Karagianis 1997, p. 198. The excerpts are from the Minister’s interview with the 
newspaper Apogevmatini, published on 6 July 1993. Question by journalist: “Is this 
amendment a result of your own initiative exclusively?” Minister: “Yes, it was my
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The turmoil that followed the announcement of the decree very well illustrates 
the extent to which power politics have penetrated the religious sphere, and the ability 
of prelates to mobilise their lay supporters in rather extreme forms of activism. 
Several Ieronymite bishops exercised their right of appeal against their “holy 
brothers” elevated by the predominately Serapheimite hierarchy. The agitation was 
not confined to the premises of the Council of State, and quickly spread to the streets 
of several dioceses. Violent clashes between followers of the two opposing factions 
brought out the riot police and terminated in a number of arrests. This partisan 
behaviour was largely the result of the “colonisation” of the religious sphere by both 
politicians and politically-minded prelates who were trying to benefit from the 
situation by accusing each other and claiming that the choices and timing of the 
episcopal appointments rested on political and clientelist affiliations stretching back to 
the junta years.
With all these intertwined vested interests at stake, the State opted for a 
strategy of compromise, since an irrevocable solution to the problem would entail too 
high a political cost for the winning faction. Between 1990-1993, therefore, the ND 
government of Mitsotakis both acknowledged and respected the Serapheimite 
majority in the synod, and at the same negotiated with the last three Ieronymite 
bishops for a viable solution (all the others were meanwhile deceased).125 PASOK, on 
the other hand, remained totally opposed to the Ieronymites, chiefly because they had 
been elevated by the junta. Matters became further complicated when the Council of 
State in July 1993 vindicated bishop Theologos’ appeal for reinstatement in the 
diocese of Larissa, and subsequently prosecuted the Archbishop for failing to comply 
with this verdict. This triggered a vociferous reaction from Serapheim, who joined 
forces with the PASOK opposition against what was perceived as a State-engineered 
attempt to control the administration of the Church and give in to the Ieronymite 
bishops in return for political support. Finally the government, wishing to prevent the 
potentially harmful political repercussions of its pro-Ieronymite position, decided to 
suspend all legal actions against the prelates. On 21 July 1993, following an intense 
debate in the Ministerial Council, Prime Minister Mitsotakis announced the
own initiative.”
1 9^ Under a statute passed on 31 May 1991 the Church hierarchy offered to reinstate 
these three bishops in dioceses of lesser importance created specifically for this 
purpose.
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government’s decision to this end, and added: “...the involvement of the Council of 
State in ecclesiastic affairs, and particularly the prospect of prosecution, should not 
upset our relation with other Orthodox countries, patriarchates, or Churches 
abroad.”126
Once the threat of legal action against the Church had been lifted, the synod 
proceeded to ensure the virtual elimination of the Ieronymite bishops by defrocking 
them, on the grounds that they had failed to comply with its decision. The Ieronymites 
remained intransigent and responded with a new round of appeals to the Council of 
State, accompanied by demonstrations and riots in the dioceses of Larissa and Attica. 
In due course, in February 1996, the Council of State irrevocably rejected the three 
bishops’ appeal. However, neither the Council’s decision nor the subsequent death of 
Theologos (bishop of Larissa) brought the issue of the Ieronymites to a close. As will 
be shown in the next chapter, the Ieronymite faction within the synod (bishops who 
either belong to brotherhoods or supported the ecclesiastic model of Ieronymos),127 
played a decisive role in the election of the new Archbishop after the death of 
Serapheim in April 1998.
2.4.5 The Westernisation Dilemma: Church and State Relations,
Secularisation, and EU Integration
The European Union’s attempt to forge a supranational European identity is 
arguably the greatest challenge the Greek-Orthodox Church has had to face in the 
1990s. The bond uniting Church and State in Greece having been cemented in the 
course of their long historical and cultural past, both institutions have a legitimate 
basis for justifying the close association of Orthodoxy with national identity and the 
cultural constitution of modem Greek society. In the 1980s Papandreou attempted to 
buttress his idiosyncratic socialist modernisation with a cultural policy that aimed at 
incorporating into the Church-nation connection the previously excluded Centre-Left, 
and so to divest nationalism of its mainly conservative ideological connotations. 
However, the populist nature of his strategy generated huge confusion over the 
meaning of modernity and the role of Orthodoxy in the largely secular, institutionally 
differentiated political culture of the EU in the 1990s.
1
Karagianis 1997, p. 199. Mitsotakis referred to several Orthodox patriarchates 
which had condemned the prospect of prosecuting leaders of the Greek Church.
127 See chapter 4.
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On the one hand, for geo-political and economic reasons, the Greek State 
followed a pro-European strategy and expressed no reservations whatsoever in 
subscribing to the Maastricht and Shengen agreements. On the other hand, for reasons 
of internal consumption, the State has evinced the highest interest in emphasising and
enhancing nationalism in Greece, while remaining strangely indifferent to various
• • 128 manifestations of chauvinism and intolerance.
Global socio-economic changes thus have enhanced the ethnic functions of the 
Greek Church. While the official Church adopted a cautious strategy and did not 
openly condemn the State’s pro-European stance, some bishops, lower clergy, and lay 
groups have exhibited a rigorous conservatism and intransigently promoted the 
absolutism of Orthodoxy, along with an almost irredentist, xenophobic and racist 
discourse on the “national issues” and Greece’s integration with the EU. There has 
always been a significant conservative-nationalist element among both the Orthodox 
clergy and laity, but the neo-traditionalism of the 1980s and the widespread 
nationalism of the 1990s are unprecedented, inasmuch as they are accompanied by 
attempts at large-scale modernisation projected alike by Papandreou’s socialism in the 
1980s, Mitsotakis’ neo-liberalism (1990-1993), and Simitis’ democratic Europeanism 
today (since 1995). These three different political strategies of modernisation have not 
only failed to manifest a strong willingness to challenge the structural interpenetration 
of Church and State, but have actually contributed to the continuing expansion of 
nationalism and the consolidation of the Church-nation connection, which has now 
acquired a peculiarly modem legitimacy.
With respect to the Orthodox attitude towards Europe, this generalised type of 
nationalism can be observed in the hostility towards EU integration that is shared by 
both the Neo-Orthodox and fundamentalist movements.129 Although the upper clergy 
seem reluctant to engage in open confrontation with the State over EU integration, 
they implicitly endorse Euro-scepticism in that it takes no initiatives whatsoever to
128 Aside from examples pertaining to Orthodox chauvinism, evidence of such 
discrimination is found in the xenophobic and racist reaction to the influx of Albanian 
immigrants, the nationalistic fervour with which the media and politicians welcome 
Greek successes in international sports and many other mainly aesthetic fields (e.g. 
music), which points to an increasing glamourisation of anything Greek (in contrast to 
the “xenomania” of the 1960s and 1970s).
129 More about those two movements in subsequent chapters.
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promote any positive prospects for Orthodoxy in a unified European civil society. The 
examples that follow are all indicative of the positions of various Greek-Orthodox 
prelates and organisations towards the EU agreements of Maastricht and Shengen, the 
dramatic increase of foreign immigration into Greece, the role of Greek Orthodoxy in 
the recently emancipated eastem-European Orthodoxy, religious and cultural 
pluralism in Greece, and the so called national issues. We shall investigate the 
fundamentalist movement in a later chapter;130 here it suffices to note that its Euro- 
scepticism is clearly anti-Semitic and anti-Occidental, as witnessed by their frequent 
references to “dark powers”, “Zionist plots”, and “Papal conspiracies” against 
Orthodoxy.131 There has also been extensive talk of the coming of Antichrist, so much 
so that the government was actually obliged to put into abeyance an act concerned 
with new identity cards, because the fundamentalists claimed that the number 666 (the 
Number of the Beast) was somehow hidden in the new cards.132
The government’s unwillingness to overcome such fundamentalist dissent and 
implement an uncompromising secularisation policy, seems to imply its tacit consent 
to a civil society that is vulnerable to irrational obscurantism and susceptible to party- 
clientelistic patronage and ideological manipulation. It is also indicative of an unholy 
alliance between religious fundamentalists and left-wing Euro-sceptics, the two main 
poles of reaction against the Shengen and Maastricht accords.133
In other words, Papandreou’s normalisation of the discourse of nationalism 
and its subsequent standardisation during the 1990s has had a profound impact on the 
relations between Orthodoxy, political culture, and civil society, inasmuch as it has 
encouraged reactionary entrenchment and theological conservatism in religious 
organisations and the official Church itself. To the extent that the Synallilia doctrine 
of the Church-State connection entails Church support for the imperative European 
orientation of the Greek State,134 this combination of heterogeneous strategies vis-a-
130 The Neo-Orthodox and the Orthodox Academy of Crete are the subject of two 
additional case studies (chapters 5 and 6 respectively).
131 Kokosalakis 1995a.
132 Ibid., p.261 
1 This is discussed at greater length in chapters 4 on fundamentalism (Zoe) and 5 on 
Neo-Orthodoxy.
134 Apart from economic considerations, Greece’s European orientation is considered 
imperative by almost all political parties, due to reasons of geopolitical integrity (the
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vis Europe and modernisation inevitably results in a discourse of syncretism. 
Henceforth, modernisation in contemporary Greek political ideology does not include 
the cultural values and implications of secularisation.
In accordance with this line of thought, the president of the Greek Theological 
Association told delegates at their 1990 annual conference: “After the collapse of the 
Marxist-Leninist regimes and the complete failure of the capitalist system to form 
humane communities, Orthodoxy is the only possibility for united Europe to become a 
community with a human face.”135
Archbishop Serapheim expressed his fears not only concerning the impact of 
socio-economic change on the Greek ethno-religious identity, but also of a perceived 
threat emanating from the proliferation of religious and ideological pluralism in Greek 
society: “It is no exaggeration to say that never since the establishment of the Greek 
State in 1830 has our nation faced a more serious crisis than today. Our problem does 
not lie only in our weak economy.... Our problem is spiritual, ethical, and cultural. 
Like Hercules, the mythical hero, our nation finds itself at the crossroads of choices 
and re-orientations. Our entry to the new world of a United Europe is connected with 
the agony and the struggle for the safeguarding of our national, cultural, and 
especially our spiritual and religious continuity... All kinds of propaganda from East 
and West flood our country and create tragic victims among those who have no 
foundation in the faith and traditions of our fathers. Para-religions and heresies, 
various ideologies, and even magical cults ensnare our brother Greeks, ostensibly in 
the name of progress and freedom.... Let us then remain steadfast in our faith, our 
traditions, our ethics and customs, in everything that constitutes the specificity of 
Hellenism through the centuries. I, therefore, call on you all to gather around the 
Church, a tower of strength and the antidote against the corrosion of our Greek- 
Orthodox identity, our race itself.”136
Given the upheavals in the Balkans during the 1990s (the Bosnian war and the 
Macedonian question), and the still unresolved Greco-Turkish conflict, the connection 
between Orthodoxy and the “national issues” has become even stronger. Combined 
with a huge influx of foreign economic immigrants into Greece and the perennial 
debate between Europhiles and Euro-sceptics renewed in the light of Greece’s place
threat of Turkey).
135 Kokosalakis 1995a, p.261.
136 Ibid., p.261.
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in the supranational EU, these previously chiefly political issues have attracted the 
attention of several politicians, prelates, and civil-society groups with a vested interest 
in appropriating Orthodox symbolism for their own political expediency and 
legitimacy. Hence Antonis Samaras, a former minister of foreign affairs in the 
Mitsotakis government (1990-1993), founded a new party (Political Spring) and 
emphasised the role of Orthodoxy in a political agenda intended to sensitise Greek 
public opinion to real or potential national threats. In announcing his platform (June 
1993), he stressed the role of Orthodoxy as a major factor in shaping his foreign 
policy towards other Orthodox countries in the Balkans and Russia.
At the same time several members of the clergy, confident in their legitimate 
role as protectors of the nation, manifested a racially discriminatory, xenophobic, or 
ultra-nationalist attitude and are blatantly at odds with constitutionally guaranteed 
basic human rights. Examples are the curfew that was proposed by a local priest for 
Albanian immigrants in a village in the province of Drama; the arbitrary refusal of 
another priest to officiate at a burial service because the deceased had been married in 
a civil ceremony; the adamant opposition of several dioceses in Attica and Thrace to 
grant permission for the building of mosques; the ordeals of a Catholic and an atheist 
student of theology who were not permitted to register at the University; or the case of 
two high-school professors who were facing legal prosecution because they refused to 
join in the compulsory morning prayers.137
Usually, the Greek legal system has upheld the constitutional legitimacy of 
suits associated with religious freedom, and almost always has ruled in favour of 
citizens or groups who are discriminated against because of their religious affiliation 
or their atheism. Yet the persistence of certain undemocratic Articles in the 
constitution and the provocative indifference of the Greek political mainstream, the 
media and civil society towards such phenomena of intolerance and arbitrary 
despotism, only underscores the pivotal role the Greek State attributes to the 
promotion of Orthodox nationalism.
137  •Bishop Panteleimon of Thessalonika is perhaps the most outstanding case of 
uninhibited racism and ultra-nationalism. In the official ceremony on the anniversary 
of Greek independence (25 March), numerous ministers and parliamentarians watched 
him launching a vociferous attack on “our foreign enemies, Turks, Skopjans and 
Albanians” and warned them, “go back to your countries, Greece is for Greeks”. 
Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 11 April 1998.
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Apart from reasons of internal legitimacy, there are even more significant 
sociological reasons that serve to strengthen Church-State relations and the role of 
religion in Greek society. It is now well understood that all national societies are 
shaped and transformed by global, socio-economic forces and political processes. As 
globalisation grows, so does the need for an awareness of cultural roots and identity. 
The following statement by Robertson is fully applicable to Greece: “A pressure to 
connect religious and State domains in the modem world, regardless of the degree to 
which there is formal, constitutional separation, arises from the fact that increasingly 
we face the problem of the plurality of cultures and faiths at the global level, and that 
circumstance is almost certainly also a source of our becoming more conscious of the 
‘deeper’ aspects of modem life. By the same token, consciousness of roots, tradition, 
heritage, and so on increase the likelihood that societies will draw upon religio- 
cultural resources in defining their identities and that movements within and across 
societies will invoke religious symbols.”138
2.5 Summary
While Greece has entered the EU as a full member and as her economy and 
polity are increasingly becoming part of an interdependent supra-national socio­
economic framework, so her cultural and ethnic identity undergoes an experience of 
heightened tension and insecurity. Religion in this context, as Kokosalakis argues, is 
the most immediate and most amenable cultural resource to give not only a cultural 
response to the global socio-economic forces, but also provides cultural boundaries 
for a continued identity.139 Despite the resurgence of the Orthodoxy-nation dyad, 
however, neither the Church nor the political mainstream, nor public opinion 
generally are objecting to Greece’s membership in the EU. But the fact that much of 
the legislation concerning citizenship and religious rights is now being enacted in 
Brussels or Strasbourg, combined with Greece’s unequivocal decision in favour of a 
European geo-political and economic future, seems to present a definite danger for the 
historical and cultural hegemony of the Orthodox Church in Greek civil society. As a 
result of this, as well as the fact that pluralist components are increasingly penetrating 
the whole fabric of the relatively homogenous Greek culture (especially through the
138 Robbins and Robertson 1987, op.cit. p. 96.
139 Kokosalakis 1995a, pp. 254-55.
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recent influx of all kinds of legal and illegal immigrants, as well as through the 
proliferation of various western consumer subcultures and alternative lifestyles), there 
is apprehension that sooner or later the strain and tension between Church and State 
will become increasingly severe.
Whether and how these strains could be managed depends largely on the 
Church’s ability to reflect on such radical and unprecedented social changes in a way 
compatible with the Zeitgeist of the modem Greek political culture. On the one hand 
this necessitates concessions, modification, and compromises to cope with the modem 
exigencies and avoid a renewed demand for total Church-State separation. On the 
other hand the Church will continue to maintain and enhance its privileged and 
exclusive position as the main institution responsible for the definition and protection 
of the Greek national identity. Inevitably, this ideological project entails several 
antinomies and contradictory values that reflect the complexity of the Greek case and 
the eminent confusion surrounding the issue of the country’s integration in the secular 
culture of the EU.
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CHAPTER 3
THE END OF SERAPHEIM’S LEGACY. AND THE NEW 
ARCHBISHOP CHR1STODOULOS
3.1 From Serapheim to Christodoulos
Any meaningful conceptualisation of the lack of institutional differentiation 
between Church and State in contemporary Greece must go beyond the legal-formal 
interpenetration of these two main Greek institutions. The more inclusive approach of 
this thesis emphasises that the democratic deficit in Greek political culture can be 
partly attributed to the personalisation of power at the higher-elite levels of each 
institution. It is the charismatic authority of the main actors on both sides that is partly 
responsible for the concentration of power in specific individuals and the concomitant 
marginalisation of lay participation.1
The career of Archbishop Serapheim, who died on 10 April 1998, was a 
striking example of the difficulties that can arise in Church-State relationship in 
extreme circumstances. It was one of the earliest acts of the colonels after the 
establishment of the military dictatorship in April 1967 to elevate Ieronymos to the 
highest ecclesiastical office in Greece. When his patron, Colonel Papadopoulos, was 
ousted by Brigadier Ioannidis in November 1973, Ieronymos was likewise deposed 
and Ioannidis engineered the election of his own nominee, Serapheim, as Archbishop. 
Whereas Ieronymos had been unanimously elected by a “specially selected or 
meritocratic synod” composed of eight Bishops (nominated by the junta), Serapheim 
was elected by 20 members of a synod consisting of 32 Bishops nominated by the 
Ioannidis regime (out of a total of 66 Bishops in the country as a whole). General 
Gizikis, one of the junta’s protagonists, assured Seraphim’s election by excluding 
from the electoral body more than half the Bishops as possibly hostile to his protege. 
Serapheim therefore was the second non-canonical Archbishop in succession. When a 
few months after his enthronement the colonel’s regime collapsed, he remained in 
office despite the purges of junta appointees in other areas. A brilliant tactician, 
Serapheim not only remained in his post -  even officially swearing in the newly 
reconstituted parliament -  but appeared immune to any criticism from the Left that he 
was tainted by association with the colonel's regime.
Epitomising our contention that personal relationships occupy a pivotal role in 
the Greek political culture in general and in Church-State relations in particular, 
Serapheim’s immunity can be partly attributed to Florakis, the leader of the newly
1 See chapter 2 on how the special committees organised by Tritsis were marginalised 
as Papandreou and Serapheim decided to negotiate the issue between themselves.
legalised Communist party, who helped to protect his old friend from the time of the 
resistance against the German occupation, despite considerable disagreement from 
left-wing politicians.
“The Church is neither politics nor opposition” is how Serapheim defined his 
own role, and how he justified the manoeuvring necessary to negotiate the position of 
the Church with a succession of different governments during his record quarter- 
century at its head. He showed little inclination, however, to soften the Church’s 
hegemonic stance towards Greece’s small religious minorities and fervently supported 
the constitutional ban on religious proselytising. Serapheim’s concerns tended to be 
narrowly parochial and made little impact on the Christian Ecumenical movement. He 
seemed reluctant to tackle any of the great spiritual and intellectual questions of the 
age, and his measures to improve the educational level of parish clergy did not go far 
enough. He not only rebuffed overtures from the Vatican, to which he attributed the 
darkest of motives in “stealing Balkan souls”, but also scorned the Orthodox 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew for his liberalism and ecumenicism.
Although, therefore, he had the managerial and personal skills to hold together 
an institution much given to factionalism and ridden with constitutional disputes, he 
did not display any great vision of the role of the Church in a rapidly evolving society. 
The crucial question for Serapheim’s successor was whether a possible modernisation 
of the Church could be confined to giving it a more sophisticated public image, or if it 
will include more substantive and structural changes towards democratisation. Would 
the new Archbishop perpetuate the intense factionalisation at the hierarchical level 
which was the result of the Ieronymos and Serapheim periods? Is it realistic to 
anticipate a democratisation process that will mark the end of what had effectively 
become the regimentation of the Church leadership?
As had happened in the early 1980s in politics with the advent of a socialist 
government, the prospect in the late 1990s of a new leadership in the Greek Church 
provided the opportunity for altering the official status of the Church in society and 
for significant changes in the organisational life of the Church. Indeed, during the six 
months between the death of Serapheim and the first samples of the new Archbishop’s
2 It will be shown below how two laws passed during the Metaxas dictatorship (1936- 
40) guarantee the privileged treatment of the Orthodox Church over other faiths by 
forbidding religious proselytising.
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policy there was an unprecedented rise in political and public interest concerning the 
role of Orthodoxy and the Church in Greek society. The issue of the Church-nation - 
State connection ceased being the preoccupation of an influential but relatively small 
proportion of academics, politicians, clergy and lay believers, and became national 
headlines capturing the attention and interest of all Greeks. We shall try to account for 
developments during this transitional period by looking at contested issues such as the 
autonomy of ecclesiastical administration (Church-State separation), social pluralism 
and tolerance regarding religious and ethnic minorities, amendments to the 
Constitution for secularisation and democratisation, religious education, and finally, 
the role of the Church vis-a-vis EU integration and the so-called national issues.
3.1.1 The Election
Serapheim insisted on his right to exercise office for life. In an unprecedented 
move (March 1998), some of the 77 Bishops now making up the Holy Synod asked 
him to step down because of poor health.3 The response from his deathbed was to 
dismiss “the vultures circling around to get me”. This macabre detail illustrates how 
the State, by means of a mix of power politics and tactical alliances, had reinforced 
the archiepiscopal prerogatives of decision-making to create a virtual despotism 
within the Church. By the same token, this concentration of authority encouraged the 
formation of backstage factions and alliances, since any chance of dialogue and 
democratic representation within the synod was subject to final consent by the 
Archbishop. At the time of the election, therefore, the synodal body was deprived of 
any motivation for a democratisation of the ecclesiastical structure, and intra- 
hierarchical debate was severely undermined. The Archbishop was effectively armed 
with two forms of recompense vis-a-vis his Bishops: penal or promotional.
In this respect and concerning the pertinent role of charisma and personal 
relations in Greek political culture, the identity of candidate Bishops is central to the 
nature of the Church’s future prospects. The difficulty for the 77 Bishops was 
deciding whether to sustain the established modus operandi of Church-State
J 59 of the 77 bishops were appointed in Serapheim’s period, nine of the remainder 
are Ieronymites (elected between 1967 and 1974), and the other nine were elected 
prior to 1967. Newspaper To Vima, 26 April 1998.
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interpenetration, which requires the undisputed authority of a single negotiator in the 
person of the Archbishop, or to follow the ancient paradigm of synodicity where the 
Archbishop is first among equals and the lower clergy can participate in elections and 
voice opinions in Church matters. Despite the obvious democratic merits of the latter 
option, this was not easy to implement. The late Archbishop had virtually eliminated 
any residue of the Ieronymite faction and managed to elevate his favourite Bishops 
who, in return for their loyalty, were granted their customary honours. Serapheim in 
fact had forged a benevolent hegemony, inasmuch as he rarely met with any 
opposition and the synod reflected a strong and peaceful image of unity. This and the 
fact that he did not promote a successor for the archiepiscopal throne exacerbated the 
fear that less absolutism could lead to the resurgence of bitter disputes between 
different factions and brotherhoods which would potentially do incurable damage to 
the unity and power of the Church.
The consensus of the synod seemed to be that the new Archbishop should 
possess the necessary social and intellectual skills to revive the fading message of 
Orthodox spirituality and deploy his cultural-symbolic capital against the 
impoverishing values of consumerism, secularism, individualism, and the 
fragmentation of traditional identities. New, more sophisticated discursive practices 
and image policies were considered imperative for all those interested in a Church 
capable of surpassing its parochial and obsolete elements in accord with modern 
exigencies. In practical terms, the new Archbishop’s agenda was weighted down with 
at least four major problems.
(i) The resolution o f the complex issue o f Church property, still pending despite 
the passing of NS 1700 (see previous chapter). If no viable compromise could be 
agreed between Church and State, neither the Strasbourg verdict nor the ecclesiastical 
Bill can be implemented. According to several commentators,4 failure to satisfactorily 
deal with this problem not only damages the country’s credibility in the EU but also 
exposes the weakness and dependency of both Church and State on extra-institutional 
economic and political interests that prefer to cover up the issue rather than find a 
solution to it.
A
Law professor I. Konidaris, To Vima (26 April 1998) and theology professor G. 
Fidas, ibid.
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(ii) The westernisation dilemma, where the new Archbishop, as the head of the 
strongest, most homogenous and best organised Orthodox Church in the Balkans, is 
called to decide the role of the Greek Church towards the post-communist Balkan 
Orthodox Churches in conjunction with the official Greek foreign policy and the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. This is a highly contentious issue, 
particularly taking into account the Church's role and commitments in the EU despite 
its possible anti-western political and cultural predisposition, as well as the western- 
European (liberal, secular) orientation of the Greek State.
(iii) Several pressing social problems having been marginalised or completely 
ignored during Serapheim’s tenure, the new Archbishop will need to re-orient the 
Church towards such matters as unemployment, juvenile delinquency, drug addiction, 
racism, and xenophobia. In addition he must deal with the increasing wave of new 
religious movements and the persistence of heterodox or schismatic churches,5 and do 
so in a way that does not violate the status of Greece as a pluralist, democratic 
member of the EU.
(iv) Communication with the Ecumenical Patriarchate was minimal during 
Ieronymos’ and Serapheim’s tenure in office, and there were no visits between them. 
This had a negative impact on the Greek Church, since particularly in the 1990s the 
Patriarchate won worldwide recognition for its initiatives towards peace, ecology, and 
Ecumenical religious and cultural dialogues. Serapheim used the pretext of his bad 
health to justify this apparent lack of communication, but that did little to cover 
differences in outlook. The new Archbishop will have to restore relations with the 
Patriarchate, and find a viable third way between the inward-looking strategy of his 
predecessor and the overt ecumenicism of Patriarch Bartholomew.
During the eighteen days between the death of Serapheim and the day of the 
election (April 28), the above issues dominated the media, and a number of politicians 
and intellectuals were asked whether they were for or against Church-State separation. 
With the exception of the two left-wing parties, the representatives from PASOK, ND, 
DIKKI, and Political Spring seemed to endorse the established strategy of dualism
? See below for how the new Archbishop dealt with two schismatic churches: the Old 
Calendrists and Jehovah’s Witnesses.
6 Headed by former PASOK minister D. Tsovolas, DIKKI was a new party that was
and gradualism. On the one hand they urged the Church to use the opportunity of the 
new leadership for modernisation, while on the other they all expressed doubt about 
the introduction of amendments to the Constitution for full differentiation between the 
two main Greek institutions.
Papathemelis, a former PASOK minister argued that “In Greece the Church 
and people are identical concepts and can not be separated”,7 and suggested the deep 
organisational changes towards democratisation to “meet the challenge of the second 
millennium”. In particular he singled-out the need to upgrade the role of parish clergy 
and lay believers in the organisational life of the Church; and the gradual introduction 
of the conditions and measures which will ultimately allow the re-institution of the 
ancient system of synodicity, by which episcopal appointments are decided according 
to the public vote of parish clergy and lay believers. ND vice-president Varvitsiotis 
was even less reformist and echoed the standard gradualism of his party vis-a-vis 
Church-State separation: “No change is necessary in the established constitutional 
decrees delineating the mode of conduct between Church and State.... any initiative 
towards constitutional amendments that may alter the existing status quo is the
o
exclusive prerogative of the Holy Synod..."
Meanwhile, the four main candidates -  the Bishops of Dimitriada, Ioannina, 
Alexandroupolis, and Thebes -  during their election campaigns relentlessly 
maximised their networks of allied Bishops and factions. The outcome was highly 
unpredictable, since the limited number of voters (77) created several cases of 
overlapping promises of promotion -  the basic means by which the candidate Bishops 
tried to attract the vote of their “holy brothers”, involving transfer from some small, 
isolated, and relatively insignificant diocese to a larger and more important one.
established a few months before the elections of 1996. It attracted mainly former 
PASOK voters who could be loosely associated with the “patriotic” and “presidential” 
factions of the party. Tsovolas’ ideology claimed to be the true spirit of Papandreou's 
political logic which was supposedly undermined by the new PASOK of the 
“modernisers” and the leadership of Simitis.
7 Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 11 April 1998.
8 Ibid.
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Several denunciations came from members of the synod who realised that a fellow- 
Bishop had been promised the same diocese by the same candidate.9
Amid this rather Machiavellian procedure of religious clientelism, Bishop 
Christodoulos of Dimitriada succeeded in gaining an astonishing 49-majority vote and 
wining the election.
3.1.2 The New Archbishop
Born in 1939, Christodoulos Paraskevaides is one of the most educated and 
younger prelates. He studied law and theology at the University of Athens, and speaks 
five languages. He also studied Byzantine music and has a theology doctorate in 
canon law. During his 25 years as Bishop of Dimitriada he established himself as a 
successful and modern leader, capable of addressing the public through a wide 
network of diaconal institutions and media of communication. As one of the synod’s 
chief negotiators, he represented the Church in the 1987 crisis over NS 1700 and has 
been a regular contributor to the most prominent nation-wide Sunday newspaper.10 
According to a nation-wide survey in March 1996, the public regarded Christodoulos 
as the most appropriate choice for the post-Serapheim era.11 Confident in his 
popularity and possessing excellent public relations, the new Archbishop attracted 
unprecedented media attention and received an enthusiastic reception from the laity, 
which saw in him the personification of the Greek Church in the second millennium.
Indeed, as soon as Christodoulos' victory was confirmed, his immediate 
reaction was to announce a large-scale modernisation project for '“Church open 
towards the modern society of the 21st century.” At the same time, he declared his 
admiration for the Ecumenical Patriarch, and stated his intention to co-operate closely 
with the mother church of Constantinople, beginning with an invitation to the
9 Newspaper To Vima, 19 April 1998.
10 In his diocese Christodoulos founded the radio station “Orthodox Witness”, a 
newspaper, and a web-site and oriented his diaconal mission towards youth problems, 
drugs, AIDS, unemployment, young offenders, etc. He is also the author of more than 
forty books.
11 The VPRC institute sampled 1200 individuals in this survey. Published in 
newspaper Ta Nea, 29 April 1998.
Patriarch to visit Athens. He also spoke about the need to rejuvenate the human 
resources of the Church by appointing young and educated individuals in key
• • 19administrative positions. On the contentious issue of Church unity and the conflict 
with the Ieronymites, he insisted that there are no factions among the higher clergy, 
and emphasised that “this was reflected in the election... The politics of sterile
1 9confrontation do not facilitate the new dynamism that we envision.”
The euphoria, however, lasted only a few days, and the Archbishop’s 
popularity and tendency to comment on a variety of political issues, literally 
dominating the media headlines, started to arouse a strong feeling of unease in the 
government. The first signs of discomfort appeared at the occasion of the 
enthronement ceremony (May 6), where the State delivered a clear message of 
differentiation between the political and religious spheres, by the Prime Minister and 
the President of the Republic refusing to attend. In his introductory address, 
parliamentary Speaker Kaklamanis emphasised that Church and State each have their 
own space, and warned the Archbishop to "avoid direct or indirect engagement of the 
Church in fields irrelevant to its spiritual and diaconal mission.”14 Christodoulos 
reassured the secular authorities that the Church’s presence is “maternal, spiritual.... 
and by no means political”, but declared that “we are not going to abandon our 
precious privilege to express the Church's views on the vital problems of our 
nation.”1 ?
Despite such formal reassurances, the question of whether the new 
Archbishop’s intervention is essentially political or strictly religious epitomises the 
increasing tendency of the Greek political culture during the 1990s to give pre­
eminence to issues of identity and culture. Different actors and agencies confront each 
other in the struggle between the religiously sensitive “patriotic” faction and the
12 His first decision was to appoint Father Georgakopoulos, who conducts a religious 
program on State television, as his representative and spokesman.
13 Indeed, his astonishing 49-majority vote included the 9 Ieronymites of Zoe. His 
good relations with the brotherhoods dates back to 1961 when, prompted by his 
mentor bishop Kallinikos from Piraeus. Christodoulos joined the brotherhood 
Chrysopigi.
14 Newspaper Ta Nea, 11 May 1998.
15 Ibid.
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secular modernisers. This is as much a civilisational/cultural cleavage as it is an 
ideological and political one. In this sense, the patriotic factions both within PASOK16 
and ND are relatively content if not enthusiastic with the new Archbishop, since his 
astonishing popularity and overtly patriotic views may very well serve the 
legitimation of their own more inward-looking political strategy and cultural logic.
Certain right-wing newspapers re-introduced the term ethnarch for the new 
Archbishop, used previously to describe the qualities of men like the late Karamanlis 
who from 1974 guided Greek democracy for decades along the path of development, 
or Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus. Christodoulos’ comments and public appearances 
certainly seemed to reflect an exuberant desire to live up to this characterisation. 
Speaking on the issue of globalisation he said, “We Greeks are an exception, and next 
to us in the same exception is the State of Israel”, and “any attempt to dissociate 
Orthodoxy from Hellenism is a threat against the unity of the nation.”17 Commenting 
on a proposal from 52 parliamentarians (modernisers from PASOK and the Left) to 
abolish the religious oath in the parliament, he did not hesitate to denounce “such
I 8Brussels-imposed initiatives.”
Tension culminated when the ultra-nationalist newspaper Stohos recognised in 
the person of Christodoulos “a friend from the past” and proudly asserted that 
“Archbishop Thunder” identifies with their irredentist ideology. They gave several 
examples, such as Christodoulos lecturing at a symposium organised by Stohos to 
commemorate the fall of Constantinople, where he congratulated the editor and said: 
“Mr Kapsalis is known for his Hellenocentrism.... which is at the same time Christian- 
centrism and Orthodox. The country needs men like him.”19
The resurgence of the old cleavage between nationalists and modernisers in 
Greek political culture during the late 1990s is exemplified by the way the new 
Archbishop’s ethnocentrism has been embraced or rejected by religious organisations, 
political parties, and civil society groups. To understand the way in which religion and
16 Also referred to as “ the presidential”. Inspired by the late A. Papandreou’s 
independent and nationalist political/cultural logic, they fervently oppose what they 
perceive as blind Europeanism by Simitis and his governing modernising faction.
17 Newspaper Ta Nea, 11 May 1998.
18 Ibid.
19 Periodical S«//, issue 661, p. 17, May 1998.
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modernisation are mixed up in Greece with the debate about secularisation, 
democratisation and EU integration, it is instructive to examine how the two camps 
are situated with respect to specific issues that arose in the first six months of the new 
Archbishop’s tenure.
3.2 Democratisation, Secularisation, and Church-State Separation
3.2.1 The Political Debate
As anticipated, the end of Serapheim’s era and the elevation of a widely 
acclaimed moderniser to the archiepiscopal throne, reopened discussion on the 
contentious issue of Church-State separation. Only two days after the election the 
Coalition of the Left and Progress20 initiated the procedure of collecting fifty MP 
signatures in order to bring the issue before the forthcoming parliamentary committee 
responsible for discussing amendments to the Constitution. The parliamentary 
representative of the Coalition articulated the party’s proposal in terms of 
secularisation and democratisation: “The established system of Synallilia is a residue 
of the distant past and its shortcomings are clear and well documented.... Those who 
have a vested interest in the prolongation of Church-State interpenetration are 
manipulating Orthodoxy through the tension and turmoil associated with our national 
issues. They offer a bad service to both sides.”21
It is characteristic of the lack of communication and co-operation among 
Greek political parties that, whereas the proposal was backed by more than the 
necessary number of signatures, ten Coalition MPs were not available at the time of 
voting and the petition failed. It was followed by two more effective petitions, 
however, one from the modernising faction within PASOK, and another one from a 
wide range of influential individuals. Its 60 signatures came from MP’s, MEP’s, 
former ministers, academics, writers, publishers and journalists, who aimed to create 
forums and sensitise civil society groups to the idea of Church-State separation.
90 A moderately left-wing party which does not identify with the hard-line Communist 
party KKE.
21 The representative of the Coalition, F. Kouvelis, interviewed in the newspaper 
Kathemerini, 29 April 1998.
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Indeed, within two weeks from the launching of their declaration, five civil-society
9 9groups were mobilised and organised two open discussions. Their objective was to 
affect amendments to the Constitution that would guarantee full religious freedom as 
well as freedom of consciousness and speech: “Church-State interpenetration in 
Greece is one of our civil society’s unresolved problems in that it establishes a 
privileged ideological, legal, and administrative regime for Orthodoxy at the expense 
of other religions. This is against the liberal spirit of the Constitution and several 
international agreements (e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights)... A whole 
range of different issues, which fall in the wider field of the protection of individual 
and social rights, are directly or indirectly regulated in co-operation with or through
9Tinterference from the Church.”
Their programmatic declaration then referred to two decrees passed during the 
Metaxas dictatorship which are still in force (Laws 1363 and 1369 voted in 1938) : 
“According to these decrees the free expression and dissemination of non-Orthodox 
ideas is considered proselytism, while a special permission from the Church is 
required should a religious minority wish to exercise its constitutionally guaranteed 
right of religious freedom by building a temple or place of pilgrimage.”24 Among 
several other issues that are “unprecedented in a democratic country” they singled- 
out: (i) the compulsory registration of religion on the identity cards; (ii) the absence of 
any regulation allowing the option of a civil (non-religious) funeral service; (iii) the 
privileged treatment of Orthodoxy in the teaching of religion in secondary education 
and its compulsory nature; and (iv) discrimination against non-Orthodox or atheist 
teachers and professors.
Religious freedom, they maintained, was and still is a precondition for 
political liberty and the cornerstone of social freedom: “Unfortunately, in the Greek 
State this is not self-evident.... since on the one hand Orthodoxy is inalienably 
connected with national identity (the majority believe that only an Orthodox Greek is
22 These groups were the Citizens’ initiative for the Separation of Church and State, 
the Citizens’ Movement, the Citizens’ Union for Intervention, the Greek Union for 
Human Rights, and Nicos Poulantzas (an organisation loosely associated with the 
Coalition of the Left).
9 3" Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 5 May 1998.
24 I b i d .
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a “pure” Greek), while on the other a mutual clientelistic relation between Church and 
State is perpetuated.... The separation between Church and State does not have any 
anti-religious implications, nor does it in any sense harm the benevolent spiritual role 
of the Church. On the contrary, it enhances the Church by emancipating her from the 
State’s suffocating embrace. Yet both the parties and the government are frightened 
by the high political cost and so avoid to address the problem.”25 The text concludes 
by saying that the forthcoming parliamentary discussion on the amendment of the 
Constitution presents a unique opportunity for revising Articles 3 and 13 which are 
responsible for this unsatisfactory situation: “The one thing that is required is political 
will.... This will be a clear indication that Greece is indeed marching towards a 
democratic European modernisation rather than some merely technocratic version of 
it.”26
At the same time, 52 PASOK MPs signed a petition proposing the substitution 
of the religious oath in parliament (“in the name of the Holy Trinity”) with a secular 
one (“in the name of the Greek people and nation”). The fact that foreign minister 
Pangalos and public-works minister Laliotis subscribed to this petition brought an 
immediate and vociferous reaction from the “patriotic” majority of ND. The resulting 
hubbub reflected an increasing tendency in Greek political culture during the late 
1990s to debate fervently issues of cultural and civilisation identity. Out of the total of 
102 ND members, 83 signed a counter-petition expressing their adamant opposition to 
the abolition of the religious oath and to Church-State separation generally. They 
produced a text in which the 83 MPs proclaimed themselves “guardians of our
7 7historical heritage, our Greek-Orthodox tradition, our ideals, faith and country.” 
Although none of the leading ND members were among the signatories, the 83 MPs 
clearly reflect the vast majority of the party’s base (82%). In this sense, they 
articulated their counter-declaration in accordance with the Orthodox sensitivity and 
historical particularity of the Greek people, and condemned the proposal of the 52 
PASOK MPs for being “.... a-historical, a product of ignorance of Hellenic history,
7 0 90and detrimental to the unity of the Greek nation.” This “battle of the dossiers”,“ in
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Newspaper To Vima, 10 May 1998.
28 Ibid.
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Papathemelis’ apt aphorism, may be viewed as a “Trojan horse, or a controlled 
experiment measuring the extent to which it is feasible to promote Church-State 
separation in the Greek political system.”J°
The question of the parliamentary oath was eventually brought before the 
Council of State, which was asked to decide whether or not the liberal spirit of the 
Constitution is congruent with a compulsory religious oath. The supreme 
administrative court embarked on the extremely contentious task to terminate a long- 
lasting system of co-existence between certain Articles of the Constitution which 
entail the liberal-pluralist values of secularism, and others that give priority to the 
“sacred” bond cementing Church, nation, and State. The Council of State decided to 
ratify the option of a non-religious oath in terms of Article 13 (par.l), which states 
that: “ ...freedom of religious consciousness is inalienable. The enjoyment of 
individual political rights does not depend on the religious convictions of the Greek
31citizens.”
Whereas the Left and PASOK’s modernisers welcomed this decision, the 
Church found an unexpected ally in the person of justice minister Gianopoulos, a 
highly popular, quick-tempered and outspoken politician whose role in the party is to 
mediate between the modernisers and the “presidentials” or patriots. His statement: “I 
feel sorry for them (the Council of State)... Since 1822 all Constitutions refer 
specifically to the oath’s pivotal role, so how can they now rule that anyone can swear 
in his or her own way?” came as a complete surprise from a politician who is his 
party’s protagonist in matters opposing Christodoulos. Gianopoulos’ position 
underscores the eminent confusion surrounding issues of secularity, tradition and 
modernity in Greek political culture.
During this dispute the rest of Prime Minister Simitis’ government maintained 
neutrality and awaited the final results of the “Trojan horse experiment” and the 
Archbishop’s response before committing themselves. They also procrastinated 
because they wished to know the results of official opinion polls which are the 
indicators of the people’s political will and a standard measure of possible political 
costs.
29 The “dossiers” were circulated by the two factions to collect the signatures.
30 Newspaper To Vima, 10 May 1998.
31 Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 25 Sept. 1998.
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Christodoulos’ reaction to the Council of State decision was energetic. 
Addressing himself for a time to the public on different occasions every single day, he 
once more dominated the media headlines and launched a vociferous offensive against 
the advocates of Church-State separation. Commenting on the proposal of the 52 MPs 
for the abolition of the religious oath and the proposal of the 60 for the imperative 
need of separation, he resorted to uninhibited political criticism and condemned the
T9“disgrace of those Graeculi whose criteria are the directives of Brussels rather than 
what is commanded by the historical tradition of this country.”3j
Once more, the congruity of sentiment shared between the Archbishop, the 
patriotic factions within PASOK and ND, and powerful civil-society groups (i.e. 
“Network 2 1”)34 is a clear indication of the shift of emphasis in Greek political culture 
away from class-bound ideological cleavages. It is not, however, purely a 
consciousness of Orthodox civilisation seeking alliances outside the western world (as 
Huntington described Islamic fundamental ism)3' but rather a syncretic one generated 
by the interaction of anti-western Orthodox nationalism and the pro-western geo­
political orientation of the Greek State which paradoxically the new Archbishop has 
endorsed.36
Nor is it feasible to see the Greek case as an example of Huntington’s concept 
of a “torn” country, because it is not an isolated elite that is boosting people’s 
awareness of their western orientation but a large and dynamic proportion of the
32 Graeculus: ironic appelation for a decadent Greek, one who is servile towards 
foreigners. The Romans called Graeculi those who unsuccessfully imitated the 
Greeks. Also used in modem Greek history (from 1949 until the legalisation of KKE 
in 1974) by the governing Right to stigmatise communist internationalism.
Newspaper Kathemerini, 5 May 1998.
34 The “Network 21” is a patriotic civil society group that is affiliated both with the 
Archbishop and the neo-Orthodox movement. We shall deal extensively with this 
group in the chapter on the neo-Orthodox movement.
3' Huntington 1996.
36 In his enthronement address Christodoulos emphasised the strong connection 
between Orthodoxy and Europe (see newspaper Christianiki, 11 June 1998). At the 
Archbishop’s meeting with Greece’s EU Commissioner Papoutsis both men expressed 
their satisfaction for the future of Orthodoxy in the EU.
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Greek society including the current Simitis administration. Matters became even more 
complicated if one considers the reasons for the increasing popularity of the 
“patriotic” trend in Greek culture and politics. In fact the “patriots” seem to be less 
concerned with the fading spiritual values of the Greek-Orthodox identity, and more 
with expressing their social dissent and private disaffection over what they see as a 
docile and submissive governmental strategy towards real or imaginary threats (the 
national issues) and an uncompromising austerity policy for which the West (i.e. EU)
0*7
takes the lion’s share of blame.
As far as alliance-making in the late 1990s was concerned, however, the 
Archbishop’s ethnocentric discourse, combined with his efforts to live up to his 
modernising credentials, suggested a strategy aimed at the maximalisation of power. 
To the extent that his subtle power politics augmented his alliances and popularity, the 
Greek State was obliged to accept a new powerful actor. If another crisis should occur 
it would be very difficult to reach a compromise like that between Papandreou and 
Serapheim in 1987. There are two reasons for this, (i) Unlike the 1987 crisis, a new 
confrontation between Church and State would also involve the government's alleged 
defeatism concerning the national issues and its perceived subservience towards the 
West. Neither did Serapheim have the enthusiastic support of the “patriotic” factions 
within the internal opposition of PASOK and the whole of ND. (ii) Unlike Serapheim, 
Christodoulos is well able to mobilise the masses through his modern image and 
sophisticated discursive practices.
Although no such scenario has as yet unfolded, the government almost 
panicked at the time in the light of two opinion polls revealing an astonishing and 
unprecedented social consensus with the new Archbishop’s ideas. In the first nation- 
wide survey, the Archbishop managed to dramatically increase Serapheim's 
popularity rate from 41.6 % for and 38.8 % against, to an astonishing 76.8 % for and 
11.5 % against. By the same token, 46.9 % of the sample was against Church-State
37 The combination of those two reasons made possible the paradoxical “unholy”
alliance between left-wing Euro-sceptics and anti-western Orthodox fundamentalists. 
j8 Face to face interviews of 930 people, between 12 and 21 May 1998, conducted by 
the VPRC institute in the informants’ homes with structured questionnaires, and 
published in the newspaper Ta Nea.
129
separation (36.8 % in favour), whereas only a few months earlier the results had been 
46.7 % in favour and 39 % against.
This survey is interesting for our own study for yet another reason; it indicates 
quite vividly that PASOK’s dual tactics on the question of Church-State separation, 
reflects a cleavage of its electoral base between modernisers and 
“patriots”/presidentials. Whereas in ND it is a clear majority that is against separation 
(61.1 % against 19.7 %), results for PASOK give 40.2 % in favour and 46.4 % 
against. If the issue of Church-State separation is schematically viewed as a barometer 
of modernisation, then this apparent split in PASOK’s electoral base, seen against the 
uniform opposition of ND, points to severe limitations and inconsistencies in the 
modernisation project. With respect to the westernisation debate it also demonstrates 
that the dilemma and rift in Greek politics in the late 1990s was increasingly cultural, 
and the unifying bond of nationalistic patriotism is now able to cement factions that 
operate beyond ideological and class dichotomies.
Almost one month later (18 June 1998) a second nation-wide survey assessed 
the popularity of political leaders and main public figures.39 The new Archbishop 
received a high popularity rate of 73.3 (with only 8.9 % expressing a negative view), 
at the same as the PASOK Prime Minister's popularity dropped to 28.4 % and the ND 
leader’s to 35.8 %. Amid strong criticisms from modernisers in PASOK and the Left, 
Christodoulos also succeeded in consolidating the right to express his nationalist 
political ideas, by receiving a 39 % affirmative answers to the question of whether the 
informant agreed or disagreed with the Archbishop’s inclination to intervene in 
political and national issues (25 % disagreed). Not surprisingly, the Simitis 
government responded to the potentially hazardous implications for its electoral 
objectives by swiftly dissociating itself from the advocates of Church-State 
separation. Addressing himself to a symposium entitled “Human Rights and 
Orthodoxy: Conflict or Symbiosis?”,40 PASOK’s chief moderniser Paschalides
39 Conducted during a six-month period by MRB on behalf of the television channel 
MEGA, which also presented the results.
40 Organised by three civil society groups -  the “Citizens’ Initiative for Church-State 
Separation”, the “Citizens’ Movement ”, and the “Greek Human Rights Association” 
-  and held at ESIEA (Journalists' Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers) on 25 May 
1998.
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attempted to explain the government’s unwillingness to discuss separation in terms of 
its sensitivity towards public opinion. Tacitly accepting a situation that could be 
described as a tyranny of the majority, the minister argued that “the government’s 
position ... is consistent with the last opinion poll ... showing that Greek society is 
against separation.” In conclusion he stated that “Greek society is not ready yet for 
such change”, but that “amendments to certain laws from the Metaxas period might be 
attempted by the government.”41
In the parliamentary debate on the amendment to the Constitution, culture 
minister Venizelos was even more categorical than Paschalides. He emphasised the 
inherent consequences of separating the Church from the current system of Synallilia 
which “guarantees the Church’s neutrality and spiritual role... The paradox is that 
those who suggest revision of Article 3 are unintentionally pushing the Church into a 
political and ideological role, active and aggressive, which jeopardises its political 
neutrality and ecclesiastic essence, and undermines the politically liberal, pluralistic, 
and meritocratic character of the regime.”42
The government’s reluctance to include the subject of separation in its 
parliamentary agenda consolidated the Archbishop’s political footing and introduced 
an unprecedented political debate. This was between moderniser MPs who did not 
endorse the idea of a new, non-secular actor in the overall game of legitimation, and 
Christodoulos whose charismatic style, political alliances, and argumentation 
resembled not so much that of a prelate but rather that of a idiosyncratic opponent of 
the government. At that time even the Sunday services became a political happening, 
with the congregation enthusiastically applauding Christodoulos’ declarations that the 
Church will not succumb and subjugate itself to State pressure which, the Archbishop 
asserted, even included life-threats.43
41 From the author’s personal notes taken during the symposium.
42 Newspaper Ta Nea, 6 May 1998.
4j The Archbishop did not specify these threats nor where they came from. After a 
couple of days of intensive probing by the media his representative admitted that the 
mention of life-threats had been an inaccuracy uttered “in the heat of the moment.”
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Apart from the ultra-nationalists’ publication Stohos, which threatened that the 
“soldiers of Christodoulos will severely punish the Greaculi and their janissaries”,44 
the bulk of the Archbishop’s political support came from the far Right of New 
Democracy. The party’s former MP Karatzaferis, who owns and runs the television 
channel Telecity, was, until his expulsion,4'^  the chief protagonist of ND’s extremist 
faction that wants to restore the party's right-wing ideological orientation by re­
establishing contacts with its “natural conservative space”.46 Implicit within this 
strategy was the increasing incorporation of nationalistic discourses into the political 
mainstream,47 and to derive electoral profit from the resurgence of reactionary forces. 
In this context the new Archbishop became an emblematic figure in Karatzaferis’ 
promotion of a legitimate nationalist discourse for his party: “Our television channel 
is in total harmony with Christodoulos... What you are seeing today are issues we 
have been discussing with His Beatitude since 1985. When the time comes we shall 
prevail and march forward. I, of course, was simply an MP five years ago, but he, by 
occupying the highest office in the country, has the power to impose his word... We 
are not alone now. The Church is behind us. No more Right, Centre and Left. Now 
there are only patriots and traitors.”48
The Church, therefore, found in Christodoulos a charismatic leader whose 
popularity and political alliances may ensure the perpetuation of its association with 
the State administration and the Greek national identity.
44 The Janissaries were the special militia of the Ottoman Sultan which was 
comprised from Christian youths who were selected at a very young age, converted to 
Islam, and rigorously trained to fill in military and administrative posts..
4~ In 2000, which led him to the subsequent founding of his own party LAOS (Popular 
Orthodox Alarm).
46 He even approached the rising neo-Nazi group Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn) and 
proposed to ND leader Karamanlis to incorporate them in the party.
47 The emblematic figure of Papandreou was responsible for the post-junta 
renaissance of nationalism. This tendency is represented within PASOK by the 
internal opposition of the patriotic/“presidential” faction.
48 Telecity program of 16 June 1998.
3.2.2 The Intellectual Debate
Meanwhile, the debate over separation continued to preoccupy the media, but 
this time emphasis shifted from the politicians to the intellectuals. The schism 
between “patriots” and modernisers spread to the intellectual field, with the latter 
(loosely linked to the Left and the PASOK modernisers) trying to problematise the 
underlying cultural and political dimensions of the constitutional debate over 
separation; The “patriots” insisted that the status quo of Synallilia is the most 
appropriate for reasons of historical considerations, cultural sensitivity and political 
necessity. The modernisers asked whether the Archbishop’s fervent patriotism is 
indeed promoting the best interests of the nation. They referred to the Church’s 
segregation of Orthodox from non-Orthodox, and its demand for State intervention (in 
the form of constitutional privileges) to consolidate and legitimise its position superior 
to other faiths. The modernisers asserted that, aside from the obvious democratic 
deficit generated by obstructing and opposing the social integration of non-Orthodox 
minorities, this strategy would render the Greek political culture particularly 
vulnerable to escalating tensions. A purely intra-religious dispute can too be easily 
turned into a political or even national issue: “When we consent to raise religious 
differences at State and national level, we inevitably endorse a current of religious and 
national purification where the only Greeks are the Christian-Orthodox, and non-
49Orthodox citizens are stigmatised as non-Greek or, worse, as alien and suspect.” The 
Archbishop’s recent characterisation of the advocates of separation as Graeculi 
exemplifies this “symbolic or civilisational racism”.50 It also confirms our contention 
that the Greek political culture of the late 1990s mixes old and outdated ideological 
cleavages with even older civilisational ones.
Henceforth, the first argument of modernising intellectuals concerns the 
consolidation and enhancement of religious freedom in Greece. According to 
Mouzelis, this can be achieved within the existing legal-formal framework of 
Synallilia by introducing certain amendments that will bring the Greek legal system 
into harmony with the liberal spirit of the Constitution (e.g. abolishing the outdated 
law on proselytism voted by the Metaxas junta of 1936-39). This largely legalistic 
debate can only offer peripheral solutions, however, since it fails to deal with the
49 Chiotakis in the newspaper Eleftherotypia, 15 June 1998.
50 See Anthopoulos, “Information and Racism", periodical Thesis, issue 63, 1998.
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underlying problem of the Church’s fading spiritual message and its inability to 
become an agency of democratisation in Greek civil society. Indeed, the Church could 
offer a spiritual alternative to the impoverishing implications of instrumental 
rationalism, conspicuous consumerism, technocratic consciousness, and extreme 
individualism which exacerbate the estrangement and insecurity of the Greek people. 
Inasmuch as this is essentially a legitimacy problem, Mouzelis comments that a 
necessary precondition for enhancing the spiritual and diaconal presence of the 
Church is to eradicate its status as an administrative extension of “an inefficient and 
deeply corrupt State.”51
Although the post-dictatorial ecclesiastical Charter provided a certain degree 
of autonomy, the institutional differentiation between Church and State is still 
inadequate: the clientelistic mentality and extreme formalism of the State
infrastructure is automatically transferred to the administrative mechanism of the 
Church. This means that the State undermines the autonomy of civil society in the 
religious sphere...There is no doubt that the rejuvenation of the Church not only 
requires its dissociation from the State Leviathan but also internal reformation, a more 
open situation where the laity can participate in the decision-making process.”52
Mouzelis argues that, concerning the patriotic assertion that Church-State 
interpenetration is based on the inalienable connection between Orthodoxy and the 
Hellenic nation, the modernisers emphasise three main arguments. Firstly, that further 
differentiation between Church and State infrastructure, in the form of greater 
autonomy from State patronage and less colonisation from the logic of party 
clientelism, does not imply compartmentalisation and isolation of the Church. 
Unfettered by the logic of the State, the Church would be free to pursue its true 
spiritual and diaconal mission.
Secondly, the inalienable bond between Orthodoxy and Hellenism should be 
seen as a spiritual and ethnic resource rather than an institutional doctrine of the 
official State. Our Greek-Orthodox habitus does not justify the perpetuation of the
?1 In the newspaper To Vima, 10 May 1998.
52 Ibid.
r’J Mouzelis here uses Bourdieu’s notion of habitus for the association of the Greek 
religious identity and the wider network of collective predispositions and cultural 
patterns specific to the Greek context.
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existing system of Church-State relations, since these have less to do with our 
spiritual heritage and more with “Bavarocracy” and the mechanistic encroachment of 
19th-century German absolutism in the public administration of the new-born Greek 
state.54 Thirdly, the argument against separation entails a clear ideological bias. In 
essence, the critics of separation are less concerned with the persistence of the Greek 
national heritage than with sustaining certain privileges and prolonging their 
established politico-economic vested interests.
It is precisely this last point, also utilised by the critics of separation to launch their 
offensive against the modernisers, that confirms our contention that the underlying 
logic of the Church-State debate is more civilisational than legalistic or exclusively 
ideological. Both traditionalists and modernisers share the vision of a developed 
European Greece, but differ in their westernisation logic: the former advocate either 
entrenchment or syncretism in respect of EU integration, whereas the latter employ an 
either monological or communicative strategy. In this context, syncretic patriots are 
the Neo-Orthodox and the Archbishop, who co-operate in the framework of “Network 
21” (see chapter on Neo-Orthodoxy); entrenchment patriots are the ultra-nationalists 
of Stohos and the far Right of ND (e.g. Karatzaferis), who co-operate with the 
fundamentalists of Zoe\ monological modernisers are pro Church-State separation 
advocates (like Lipowatz) who co-operate with various civil groups; and finally, 
communicative/polylogical modernisers are other intellectuals, entrepreneurs and 
politicians who identify with the Orthodox modernisation of the Patriarchate or the 
OAC (see Chapter 6). Just as modernisers accused the traditionalists of ideological 
expediency, “patriots” accused the modernisers of being less concerned about justice 
or pluralism than about voicing their antipathy to the eastern-Orthodox dimension of 
the Greek identity. “The modernisers are hostile towards Orthodoxy ... deeply 
annoyed by its impact and appeal to the people, and aim to diminish the religious 
sentiment of the public ... Because they belong or used to belong to the Marxist Left, 
it is only natural that having failed to impose a world-wide ban on religion, they now 
observe with panic the resurgence of religion in the former East bloc and try by other 
means and arguments to achieve what they failed to gain by violence.”55
54 Bavarocracy and the 19th century are discussed in ch.l, p.38.
55 A. Marinos, newspaper To Vima, 24 May 1998.
The critics of separation also stressed two more arguments. One is that the 
legal framework of separation (NS 1700) was deemed anti-constitutional by the 
Strasbourg Court of Human Rights. This ruling underscores that the legal-formal 
status of the Church is not the exclusive prerogative of the State, and any future 
discussion on separation would have to emanate from the Church itself, rather than be 
imposed from above.
The second argument noted that several western-European democracies that 
have embarked on an autonomous path of modernisation have done so without full 
differentiation between the religious, political, and State spheres. So, the Church of 
England remains the established Church, and self-government in England does not 
necessarily mean disestablishment.56 In Belgium and Germany the State is responsible 
for the clergy’s emoluments and a percentage of the income tax goes to the affiliated 
Church of each citizen. In Italy, Germany and smaller EU member-States, the 
Christian Democrats have been ruling for decades, and Germany's chancellor Kohl 
declared outright that Christianity defines the limits of Europe. Finally, in the US. the 
election of John F. Kennedy as the first Roman-Catholic president was made possible 
only by a specially devised provision in the Constitution.?7
3.2.3 Financial Issues
The controversial issue of economic scandals in the management of Church 
property occupied a pivotal role in the new Archbishop’s programmatic agenda. 
Christodoulos has promised to enforce a strategy of catharsis (“cleansing”), under 
which justice would be done even if the guilty were senior members of the Church 
hierarchy. His elevation to the highest ecclesiastic office coincided with the final stage 
of a lengthy legal process in which an investigation committee, comprised of Bishops 
and judges, closely scrutinised the financial affairs of the Church since 1986. Despite 
the Archbishop’s public reassurances that he is determined to punish severely anyone 
profiting at the expense of the Church’s credibility, the results of the investigation 
committee presented the members of the Permanent Holy Synod with the dilemma of 
whether indeed to disclose an extensive network of corruption whose ramifications
~6 Ress-Mogg 1998.
^  A .Marinos, To Vima, 24 May 1998.
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might involve prominent prelates, or to engage in back-stage negotiations with the 
State in the well-tried method of covering up the case.
Full disclosure might easily expose latent cleavages and re-introduce the 
clergy into the power game of antagonistic factions that could end with impeachment 
and legal prosecution. This would inflict vast damage to the credibility of the 
institution, result in a legitimacy crisis, and mean the Church’s marginalisation from 
the rest of society. It is not surprising therefore that both Church and State have found 
it expedient to claim that catharsis was accomplished without serious disruptions of 
their own legitimacy and the established status quo.
The events discussed in what follows are indicative of a combination of 
different strategies. These range from catharsis (the implicated individual is either 
somebody outside the Church-State network or an upper-clergy opponent of the 
Archbishop) to covering up (both institutions having a vested interest in (i) diverting 
public opinion away from the deep structural changes necessary to bring to an end 
mismanagement of the property; and (ii) protecting their own threatened legitimacy 
from the social dissent associated with extensive financial irregularities due to 
fraudulent conduct by senior members of the synod and State officials).
The synod’s first move was a public declaration by the Archbishop that the 
disgrace inflicted on the Church by financial scandals must cease. He promised to co­
operate closely with the investigation committee to identify and punish those 
responsible. The investigating committee in fact did disclose a four trillion drachmas 
(approx. £8,000,000) deficit in the “development-works” budget of a great number of 
dioceses.58 The second move, as soon as the scandals were exposed, consisted of the 
Archbishop gradually distancing himself from the position of uncompromising 
catharsis. This change of tactic was Christodoulos’ response to a threatened counter­
catharsis and denunciations from the accused. The situation could have developed 
into old rivals implicating each other in an avalanche of unlawful deals so as to deflect 
the damage onto those who had begun to upset the delicate balance of corruption. 
Deserting his usual radicalism, the Archbishop mildly commented: “...catharsis is a 
very difficult and delicate issue” -  implying that he would attempt to preserve the 
balance of power and prevent the dissemination of disclosures. This moderation did 
not, however, apply to Bishop of Thebes Ieronymos who had been Christodoulos'
?8 Newspaper Ta Nea, 31 August 1998.
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main opponent in the archiepiscopal elections. Now, the Bishop of Thebes became the 
sole recipient of the bulk of accusations involving a 600 million drachmas (approx. 
£1,200,000) deficit; the managing director of a consulting agency co-operating with 
another diocese was also named by the committee’s 400-page findings, having 
unlawfully received 408 million drachmas (approx. £816,000). They both reacted 
vociferously confirming that catharsis has less to do with rationalising the Church’s 
financial affairs than to serve as a platform for legitimisation on which the power 
game of hierarchical control can be manifested and fought.
The Bishop of Thebes addressed himself both to the Archbishop and the media 
through a public note in which he not only dissociated himself from the scandals but 
accused the Archbishop of failing to implement an unequivocal catharsis: “The way 
you are handling the issue ... convinces me that it is not the transparent and honest 
catharsis of our ecclesiastical affairs that you desire...”59 The Bishop implied that 
Christodoulos’ supposedly moderate stance was in fact only a subterfuge for slowing 
down the proceedings in order to manipulate public and media opinion against him 
(Ieronymos), and pave the way for his ultimate impeachment. He warned the 
Archbishop: “The escalating pressure from the press to respond to its false allegations, 
and the fact that my silence is used against me as an ideal scapegoat as well as against 
the credibility of the Church, does not allow my conscience to suffer in silence ...”60 
Meanwhile, the accused consultant Kosmatos threatened to disclose “documents that 
may lead to the persecution of several Bishops”, claiming that “it is not Kosmatos that 
owes to the Church but the exact opposite."61 At this point the State decided to join in 
and launched an independent inquiry into the case through the Attorneys’ Assembly. 
Although it was the intention of both Church and State to reach a compromise that 
would not harm their overlapping vested interests and prevent a legitimacy crisis, the 
Church reiterated the imperative need for some degree of rationalisation in the 
management of its vast property. To this end the Permanent Holy Synod took an 
undoubtedly positive step by abolishing the Archbishop’s exclusive prerogative to 
appoint his own financial committee. Under a new ruling, the committee responsible
?9 Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 9 Sept. 1998.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
138
for financial affairs would be elected from the synod’s 77 members, and most 
importantly, will also include members of the laity.
3.2.4 Education
Education has always been the epicentre of any Greek debate involving 
questions of collective consciousness and ideological legitimacy. Amid the euphoria 
surrounding the elevation of Christodoulos. 58 ND MPs addressed the education 
minister to voice their strong concern over “the State’s failure to inculcate the ideas
f\~)and values of our national Orthodox heritage in the education curriculum.” They 
denounced what they saw as a State-engineered attempt “to undermine the role of 
Orthodoxy by imposing drastic reductions in the hours dedicated to religion in 
secondary education.”63
The PASOK parliamentary representative’s reply shifted the emphasis from 
religious education towards a critique of the underlying electoral and ideological 
objectives of the ND MPs’ complaint: “The only comment I wish to make is that the 
Right has a long tradition in the manipulation and patronage of the people’s religious
64sentiment for its own political expediency."
A new round of bitter disputes began when education minister denied the 
Archbishop’s personal request that the hours given to the “religions” course be 
increased. Arsenis argued that it was the exclusive prerogative of the ministry to 
regulate the education curriculum and course timetable, but the whole issue was 
blown out of proportion as a result of subsequent interference by the Council of State. 
Bypassing the ministry and the appropriate pedagogical institutions, the Supreme 
Court rejected the ministry decision to limit the hours of religious instruction to 
facilitate the introduction of new courses, on the grounds of the Constitution clearly 
stating that Orthodoxy is the “established" or “dominant” religion (Article 3, par.l). 
The Council vice-president argued that the constitutional provisions on national
62 Newspaper Ta Nea, 1 May 1998.
The course title “Religions” refers to a plurality of religious views, but in effect the 
teaching is restricted to Orthodox Christianity. It had been suggested to reduce it from 
two hours weekly to one.
64 Newspaper Ta Nea, 7 May 1998.
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education enable the development of the religious consciousness of Greek youth 
“according to the values of the Christian-Orthodox dogma, the teaching of which is 
compulsory” (Article 16, par.2). The ruling concludes that “reducing the teaching 
hours of religious education is not conducive to the above constitutional Decrees.”6'
This triggered an immediate reaction from several professors of constitutional 
law and the national union of secondary school teachers against the “unprecedented 
interference to our internal affairs”, and “arbitrary abuse of judicial authority beyond 
the limits of its jurisdiction.”66 One professor commented that “It is scientifically 
illegitimate and erroneous to institutionalise ideological manipulation”, while another 
repudiated Article 16 for bearing “a pompous resemblance to the Helleno-Christian 
sacrilege of the military junta.”67
Council vice-president Marinos, one of the most outspoken and influential 
advocates of the Church-nation-State connection, was also criticised for having taken 
advantage of his professional capacity to impose his personal views.
In addition to the controversy around certain constitutional provisions that 
facilitate the privileged treatment of Orthodoxy in the Greek education system, the 
first six months of Christodoulos’ archepiscopacy not only confirmed that education is 
an overlapping area of interest between Church and State, but also that the 
Archbishop intents to enhance the Church's “sacred” message and challenge the 
predominantly secular orientation of the educational system. He publicly urged the 
clergy to revive the old practice of paying visits to schools, and to organise a variety 
of religious activities ranging from Sunday-school lectures to confessions. The reply 
by the president of the Teachers’ Association is evidence of the resurgence of a 
civilisation dichotomy in the Greek political culture. He said that what the Archbishop 
suggested is a “parochial practise ... incompatible with the secular nature of the Greek 
State... The State is responsible for education, and the Church cannot bypass the 
established pedagogical laws with its Sunday-school mentality, nor it can turn us back
z o
to the distant past.” In the end a compromise was reached by which priests shall first 
acquire permission from the school director before addressing the students.
6? Alivizatos, newspaper To Vima, 31 May 1998.
66 Tsatsos, newspaper Ta Nea, 28 May 1998.
z 7
Alivizatos, newspaper To Vima, 31 May 1998.
z o
Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 3 Sept. 1998.
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Similar policies apply to other overlapping areas of interest in education. So 
the Archbishop and the education minister agreed to abolish the economically non- 
viable ecclesiastic schools and to incorporate them in the national education network. 
The opposite was agreed with respect to three advanced ecclesiastical schools (which 
instruct to the level of University entrance), for which the Church would assume full 
responsibility. In both cases the Church fully agreed that the schools would operate 
“under the aegis of the education ministry”69 -  its underlying motive being to sustain 
its say in the administration of the schools (the program and content of the courses) 
while not bearing the burden of their funding. This is an example of how Church and 
State co-operate in the pursuit of their overlapping interests. The State provides power 
and authority to the Church, and the Church reciprocates by cementing the State’s 
symbolic legitimacy through boosting people’s awareness of their Greek-Orthodox 
national identity.
3.3 Secularisation and the Westernisation Dilemma: Religious Pluralism and EU 
Integration
One of the new Archbishop’s most pressing problems was to improve the poor 
human-rights record of the Greek Church and its undemocratic stance towards 
religious minorities and new religious movements. The country’s credibility as an EU 
member was severely damaged as a result of five law suits between the Greek State 
and members of religious minorities who were subsequently vindicated by the
70European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
Despite Christodoulos’ overtly democratic programmatic declarations, and his 
general image as an open-minded, sophisticated, and modern prelate, his first six
69 ibid.
70 These court cases were Kokinakis against the Greek State (1993), concerning a 
Jehovah’s Witness prosecuted for proselytism according to the Metaxas period Law 
1363-1936; Manousakis against the Greek State (1996), concerning a license to 
operate a recreation area for Jehovah’s Witnesses which was declined by the local 
diocese; Tsirlis against the Greek State (1997), concerning his appeal to be exempted 
from military service due to the fact that he is a Jehovah’s Witnesses minister. Under 
Law 1763-1988 “priests from all known religions are eligible for military exemption”, 
but Jehovah’s Witnesses were not deemed a “known religion” but an unlawful cult.
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months in office revealed peculiar and confusing attitudes to the rights of religious 
minorities. The issue at stake was the decision by President of the Republic, 
Konstantinos Stefanopoulos to receive Archbishop Chrysostomos of the Old 
Calendrists.71 Christodoulos reacted sharply: “The Old Calendrist movement consists 
of several schismatic groups ... Their indirect acknowledgement by the highest
7?authority of the Greek State is causing serious problems.”
The presidential representative justified the meeting in terms of social 
pluralism and tolerance: “Mr Stefanopoulos is the President of all Greeks and every
7 ^citizen or group has the inalienable right to approach him.” The Old Calendrists 
spokesman said that followers of the patristic (old) calendar should not be treated as 
second-class citizens, but that the response from the synod confirmed the new 
Archbishop’s attitude towards religious minorities. The Church had expressed its 
willingness to incorporate “schismatic” Christian groups that wish to return to the 
mother Church as “according to the Constitution and the State authorities, the Church 
of Greece is recognised as the one and only agency of the Orthodox dogma in our
. i i l  4country.
There was considerable turmoil on 26 August 1998, when 40,000 Jehovah’s 
Witnesses congregated in an Athens stadium for a celebration. Archbishop 
Christodoulos requested the minister of education and religion that the State stop 
treating Jehovah’s Witnesses as a Christian denomination: “They are self-styled 
pseudo-Christian groups with serious dogmatic differences with Christianity...”7' The 
Archbishop attempted to justify this argument by analogy with difference between 
Orthodox and non-Orthodox Greeks. He described the latter as heretics who, among
71 Approximately 200,000 Orthodox Greeks are still loyal to the old calendar which 
was abandoned in 1923 by Patriarch Meletios to bring the Greek Church in line with 
the Gregorian calendar. The Old Calendrists consider this a schismatic act, and still 
celebrate Christmas 13 days later. See chapter 4 on fundamentalism.
72 Newspaper Ta Nea, 5 June 1998.
70 ' t
The main issue discussed between the Old Calendrists and the president concerned 
their recognition as a religious minority whose priests enjoy the same legal status as 
those of the official Church (e.g. the right of exemption from military service).
74 Newspaper Vradini, 7 June 1998.
7? Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 30 Sept. 1998.
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other evils, “follow the orders of foreign centres and do not share the Greek patriotic 
sentiments.”76 Christodoulos’ assertion vividly illustrates the eclectic way in which 
advocates of the Church-nation-State concept exclude the non-Orthodox from 
participating in the symbolic community of the Greek nationhood and citizenship. The 
holy synod too sent a memorandum to the minister, asking the State to stop this 
“contamination” (of the Jehovah’s Witnesses). The synod based itself on two Metaxas 
period laws on proselytism that give the Christian-Orthodox Church privileged 
treatment over other faiths. Those laws had recently been the centre of discussions on 
the prospect for certain amendments. The ministry replied that although it can not 
abolish the laws preventing proselytism, it would put forward the case for certain 
modifications: “It is imperative to modernise and harmonise them according to the 
European legal system and in the light of the modern exigencies of the Greek State.”77
The State’s ambivalence and dual strategy is also due to the fact that, aside 
from Church pressure at home, it has to meet certain requirements, regardless of 
possible internal political costs, at the level of supra-national interaction. An example 
of this was the UN decision to send a special envoy to inspect how the Greek State is 
treating religious minorities. The envoy concluded that “despite the fact that the Greek 
Constitution guarantees freedom of consciousness, there are limitations in the freedom 
of certain religious groups that are not consonant with the international standards for
70
human rights.”
Such ambivalence towards the values of social pluralism and tolerance also 
manifests in the Archbishop’s views on European integration. Christodoulos’ strategy 
vis-a-vis Greece’s foreign affairs consists of three hardly compatible parameters: (i) 
he generally endorses the Greek State’s European geo-political orientation and its 
commitments in the EU and NATO; (ii) he envisions an eastem-Orthodox axis 
between Athens, Belgrade, and Moscow, supervised by the Ecumenical Patriarchate;
(iii) within the patriotic political faction he is becoming the emblem of 
uncompromising opposition to the government on the “national issues” and of 
entrenchment in matters of secularisation.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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The challenge before Archbishop Christodoulos has to do with EU’s attempt 
to forge a supra-national entity and culture. In a sense the Greek Church epitomises 
the struggle of an ancient institution to ground its contemporary existence in a non­
western cultural resource (aptly described in Huntington’s Clash o f Civilisations) as 
well as in geo-political and institutional strategy that is irrevocably oriented towards 
EU integration. As a brief examination of the Archbishop’s foreign policy, he is well 
aware of the fact that Orthodoxy and Europe are both inalienable components of the 
modern Greek political culture. Problems arise only when the project is limited to 
mere discursive manoeuvres within the existing framework of Church-nation-State 
interpenetration, rather than allowing large-scale differentiation and democratisation 
to develop a more autonomous religious institution and so contribute its spirituality to 
the wider European arena of cultural communication.
Although Christodoulos initially declared that Greece is the most emblematic 
of the European cultures and occupies an undisputed position in the European family 
of nations, he then moved on to launch a vociferous critique against EU 
cosmopolitanism and an eclectic interpretation of what he saw as western bias against 
Greece: ‘'According to her name and culture, Europe is the offspring of Hellenism and 
Christianity. The heart of Europe lies in Greece, and without Greece Europe is 
inconceivable.... Historically Europe owes to Orthodoxy its very substance and 
survival.”79
This positive, if narcissistic interpretation of the Greek-European relationship 
soon changed to hostility: “The biggest threat for any people derives from meeting 
with the peoples of a unified Europe. It is thus imperative to examine the European 
edifice with regard to its views on us and our culture.... Christian Byzantine-Orthodox 
Greece is so distorted by the descendants of the Romans and Franks that is now being
O A
treated in the same way as Islamic fundamentalism”. Referring to Huntington he 
argues that “the adoption of this schema (i.e. the clash of civilisations) has led the 
westerners to side against the Orthodox Serbs who supposedly express a spirit of 
chauvinism and intolerance, whereas on the atrocities of Bosnian Muslims the vested
79 From the Archbishop’s address at his enthronement ceremony, published in the 
newspaper Christianiki, 11 June 1998.
80 Christodoulos 1997, see pp. 18-30.
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• 81 western interests remain silent and tolerant". This contention is shared among the
“patriotic” political forces in Greece and, regardless of whether the pejorative
Balkanist discourse of the West is biased or not, Christodoulos’ assertion underscores
Huntington’s interpretation of the increasing primacy of civilisational alliances and
conflicts.82
The Archbishop then mentions several initiatives undertaken by the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, all of which condemn chauvinism, racism, and intolerance. 
He does not, however, comment on one of the Patriarchate’s most persistent values; 
its dissociation from the Church-nation connection and its criticism, among other 
chauvinistic manifestations, of the nationalism of the Greek Church. Elsewhere 
Christodoulos subscribes emphatically to the “patriotic” political faction, confirming 
the contemporary rift with the modernisers: “It is sad that the anti-Greek and anti- 
Orthodox hysteria of the West has found its apologists in the heinous Greek pseudo­
intellectuals who surpass even their patrons in their acquiescence and animosity...The 
Church is frequently at the heart of criticism from all those who aspire to its total 
annihilation, those who wish to see a Church that will cease to exercise its benevolent 
influence for our Nation and Race. Impregnated with an inferiority complex 
concerning their Hellenic descent, totally illiterate with respect to the endemic social 
dynamism of the Orthodox spiritual tradition, our “enlighteners” roam triumphantly 
from one international conference to the other, now that Huntington has vindicated 
their “progressive” anti-patriotism. They denounce their very own country and people 
for religious fundamentalism, racism and anti-Semitism, for persecuting minorities,
84even for preventing the religious freedom of Jehovah’s Witnesses.”
81 Ibid.
O-)  ^ # t t
" Huntington himself confirmed his views on Orthodoxy and Hellenism in an 
interview about Greece with the newspaper To Vima, 24 May 1998.
8j Bartholomew and the Patriarchate in general have indeed gained worldwide 
admiration for their efforts to promote peace and tolerance. In the Greek context, the 
same could be said about the OAC, which is affiliated with the Patriarchate (see 
chapter 6).
o d
Christodoulos 1997, pp. 18-31. Here the Archbishop adopted the views of the 
leading Neo-Orthodox member Yannaras.
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For the Archbishop, EU integration necessarily presupposes the estrangement 
of the Greek people from Orthodoxy. His discourse is based on the essentialist 
dilemma and Manichean opposition between “us” and “them”, or “survival” and 
“death”: “We are like an irritating itch for the Europeans trying to integrate.... This is 
the final count-down of civilisational self-consciousness. We can either win and 
survive, or passively observe our effacement from the family of great nations.”83
Christodoulos finally expostulated: “We have recently been informed that a 
foundation was set up pursuing a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Greece.... Why is it 
desirable for Greece to become a multi-ethnic State and a multi-religious society?
oz
There is a clear and present danger. As we are continuing to welcome more and 
more Europeans who choose to settle and work in our country, bringing their 
traditions and way of life with them, building their temples and schools, publishing 
their own newspapers and operating their television channels ... we Greeks have to 
face two options; either subjugation if we ignore or marginalise our native tradition, 
or persisting in what we are without closing our gates and borders.... The Church is 
the only solution to the current crisis... All those who have experienced the 
predicament of alienation and ridicule, those who leaned on the futile illusion of 
‘progressivism’, those who exchanged their spiritual identity for the passport to 
Europeanisation, all those who are now exhausted and humiliated, are about to face 
chaos... Atheism and materialism are superfluous luxuries for Greece... We need Faith 
and Hope which, together with sustaining our soul, will militate against the
07
conversion of our country into a protectorate of some superpower.”
The overriding principle of the Archbishop’s cultural policy, therefore, is to 
entrench the Greek-Orthodox identity and to prevent spiritual integration in the EU: 
“Europe is currently undergoing a deep moral and spiritual crisis which is defined in 
terms of syncretism and relativism. Catholicism and Protestantism went through 
secularisation to alienation... When the Churches are the protagonists of toleration and 
consent to homosexuality and bless lesbianism, when Christian States abolish public 
prayers because this might offend the atheists, when Christian universities teach
85 Ibid.
Elsewhere in the same text he asserts, "I do not wish to say that EU integration is a 
mistake, but that it is dangerous.”
87 Ibid.
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theology in parallel with Satanism and cult studies, when I observe the extent of child
oo
pornography in Christian societies, then I only find it necessary to express the 
imperative need for the transfusion of pure Christian blood into the alienated societies 
of the West.”89
The Archbishop’s ideology now includes a paradoxical interpretation of 
European unity, dialogue and tolerance, in that it neither entails diversity nor does it 
accept that the Orthodox spirit of Greek culture has anything positive to gain from 
integration with Europe. This is underscored in the Archbishop’s views on the 
Schengen Agreement.90 Interestingly enough, he rejects it in terms of “violating 
individual human rights and religious consciousness, which should be respected and 
tolerated” -  like objections to the Number of the Beast (666) and registering the 
holder’s religion on the new identification cards. He thus makes an eclectic 
interpretation of human rights, proposing toleration of the Orthodox human right to 
feel offended by 666, and at the same time excluding the rights of the heterodox, of 
atheists, homosexuals, etc.
Apart from the EU, the Archbishop's views on foreign affairs centred on three 
overlapping and interrelated projects: to improve relations with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate; to maximalise the Greek Church’s influence in the Balkan Orthodox 
world; and to consolidate the Church’s role and right of interference in the so-called
oo
This is an example of how the logic of entrenchment co-opts under the category 
“West” matters that have little to do with each other in order to manufacture a 
homogeneous malevolent entity. So child pornography is not related to either 
Catholicism or Protestantism, whereas others of his criticisms (e.g. of the toleration of 
homosexuality) are indeed part of the modernisation of western Churches.
89 Christodoulos 1997, p.55.
90 The Schengen Agreement guarantees the free movement of persons within the 
European Union and at the same time enforces tight border control and strict 
immigration policy for the areas involved. Greece fully entered the agreement in 
2000. The other participating countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain and Sweden.
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national issues. As all three projects fall under the heading of the Church-nation 
interconnection (in that they enhance the nation’s social legitimacy and State power) 
it is not surprising that all three projects have been endorsed by the political 
mainstream, including the modernisers. Only the hardline communists have expressed 
their party’s reservations regarding the role of the Greek Church in Balkan 
irredentism.91
In the first meeting between the new Archbishop and Prime Minister Simitis, 
Christodoulos stated: “Our Church is ready to exercise its mediating role for the 
fellow Orthodox peoples of the Balkans. Our scope there is very wide and 
benevolent.” This attitude was confirmed in two subsequent meetings the Archbishop 
had with foreign affairs minister, Pangalos: “We reviewed the state of affairs in the 
Balkans... and I am particularly satisfied to announce that the minister confirmed our 
mutual desire for a close co-operation between the ministry and the Church
Q7concerning Greece’s interests of in the Balkans.” Pangalos, whose serious and 
disinterested character is greatly valued, and who has publicly criticised the Church in 
the past, seemed to endorse Christodoulos* geo-political responsibilities: “The new 
Archbishop possesses a sound knowledge of the international state of affairs, and a
• 93diplomatic capacity that can facilitate the achievement of our mutual interests.”
However, in his highly political discourse aiming on maximalisation of power 
and the consolidation of his public legitimacy, the new Archbishop did not hesitate to 
criticise the government’s handling of the delicate national issues. This was no doubt 
motivated by a wish to take advantage of the social dissent associated over the 
government’s efforts to reach a compromise with the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) and Turkey. On a visit to the archaeological cite of Vergina in 
the northern Greek province of Macedonia, he commented: “Whoever gives away our 
history is not a worthwhile descendant of our ancestors. This archaeological site [the 
burial place of King Philip, father of Alexander the Great], supports our historic rights
91 This derives from the Bosnian war experience, where the Greek Church openly 
supported the Serbs on the basis of common historical memories and their mutual 
struggle against Islam.
92 Newspaper Ta Nea, 5 June 1998.
93 Ibid.
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on the Greekness of Macedonia, and those rights should not be given away.”94 
Implicitly criticising what he perceived as subservient governmental handling of the 
national issues, the Archbishop concluded: "We must be prepared to safeguard and 
defend our rights regardless of any sacrifice.”9^
Visiting the Aegean island of Samos, just a few miles from the coast of 
Turkey, Christodoulos identified the second major target of Greek irredentism: ‘T can 
only feel nostalgic and emotional looking across to the holy land of Ionia. I am not 
talking about my country’s expansionism but to express the deep sorrow of my 
soul.”96
The Archbishop was determined to approach the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 
Constantinople, and through its internationally acclaimed endeavours in matters of 
ecumenicism, tolerance, ecology and peace gain additional internal and external 
legitimacy as a modem leader of a pluralist-democratic Church. The Patriarchate is 
the perfect institution for this because it attracts the interests of both the "patriots” (for 
obvious reasons of irredentism and nostalgia for Byzantine glory) and of modernists 
who are generally in favour of a religious institution of world-wide magnitude that 
can also play a major role in Greek civil society (e.g. boosting people's awareness of 
ecology, tolerance, etc.).
One of Christodoulos’ first commitments, therefore, was a visit to the 
Patriarchate to publicly declare his admiration for Bartholomew. But the 
rapprochement between the two sister Churches was not as easy and straightforward 
as might have been wished. This was due to several contentious issues, all related to 
potentially antagonistic interests in the funding of the two Churches by the EU, and 
question whether to be represented in Brussels as a single unified Church or as two 
separate ones.97 The Archbishop’s intention to claim autonomy and be represented as
94 Newspaper Ta Nea, 20 June 1998.
9^  Ibid. As the Church is traditionally considered the patron of the armed forces, the 
Archbishop was also particularly harsh and intolerant with the conscientious objectors 
who "jeopardise the safety of our nation. We shall not facilitate privileges for those 
who behave irresponsibly towards our moral values and our country’s needs, and 
towards the feelings of the people.”
96 Ibid.
97 The Church of Greece is the only Christian-Orthodox Church in the EU, but the
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the sole recipient of EU funding programs and development projects was in 
contradiction with the Patriarchate’s ancient canonical status as the Ecumenical 
representative “first among equals” and co-ordinator of sister Orthodox Churches in 
their international commitments (in the EU, the World Council of Churches, etc.). The 
bargaining table was soon strewn with various Patriarchal claims in Greece -  such as 
the opening of an Athens office, which Serapheim had objected to adamantly. The 
desired balance of claims and power was not achieved during the Archbishop’s first 
visit to Constantinople (13-16 June 1998). but both prelates publicly committed 
themselves to continue the dialogue.
The second round of meetings (9-11 September 1998) failed to solve the 
conflict, consolidated the existence of antagonistic interests -  chiefly the matter of 
representation in Brussels, an Athens office for the Patriarchate, and Christodoulos’ 
irredentist pronouncements -  and manifested the climate of mutual mistrust that has 
plagued the relationship between the two sister Churches ever since their separation.
Even before the second round of meetings, Christodoulos’ endeavours for 
unity were undermined by the majority of the synod not welcoming the Patriarchate’s 
exclusive canonical prerogative in Orthodoxy's foreign affairs. The synod blocked the 
Patriarch’s intention to approach the Greek foreign affairs minister in the hope of 
improving his strategic position in the forthcoming negotiations by persuading the 
Greek State to exercise pressure on the Church over the Orthodox representation in 
Brussels. Bartholomew feared that the existence of two Greek-Orthodox offices in 
Brussels could lead to a wider demand for separate national Orthodox Churches and 
so compromise the Patriarchate’s Ecumenical status. State interference such as 
Bartholomew sought here emphasises the pivotal importance both Churches attribute 
to political alliances, quite aside from the fact that political intervention is always 
desirable when it conduces to the maximisation and legitimisation of Church power.
Examination of the minutes of the meetings shows an understanding of this 
struggle over the appropriation of State and EU power that epitomises the politico- 
ideological schism between the Patriarchate and the Church of Greece. The 
Archbishop’s wish for an autonomous Greek representation in Brussels relied on the 
two institutions’ different orientation to the national issues: “There are national
Ecumenical Patriarchate is responsible for all Orthodox citizens of the Greek 
diaspora, wherever they live.
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projects that you [the Patriarchate] cannot support because of the hostile situation in 
which you find yourself. Would it be feasible, for example, for us together to 
implement some project to support the Cypriot cause in Europe? ... The blame for a 
possible failure in this and other national issues would automatically fall on the 
shoulders of the Patriarchate ... [and] consolidate the anti-Patriarchal climate within 
the (Greek) synod.”98
The Archbishop’s dual tactic is reflected in his subsequent closing statement: 
“My respect and admiration for the Patriarchal institution and Your Beatitude 
personally is the greatest, but I am not alone. We have a hierarchy of 77 Bishops... 
and my position is vulnerable... In the pre-election period the other candidates 
criticised my pro-Patriarchal orientation. Do not vote Christodoulos, they argued, for 
he will surrender us to the phanari (i.e. the Patriarchate).”99 Christodoulos also 
announced that the Church of Greece would welcome the Patriarchal intention of 
establishing an Athens office, on condition that the Patriarchal envoy addresses the 
public with the appropriate impartiality and “will not interfere in any way in the 
internal affairs of the Church of Greece.”100
It is instructive for our study that, apart from matters concerning the delicate 
balance of power between the religious and political spheres, the minutes reveal that 
there was much discussion about how the two sides should respond to pressure from 
the Greek mass media. Bartholomew’s request for an Athens office arose from the 
need to restore the Patriarchate’s public image and protect it from “the omnivorous 
and relentless appetite of the Greek media ... which do not hesitate to distort reality 
and actually create problems themselves as long as this increases their audience 
ratings.”101 This criticism was also aimed against certain conservative ecclesiastic 
circles which systematically cultivate an anti-Patriarchal climate in the Greek media 
and through their own networks of communication disseminate a variety of 
“conspiracy theories”, such as the conventional fundamentalist assertion that the
98 Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 10 Sept. 1998.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid. Also see Davie 2000 on the media's interest in religious affairs (leading 
many times to misunderstandings), and which the Churches cannot afford to ignore.
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Patriarch’s cosmopolitan outlook will shrink Hellenism, and surrender the Greek 
nation to Islam, the Pope, the Zionists, etc.
The two sides spent a whole day to prepare a common statement whose careful 
phrasing would ensure that their differences will not appear to the public as an overt 
cleavage. In the end it was agreed that the two Churches will be represented in the EU 
separately, and that the distinguished scholar Bishop John of Pergamon will be 
appointed to the Patriarchal office in Athens. Both decisions may prove detrimental, 
because there will be little or no communication between the two EU representatives, 
and Bishop John’s liberal and cosmopolitan intellectual rigor will need to be tempered 
by much diplomacy if the balance between the Patriarchate and the predominantly 
conservative and nationalist members of the synod hierarchy is to be sustained.
Concerning the third point of friction between the two Greek-Orthodox 
Churches, the Patriarch, having to consider his institution’s precarious location in the 
Turkish State, readily expressed his displeasure with Christodoulos’ persistent 
discourse of irredentism so gratifying to the “patri°tic” Greek faction. On a number of 
occasions Christodoulos has not hesitated to assert on camera that at some later time 
he hopes to be able to lead the liturgy in the churches of Saint Sophia in 
Constantinople and the Panagia Soumela of Trebizond (see footnote 114), two of the 
most popular and nostalgic symbols of Greek irredentism.
His undisputed popularity and the public support to such aspirations makes 
any governmental attempt to control him very difficult. Indeed, the government has 
simply turned a blind eye and did not bother to remind the public that Greek foreign 
policy is a secular affair and as such the exclusive prerogative of the State. The only 
member of the government who reacted publicly was the idiosyncratic justice minister 
Gianopoulos, who engaged with the Archbishop in a superficial dispute through 
media headlines. But this was more a controversy between two media personalities 
than a debate on the secular versus religious dimension of the Greek political culture.
Epitomising the interpenetration between politics and religion, the spokesman 
for the predominantly “patriotic” ND opposition, in reply to the question whether the 
Archbishop ought to declare publicly his aspirations for recapturing Constantinople 
from the Turks said that “The spiritual leader of Greek-Orthodoxy not only has the
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right but the sacred duty to express his views and speak to the Greek citizens who are
102particularly sensitive towards the national issues.”
The growing civil cleavage between modernists and nationalists has 
undoubtedly obstructed the effectiveness and political will of the Greek State to 
implement a stable, systematic, and internally legitimate foreign policy. Meanwhile 
the Turkish government reacted swiftly to the Archbishop and his political alliances 
by ensuring that the numerous historical monuments of Greek-Orthodox Asia Minor 
are efficiently protected by the ministry of Turkish culture and heritage. Indeed, one 
can hardly avoid seeing the political reasons behind the decision of the municipality 
of Trebizond in Turkey to suspend plans for a mining project and declare the whole 
area of the deserted Orthodox monastery of Soumela a protected zone.
3.4 Christodoulos and Cultural Populism
The so-called Christodoulos phenomenon is evidence that a new powerful 
actor has emerged in the national arena, who in his first six months in office achieved 
unparalleled social legitimacy largely due to his skills for creating and utilising 
alliances and manipulating for his own ends the legitimacy battle being fought in the 
Greek political culture. His persistent popularity amongst the reactionary political- 
cultural forces and the fierce opposition to him by outward-looking intellectuals and 
politicians epitomises the country’s increasing political polarisation and cultural 
cleavage. The platform for his struggle over the orientation of Greek culture and 
politics at the beginning of the second millennium is a widespread cultural populism 
in which the Greek media play a major role.
We have endeavoured to account for this phenomenon by showing the 
interactions of “patriots” and modernists in the political, intellectual, and ecclesiastic 
spheres. It has to be concluded that it is the populist logic generated by politicians or 
clergy driven by considerations of political cost, and powerful communication media 
completely regulated and driven by the market’s need to manipulate audience rates 
that is partly responsible for both the failure of the Greek public to look critically at 
the continued interpenetration of politics and religion, and the confusion and
i n? Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 27 August 1998.
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disorientation of the Greek political culture over the religious versus secular character 
of Greece in a unified Europe.
At the level of political interaction, such populism was manifested in the 
controversy between Justice minister Gianopoulos and Archbishop Christodoulos that 
captured the attention of virtually every Greek. The dispute was over the Archbishop 
transforming Sunday Church services into political happenings and arrogating to 
himself a role in national issues, as well as with his grandiose aspirations for a 
powerful new Church that will play a pivotal role in the Constitution of the modern 
Greek society of the second millennium. The minister, who was publicly acclaimed 
for his outspoken, extroverted personality and often criticised his opponents in very
1 OTblunt terms, took the matter personally and launched a vociferous offensive 
intended to disenchant the public with the Christodoulos phenomenon.
Ignoring PASOK’s dual moderate strategy towards the Church, he employed 
the type of populism that relies on manipulating public sentiment against certain right- 
wing politicians who may or may not be associated with the hated dictatorship of 
1967-74. Gianopoulos televised comments, show all too clearly how populist 
demagogy limits any opportunity for dealing with historically-grounded tensions 
centered on the meaning and role of Christian Orthodoxy. Whereas, for example, 
other government spokesmen remained conciliatory in accord with the established 
principles of Synallilia, Gianopoulos capitalised on turmoil as a chance to gain 
additional popularity through uninhibited anathemas. Commenting on the 
Archbishop’s irredentist views concerning Saint Sophia and Panagia Soumela, 
Gianopoulos said: “If he wants to be a politician then let him take off his frock... 
Christodoulos wants Constantinople and Saint Sophia. What kind of talk is that, that 
he’ll go to Trebizond to lead the liturgy in Panagia Soumela? What’s his point? ... to 
change the borders?” The Archbishop’s reply did nothing to calm the tension ("I do 
not comment on nonsense”),104 but he subsequently attempted to justify his 
irredentism in terms of the inalienable bond between Church and nation: “Orthodoxy 
and Hellenism have always followed a parallel course ... no secular power can uproot
103 It should also be said that although Gianopoulos supported the government of the 
moderniser Simitis, he also had excellent relations with the patriotic faction of the 
party.
104 Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 28 Sept. 1998.
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the people’s unlimited love and confidence towards the Church. Your love is our 
shield, our power.”105
Feeling perhaps that his failure to arouse public opinion against Christodoulos 
might be due to the fact that the Archbishop reflected the growing nationalist 
sentiment of Greek political culture, the minister then resorted to the standard and 
very effective practice of accusing an opponent of having collaborated with the 
authoritarian regime of 1940-45 (Nazi occupation) or 1967-74 (Colonels’ junta): “We 
are aware of the Archbishop’s past since the time he was appointed a close associate 
of Ieronymos, the junta Archbishop.106 ... I remember the time when the priests spoke 
against democracy and the people’s political freedom ... unfortunately this right-wing 
mentality still persists in the minds of certain religious prelates. We wanted to forget 
the past and endorsed his elevation to the highest ecclesiastical office, but if he 
persists in meddling in politics he’ll get the proper answer. That’s my objection to 
Christodoulos.”107
The Archbishop responded by turning the minister’s charges to his own 
advantage and led a memorial service to honour the controversial junta Archbishop, 
and so sealed the Church’s unity with the Ieronymite faction. He also suggested lifting 
the sanctions on the deposed Ieronymite Bishops that were imposed under Serapheim 
to eliminate counter-factions.
As the dispute is primarily one of social legitimacy, it is not surprising that the 
minister interpreted the Archbishop’s commemoration of the late Ieronymos as an act 
of treason against the unity of the Church: “This memorial tribute to a junta-appointed 
tyrant of the Church is despicable. Disseminating his far-right political convictions, 
Christodoulos in not following the example of Serapheim who united the clergy and 
people.”108
105 Ibid.
Gianopoulos assertion concerning the new Archbishop’s presumed collaboration 
with the junta is based on the fact that during Ieronymos’ tenure Christodoulos served 
as a senior secretary in the Archepiscopate. It must be stressed, however, that 
Christodoulos was appointed Bishop by Serapheim in 1974, once democracy was 
restored.
107 Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 28 Sept. 1998.
108 Newspaper Ta Nea, 8 Sept 1998.
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The above examples illustrate that beneath the criticisms lies the logic of 
cultural populism, since both sides seem to be chiefly preoccupied with how they can 
manipulate the Greek media and public for their own ends. Meanwhile the structural 
causes of the crisis and any prospect of resolving it are neglected or ignored. Perhaps 
it is not even desired to resolve it, since the perpetuation of obsolete structures and 
anachronistic stereotypes serves the two sides’ respective interests in prolonging their 
rule and legitimises their access to political power through factionalising the political 
culture. In other words, this power struggle entails a populist ideological dimension to 
which the issue of Greek cultural identity is pertinent.
The minister’s offensive actually constituted a shrewd mixture of religion and 
politics, which was adopted by anti-Christodoulite factions within the higher clergy, 
and on at least two occasions Gianopoulos found unexpected allies in the synod. The 
first was a discussion on the impeachment of the Bishop of Zakynthos over a 
Penthouse magazine interview in which he had endorsed pre-marital sexual 
relationships. The motive behind the minister’s and several Bishop’s reaction against 
the impeachment was not to examine the important issue of secularisation (human 
rights, sexuality, Christian ethics), but to damage the Archbishop’s popularity through 
the populist practice of categorising the opponent as belonging to the political Left or 
Right. Instead of using the opportunity to promote an in-depth discussion, the minister 
and several Bishops manipulated the subject of pre-marital sex to create an obsolete 
right-wing image of Christodoulos intended to improve their own strategic position in 
the overall game of legitimation: “The right-wing orientation of the Church leadership 
[the minister argued] is cracking down on any progressive idea that might penetrate its 
infrastructure.... The Bishop of Zakynthos is one of our most enlightened 
hierarchs...”109
Populist demagogy notwithstanding, the issue of the Bishop's impeachment 
extends far beyond political exploitation, and has already put the synod in the 
awkward position of having to decide whether to embrace a modern-tolerant or a 
traditionalist-austere stance towards premarital sex and other aspects of every-day life. 
At the present time the Archbishop seems to be preparing an inconsistent populist 
strategy, inasmuch as his prelates are mostly over-aged and poorly educated Bishops 
(to whom he owes his elevation), but the future of his office will depend on whether
109 Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 29 August 1998.
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or not he can tackle contemporary problems and concerns and attract the younger 
generation. His main concern seems to consist of being all things to all people, and 
this catch-all modus operandi epitomises the logic of cultural populism.
Much the same applies to the second occasion when Gianopoulos criticisms 
found fertile ground within the synod. The Archbishop’s decisions to lead Ieronymos’ 
memorial service and to lift the sanctions on the deposed Ieronymite Bishops do not at 
first glance seem in Christodoulos’ best interests. In fact they were opposed by both 
the justice minister and the Serapheimite faction within the synod, although for the 
nine Ieronymite Bishops who had voted for Christodoulos the Archbishop’s initiative 
to pay tribute to Ieronymos was consistent with his election promises. When on 3 
October 1998 the predominantly Serapheimite synod decided against lifting the 
sanctions against the Ieronymites, the result did not particularly distress the 
Archbishop. This was because on the one hand it could not detract from his image as a 
leader trying to promote the unification of the Church, and on the other, it saved him 
from having to reinstate the deposed Bishops, and so kept the status quo without 
serious disruptions in his relations with the Serapheimites.
The Archbishop’s cultural populism is inextricably linked with the 
civilisational cleavage in Greek political culture durimg the late 1990s. The 
reactionary patriotism of Christodoulos’ discourse equates Orthodoxy with Hellenism 
(“Us”) and juxtaposes this sacred entity to the heterodox, the foreign, the “Graeculus” 
(“the others”). Personalising the latter as enemies of Greece, the Archbishop insists 
that there are both internal (e.g. Jehovah’s Witnesses) and external (the “barbaric East 
and the heretic West”) threats to the unity of Hellenism.
In parallel with indulging in this demagogy, the Archbishop is fully aware that 
the exclusively Greek-Orthodox qualities he strives to entrench entail the danger of 
isolating the Greek Church from the increasingly cosmopolitan orientation of the 
international community to which the Greek State wishes to belong (EU integration). 
Church participation in this supra-national community requires tolerance for 
heterogeneity and cultural pluralism. However, the principles of the Archbishop’s 
“modern” discourse to bring together the two sides of his ideological project are 
sometimes utterly inimical to the values and implications of cultural modernisation 
and EU integration, let alone Orthodoxy itself.
His pronouncements in the EU context are riddled with ideological 
constructions and paradoxical formulations, that were extremely popular between
157
1996 and 2000, in criticism of the government’s program of economic austerity and 
its restraint in national issues, for which Greece’s EU commitments take most of the 
blame. Projecting a variety of endemic deficiencies on “foreign centres” is a routine 
tactic of nationalist populism and, combined with the disorientation and insecurity of 
Greece’s role in a supra-national Europe, provides ideal circumstances for 
Christodoulos augmenting his popularity. The bulk of his supporters share New 
Democracy’s traditionally conservative ideology. Since Papandreou’s idiosyncratic 
socialist modernisation managed to include in the nationalist ideology the previously 
excluded Centre-Left, the Archbishop’s populist discourse is also welcomed by a 
significant proportion of PASOK’s base. Christodoulos' emergence coincided with 
the consolidation of the “patriotic” or presidential faction within the party that is 
particularly sensitive to the national issues. For them too, the Christodoulos 
phenomenon is potentially useful, as it can help in their attack on what they perceive 
as a neo-liberal threat and a Brussels-directed foreign policy in Simitis’ Eurocentrism.
The Archbishop’s increasing power has prompted several commentators to 
express apprehension regarding his role in the unlikely event of a military emergency 
with Turkey: “Imagine something like the Imia crisis,110 which requires cool 
manoeuvring and sensible political handling -  and there you have Christodoulos 
mobilising a million demonstrators down to the Constitution Square!” 111
While the Simitis administration had committed itself in the EU to improve 
Greece’s relationship with Turkey, cut down on armaments and so save millions of 
euros for its deficient welfare State, it was brought up against a new powerful 
opposition in the alliance between Christodoulos and the “patriotic” faction. The 
Archbishop himself confirmed his essentially political outlook: “Today that our voice 
is echoed throughout the heavens, we once more declare in every direction, both to 
the civilised West and the barbaric East, that we are ready and prepared to say another 
Molon Lave.U2 All of us who keep on talking about our unforgettable and lost
110 The disputed Aegean islets of Imia (Kardak in Turkish) were the epicenter of a 
“hot episode” between the Greek and Turkish fleet in 1996.
111 Professor Gavroglou, addressing the Youth Festival of the Coalition of the Left 
and Progress on Church-State relations (15 September 1998).
112 The ancient Greek phrase Molon Lave is equivalent to “Come and get it”. Leonidas 
of Sparta gave this reply to the Persian King Xerxes when he demanded the surrender
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lands, J all of us who keep on remembering those lands, are in danger of being 
characterised as anti-democratic. This is a monstrosity of logic.”114
Irredentist comments of this kind were soon noticed by the international 
media. The Associated Press reported from Athens: “Christodoulos resembles a 
general preparing for war provoking nationalist fever in sensitive times... Although 
initially he was considered a reformist promising to modernise the Church, he became 
eventually the emblem of the far Right." The Austrian newspaper Die Presse 
reported: “From God’s slave, as the name Christodoulos suggests, the new 
Archbishop has become a slave of the mass media.”115
Back in Greece, intellectuals tried to account for the so-called Christodoulos 
phenomenon and to explain the notion of cultural populism:
“Although it may gain him a great number of supporters, Christodoulos’ 
nationalist discourse can never promote unity. The existence of exclusive religio- 
national entities inevitably presupposes the existence of adversaries, and so the 
Church’s discourse becomes stereotyped. This transforms its natural spiritual role of 
humanising and unifying the impersonal secular world into merely another ideology 
of fragmentation and antagonism. With regard to the Archbishop’s self-proclaimed 
role in Greek foreign policy and his remarks on the fading legitimacy of the elected 
political representatives and by extension of parliament itself, it must be emphasised 
that this not only reflects an alarming democratic deficit at the level of institutional 
interpenetration, but most importantly underscores a nationalist populism for which 
the Archbishop seems to enjoy unprecedented social consent. When his irredentist 
discourse is articulated ‘in the name of the Greek people who are betrayed by the
of the Greeks that were opposing him.
113 A term used to describe the Greek-populated areas in Asia Minor that were 
abandoned during the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in the war of 
1920-1922.
114 Newspaper Eleflierotypia, 14 Sept. 1998. The Archbishop made this comment 
during an event commemorating the abandoned Monastery of Soumela in Trebizond, 
Turkey.
11? Newspaper Ta Nea, 20 Sept. 1998.
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politicians’, it is not only the politicians who should react, but primarily the 
people.”116
Consequently, the Archbishop’s persistent popularity and the social consent to 
his nationalistic role cannot be properly explained except by taking into account the 
interplay between the historical, cultural, and political factors that paved the way for 
the resurgence and consolidation of chauvinism and irredentism in Greece on the eve 
of the second millennium. Particularly instructive is an assessment of how Church and 
State co-operated throughout modern Greek history in the construction of a 
pathological fixation to the glories and traumas of the past which has plagued the 
political culture since Greece’s independence.11'
3.5 Summary
The purpose of chapters 2 and 3 has been to examine how the relationship 
between Orthodoxy and the State has developed since 1974, and the direction in 
which the Greek political culture is currently moving under the influence of a 
powerful new religious prelate. The underlying contention in both chapters is that, 
apart from the nationalist ideological manipulation and political exploitation 
emanating from the vested interests of the Church-State interconnection, the so-called 
Christodoulos phenomenon found fertile ground in the cultural sensitivity of the 
Greek public, who are vulnerable and susceptible to any discourse of difference and 
superiority. The Macedonian question is a good example of how a shrewd mix of 
populist media sensationalism, politicians’ electoral objectives, and the desire for 
power among the clergy corresponded to the chauvinistic patriotism of millions of 
Greeks who were mobilised in massive demonstrations on an unprecedented scale. 
The matter of internal legitimation and the omnipresent fear of political cost (in the 
sense of electoral losses if voters are alienated by the specific govermental policy) 
have negatively affected Greek politics with their inconsistent and deeply irrational 
logic, culminating in the fiasco of the country’s isolation from the international
1 1 o
community both over the Macedonian question and the Bosnian war.
116 Quote from an analysis by Theology professor Konstantinou in the newspaper Ta 
Nea, 20 Sept. 1998.
117 See chapter 1 on the historical background.
I 18 In the same way that the Greek aggression towards FYROM can be partly
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In his capacity as the Archbishop of Greece, Christodoulos seemed initially to 
embrace the iconoclastic profile of a moderniser ready to reconsider the practices of 
his predecessor. However, his radicalism was merely confined to a variety of 
symbolic and discursive innovations (e.g. modernising the Church’s media network), 
leaving the structural (Church-State interpenetration) and the ideological dimensions 
(Church-nation connection) largely intact. Moreover, his aspirations for the Greek 
Church extend far beyond the status quo sustained by Serapheim. The new 
Archbishop reflected between the imperative necessity of Christian-Orthodox 
patriotism (supposedly expressing the age-old pride of the Greeks and safeguarding 
the future progress of Hellenism) and the malevolent threats emanating from the 
modern West, the “barbaric East” and the atheist Greeks or Graeculi whose ultimate 
target is to alienate and destroy Hellenism.
This reactionary discourse of cultural populism, which segregates the 
benevolent/proud patriot from the malevolent/conciliatory modernist, is alarmingly 
popular. The radical patriotism and cultural populism disseminated by Archbishop 
Christodoulos has also been embraced by several political factions, media interests, 
intellectual currents (e.g. Neo-Orthodoxy), and powerful civil-society groups (e.g. 
“Network 21”), and cannot be ignored in any serious analysis of how the Greek 
political culture is preparing to integrate into the supra-national entity of the EU.
interpreted as a side-effect of this chauvinistic patriotism and an overdose of cultural 
classicism, the Greek consent to Serbian aggression in Bosnia can be attributed to 
cultural empathy towards “our Orthodox brothers who fight against the perennial 
enemy of Islam and its heretic western ally."
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ASPECTS OF ORTHODOX FUNDAMENTALISM IN CONTEMPORARY
GREEK POLITICAL CULTURE
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It is one of the key contentions of this thesis that even at the start of the new 
millennium the Greek political culture is still struggling to resolve its ideological 
inconsistencies and contradictions. While Prime Minister Simitis and his 
establishment of modernisers moved towards European integration, reactionary 
political and cultural forces were exploiting the people’s disaffection with pro- 
European economic and foreign policies. These forces represent a remarkably 
heterogeneous front consisting of members from the whole range of the political 
spectrum.
Perhaps the most radical and polemic protest against a Greece fully integrated 
into Europe has come from the fundamentalist brotherhoods. Despite the extreme and 
eschatological nature of their critique it is not altogether without interest. Some of 
their contentions echo the preconceptions of a large section of Greek society that is 
inimical to or totally at odds with some basic presuppositions of the Greek 
constitution, not to mention EU integration -  e.g. with human rights, religious 
tolerance, etc. This chapter will show that the recent upsurge of religiosity in 
contemporary Greece has had a profound effect on the people’s political and cultural 
outlook, and that extreme-Right politicians from the “patriotic” faction maintain close 
links with fundamentalist brotherhoods.
The reasons for this liaison lie in the Greek State’s systematic policy of 
cementing national cohesion through the cultivation of the Church-nation-State 
interconnection. In contrast to western European secularism, the Greek political 
system upholds the traditional Symphonia between politics and religion, in both 
institutional and ideological form (Church-State and Church-nation interpenetration 
respectively). This chapter will first focus on the political and historical conditions 
that have consolidated the connection between Orthodox fundamentalism and the 
Greek Right, and then account for the impact of these conditions on today’s political 
culture, and on the dilemmas now confronting Greece.
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4.1 Historical and Theoretical Perspectives
4.1.1 The Origins and Basic Characteristics of Fundamentalist
Brotherhoods in Contemporary Greece
The term “brotherhoods” refers to privately governed associations within the 
Greek-Orthodox faith whose work lies primarily in the areas of preaching and 
education. The most important groups which survive today are Zoe (Life), Soter 
(Saviour), the Ellino-orthodoxo Kinema Soterias (Greek-Orthodox Salvation 
Movement), Chrysopigi (Golden Spring), and Christopistia (Faith in Christ).1
They have enough in common to permit their joint consideration. 
Notwithstanding some sectarian features in the hands of the official Church such 
groups constitute a very important tool. Although the synod always states its formal 
disagreement with the extreme practices and views of fundamentalist brotherhoods, 
whenever Church and State clash, the government’s task of maintaining social order is 
threatened by the possibility of fundamentalist belligerence.
The fundamentalist brotherhoods appeared on the scene principally because of 
the inability of the official Church to satisfactorily handle the people’s spiritual needs, 
particularly as regards preaching and religious education. Their historic origins lie in 
various popular religious movements of 18th and 19th century Greece. A key figure in 
the early religious brotherhoods was Apostolos Makrakis (1831-1905). Not a priest 
but familiar with the thought of the Church Fathers and that of ancient Greek 
philosophers, Makrakis emphasised the importance of returning to the fundamental 
principles of Church tradition. He advocated both religious and political reforms and 
saw himself as designated for this work by divine providence. Eager for the religious 
reform of political life, he drew up a special political program (Christopoliteuma) and 
repeatedly stood for parliamentary elections. He also suggested a philosophical view 
of history, stressing the theocratic mission of Hellenism as bringing about “the new 
Israel”.2
Section 4.1.1 will focus chiefly on Zoe. as by far the most influential in Greek public 
life.
2 Jioultsis 1975, p.69.
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Many laymen and clergy, who saw in the Christopoliteuma a theoretical 
justification of their own ideas, enthusiastically welcomed the vision of Byzantine 
grandeur illuminating Makrakis’ national and religious messianism. The official 
Church being unable to respond to popular needs, Makrakis saw it as his 
responsibility to lead the people back to the source, to the roots of the tradition from 
which they had been cut off The recklessness of his grass-roots leadership resulted in 
his separation from the Church. This was due not only to Makrakis’ own activities and 
disobedience, but also to the upper clergy's unwillingness to exchange their positions 
in the State bureaucracy for pastoral work with the faithful. When Makrakis persisted 
in his opposition to the Synod, many of his followers abandoned him and created 
separate religious movements and brotherhoods (see below).
The basic premises of Greek-Orthodox fundamentalism are as follows:
(i) Fundamentalists harbour a strong sense of exclusivity, believing that they alone 
are in possession of the truth. Their naive elitism makes them likely to “demonise” all 
they perceive to be a threat to Orthodox Hellenism. These attitudes have intensified in 
the 1990s due to globalisation processes and particularly Greece’s EU integration. If 
the entire world becomes one, then strong interdependence between societies and 
cultural pluralism poses a serious challenge to exclusive claims to truth -  and so 
undermines Orthodox superiority. Fundamentalists overemphasise the importance of 
Orthodoxy in the modern world to such a degree that it counterbalances their 
inferiority complex with regard to the West. This inward-looking spirit leads to 
religious complacency, triumphalism, and the idealisation of Orthodox history. Self­
critique and objective evaluations are rare or unknown. The profoundly human 
characteristic of striving for novelty is subjugated to an absolutist process which 
strongly repudiates any attempt at change as a betrayal of Orthodoxy.
(ii) Fundamentalists are predisposed to seeing threats and enemies all around them, 
plotting malevolently against Orthodox Hellenism. Even in the absence of obvious 
danger (when, for example, there is no tension between Greece and Turkey), they tend 
to conjure up remembered historical traumas or some new evil plots supposedly 
jeopardising the existence of Orthodoxy “As a result, they not only build up a 
community of solidarity in order to exclude all enemies, but also embark on an 
ideological or even active show-down against them.”3 The bulk of Greek
3 Makrides 1991a, p.54.
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fundamentalist dissent is directed towards Islamic Turkey and the Latin West. In 
section 4.1.2 below, it will be seen how the initially religious antithesis has been 
turned into a broad and generalised clash of Orthodoxy versus both Islam and the 
West, which involves the systematic manipulation of popular stereotypes rather than 
doctrinal arguments.
(iii) The intense militancy of Greek-Orthodox fundamentalism prompts the faithful 
to consider the Church as a kind of public prosecutor. Their stubborn adherence to 
“eternal Orthodox verities” has occasionally endorsed the use of violence and the 
demonisation of differing viewpoints. Such ideas may lead their adherents to a sacred 
war to actively implement their beliefs.
(iv) Fundamentalists place strong emphasis on moral issues and pride themselves 
on their puritanical, pietistic ethic and lifestyle. For them, the survival and welfare of 
Christian-Orthodox Hellenism depends primarily on personal morality. According to 
Makrides, they usually see things from a polarised, Manichean perspective, as a 
struggle between Good and Evil, right and wrong, light and darkness, within a deeply 
apocalyptic framework.4 They make efforts to abstain from the hedonistic habits and 
consumer values of the modem urban lifestyle, as well as from the “sinful” pleasures 
of sex. Since fundamentalists are highly sensitive to such issues as the preservation of 
the patriarchal family and oppose women’s emancipation, their ideological critique is 
often intensely moralistic. In later sections the chapter will furnish examples of the 
moral and apocalyptic tenets with which they interpret historical, political, and natural 
events. A great variety of issues, from the fall of Constantinople to AIDS, are thus 
more likely to be interpreted as evidence of God's wrath than as natural, historical or 
scientific facts.
(v) In Makrides’ view, fundamentalists are afraid of offending divine law. Their 
attitude to the surrounding prevailing secular culture from which they disconnect 
themselves is twofold. On the one hand they want to transform it according to their 
ideals, on the other they feel threatened by urban socio-cultural differentiation and 
their own marginalisation as an unimportant subculture. They are vitally interested in 
not only increasing their social legitimation, but also in instilling sound principles into 
the young generation. Their strong social activism and its necessary infrastructures 
(e.g. pamphleteering and publishing, missionary work, Sunday schools), as well as the
4 Ibid., p. 60.
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support of nationalistic political forces, are clearly offensive rather than defensive. In 
consequence, Greek fundamentalists do not passively expect justice and rewards in 
the afterlife, but engage in an active reformism that demands the total restructuring of 
modem society according to the values and mores of their own perception of the 
Christian-Orthodox tradition.
(vi) Finally, Orthodox fundamentalism is highly sceptical of the idea of progress 
and modem development. While the dissertation’s enquiry whether Orthodoxy is 
compatible with modernisation relies much on Mouzelis’ concepts of autonomous 
(development with human rights) and heteronomous (development without human 
rights) modernisation, the fundamentalists' values seem to have little use for any kind 
of modernity. Indeed, their uncompromising views and attitudes are hardly 
compatible with the values of tolerance and pluralism. However, although 
fundamentalism is an impediment to any objective judgement of new developments 
and ideas, it does not rule out the prospect of achieving progress, development and 
productivity, nor does it obstruct an industrious work ethic (heteronomous 
modernisation).
4.1.2 Ideological and Political Considerations
A crucial question related to the ideological and political dimension of 
fundamentalism in Greece is whether or not fundamentalists pose a threat to the 
alliance between the official Church and the State. At the politico-ideological level, 
there is complete accord between fundamentalists and the Church. Nationalism being 
the common denominator for both the official and the fundamentalist version of 
Orthodoxy in Greece, the sectarian features of fundamentalist organisations are 
effectively contained in a mutual endeavour to consolidate the Church-nation-State 
interconnection.
This relatively peaceful relationship suffered a major blow as a result of 
Simitis’ Eurocentric and secularising policies. While the official connection between 
Church and State remained intact, several measures to harmonise Greece’s legislation 
with that of the EU (e.g. new identification cards) jeopardised the State’s usual line of 
being both modem and Orthodox, and brought fundamentalists closer to the official 
Church, both of them being completely inimical to the government.
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This new configuration means a wider reformulation of ideological alliances in 
Greek political culture along increasingly civilisational lines. Inasmuch as the 
government has been very reluctant to implement policies that may offend the Greek 
people’s Orthodox propensities, the “patriotic” political faction and the official 
Church rely on this long-lasting legacy and utilise fundamentalist activism to put 
pressure on the modernisers. Threat of political consequences would not be possible 
without the versatile strategies of the fundamentalist brotherhoods. Tactics like this 
can be observed in the vociferous Church protests against the State confiscating 
ecclesiastical and monastic property in 1987, as well as in more recent Church-State 
disputes (see below).
Notwithstanding certain sectarian features, historical circumstances and 
political expediencies have rendered Greek-Orthodox fundamentalism an
idiosyncratic but pertinent part of a relatively unified official Church. In other words, 
any possible differences between the official Church and the fundamentalist 
brotherhoods are less important than their joint convictions. First and foremost, both 
share a chauvinistic attachment to inherited tradition, xenophobia towards other 
religions and cultures, and a constant fear of imminent dangers threatening
Orthodoxy. This conservatism underlies their liaison with the extreme Right, which in 
2000 had culminated in the establishment of the fundamentalist extreme-Right 
political party LAOS. Before discussing this development (section 4.3), the
ideological presuppositions that made this collaboration possible should be clarified.
The ideological liaison between Greek-Orthodox fundamentalism and the 
political extreme Right, derives from their common reactionary absolutism with 
respect to the past. In Orthodox traditionalism, the past generally is indubitably better 
than either the present or the future. For example, the theocratic Byzantine State is 
considered vastly superior to the present, largely secular reality. This idealised and 
eclectic interpretation of the past emphasises the glorious elements, while its less 
triumphant periods are overlooked or cited as the cause of all evils and subsequent 
misfortunes. According to Makrides, this constant preoccupation with seeking
religious truth solely in the age-old verities of the past has turned into a predisposition 
to measure modern developments by standards from the Golden Age, a form of 
obscurantism that hinders any attempt at free inquiry.
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Such distorted ideological use of the past is evident in the way both official 
and popular Greek Orthodoxy sanctifies the State’s nationalistic aspirations. A 
recurrent theme within the fundamentalist discourse is the idealisation of the 
Byzantine era when the emperor and priesthood were inextricably linked, and 
Orthodox superiority was a key element in the empire’s political philosophy by 
legitimising its political aspirations on the basis of religious superiority. The same 
applies to post-1453 Moscow, called the third Rome, which was intended to be the 
sole bearer and guardian of Orthodoxy within the Tsarist foreign and domestic 
policies. In the early 20th century, religion and nationalism were associated with the 
irredentist dream of the Megali Idea to liberate Constantinople and Asia Minor from 
the Turkish yoke. This dream has not entirely vanished even today, but fundamentalist 
emphasis has shifted to the liberation of northern Cyprus from the Turks, and Greece 
incorporating the mainly Orthodox-populated northern Epiros (southern Albania).
The fundamentalists’ aversion of the Left goes hand-in-hand with adherence to 
the Right. The communists in particular have always been considered enemies, as 
plotting to undermine the very existence of Orthodoxy and the Greek nation. It will 
be seen later how the most influential of the fundamentalist organisations collaborated 
with the dictatorial regime in the anti-communist crusade after the civil war. More 
recently, fundamentalists have interpreted the disintegration of the communist bloc as 
the realisation of ancient prophecies and the triumph of Orthodoxy over atheism and 
materialism.
Allthough the Right often manipulates Orthodox symbolism to attract 
fundamentalist votes (see section 4.2), theirs is by no means an alliance between 
indifferent collaborators. A case in point is ex-ND parliamentarian Karatzaferis, 
whose ultra-nationalistic discourse combining fundamentalism, irredentism, 
chauvinism and xenophobia renders him the leading proponent of a new, Haider-type 
Greek Right (see 4.3.2). The Karatzaferis faction denounces the Eurocentrism of ND 
and PAS OK, and aims at uniting all Greek “patriots” under Archbishop 
Christodoulos’ charismatic leadership. What is the political background that facilitates 
this convergence between fundamentalist Orthodoxy and the extreme Right?
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4.1.3 Zoe and the Junta
The politically most active and influential Orthodox brotherhood in the 20th 
century has been Zoe. Founded in 1907 by a Makrakis follower, the archimandrite 
Eusebios Matthopoulos, Zoe became a group with a profound impact on Greek people 
and public life. From 1924 onwards, it very effectively organised both clergy and (for 
the most part) laymen, and expanded noticeably. In its early stages, the purposes of 
Zoe were twofold: to foster the spiritual growth of its members according to the 
principles of Orthodoxy, and complete dedication to the expansion of Orthodoxy 
within Greece in view of the growing urbanisation and secularisation then taking 
place.5
Zoe's internal structure exhibited some similarities with traditional eastern 
monasticism. Its members have to accept the three monastic virtues of poverty, 
chastity, and obedience and have to spend a certain time as postulans before receiving 
full membership. In contrast to monasticism, however, Zoe has always remained in 
the world, fighting any new problems challenging the Orthodox tradition. Through its 
rapid development Zoe acquired a sophisticated organisational network of members 
dispersed all over the country, supervising all local missionary activities such as 
preaching, Sunday schools, summer camps for students, etc. The zeal of Zoe in 
preaching and teaching was surpassed only by its massive output of published 
material. Since 1911 it has brought out its own weekly for up to 170,000 subscribers, 
and as many as 1,300,000 copies of its pamphlets on “Religion and Life” have been 
printed and distributed.
Aided by professor Tsirintanes, an ardent supporter of the brotherhood, in the 
1950s the purely religious aims of Zoe became part of a broader development of all 
aspects of Greek life under the banner of the “Graeco-Christian civilisation”. This 
quasi-messianic vision led to another, more political culmination of the brotherhood’s 
power in the 1960s and early 1970s. Concerning the theoretical presuppositions of this 
liaison between fundamentalism and politics, and particularly how it manifested in 
Zoe’s dynamic mix of ideological chauvinism and religious pietism, it can be said that 
the brotherhood succeeded fairly well in supplementing the Church’s national and 
political views with the purity of Christian preaching. In other words, the standard 
geographical messianism of the “Great Idea” and revival of a Byzantine theocracy
? Makrides 1988, p. 168.
171
were merged with social, racial (ethnophyletic), and humanistic pietism. Great stress 
was laid on practical piety, personal morality, and liturgical participation.
Notwithstanding the conservative ideology and puritan character of Zoe, its 
striking similarity with German Protestant pietism gradually led to the estrangement 
of the brotherhood’s older members who accused the younger of “progressivism”. In 
the long run a schism between conservatives and progressives was inevitable, as the 
latter gradually subscribed to an increasing amount of more action-oriented and 
political tactics. Eventually most of the conservatives split off from Zoe and founded 
the new brotherhood Soter, denouncing Zoe for having heretically deviated from the 
original principles outlined by Eusebios Matthopoulos.
The brotherhood’s “progressivism’*. however, found ideological shelter within 
the discourse of the junta regime (1967-1974). While not advocating any religious 
opposition to the official Church or a relatively a-political critique of alleged 
secularism in Greek society, the group assumed power over the Church leadership and 
joined forces with the junta in the unprecedented project of building a “Hellas of 
Christian Greeks”. In its capacity as the largest and most vocal lay organisation, Zoe 
had maintained for some time that the higher clergy were so steeped in stagnation and 
irresponsibility that interested parties, both secular and clergy, would have to come to 
the Church’s rescue. The opportunity presented itself in the spring of 1967 when the 
military took over the government. This coup d ’etat incidentally pointed to the 
political limitation of Church intervention, and also brought out its latent power. 
While the military took up the reins of government, the Church embarked on a project 
to legitimise the new regime’s ideology.
Rather than totally reject modernisation, the junta elaborated its own brand of 
modernisation via nationalism. In an authoritarian/heteronomous type of 
modernisation, the colonels attempted to rationalise the governmental structure and 
mitigate the power of nepotism, class, and status, as well as to eliminate the menace 
of communism. In other words, the new regime championed an inward-looking 
modernisation without regard to human rights, and focused on a robust economy and 
a society bonded by nationalism and an austere work ethic.
Part of the junta’s regulations was aimed at rehabilitating life in Greece and 
restoring its purified ideal. To this end the people had to be in better communion with 
the Church. Government officials were expected to attend services regularly, and one
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of the junta’s first decrees was to order all school children and civil servants to take 
Holy Communion once a week. Government slogans presented the view that “Youth 
and clean living will win every time.” Anyone who publicly voiced doubt of the 
existence of God could be arrested and found guilty of blasphemy. As one 
commentator noted at the time, “These spiritual benefits are hastened by torture as 
well as exile.”6
In order to avoid the possibility of an unpredictable and recalcitrant Church, a 
concordat between the junta and a particular faction of the higher clergy was worked 
out. A key figure in this affair was Ieronymos Kotsonis, chaplain to the King. He was 
an educated and ambitious clergyman, held back professionally because of his 
association with the lay organisation Zoe. As one of the brotherhood's most active and 
outspoken members Ieronymos was denied episcopal rank though more than 
qualified. Once the junta took power, however, he seemed to be well situated: with his 
military and Zoe connections, he could not be considered a threat to the military 
regime. He therefore formulated a working arrangement with the colonels, which 
served as a valuable platform to legitimise the coup.
Ieronymos was able to offer the support of those elements of the Church that 
could benefit the new regime, and the junta needed someone to mediate the 
differences between themselves and the king. Their liaison was especially fruitful 
because it was a natural alliance: “Both were trying to form monolithic 
establishments; one within the Church and the other concerning the whole of society. 
Through Zoe’s influence, the State was using the Church to control the population.”7
The junta was able to advance Ieronymos’ aspirations because Zoe, by taking 
control of the synod, could thoroughly reform that body and ensure the promotion of 
individuals associated with the new Graeco-Christian regime. As we have seen, the 
junta, in an unprecedented act of direct political intervention, deposed the then- 
Archbishop Chrysostomos and replaced the members of the permanent holy synod 
with bishops from among the clergy belonging to Zoe. Once installed on the 
archepiscopal throne, Ieronymos not only began to remove bishops hostile to his 
reforms, but also introduced personnel changes in the public offices dealing with 
Church matters. Posts in the ministry of education and religion as well as its top
6 Kent 1971.
7 Ibid., p. 416.
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offices were filled with new men. Virtually all these new personnel were Zoe 
members who, consistent with the junta ideology, believed that to be Greek means to 
be Orthodox.
One of the most remarkable events of this entire period occurred in the spring
of 1968. Archbishop Ieronymos held a press conference at which he announced that
the Greek Church would boycott the World Council of Church’s Fourth Assembly to
be held in Sweden. The reason he gave was the Swedish government’s “hostile
attitude” towards Greece. The Archbishop said that he was “incensed” by what he
termed as “the World Council of Churches' blatant and inconceivable interference in
suggesting that its Commission of Churches on International Affairs seek expert
• • 8appraisal of the new Greek Constitution.”1 At the same time he announced that the 
secretary-general of the World Council of Churches would not be welcome in Greece. 
The executive committee of the Council had proposed earlier that the secretary- 
general should visit Greece to investigate charges of maltreatment of political 
prisoners.
Despite the fact that Zoe seems to have influenced some of Ieronymos’ 
reforms, such as increased participation of laypersons in ecclesiastical activities, 
Runciman’s prediction was to prove true that, “though Greece is now the only fully 
Orthodox country left in the world, and though the Church still means a great deal to 
the average Greek, it is hard to believe that religion in Greece will benefit in the long 
run by its subjection to the wishes of dictators.”9
After the fall of Ieronymos (1973) and that of the military regime (1974), the 
Zoe brotherhood entered a long period of disregard. Especially during the 1980s, the 
positive public reception of Papandreou’s socialist overtones left very little space for 
Zoe or any other fundamentalist movement. But rather than leading up to complete 
oblivion, this period may be considered a time of hibernation, when fundamentalism 
was waiting on the sidelines of the political and cultural mainstream for better times 
to come. This situation changed dramatically in the 1990s, when favourable 
circumstances for the development of politico-religious fundamentalism begun to re- 
emerge in reaction to the State’s Eurocentric policies. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 will 
furnish a critical account of contemporary Greek-fundamentalist ideology.
8 Ibid., p. 427.
9 Runciman, 1971, p.71.
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4.2 Secularisation, Democratisation and Civil Society
4.2.1 Secularisation: Bishop Kantiotis, the Schengen Agreement, and the
Antichrist
Greek-Orthodox fundamentalists have been especially hostile towards 
secularisation, due to their deep conviction that Orthodox Greece is under continuous 
threat from the plottings of external enemies. Such obsessions lead to strong anti- 
ecumenicism (see section 4.2.3) and a general suspicion of western culture as well as 
of the Islamic East and South. It also tends to see dangers and conspiracies outside the 
religious domain. The fundamentalist conspiracy theories usually operate within an 
apocalyptic framework consisting of a great struggle between Good and Evil, 
expressed in terms of God’s battle against the “dark powers”.
The supposed role of Zionism in the machinations of these “dark powers” is a 
key aspect of modem Greek anti-Semitism. For example, there is strong emphasis on 
the Jewish roots of Marxism-Leninism (i.e. the Jewish descent of Marx, Lenin, and 
Stalin) and of freemasonry and other organisations (the Rotarians, Lions etc.) all of 
whom, according to the fundamentalists, conspire against Orthodoxy.10 The origin of 
these sentiments lie in the stereotyped view of Judaism as the arch-enemy of 
Christianity.
Apocalyptic orientations frequently mean that fundamentalists expect the end 
of the world to be nigh, and interpret historical phenomena or natural catastrophes 
from this perspective. Apocalyptic frenzy turned into a pure hysteria in the 1990s, 
when it was alleged that the number 666, the sign of the Antichrist according to the 
Book o f Revelation, appeared in code on new identity cards being issued. A wide 
range of polemical literature on this theme appeared, and several demonstrations were 
organised against the Antichrist’s plot to subject Orthodoxy to the powers of Satan, 
mostly by Old Calendrists from the Greek-Orthodox Salvation Movement.
Despite the extreme, eschatological nature of their critique, fundamentalists do 
not stand outside the Greek political culture. Inasmuch as the values of secularism and 
rationalism collide with their deeply entrenched nationalistic political and religious 
discourses, apocalyptic scenarios provide fertile ground for political manipulation by
10 Makrides 1991a, pp. 49-72.
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the Helleno-centrists. Before we examine political fundamentalism (section 4.3), it 
should be understood that, unlike western politicians and New-Age fundamentalists 
pursuing more or less separate courses and operating in distinct domains, Greek 
fundamentalism and the political mainstream still negotiate a viable way to coexist 
and collaborate. This is true also of the relation between fundamentalists and the 
official Church, whose common endeavour to cement nationalism greatly outweighs 
their differences.
The most notorious fundamentalist member of the synod is Augustinos 
Kantiotis, the bishop of Fiorina. Despite his advanced age, he runs a highly effective 
fundamentalist network and has had repeated conflicts with the government. 
Anticipating the likely political costs of meeting him head-on the government often 
retreats before his militancy. In his “sacred wars”, Augustinos often mobilises his 
numerous adherents against a variety of supposed “anti-Greek” and “anti-Orthodox” 
enemies. A case that vividly illustrates the bishop’s strategy is the organised reaction 
to the film “The Last Temptation of Christ”, in 1989. Fundamentalists marched 
singing and praying, and some went so far as to damage the cinemas where the film 
was shown and even attacked the spectators. This fanatical spirit was clearly depicted 
in the fundamentalist newspaper Orthodoxos Typos (Orthodox Press), which urged the 
Orthodox people to revolt: “Let us be illegal' for the sake of Jesus Christ and carry 
his blame and blemishes. Many saints would like to live in our hard days to earn 
precious crowns of martyrdom. Perhaps Christian blood will be shed in the streets of 
Athens, because a Church that is not persecuted is no Church at all!”11
Another feature of anti-secularism is the fundamentalists’ endeavour to abstain 
from hedonistic consumer habits and the ephemeral pleasures of the modern world. 
They are even more militant in matter of sexual transgression (pornography, 
homosexuality) and vehemently against women’s emancipation and related issues 
(e.g. abortion). They also abominate the introduction of sex education in schools, 
considering it potentially dangerous for the students’ moral integrity. They deplore the 
decline of traditional, patriarchal family values and usually claim that their enemies 
fail to run a properly pious Orthodox family. Finally, both moralising and the 
irrational interpretation of historical events (e.g. the invasion of Cyprus by the Turks 
in 1974) or natural catastrophes are very common among fundamentalists. So
11 Ibid., p. 59.
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Kantiotis asserted that the 1978 earthquake in Thessaloniki was a sign of the wrath of
1 9God over the increase in abortions and blasphemies in Greece.
Is the fundamentalist mobilisation and protest against the surrounding secular 
culture a yearning for otherworldliness? Given the pervasiveness of Greek 
nationalism, Orthodox fundamentalism is less a spiritual retreat from the modern 
world, as in the case of New Age groups, and more a form of reactionary social 
activism. Regardless of the secular culture’s negative responses towards their 
extreme ideals and activities, fundamentalist devotees have associated themselves 
with chauvinistic political and cultural forces. Their sense of exclusive truth and elitist 
superiority, their persecution complex, and their absolutisation of the past are all 
irrational characteristics that bring them close to their chauvinistic ideal of racial 
purity.
One of the anti-secular convictions that cement the liaison between 
fundamentalism and the extreme Right in Greece is their common aversion to the 
principles of free thought and inquiry. Thoroughly engrossed in dogma and convinced 
of being in possession of the sole truth, they denounce all academic institutions that 
employ scientific reason as “centres of darkness”. Even the theological schools of 
Athens and Thessaloniki are allegedly “contaminated” by the “Protestant” 
preoccupation with dry intellectual theology, neglecting the real problems of the 
believers by avoiding “practical theology” and, worst of all, showing a predilection 
for non-Orthodox positions. Moreover, fundamentalists strongly oppose the 
continuing tendency of Orthodox theologians to pursue their graduate studies abroad. 
For them, all and any contact with foreign theological circles and lifestyles inevitably
• 1 7leads to the loss, or at least the relativisation. of Orthodoxy.
In consequence, fundamentalists condemn the modernising influences of the 
Orthodox diaspora. There are indeed striking differences between the Greek-Orthodox 
Churches of the diaspora influenced by the cosmopolitan ideas of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate of Constantinople, and Orthodoxy within the Greek borders which is 
generally more nationalistic, chauvinist, and less tolerant. This cosmopolitan 
“contamination” prompted bishop Kantiotis to denounce the unorthodox practices of 
the then-Archbishop of Australia Stylianos. Followers of Kantiotis visited Australia
12 Ibid., p. 61.
13 Ibid., p. 67.
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for missionary purposes and professed themselves shocked by what they considered 
deviations from the true Orthodox spirit. They severely criticised and denounced 
various of the Australian Archbishop's policies, and Kantiotis demanded the 
intervention of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. However, the Patriarchate 
supported Stylianos’ policies and suggested that Kantiotis avoid interfering in the 
affairs of a diocese outside his jurisdiction.14
Let us now look at some of the implications in the matter of the number of the 
Antichrist as well as the Schengen Agreement, as prime examples of fundamentalist 
logic and how it has entered the political mainstream.
The first point that should be emphasised is that, despite the profoundly anti­
western character of the fundamentalist Greeks’ critique of secularism, they often 
emulate the Protestant fundamentalist model. For example, the creation and evolution 
controversy occupies a central place in Greek fundamentalist thinking. In their anti­
evolution campaign, fundamentalists organised a demonstration against a high-school 
textbook entitled I  istoria tou anthropinou genous (The history of the human race), 
which openly endorses Darwin’s theory of evolution. The demonstrators demanded 
not only the withdrawal of the book from the schools, but also its public burning. Yet 
although their intention is to uphold Orthodoxy by such measures, their entire 
argument is based on Protestant fundamentalist literature (for instance Duan Gish’s 
book Evolution? The Fossils Say No! which was published in Greek in 1985).1
Much the same applies to the matter of the satanic number 666, which was for 
the most part based on Protestant fundamentalist publications. Another paradoxical 
point is that despite the eschatological nature of the fundamentalist critique against 
666 and the Schengen Agreement of 2000 (see fn. 91, ch. 3), the latter is based on 
Enlightenment notions of human rights in defence of what is perceived as the 
inalienable constitutional prerogative of any citizen to deny the State access to his/her 
private data and personal sources of information.
The same contradictory attitude is held by the synod as well as the 
communists, whose suspicion towards EU-integration measures (such as the 
Schengen Agreement) has a striking affinity with fundamentalist anti-Occidentalism:
14 Ibid., p. 71.
15 Ibid., p. 72.
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“The Holy Synod and every Greek citizen has the constitutional right to revolt against 
the violation of our inalienable constitutional rights ... we can no longer bear to see 
the malevolent way in which the progress in digital applications and electronic 
technology has been erroneously associated with 666, the number of the Antichrist as
1 f\it is clearly identified by the Holy Book of Revelation.”
Not only the official Church, but also the priestly community on Mount Athos 
(the centre of Christian-Orthodox spirituality) denounced the government in the 
matter of the satanic number, and launched a relentless campaign against all who are 
supposedly trying to undermine the unity of the Greek-Orthodox nation. The common 
denominator in the alliance between fundamentalists, the official Church, the Mount 
Athos community (and the communists with regand to the Schengen accord) was the 
nationalistic essence of their shared contentions. The most crucial point of dispute, 
however, was not so much the eschatological dangers of having the State subjugated 
to a “Devil hacker” but another clause of EU legislation that would make it possibile 
not to mention the holder’s religious affiliation on the new identity cards. Since 1939 
identity cards have compulsorily listed the religious affiliation (and incidentally 
shown that some 98% of the Greek population are Greek-Orthodox).
EU legislation considers religion a sensitive personal matter that should not be 
revealed in a citizen’s transactions with the State because it might lead to 
discrimination against religious minorities. This view has met with harsh criticism: 
“The new electronic identity cards that make the inscription of religion voluntary will 
facilitate the ongoing process of the immortal Greek soul’s spiritual demise, and will 
serve in the disintegration and loss of the heroic Greek soil to the enemy... Only the 
total and irreversible abolition of this law will appease the people and end their 
justified concern for those who are paving the way for the Antichrist coming through 
666. ”17
The reasons for fundamentalist dissent against the Schengen Agreement stem 
from a deep historical scepticism towards European integration, and particularly 
unwillingness to accept subjugation of the Greek-Orthodox culture to the values and 
mores of the West. Moreover, it is doubted that the West would be a true ally ready to
16 Angeloglou 1997, p. 10.
17 I b i d . ,  p .  11 .
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protect Greek interests against Turkish imperialist claims. Despite the fundamentalist 
assertion that the Orthodox have greater justifaction than anyone else for desiring a 
strong and unified Europe -  because ‘'We are the very founders of Europe” -  
misgivings raised by historical and current affronts (the crusades, western support for 
Turkey) exacerbate the already existing climate of cultural estrangement and promote 
a logic of entrenchment. Perhaps the most interesting point about the fundamentalists’ 
Euroscepticism is that it more and more resembles the communist critique of EU 
cultural integration. For both, it is the capitalist imperative to create new markets and 
maximise profits that boosts the epiphenomenon of cultural unification. In other 
words, Maastricht and Schengen were not the products of a benevolent democratic 
endeavour to eradicate potentially explosive differences by creating a unified political 
body, but a pragmatic decision to create uniform consumer needs in a stable and 
docile political and cultural environment.
According to the fundamentalists, the modification of national constitutions in
line with the interests of the Eurocrats in Brussels is part of the effort to create such a
submissive environment. It is believed that, under the pretext of cracking down on
crime and introducing a more effective containment of illegal behaviour, European
forces ultimately aim at establishing a surveillance society (quite similar to Foucault’s
Panopticon) that will diminish national sovereignty and signal the demise of
Orthodoxy. Epitomising the connection between communism and fundamentalism,
we have the remarks of the Neo-Orthodox sympathiser communist MP, and major
media personality Liana Kanelli, who identified the sentiments underlying the alleged
words of the former US foreign-affairs secretary Henry Kissinger with the logic of
Schengen: “There is no chance of controlling the Greek people unless you inflict
damage on its civilisational roots. Unless we exterminate the Greek people’s rich
spiritual and cultural reserves, namely language and religion, Greece will not cease to
18cause us trouble in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.”
The fundamentalist critique against Schengen is, therefore, less an 
otherworldly conviction about the coming of the Antichrist than the manifestation of a 
long hostility to secularisation, westernisation, and globalisation. Devotees of this 
anti-ecumenical political stance back their convictions with highly apocalyptic and 
eschatological arguments. They assert that the Antichrist bar code, including sensitive
18 Ibid., p. 26.
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information from political convictions to health history, DNA structure and sexual 
preferences, is to be carved into the individual’s forehead or arm, and will follow 
him/her in every transaction with the supra-national State. The control panel for this 
omnipresent Panopticon will be in Brussels, where a worldwide dictatorship will set 
to work to utterly eradicate Orthodoxy.
4.2.2 Fundamentalism and Democratisation: Church-State Relations and 
the Rotonda Affair
The fundamentalist opposition to secularisation is interrelated with a number 
of issues that either have prompted fundamentalists to seek inroads into the State 
apparatus in order to improve their negotiating position, or has brought them into 
direct odds with State attempts to enforce certain measures of democratisation and 
secularisation.
The most important dispute between the Church and State was over PASOK’s 
attempt to socialise-nationalise Church property and modernise-democratise the 
Church structure (see chapter 2 on Law 1700), when fundamentalists worked hand in 
hand with the official Church and were the first to take to the streets to campaign 
against the government’s wicked plot. Although fundamentalism criticises the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of bishops, and at least certain 
fundamentalist groups endorse an extremely austere and ascetic life-style, they were 
much more eager to support the Church in the matter its real-estate property than to 
support an “anti-Christian socialist government.” A justification for this is couched in 
mainly nationalistic and traditionalist terms: “I do not feel pain about the landed 
property. I feel pain over the treatment of the Church. I hurt because of its systematic 
marginalisation and the unappreciative way we treat our race’s Saviour. I feel pain 
and agony for the future of this great nation, its continuous de-Hellenisation, and de- 
Christianisation, its disconnection from the roots of its being. The landed property 
issue is just a symptom of our people’s widespread alienation.”19
Most of the disputes between the State and fundamentalists are cases where 
fundamentalist logic considers State intervention in the values and mores of the 
faithful as blasphemous. In consequence, fundamentalists have had a strong interest in 
upholding the law criminalising blasphemy. Passed by the Metaxas dictatorship in
19 Theodoropoulos 1987, p. 19.
1937, this law provided legality for fundamentalist “prosecutors” wanting to impose 
censorship on virtually anyone who dares to openly declare his/her deviation from the 
Orthodox mainstream or disseminated an eccentric or heretical intellectual, artistic 
and political viewpoint. In order to uphold the otherwise secular and tolerant character 
of Greek legislation, the law prosecutes only “malevolent” in differentiation from 
“non-malevolent” blasphemy, perceived as non-malevolent in the sense of not taking 
the name of the Lord in vain but being a form of expressing philosophical objections.
The interpretation of the aforementioned law constitutes one more example of 
the inconsistentcy in the Greek political culture. More specifically, despite the vague 
and ambivalent sense of tolerance entailed in distinguisting between malevolent and 
non-malevolent blasphemy, the Church in its capacity as the semi-official State 
religion was in effect the only legitimate authority empowered to make that 
distinction. Indeed, it makes little sense that somebody may be systematically 
stigmatised and dragged through endless court battles, only to be eventually 
vindicated by a higher court. The only meaningful measure that could restrain the 
official Church and its fundamentalist avant-garde from prosecuting a variety of 
“heretics” is obiously a complete separation of Church from State.
However, even uncompromisingly modernising Prime Minister Simitis has 
avoided bringing the subject up in parliamentary debates on amendments to the 
constitution. The dual strategy of a secular/pluralistic legal framework, combined with 
a political privilege for Orthodoxy, reflects the ambivalence in the constitution in this 
matter. The balance between the two leading Greek institutions is disturbed whenever 
either of them acts without making the necessary concessions to the other. Examples 
have already been given of bitter disputes resulting from the failure to strike a balance 
in Church-State relations, but in conflicts between Orthodoxy and the State, the 
fundamentalists’ main allegation is that the State tolerates blasphemy.
The so-called Rotonda affair is an instance of a dispute in which 
fundamentalism and the official Church united their voice against the State’s “anti- 
Greek” projects. The Supreme court was called to deliberate whether or not to uphold 
a decision by the culture ministry to limit liturgical services to three times per year in 
the Thessaloniki Rotonda, a building that dates back to Roman times. The Church 
denounced the ministry decision as violating the freedom of worship. The Rotonda 
dispute quickly turned into another example of the ideological, political, and cultural
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ramifications of the turbulent relations between Church and State. It also underscored 
the role of the fundamentalists as an Orthodox militia vigilantly active in containing 
the government’s aspirations for secularisation, and a reminder of Orthodox power to 
punish the unfaithful “heretic” at election time.
One of the city’s oldest and most beautiful landmarks, the Rotonda is a 
national monument. The State wanted it as a venue for cultural events, and the Church 
sought to perpetuate it as a church. Thessaloniki having been designated the cultural 
capital of Europe for 1997, EU funds had poured into the city to restore the Rotonda 
and other monuments. It is ironic that the Rotonda should encapsulate Greece’s dual 
identity (Orthodox and European), because violent riots erupted over the attempt to 
give it a twin role. This is symptomatic of the more general predicament in Greece’s 
political culture. At the same time as the Eurocentric Greek government is trying to 
forge a coherent cultural policy and build bridges between Greece’s different 
identities, its privileged treatment of the modem-secular-western identity encourages 
a divide between the modernisers and an increasingly powerful nativistic movement 
that employs tactics of cultural populism to assert what makes Greece essentially 
different from other EU countries.
A brief look at the actual events that unfolded in the Rotonda affair will show 
the kind of political and cultural frenzy associated with the aforementioned 
predicament, as well as the role played by Orthodox fundamentalism. While an 
exibition of Byzantine icons was still in progress at the Rotonda, the Church obtained 
permission from the ministry of culture for a service there. When the exhibition 
closed, a lot of people gathered at the Rotonda on the Sunday, expecting that a church 
service would be held. (It is the fundamentalist groups that had disseminated this 
information.) In the event, the gates to the building remained locked. This generated 
frustration and anger among the faithful, and one of the rumours that began to 
circulate was that the ministry of culture was planning to turn the Rotonda into a 
centre for Islamic studies.
At this point the Church called for an all-night vigil to be held at the Rotonda.
The crowds shouted slogans such as: “Not a synagogue, nor a mosque, but a Greek
21church!” and “This is Greece, not Albania: For Macedonia and Orthodoxy!” A
20 Stewart 1998.
21 Ibid.
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senior archimandrite as chief spokesperson of the Church went on the offensive. He 
asserted that, when allocating it to the ministry of culture, the State had never ruled 
out the Rotonda’s use as a church, and disputed the authority of the Archaeological 
Service or even the ministry to deny him and other faithful the right to worship there. 
He also charged State officials with plundering and desecrating the Rotonda, and even 
claimed that in 1986 the Rotonda had been used to show pornographic films. The 
archimandrite concluded: “The Turks took the cross down from the church, and so did
♦ 29the archaeologists... What is going on? ” ~
The Church instigated a lawsuit against the Archaeological Service for 
violating the freedom of worship. Eventually the culture ministry declared that the 
Rotonda would remain a museum, and that its religious use would be limited to three 
times a year; One day later the bishopric officially rejected the decision and planned 
another liturgy for the coming Sunday. The bishop of Thessaloniki adopted the 
fundamentalists’ rhetoric and associated the Rotonda affair with the need to entrench 
Orthodoxy, in the light of concerns that university students were succumbing to 
heresies. Muslim students were reported to be worshipping on Fridays in the 
Theology school of the university.
The dispute over the Rotonda’s double identity attracted the interest of most of 
Thessaloniki’s citizens, who came to be divided into two opposing camps. The 
Citizen’s Union of Thessaloniki, comprised of academics, professionals, journalists, 
students and other open-minded residents, wanted to maintain the monument’s secular 
character, and expressed their discontent with what they considered an anachronistic 
attitude on the part of the faithful. Reactionary political and cultural forces took sides 
with the synod and its fundamentalist activists.
As usual, the State -  unsuccessfully -  tried to pacify both sides. When the 
synod declared the Rotonda a sacred place of pilgrimage, thus indicating that it would 
not back down and that it would deploy every means at its disposal to make it clear 
that this was a dispute between the sacred and profane, the Supreme court hastily 
passed a temporary ruling that the Rotonda could be used as a church provided 
applications were made to the Archaeological Service. The Church formally requested 
and received permission to hold an all-night vigil to conduct a special liturgy 
celebrating the holy relics of St George. That night the Archaeological Service
22 I b i d .
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watchman observed an unusual number of clergy entering and re-entering the 
Rotonda, carrying bulky objects. Next day it was found that they had been building an 
altar of marble and cement, on which they had laid the Saint’s relics.
By this action the Church exceeded its right to “use” the Rotonda and violated 
State law by making unauthorised additions to a protected national monument. An 
altar, however, is a consecrated object and it violates the canons of the Church to 
remove it. Clearly its erection was a carefully thought-out act meant to bring the issue 
to the popular level and heightening Orthodox sensitivity.
The most dramatic event in the saga of the Rotonda took place on Monday, 30 
October 1995. A piano recital of jazz music was scheduled by the Citizen’s Union and 
permission for it to be held in the Rotonda was obtained from the Archaeological 
Service. The Church promptly called a vigil for the very same time, clearly attempting 
to ruin the concert. The “faithful” surged and seethed outside the locked gates 
shouting “Anti-Greek!, Anti-Christ!”, “Do you want to make the church a mosque?”, 
and “God will bum you!” Finally they broke in, and yelling “A piano in the church! 
Antichrist!”, proceeded to overturn chairs and then banged, struck, and bludgeoned 
the piano, completely destroying the instrument. At the end a member of the clergy 
took the microphone and shouted: “The people of God have triumphed! They tell us 
that Thessaloniki has a mixed history. If they mean that many conquerors passed
2 4through here, I agree. But the Orthodox character of the city has never changed.” 
When the same clergyman was asked to explain this atrocious behaviour, he said it 
was because the government had been trying to close churches throughout Greece. 
Besides, he was worried that the government was supporting Muslim interests to a 
greater degree than it should.
The Rotonda events may, therefore, be seen as evidence of the power struggle 
between Church and State. Provoked by the State’s secularising (NS 1700), and its 
moderate foreign policies (normalising relations with FYROM), the Church had 
begun to realise its ability to cement a variety of anti-European political and cultural 
forces. So in the Macedonian controversy, it had been the Church that spearheaded the 
rousing of popular support. The bishop of Thessaloniki was in the forefront of 
massive demonstrations opposing EU recognition of “Macedonia”, and presented the
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
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Church as the guardian of national interests -  indeed, as the representative of the 
nation -  and, moreover, at the same time that the State had to give in to international 
pressure and relax its initially uncompromising position.
The Rotonda affair clarifies the parameters at play in the Church-nation-State 
triad, and the role played by fundamentalism in the balance of power between them. 
Nation and Church are virtually equivalent and equally subordinate to the secular 
State. However, whenever fundamentalism ignites Orthodox nationalism, the State 
has to oppose any forces which the fundamentalists for their part consider dangerous 
to the Greek identity. To a certain extent, therefore, fundamentalism controls the 
quality of democracy enjoyed in Greece, and is one of the main causes of the 
country’s considerable democratic deficit.
4.2.3 Anti-ecumenicalism, Chauvinistic Patriotism, and Xenophobia
The above description of Orthodox fundamentalism seems to confirm that its 
discourse and activism is the definitive anti-western critique, and that its position at 
the head of the “patriotic” political and cultural alliance threatens to boycott the 
government's European strategy.
However, this alliance between fundamentalism and other anti-western ideas 
(e.g. communism) is a quite recent phenomenon and underscores the importance 
culture plays in contemporary political processes at the expense of class-based 
ideologies. During the last thirty years fundamentalists have evolved from being 
collaborators with extreme-Right dictatorial politics relying heavily on Orthodox 
symbolism and American aid, into active enemies of the State’s European orientation 
and its culture of secularisation and human rights. In other words, once the Soviet 
threat was gone, fundamentalism ceased to be connected exclusively with the Right 
and unleashed its cultural dynamism to found new alliances based on long historical 
and cultural stereotypes. At the same time, now that Orthodoxy has loosened its ties 
with authoritarian politics, a similar process has gradually drawn the Left away from 
internationalist ideals, and some former leftists have discovered elements of Orthodox 
political culture that better suit their now more Hellenised image (see chapter 5.3.2).
With new confidence and a more inclusive and sophisticated image, therefore 
fundamentalist individuals and ideals are penetrating mainstream Greek society. 
Exploiting a general sense of uncertainty around such issues as globalisation and EU-
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integration, fundamentalism has attracted growing audiences to whom it appears as 
the last frontier of a proud patriotic tradition. Reluctance towards ecumenicism and 
pluralism, previously confined to purely religious issues, now has a political 
dimension and affects even foreign policy and public administration. This poses 
serious problems for the normal course of Greece within the EU.
Before looking at purely political interactions between fundamentalism and 
the political establishment (in section 4.3), let us examine certain aspects of 
fundamentalist activism in religious issues that paved the way for xenophobic political 
ideas becoming acceptable to wider audiences.
Unlike the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Greek Church has not been overly 
optimistic or enthusiastic about the ecumenical movement, and has hesitated to co­
operating fully with the World Council of Churches in all matters. A telling example 
of this was a dramatic Greek reaction to patriarch Athenagoras' attempts at 
rapprochement with the Roman-Catholic Church in the 1960s. The meeting of pope 
Paul VI and patriarch Athenagoras I in Jerusalem in January 1964, the simultaneous 
lifting in December 1965 of the 1054 anathemas in both Rome and Constantinople, 
and their exchange of visits in the summer of 1967 were historic events with 
international repercussions. In Greece, where distrust and suspicion of Roman 
Catholics goes back to the time of the crusades and the sack of Constantinople in 
1204, the vast majority of the Greek people and even the clergy are either indifferent 
to or completely ignorant of these matters. The Greek intelligentsia, on the other hand, 
were favourably impressed by the Patriarchate's endeavours for Christian unity. 
Fundamentalists and other conservatives within the Orthodox Church meanwhile 
engaged in a bitter, vehement, and concentrated campaign against any and all 
collaboration with “heretics”.
By promoting the Orthodox-Catholic dialogue within the context of the 
ecumenical movement, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is drawing the Greek Church into 
an international setting, given that Greek representatives must be able to engage in 
meaningful relations within a worldwide context. This does not seem to appeal to the 
Athens higher clergy, however, who still maintain that there is nothing to gain from a 
more open Church. This difference in attitudes show very clearly that politics and 
religion can interact in different ways. From the fundamentalist point of view, priority 
is given to the development of a robust and coherent national(ist) Orthodoxy. At the
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ideological level, this would keep public opinion pro-fundamentalist in respect of the 
more pluralistic ideas of the role of modern Greece in the new millennium. At the 
political level, it prolongs Orthodoxy’s privileged constitutional treatment and so, by 
its ability to influence the State’s political decision-making, ensures its own power.
In addition to the fundamentalist discursive mechanisms examined earlier, we 
shall now look at a typical example of fundamentalist rhetoric. Seeing how 
irredentism, Orthodoxy, and Hellenism make up one seamless entity will pave the 
way for analysing political fundamentalism.
In the prologue to his book Eternal Greece o f Mine, the archimandrite 
Timotheos Kilifis asserts that all readers are aware that our country is in a very 
difficult situation. He also assumes they know about the need to “overturn all 
organised anti-Hellenic propaganda against eternal Greece and also to respond to the
9 Sinternal needs of our nation.” '
Kilifis then illustrates the threefold character of Orthodox fundamentalism. 
First he says that the flag, “the symbol of our nation and of Hellenism throughout the 
world, expresses our national substance as well as our spiritual one, through the cross. 
The cross must never be absent from our flag. It is our guide on our crucified course 
to ... resurrection Day!”26 He then, in typically eclectic fashion, quotes one line by 
the widely acclaimed poet N. Vrettakos, entirely out of context, claiming that it refers 
to the dangers Hellenism is facing today: “The Barbarians camped in the dreams of
9 7the Hellenes.” Finally, in an obvious attempt to give international kudos to his 
views, Kilifis quotes, the non-Greek commentator Will Durant: “There is nothing 
perennial in the world that does not come from Hellas. All people should have two
9 ftcountries, the country they are bom in, and Hellas, which regenerates the world.” "
The bulk of Kiflis’ text is directed against Turkish and “Macedonian” claims 
on Greece and purports to give proof of the Greek identity, not only of today’s “Free 
Greece”, but also of the still “enslaved Greek areas”. Elsewhere he proclaims: “There 
do not exist for us lost native lands. There only exist enslaved native lands which 
sooner or later we will liberate.” Doubting the benign motives of Greece’s western
25 Kilifis 1992, p.5.
26 Ibid., p. 6.
27 Ibid., p. 7.
28 Ibid.
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allies he says: “I am also addressing our audacious ‘friends’ and enemies. I am telling 
them that if they dare attack our territorial integrity, they will once more receive the
9Qbefitting reply from the whole of the Greek nation.”
The author invites both Church and State as equally important and 
complementary forces to undertake common national(ist) initiatives. The strategy of 
the State should consist of doing everything in its power to “enlighten the whole 
world about the ‘Greekness’ of all the parts of free Greece... Because the forgers, 
anti-Hellenes, enemies of ours throughout the world are in frenzy, saying that we are 
descendants of Albanians, Dardanians-Skopjans, and of other barbaric tribes, trying to 
usurp our eternal and indelible achievements.”30 The Church is assigned a task much 
more important than merely raising awareness about Hellenic purity. The priest 
unreservedly urges the Church to instil and uphold irredentism: “The Church must 
establish an unceasing prayer for the liberation of North Macedonia, North Epiros, 
North Cyprus, North Thrace, the Pontus and Asia Minor, as well as for all our 
brothers who are still in bondage, so that all the Greek generations are being brought 
up with this conscious thought. We must not listen to our enemies saying the opposite, 
namely that they want to take from us more of our territories... Would to God, my
T 1proposals will be heard!”
He touches on another fundamentalist hobbyhorse concerning the West when 
he cites a number of enthusiastic statements by western leaders about Greece's 
sacrifices in World War II, and then denounces them for failing to pay Greece back as 
promised: “And indeed! They ‘repaid’ and ‘rewarded’ us in ‘excess’... That is why, 
today the whole of our Cyprus, the whole of our Aegean sea, the whole of our Thrace, 
the whole of our Macedonia, is threatened...'’
On Islam the priest expresses the stereotyped mentality shared by Orthodox 
fundamentalism with many Greeks throughout the political spectrum: if the West is a 
malevolent and ruthless ally, Islamic Turkey epitomises evil itself. His rhetoric is 
simple and effective. Just as the crusades were taken as typical of western
29 Ibid., p. 8.
30 Ibid., p. 66.
31 Ibid., p. 67.
32 Ibid.. p. 80.
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Christianity, the most extremist Islamic irredentism is interpreted in fundamentalist 
logic as representing the whole of the Turkish people and the essence of their faith.
The archimandrite praises the restrained Greek way of treating enemies, and 
compares it with that of the “barbarian” Turks “who even in their Koran are talking 
about Greece’s annihilation.” He substantiates his contention with citing a poem 
which on the eve of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 appeared in the popular 
Turkish newspaper Hurriyet. It is entitled "Hatred” and says outright that only the 
ethnic cleansing of all Greeks will wash this hatred from the Turkish heart. Kilifis 
then extends the evil nature of Turks and Islam to the rest of Greece’s enemies and 
neighbours, Slavs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Skopjans, whom he brands as forgers of 
history. Other fundamentalist and extreme-Right voices having spoken of a uniform 
Balkan-Russian “Orthodox arrow”, Kilifis tarring Turks and Orthodox Slavs with the 
same brush came as a surprise to his fellow-fundamentalists.34
The archimandrite’s book concludes with an urgent message: “It is absolutely 
necessary for Eternal Greece to wake up and gather around Hellenism and Orthodoxy 
in order not to be annihilated ... The biggest threats are our discord and our seeming 
indifference to the continuation of our glorious history... we must take draconian 
measures ... today; we seem to be living without roots, without ideals and without 
actions in proportion to our historical mission.”35
33 Ibid., p. 81.
34 Ibid., p. 85.
35 Ibid., p. 93.
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4.3 The Impact of Fundamentalism on Contemporary Politics
4.3.1 Fundamentalism and the New Greek Right
Archimandrite Kilifis’ book includes more than mere fundamentalist views on 
Greece’s relations with other countries. In two appendices, he publishes a series of 
letters he sent to US president George Bush. EU president Jaques Delors, and Russian 
president Boris Yeltsin, in which he explicitly champions the “eternal verities” of 
Greek nationalism and irredentism, such as Greek superiority over the West, the 
inalienable Greekness of Asia Minor, Macedonia, Cyprus, Eastern Thrace, northern 
Epiros (southern Albania), etc. He does not hesitate to refer to FYROM’s intention to 
request international recognition for the constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia” 
as utterly preposterous: “The Skopjans are described by all the ancient historians as 
barbarians and uncultured, having contributed nothing significant to the cultural 
history of the world, unlike the Greeks, who founded philosophy, science, arts and 
democracy.”36 The priest warns the EU president that a possible failure to comply 
with his message would have ominous consequences for the stability of the area: 
"...You would not wish to make such a historical mistake nor to commit such a crime 
against Greece.”37
While the open irredentism of such views is not particularly novel, their timing 
(when Greece was about to achieve full integration into the EU), and the choice of 
persons to whom they were addressed seem to reflect a new confidence in the internal 
legitimacy of nationalistic claims. The political underpinnings of such views would 
have been much more modest and contained had it not been for Christodoulos 
leadership and his political agenda. As we have seen (ch.3), the new Archbishop 
managed to transform relations between the Church and politics, and gave an entirely 
new meaning to the conceptualisation of contemporary Greek political culture.
Both his advocates and critics were agreed that the Archbishop’s power made 
him, and through him the Church, into powerful political players. For the first time in 
modern Greek history the Church did not have to rely on the State but, as a 
department of public administration with the task of cementing national cohesion,
36 Ibid., p. 107.
37 Ibid.
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could claim relative autonomy from its traditional role. This same ideological 
mechanism of national cohesion now threatens the authority and legitimacy of the 
State in socio-cultural and foreign-affairs issues. In other words, Christodoulos has 
managed to challenge the goverment’s pro-Europeanism and secularism, and to 
present the Church as a more popular representative of national interests than the 
State. The choice of “popular” instead of “legitimate representative” is deliberate, 
because so far there have been no serious signs of social disorder due to the State’s 
pro-European strategy. However, the government is suffering deeply as a result of 
underestimating the Archbishop’s ability to affect political outcomes.
Above all, in the person of Christodoulos the government has an evasive 
ideological critic who can inspire politicians from the Right, the Left, and the Centre 
and engage in a variety of alliances. In a sense he is a symbolical figure in the post­
modernisation of Greek political culture in that he epitomises the rampant power of 
image and the importance of the mass-media while, by condensing the pertinency of 
culture and tradition, he transcends the old predominance of class and ideology.
The repercussions of this phenomenon on PASOK and the Left were examined 
earlier, but the natural recipient of fundamentalist ideas was and still is the Right. 
Christodoulos managed to reconcile the adverse reactions of right-wingers not 
inclined to fundamentalism, and his charismatic discourses present fundamentalist 
views as patriotic ideas of sovereignty and independence that are acceptable to all, 
even communists. The association of most of the Right with fundamentalism, 
references to the junta, anti-communism and the monarchy have become relatively 
unimportant now.
Christodoulos, instead of adopting a recalcitrant position towards western 
culture and having engineered an unprecedented upsurge of what we may call 
“Orthodox political culture”, can actually claim a leading role in the process of 
Greece’s integration into Europe. His acceptance by ever wider audiences may be 
partly attributed to slogans like “Greece, Europe, Orthodoxy”, that are clearly 
designed to endorse Greece’s position in Europe without any concessions towards 
“opening up” Orthodoxy in the integration process. Needless to say, this strategy 
entails some highly paradoxical and confusing consequences, already apparent in 
Greek public life.
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The slogan “Greece, Europe, Orthodoxy” was originally launched as part of 
the Church campaign against the State intention to issue the new identity cards that 
would not mention sensitive personal information (religion, marital status, profession) 
The change from previous usage complies with the International Accord for Human 
and Civil Rights and aims at harmonising the Greek legal system with that of the EU. 
The Church's stubborn refusal to endorse the measure has introduced a new type of 
cleavage between “patriots” and “anti-Greeks” and added yet further confusion to the 
inconsistencies in the country’s political culture. Moreover, the Church campaign and 
polemic against secular Europeanists is not conducted in a moderate and sober 
manner, but reinforces the profound role of cultural and political populism in Greek 
public life. (Indicative of this is the Church's campaign to collect over three million 
signatures petitioning against the new identity cards.)
The new civil-society dilemmas introduced during Christodoulos’ tenure of 
office found their warmest reception among the so-called new Greek Right. Having 
been raised by the populistic and Manichean values of fundamentalism, nationalism 
and anti-communism, the “patriotic” Right is the most enthusiastic group among 
Christodoulos' followers. The association between the Archbishop, fundamentalism, 
and the new Right was brought about by (i). the social unrest created by the massive 
influx of foreign immigration; (ii) public dissent with the austerity measures necessary 
for Greece to join the European Monetary Union; (iii) the cultural insecurity due to 
EU integration procedures (e.g. new identity cards); (iv) unresolved problems with 
Turkey, FYROM and Albania, coupled with EU and NATO reluctance to vindicate 
the Greek position; and (v) the anti-western and anti-Muslim sentiment that had 
penetrated Greek-Orthodox society following the role of NATO and Turkey in the 
defeat of Orthodox Serbia in the Bosnian and Kosovo wars.
The profound impact of the above parameters on Greece’s political culture, 
combined with the messianism of Christodoulos, resulted in an injection of 
fundamentalism into politics. This affected particularly ^ jhe Right, and a rift between 
the liberal pro-European faction of New Democracy, and the party’s reactionary, 
xenophobic, and fundamentalist faction was inevitable.
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4.3.2 LAOS and Karatzaferis -  the Greek Haider?
The personality of former ND parliamentarian, television-channel owner, and 
party leader Karatzaferis, exemplities the type of political outcomes following 
Christodoulos’ fundamentalist advance. As a “child of the Right”, Karatzaferis was 
disillusioned by the increasing discrepancy between the liberal/pro-European 
leadership of New Democracy, and the popular Right-wing values he and presumably 
the base of the party believes in. He therefore resigned from ND and formed a party of 
his own, the Laikos Orthodox Synagermos (Popular Orthodox Alert); the LAOS 
abbreviation of its Greek name means “people”. He should not, however, be regarded 
as simply the leader of a small party, but is in fact the representative of the so-called
TO
radical-Right populism. This political movement has gained growing success in 
western Europe (e.g. under Haider in Austria), and is best exemplified in Greece by 
Christodoulos and his political alliances that cut across the party spectrum. What is 
unique about Christodoulos therefore is that, in contrast to western chauvinism almost 
exclusively associated with the Right, he has managed to attract a large section of 
Greek society not necessarily belonging to the Right.
The main features of LAOS are anti-elitism, anti-Semitism, anti- 
intellectualism, populist majoritarianism, fundamentalist neo-pietism, and radical 
patriotism.
(i) Anti-elitism and overt anti-Semitism are grounded in suspicion and prejudice 
against leading members of local society who are indiscriminately deemed to be 
members of a global Zionist establishment. In his tv-show, Karatzaferis offers a 
graphic sample: “We live in a country run by Jews. The prime minister's grand father 
was Aaron Avouris. George Papandreou had a Jewish grandmother... the whole 
government is run by Jews.” Karatzaferis then identified more hidden Jews among 
his former party's leading members who are malevolently plotting against Orthodoxy 
and Hellenism. The LAOS leader similarly denounces parliament and all MPs as 
traitors and agents of the new order, the Pax Americana. He makes one single 
exception of Mr Papathemelis, for whom he expresses admiration and to whom he 
extends an invitation to join the “Club of the Untouchables”.
38 Betz 1994.
39 Telecity tv-channel, 24 May 2000.
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(ii) Anti-intellectualism is the abomination of the so-called “oligarchy of 
koultouriarides and kathegitades” (derogatory names for intellectuals and professors 
respectively). Christodoulos and Karatzaferis share the conviction that the pro- 
European Greek intelligentsia has estranged itself from the people’s mores and values, 
and is responsible for cultural confusion, moral crisis and alienation from Orthodox 
roots.
(iii) Populist majoritarianism is the pseudo-democratic contention that it is legitimate 
to violate or ignore the human rights of a small minority in the name of the people's 
majority. This tyranny of the majority is typical of the Greek-Orthodox political 
culture's democratic deficit, and partly attributable to the Church-nation-State 
concept. The success of majoritarianism depends on fostering fundamentalist 
prejudices and stereotypes. In this respect, Karatzaferis and Christodoulos share a 
vested interest in disseminating pejorative popular beliefs and manipulating 
conventional wisdom through conspiracy theories about Jews, the Vatican and 
Muslims. For example, according to Karatzapheris, a wide range of developments and 
institutions, from the new identity cards to the EU itself, are essentially serving anti- 
Greek interests: “Who benefits from a Unified Europe and the New Order? The Jews 
and the Vatican. I can offer more than one example of the Vatican and Zionistic 
conspiracy against Greece. Karamanlis and Papandreou went together to a Masonic 
ark in Scotland. There they met with Cem, Holbrook and the rest of the Jewish pack. 
We are nothing more than puppets in the hands of Masons and Jews. The single 
currency, the new identity cards, the supranational authority of Brussels: these are the 
targets set by the Protocol of Zion two hundred years ago.”
(iv) Fundamentalist neo-pietism is the resurgence of religious dogmatism through a 
new wave of contemporary pietism that aims to impose theocratic rules for social 
behaviour. Karatzaferis saw in this movement a formidable opportunity to attract 
more votes and does what he can to support the political role of fundamentalist 
organisations. He has collaborated with members from the Greek-Orthodox Salvation 
Movement (Ellinoorthodoxo Kinema Soterias, ELKIS) by screening television debates 
to mobilise the masses against Schengen and other supposed threats.
(v) Radical patriotism is a term which may be applied to the new type of combined 
nationalism, xenophobia, and fundamentalism that coincides with the effort to
40 Ibid., 29 May 2000.
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eradicate such vies in a culturally, politically, and economically unified world. If 
"unity in diversity” is the cosmopolitan motto, radical patriotism juxtaposes it with its 
advocacy of charismatic leadership as well as racial and cultural purity.
His allegiance to Christodoulos was one of the basic parameters that prompted 
Karatzaferis to abandon ND and pursue an independent political course. Even as a ND 
member he urged to shift the party's orientation away from Eurocentric liberalism 
towards inward-looking political and cultural forces: “Why does ND not bring the 
people down to the streets to support Christodoulos? Adopt the Archbishop's line and 
your popularity will rise to 70%.”41
In the LAOS founding declaration, Karatzaferis did not hesitate to express his 
policy for racial purity: “For the Nation, the Faith, the Race and our Civilisational 
identity”.42 Two more details indicate the new party's ideological syncretism as well 
as its liaison with the Church. The first is, the party's logo, which consists of a red 
Byzantine circle, a blue Greek flag, Christian Cross and a laurel wreath symbolising 
the ancient glory. Secondly, the party’s organisational structure does not follow the 
conventional style of having local committees, but the Church system of dioceses. 
Moreover, the party’s first political propositions made a clear demand for more 
Church intervention in politics by proposing that it should be the synod’s 
responsibility to appoint education ministers, and that Church universities should be 
established in every major city.
4.3.3 Fundamentalism and the New Archbishop
The election of Archbishop Christodoulos changed the status quo in Church- 
State relations, and initiated a new era of religious interference in politics. As a 
leading figure of the “patriotic” political and cultural force, Christodoulos has been 
using the Church’s power to affect public opinion in several political issues such as 
foreign affairs and education. Although officially he expresses himself in favour of a 
more or less moderate strategy, he also endorses the uncompromising and 
fundamentalist views held by most of the members of the synod. As mentioned 
already, the fundamentalists are striving to undermine the government’s efforts on key
41 Ibid., 25 May 2000.
t-)
_ Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 6 August 2000.
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issues such as rapprochement with Turkey, educational reforms towards 
secularisation, and EU cultural integration.
The popular fundamentalist newspaper Orthodoxos Typos (Orthodox Press) 
went so far as to issue a pamphlet entitled Ekklisia kai Kyvernisis (Church and 
Government) about the disillusionment of the faithful with PASOK's policies. The 
pamphlet offered “enlightened intervention" and was distributed in all churches a few 
days before the national elections in April 2000.
The Orthodox Press described the government stance towards Orthodoxy as 
hostile and anti-Greek. In particular, the paper denounced the proposed introduction 
of non-religious funerals and cremation. It also objected to the education minister 
supporting the right of Muslims’ to be educated according to their own values, and to 
the withdrawal of chapters from religious textbooks that describe certain new 
religious movements as “satanic cults serving anti-Greek interests.”
In his capacity as synod secretary at the time of the military dictatorship, 
Christodoulos wrote a small book to commemorate the inaugural convocation of the 
new synod, where he praises the “national government” for helping the Church break 
free from traditional State patronage and bureaucracy and play a more important role 
in Greek Orthodox society.43 As explained earlier, this effort to inculcate puritan, 
fundamentalist, and nationalistic values was a characteristic of the Zoe brotherhood’s 
political strategy.
Even when democracy was restored in 1974 Christodoulos continued to 
profess his fundamentalist convictions. After PASOK took power in 1981 and 
proposed reforms for secularisation, Christodoulos in his capacity as bishop of 
Dimitriada collaborated with the fundamentalist organisation Chrysopigi in a series of 
articles entitled “Greek-Orthodox self-awareness”. The purpose of the articles was to 
denounce the rapid westernisation of Orthodox society as Greece was preparing to 
join the EEC: “There is a systematic effort to undermine the very foundational 
principles of our nation ... the people's enemies [i.e. the State] do not find it necessary 
for a couple to give their children the father's surname, they legalised homosexuality, 
and corrupt our youth in night-clubs... [Moreover], instead of protecting the people 
and imposing severe punishments on those who try to alienate them from Greek-
43 Paraskevaides 1972.
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Orthodox culture, the State is curtailing us [the Church] and subjugating us to those 
who will benefit from our demise.”44
Between 1999 and 2000 the fundamentalists campaigned very actively and 
effectively. Working hand in hand with the Archbishop and “patriotic” political 
forces, several fundamentalist groups managed to resist the government’s intentions 
on subjects such as the pope’s visit to Greece, and the right of Greek Muslims to build 
a mosque.
It was bishop Anthimos of Alexandroupolis, who expressed objection to the 
government's intention to build the first mosque in Athens,43 where there is no place 
of worship for the approximately 300,000 Arab and Albanian Muslim immigrants 
living in the capital. International concern having been expressed in the matter, seeing 
that Athens will host thousands of Muslims at the 2004 Olympics, the government 
authorised the building of a mosque, but met with vociferous protests from the Church 
and politicians belonging to the patriotic faction. They argued that Turkey does not 
allow Greeks to build churches, and there is no need for Greece to make unilateral 
concessions to Muslims. Besides, they perceived the growing number of Muslim 
immigrants as a threat, because they might join forces with the Greek Muslim 
minority of Thrace and incite Turkey to additional claims. In several days of intense 
media debate, the human-rights argument was muzzled, Muslims became 
synonymous with Turks, and the government was forced to back down in the matter 
of building a mosque in Athens. Concerning the Pope’s visit to Greece, 
fundamentalist groups, mainstream politicians like Papathemelis (PASOK), 
Psomiades (ND) and Kanelli (Communist party) plus of course the higher clergy and 
synod, strongly disapproved, on the grounds of the papal role in issues ranging from 
theological differences, the sack of Constantinople during the crusades, proselytism, 
the slaughter of Serbs by Croats in World War II, the Vatican-Mussolini association, 
and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The Pope became a persona non grata in 
Greece, and his visit was cancelled despite the official invitation the Greek President 
had delivered to him personally during his visit to the Vatican.
44 Newspaper Elefherotypia, 31 July 2000.
43 Newspaper Elefherotypia, 13 October 2000.
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CHAPTER 5
THE NEO-ORTHODOX MOVEMENT
5.1 Historical and Theoretical Perspectives
5.1.1 The Generation of the 1930s, and the Origins of Neo-Orthodoxy
The subject of the so-called Neo-Orthodox movement is part of the wider
framework of the ongoing debate in Greek political culture about westernisation. 
There is acute disagreement between the modernising and “patriotic” factions over 
whether and how to integrate the eastern Orthodox heritage into the predominantly 
western, secular, and supra-national culture of the EU. Although historically the 
debate rests on the ideological infrastructure of Greece’s culture since the period of 
the (neo)-Hellenic Enlightenment and the foundation of the independent Greek State,1 
the origins of Neo-Orthodoxy can be loosely associated with the intellectual 
movement of the 1930s.
The so-called generation of the 1930s may be understood as part of the broad 
intellectual struggle among Greeks to define and experience their ethnic identity in the 
context of modernisation. For the most part bom after the turn of the century, this 
generation of writers and critics saw their formative years coincide with the Balkan 
wars and World War I, and they finished their university studies shortly after the 
defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor. Two of the most important men, Seferis and 
Theotokas, were both tourkomerites (born on Turkish soil), who moved to Greece in 
1914 and 1922 respectively in the massive influx of Greek immigrants from Asia 
Minor to mainland Greece as a result of the Greek army’s withdrawal. They began 
writing in the late 1920s, a period of great social change and rapid modernisation.
Theotokas’ 1929 manifesto Free Spirit, written near the end of a two-year stay 
in France and England, may be considered the opening shot of the new generation’s 
campaign against the established intellectual debate between the entrenched 
traditionalists and the Eurocentric modernists. Theotokas embraced a new kind of 
patriotism that eschewed nativistic worship of Greek folk culture, especially the 
adulation of Christian-Orthodox authors like Papadiamantis. He enjoined new writers 
to respond to present conditions as free-spirited individuals open to European 
influence but alive to current Greek realities. Their advocacy of individual freedom, 
Orthodox spirituality and humanism distinguished them from the socialist camp that
1 See chapter 1 on Historical Background.
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was starting to increasingly associate itself with Soviet communism. On the other 
hand, their cosmopolitan admiration of European intellectual tolerance and flexible 
thinking differentiated them from the conservative Europeanism expressed by the 
Greek Right. Their cultural logic, therefore, espoused its own brand of patriotism, 
either to placate the Right, or to counter the communist’s internationalism, which they 
saw as a threat to the distinctiveness of Greek-Orthodox sensitivity and culture.
Theotokas put it like this: “We have pro-German, pro-French, pro-English, 
and pro-Muscovite intellectuals, as we also have purely native intellectuals attached to 
our narrow local traditions, but we do not have many Europeans. The European spirit 
presupposes understanding of the harmony of the European whole. Superiority 
belongs to the whole. The great value of this whole is that it has managed to unite all 
the contrasts within it into a higher synthesis.”2 He is making the point that while 
European regional differences are fused and harmonised within the European context 
of a shared culture, in Greece they are overemphasised. For Theotokas, Greeks do not 
have the intellectual tolerance or flexibility of European thinkers, nor do they readily 
accept dissent, being totally engrossed in dogma and absolutism. He argues that each 
nation aspires to transcend its national identity in order to discover its human essence 
within itself, and realises that only in a larger supra-national community can a higher 
degree of democracy and progress be achieved. Nationalism and narrow-mindedness 
are for him the enemies of humanism and the main obstacles to human development.
The term “Neo-Orthodoxy” was coined in 1983 in order to describe an 
unprecedented spiritual quest by some left-wing intellectuals. This was a highly 
unusual phenomenon among the traditional leftist intelligentsia of Greece, who 
considered Orthodoxy a reactionary, conservative, obsolete, and irrational element 
bound to disappear in the long run. Much like the generation of the 1930s, Neo- 
Orthodoxy wants to move beyond the conventionalism of the official Church towards 
a spiritual renewal, and has attempted to reconstruct the Orthodox discourse on the 
basis of its authentic and rich heritage which represents a modern Orthodox 
alternative to the crisis of the western culture.
In order to understand this quest it should be remembered that there was a 
widespread feeling in Greece at the time that the official Church was not fulfilling its 
mission to preserve the integrity of the eastern-Orthodox community. There were
2 Carabott 1995.
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several reasons for this: firstly, the Church's subjugation to and later alliance with the 
interests of the State whose attitude to the Church was mainly one of political 
expediency; secondly, the Church’s ineffectiveness in proclaiming the Christian- 
Orthodox message to the people, its purely decorative role in dealing with social 
issues and its consequently waning social image and significance; thirdly, the 
Church’s bureaucratisation, legalism, and despotism in handling religious and social 
issues in general, which obstructed the expression of the rich Orthodox spirituality 
and its relational, communal character; and fourthly, the Church’s overall 
conservatism, in exchange for which the State supported the Church not only 
economically but also by granting it the customary honours.
Neo-Orthodoxy put renewed emphasis on the rich patristic tradition and on the 
Christian-Orthodox mystics of the Byzantine period, as well as on the liturgical 
heritage of the East. The fundamental features distinguishing the Orthodox culture 
from the Roman-Catholic and Protestant ones were also stressed. The Enlightenment 
legacy that had given rise to the modern western ethic was sharply criticised for 
curtailing the free spirit of classical spirituality within the iron cage of capitalism. The 
monasticism on Mount Athos was considered a culmination of personal freedom, an 
unpredictable, uncontrollable, anarchic way of life, beyond all rules, prescriptions and 
totalitarian patterns of the established Church and of the secular-capitalist way of life. 
The movement’s broader influence today can be seen in the work of intellectuals such 
as Lorenzatos, Yannaras, Zuraris, Ramphos; artists such as Savopoulos and 
Mikroutsikos (who also served as a minister of culture and education), and politicians 
such as the former ministers Papathemelis and Tritsis.
They all put forward a pro-modernist affirmation of Hellenism, turning the 
general debate between tradition and modernity into one of East versus West, and so 
giving a moral-spiritual dimension to aesthetic, cultural, political and above all 
national concerns. Their cultural discourse -  synthesising elements of classical 
philosophy, Byzantine theology, and Marxist politics -  is intended to contribute to the 
resolution of the current identity crisis which, in their view, grew out of an arbitrary 
and incompatible modernisation of Greek culture.
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5.1.2 Intellectual Personalities and Basic Conceptualisations
As Lorenzatos pointed out, western rationalism is in sharp contrast to the
metaphysical tradition of eastern Christianity. True Greekness resides in the eastern 
tradition of community welfare and reciprocal personal relationships, and imitating 
the western prototype is an error to be paid for dearly. Lorenzatos contends that for 
western culture the belief in human emancipation that once held civilisation together 
has been blinkered by its stubborn adherence to rationalism and the exogenous force 
of utility logic. He juxtaposes this with the mystical tradition of eastern Orthodoxy 
with its focus on the endogenous power of the spirit.
Having characterised the essential feature of the West as “in crisis” and the 
essential feature of the East as the antithesis of the West, Lorenzatos explores the 
relationship in which modem Greece stands to these two poles, and sees her moving 
further and further away from herself -  away, that is, from the East towards the West. 
The 1821 war of Independence marks the crucial moment when Greece becomes 
trapped in a western debate about her own Greekness and concurrently moves toward 
western cultural values. “Whatever was meant to remain alive from the Hellenic 
tradition was channelled intact into the Orthodox one and there it lives on to this day 
in another form. That which we call Greece, that which was spiritually viable and 
therefore survived Greek antiquity, is not to be found in the values of western 
Enlightenment... but in the sanctuary of the Christian spirit as it was passed on in our 
Orthodox heritage.”4
An anti-modern, anti-western Neo-Orthodox revision of the concept of 
Hellenism is found in the recent works by Ramphos. In his Transcendental Territory,~ 
he describes the spiritual conflict experienced by Greece from late Byzantine to 
modern times as she staggers between East and West seeking her proper identity. 
Caught in the stagnant waters of a mired present, Greeks have become absorbed in 
aberrant philosophising: the “archaeology of identity”, the Megali Idea of resurrection 
(i.e. cultural classicism and irredentism), and the Enlightenment with its ideologies of 
power and rupture. As Ramphos explains it. the West has appropriated Hellenism in 
the spirit of technical prowess and positivism, and now the blighted dialogue between
3 Lorenzatos 1976.
4 See Metallinos 1987, pp. 87-163.
? Ramphos 1996b.
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Greeks and western scholars produces only spurious approaches to modern Hellenism, 
a “progressive” (modernising) imitation of western prototypes that responds to no 
living Greek reality, and the reactionary “traditionalist” inhalations of the “dusty 
greatness of the past”. As long as Greece remains severed from her tradition, 
Ramphos asserts, her forces will remain divided and her future uncertain. The real 
Greece is not the Greece of borders and monuments, but a “conceptual territory”. 
Ramphos’ conception of Orthodox Hellenism is “the Other” of the western World, the 
alternative. The Hellenism re-appropriated from the Enlightenment legacy is an 
impoverished Hellenism that has been reduced to a system of ideas bounded within a 
rationalistic-impersonal western State, but “the Other” of the western world is the 
oriental Byzantine-Orthodox Christianity which, according to Ramphos, was born in 
Greece, the way for it prepared by Aristotle’s metaphysics and Stoic thought.
The problem for Ramphos is how to recover an authentic Greek space in a 
world that de-Hellenises in the name of Hellenism, and when Enlightenment thought 
and rationalistic political, religious, or cultural forms dominate the world. He is trying 
to find a tentative explanation for the fate of the Orthodox tradition. For him, tradition 
is the space where the Greek communicates with a Hellenism already extant. 
Tradition is not a concept, but the space of history, communion with an idea that pre­
exists. Tradition is the insertion of the present into a hardly perceptible pre-existing 
framework, the persistence of the past in the formation of the present. Its 
transubstantiation takes place wherever it is venerated and observed, whether by the 
monks of Mount Athos or by Orthodox believers anywhere, whether in pure or 
distorted form.
According to Ramphos’ Neo-Orthodox discourse therefore, it is the Orthodox 
soul with huge reserves of feeling and spirit at its disposal that resists the provocation 
of the West. The soul of the believing Orthodox Christian is the territory where a 
continuous and self-creating history unravels, giving a temporary location to the 
transcendental spirit of a single, unified ancient philosophical and Byzantine 
Orthodox tradition, and becoming the site for the formation of an authentically 
Hellenic territory. The individualistic western tradition was confronted unavoidably 
by the communal eastern culture imbued by the Orthodox tradition, which remained 
untouched at the bottom of the Greek soul and inhibited the road towards 
individualisation. Communalism does not signify an undifferentiated mass society,
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but a society in which family, neighbourhood, companionship, clan, and community 
play an important role in the formation of a person’s self-awareness -  which is not at 
all the same as having no individual identity. Individual thinking and judgment must 
emancipate itself from the established truths of the group. Individuals must be able to 
express the integrity of truth, themselves, and not always rely on established general 
authorities and opinions. Otherwise, the clash between personalism and communalism 
can become an obstacle to social evolution.
In other words, it is possible to avoid the Scylla of egocentrism and the 
Charybdis of irresponsible, amorphous group living. The Greek nation, Ramphos 
argued, must find a new “Great Idea” similar to the one held until 1922, a new 
strategic goal in the face of her full integration into the EU and the world community. 
What Greece has to offer to the West is not some technical achievements, but a new 
mystique bringing everything together in an integral, holistic perspective and giving 
meaning to the ongoing fragmentation of the contemporary world. From an optimistic 
point of view, the problem of Greece’s acculturation in the contemporary world 
should follow this path if the country wants to avoid its perpetual disorientation in 
modern times and find an equilibrium between its own tradition with its universal 
appeal, and the modem exigencies. Greece belongs neither to the West nor to the East, 
but constitutes a point of convergence between them.
According to Yannaras, an analysis of eastern Christianity must begin with 
Orthodox anthropology and the concept of personhood as developed in theology. The 
notion of personhood is critical to understanding how Orthodox doctrine is relevant to 
the emphasis on public community and pluralism as constituent aspects of civil 
society. The defining features of personhood are “relationality” (being in communion) 
and “dynamism” (growth). Personhood is experienced and realised only through the 
individual’s relationship with others: “Man is an existential fact of relationship and 
communion.”7
Both in contrast to the authoritative Roman-Catholic culture and the Protestant 
ethic of individualism, the Orthodox doctrine is axiomatically concerned with the 
individual as part of the social community, which is the public realm of civil society.
6 See Ramphos 1990, Ramphos 1994, and Ramphos 1996.
7 Yannaras 1984.
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An equal emphasis on dynamis or growth complements communalism and contributes 
to full personhood. Just as the eastern-Orthodox conception of personhood as 
relational and dynamic (i.e. context-sensitive and culturally specific) is not inherently 
incompatible with emphasis on the public sphere and the social collectivity of civil 
society, so the affirmation of personhood and freedom underscores a potential 
compatibility between eastem-Christian political culture and the pluralist dimension 
of civil society.
Yannaras clearly attempts here to refute the shared contention among 
modernists that the inward-looking Orthodox culture is incompatible with the 
Enlightenment legacy of pluralism and welfare democracy. The very dynamism that 
grows out of the individual’s participation in the community is driven by the freedom 
that constitutes the essential mode of existence for each individual. Eastern-Christian 
doctrine assigns primacy to freedom as the condition reflecting an entire range of 
possibilities for personhood. Without freedom, personhood is unattainable. 
Personhood presumes the individual’s conscious decision, by free choice and grace, to 
transform himself and the temporal community into the image of divine Christian 
benevolence. Freedom and conscious choice as the primary conditions of personhood 
also imply a distinctiveness that rejects the ordering of human existence according to 
putative universal objectives negating choice.
As Yannaras explains, communion or society (personal relationships which 
make up a living community) cannot possibly come into being when truth is an 
objective datum; when there are no specifically personal approaches to the truth to 
permit the distinctiveness and freedom of the person. By refuting the exclusive 
correlation between democracy and rationalism, Yannaras has sought to pave the way 
for an Orthodox route to prosperity and democracy. This was a part of the ancient 
Greek tradition that survived in the Byzantine ethos as a radical hierarchy of life’s 
priorities. In Byzantium the political and administrative hierarchy was justified only 
to the extent that it created a true society of personal relations through the correct 
ranking of human priorities. The ancient Athenian concept of democracy survived in 
the Byzantine imperial administration as a form of politics that aimed at the 
attainment of truth and of authentic life, not of some utilitarian or conventional needs. 
Truth in ancient Greece and Byzantium was not a preconceived ideology, but an 
immediate empirical reality. The Greek and Byzantine understanding of religion was
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a holistic attempt to find the essence of being, and to look for truth in communion 
with others rather than in a utilitarian, individualistic satisfaction of fragmented 
religious needs.
Yannaras states that it was Orthodoxy that, through the social dynamics of
o
Christian Eucharistic fellowship, formed the communal way of Greek life in 
Byzantium over a span of a thousand years. Byzantium exhibited major differences 
from the western medieval societies under the deep class cleavages of feudalism; they 
were religious too, but lacked the Byzantine social and personalistic ethos. Byzantine 
civilisation was the individual road to a truth never transformed into an object that can 
be “verified”, controlled and manipulated by various authorities. These 
presuppositions differed radically from those developed in the West after the late 
Middle Ages (e.g. intellectualism, rationalism, objectification of truth), and had 
disparate social consequences. Byzantium, at times, had a strong centralised 
administration, but was never a totalitarian State. There was often great accumulation 
of wealth, but no capitalism. There was also no feudalism in Byzantium, for feudalism 
was imported from the West by the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century, in the wake 
of its economic dependency on western interests and the deterioration of its social 
structures. From the 14th century onwards, Yannaras argues, there has been a 
wholesale attempt to westernise the East, which finally resulted in the estrangement of 
the Orthodox peoples from their heritage, and signified the gradual penetration of 
western intellectualism, rationalism and utilitarianism into the Greek milieu.
Yannaras even goes so far as to say that, aside from apparent differences and 
conflicts, western political culture in its content and goals more resembles the Islamic 
than the authentic and undistorted Greek tradition. This also explains, in his opinion, 
western countries today “flirting” with Islamic ones (e.g. Turkey) to the detriment of 
Greek interests.
The Greek-Orthodox alternative to the western paradigm of social relations 
can be found in the autonomous village communities which preserved Orthodox 
sensitivity and real solidarity among the people, and paid as much attention to their 
spiritual as to their material welfare. It is these communities that represented the 
transformation of the communal ideals of Orthodoxy into reality, social praxis and 
justice, and allowed the cohesiveness, but not the differentiation, of the various social
8 See ch. 6.5 on the implications of this for today’s adherents to Christian-Orthodoxy.
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strata. Communalism thereby became the way the Greek-Orthodox nation continued 
to exist, with foundations that were not rational or economic, but spiritual and 
Orthodox.
Like Byzantium, Yannaras argues, modem Greece lies at the crossroads 
between East and West. Although influenced by both, it retains its specificity and 
otherness. Modern Greeks should not feel inferior to the West, because they are in 
fact equal partners who can contribute a fresh cultural proposition concerning the 
meaning of existence and life, the correct ranking of life’s priorities and needs, and 
the value of communal, social relations. Greeks, due to their long and rich heritage, 
have always had a certain sense of nobility. They have represented an aristocracy in 
the literal meaning of the term; they have known what holds priority in life, and have 
had a sense of measure.
In contrast, the Greek State constructed by the Bavarians and perpetuated by 
the westernised political elite is totally irrelevant to the actual needs, idiosyncrasy, 
and potential of modem Greeks. Here, according to Yannaras, lies the reason why the 
narrow-minded Greek State, manifesting the most decisive shrinkage of Hellenism in 
history, is dogged by misfortune. The Eurocentric ideology has led the country to 
understand the ancient Greek past as it is presented by the West, with no relation at all 
to Byzantium. Western humanism and the Enlightenment, which intended to 
transform the subjugated Greeks into direct heirs of the ancient Greek heritage, had 
also attempted this. Yet the encounter between Hellenism and Christianity (despite 
their conflicts) was a practical achievement, not a theoretical one, and it gave birth to 
a new civilisation which survives today in the worship, the language, and the people’s 
customs.
While belonging to a community exclusively in terms of Orthodox 
eschatology may indeed constrain the possibilities for social transformation in purely 
pluralist terms (according to the western prototype), such reasoning fails to recognise 
that the choice for communion and growth involves respect for the undeniable 
freedom of each individual to choose a distinctive way of life. Insofar as pluralism 
rests on respect for and toleration of a multiplicity of interests and ideas, then the 
Orthodox emphasis on the individual’s free will -  on choice as a consequence of 
respect for oneself and others -  is not inconsistent with the pluralist dimensions of 
civil society and democracy. According to Yannaras, therefore, policy makers should
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not ignore the potential of Orthodoxy’s emphasis on freedom, community, and choice 
as values compatible with a democratic culture.9
For Zouraris, another proponent of Neo-Orthodoxy, the enduring persistence 
of Greek Orthodoxy is evident in the apophatic reasoning in all domains today, from 
theology to politics. Zouraris applied his hermeneutic scheme to all periods of Greek 
history as we know about them from ancient Greek, patristic Byzantine, and modern 
texts and forms of life. What then are the distinguishing features of Greek-Orthodox 
ways and thought? First of all, truth was never objectified in rigid, set and unchanging 
definitions within iron-cast systems of intellectual reasoning as happened in the West, 
but was always defined approximately -  on the basis of “almost”, “about”, “more or 
less”, peripou. Avoidance of tyrannically exacting definitions then enabled the Greeks 
to develop a special understanding of all situations as a fluid mixture between two 
antitheses. For example, good and evil are not two absolutely distinct categories, but 
coexist in every case. This coexistence implies the close entanglement of antithetical 
conditions which nevertheless always retain their individual character, a mutual 
penetration of conflicting states, rather than a synthesis or new creation. Finally, 
progress for humanity is not linear but cyclical, with both change and immobility 
coexistent. So each new situation means not only that earlier problems have been 
overcome or completely solved, but itself consists of positive and negative aspects 
and consequently presents new challenges. In Greek-Orthodox thought, politics does 
not and cannot solve problems definitively, but every new situation is subject to 
limitations and deadlocks.
In Zouraris’ view it was these flexible presuppositions that helped Greeks to 
avoid the impasse created by the serious discrepancy between western progressive 
ideas with their absolute systems of thought, and their tragic failure to deliver the 
promise of emancipation. On the other hand, Greek apophatism, complemented by the 
virtue of discretion, of a person-centred sense of responsibility, fosters forbearance 
and indulgence in both theory and practice. Through interpersonal relations and 
handling contradictory situations on the basis of the aforementioned humble approach, 
Greeks avoid the pressures inherent in impersonal and authoritarian social
9 For a summary of Yannaras’ ideas see Makrides 1996.
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prescriptions aimed at eschatological happiness, and consequently also a sense of guilt 
when such granite precepts fail to bear fruit.
Greek disorderly behaviour and social disarray, as well as the modernisation 
deficits (e.g. in productivity and administration) can be accounted for in this way. 
According to Zouraris, Greece can never simulate other westernised modern States, 
for it cannot be subject to some imported reform program for creating a uniform 
rather than bipolar social system. Greek politicians without any understanding of the 
persistence of Greek-Orthodox thought, who attempted the wholesale modernisation 
of the country, in fact facilitated western dominance over the Greek nation. Yet 
Greeks belong neither to the West nor to the East; they have a distinct idiosyncrasy 
and a concomitant proposal for life, which must be preserved at any cost, and used as 
a catalyst in the European Union.10
5.1.3 Neo-Orthodoxy and Political Culture: From Marxism to Patriotism
The unofficial dialogue between Orthodoxy and Marxism/communism which
began in the early 1980s has prompted several commentators to describe Neo- 
Orthodoxy as a liberation theology in the Greek style.11 The dialogue was a marginal 
one to start with, with little outside appeal except for university students (for instance 
the EXON Greek Christian-Orthodox Socialist Youth), and neither the official 
Church, the State, nor the political parties supported it. It met with negative reaction 
from other Orthodox as well as political and intellectual circles, and began to fade in 
the late 1980s. The Orthodox-Marxist dialogue bore no fruit at all and was abandoned 
even before the collapse of communism in eastern Europe.
However, due to the radical changes in eastern Europe after 1989, which 
contributed to a considerable revival of Orthodoxy, there was renewed interest in it 
also in Greece during the 1990s. As a result Neo-Orthodoxy was incorporated into a 
generally positive appreciation of the Orthodoxy-nation concept, and its potential was 
reassessed more positively than in the past. In recent years, some Neo-Orthodox 
thinkers have taken a leading role in the quest for a fresh understanding of what it
10 For a summary of Zouraris’ ideas see Makrides 1996.
11 Liberation theology is a term coined to describe the involvement of certain Latin- 
American priests and theologians in the socialist revolutionary movements of their 
countries. See Clement 1985, pp. 69-71.
210
means to be Greek and Christian-Orthodox in the contemporary world. They see the 
revival of Orthodoxy as an all-encompassing scheme, as a meaningful and attractive 
Greek way of life for facing the challenges of the world system. For this reason some 
outsiders, have dubbed them Hellenocentric as opposed to Eurocentric intellectuals. In 
that way the movement transcended its religious boundaries and came to the attention 
of people who previously had little or no interest at all in Orthodoxy.
The bond that unifies the Neo-Orthodox is their patriotic opposition to 
enthusiastic westemisers, reactionary traditionalists and Orthodox hard-liners, as well 
as ignorant moderates. They see the so-called progressive Greek intelligentsia and 
political establishment as shortsightedly unable to discern the wealth of Greece’s own 
tradition and heritage, and so perpetuating the country’s disorientation in today’s 
global environment. They themselves view and interpret the Greek-Orthodox history, 
politics, and culture introspectively, not based on imported western ideological 
presuppositions and objectives.
In order to legitimise their radical patriotism and participate in the ongoing 
debate concerning EU cultural integration, the Neo-Orthodox cite the enduring 
persistence of the Hellenic base under the Greek presence that owes nothing to 
western influences. They do not pretend an uninterrupted continuity of ethnic 
Hellenism over a span of 3000 years, but seek to highlight what are the features of 
the Greek identity that have contributed to this durability, differences and 
discontinuities notwithstanding. Neo-Orthodoxy rejects as superficial the 
conventional nationalist discourse of the “Helleno-Christian civilisation”, and 
considers the harmonious relationship and union between Christianity and Hellenism 
that is embraced both by both Church and State as misleading and merely serving 
ideological goals and political expediencies.
Their ultimate objective is to pull the Greek political culture out of its present 
stagnation and orientation crisis by suggesting radical and realistic solutions based on 
the inherent dynamism in the Greek-Orthodox ecclesiastical tradition, and inviting the 
Church to play a more meaningful and dominant role in present-day society. The 
current crisis can be brought to an end only by a dramatic shift in orientation both in 
the realm of ontological concerns (the individual’s existential struggle against the 
spiritually impoverishing and alienating ethic of capitalism), and in that of the 
collective consciousness (political, national and cultural sovereignty). A prerequisite
for this is to realise that Hellenism should not be confined in geographical borders, 
because it ultimately consists of a specific way of life.12
The movement underscores the Orthodox tradition of communal life 
structured around reciprocal interpersonal relations. This signifies freedom from 
prescribed laws and static patterns of rational human action, as can be observed in 
the local communities during the long period of Ottoman occupation as well as in the
i o
coenobite tradition of Mt Athos monasticism. By opposing western rationalism 
through the promotion of an apophatic understanding of truth or order as a 
communal, participational and non-utilitarian achievement founded on the ancient 
Greek and Byzantine-Orthodox tradition, the Neo-Orthodox challenge the inferiority 
complex of modem Greeks in order to restore the nation’s aristocratic genealogy. 
This heritage entails a cosmopolitan universalism radically different from the 
imperialistic logic of western globalism. It implies also a specific mission in the 
contemporary world to provide solutions to dealing with the pernicious global 
influences and political deadlocks of the western world. This does not mean a 
wholesale rejection of the west. Rather, it intends a fruitful and symmetrical 
interaction with it in every domain by preserving the Greek-Orthodox otherness and 
offering an alternative way of life to that of the West’s cultural imperialism.14
The reasons for the Neo-Orthodox shifting their emphasis from mainly 
theoretical and theological matters in the 1980s to a radical political patriotism in the 
1990s should be understood in relation to the deep identity crisis and orientation 
problems of modem Greeks. This dilemma in civil society was intensified by the 
processes of EU integration and globalisation. Opposition to a mainly western and 
secular supra-European culture, and the socio-historical circumstances of the 1980s 
can be considered as the starting point for this gradual modification of the 
movement’s political logic. The socialist rise to power in 1981 prompted several Neo- 
Orthodox to search for a road to socialism that is based on indigenous traditional 
elements (e.g. the autonomous local communities under Ottoman rule) instead of on 
mechanistically imitated imported western patterns. The attempt to found Greek
12 See Yannaras 1998b, and Yannaras 1992.
13 See Metallinos 1988, pp. 113-122.
14 See Yannaras 1997, Yannaras 1998a, and Ziakas 1998.
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socialism on western atheism and materialism, rather than on the eastern coenobite 
and communal tradition, was also criticised.1^
This was more than a naive attempt to affect political outcomes, being 
followed by a much more active intervention facilitated by certain socio-historical and 
geopolitical circumstances of the 1990s. The first and foremost was the escalation of 
nationalism as a result of the Macedonian question as well as the geopolitical 
antagonism between Greece and Turkey. As we shall see later, such apparently 
political issues were perceived in the Greek political culture as conflicts in which 
religion and culture play a pivotal role. In this context the Neo-Orthodox movement 
sought to form alliances with powerful politicians, civil society groups, media barons, 
and the clergy to boost patriotic awareness. Concerning its involvement in the internal 
political polarisation and cleavage between the “patriots” and the modernists, here 
again an essentially political debate on how Greece should pursue her institutional and 
cultural modernisation came to involve civil-society groups and the media.
5.2 Orthodoxy versus a Supra-National Culture
5.2.1 Ethnic Identity and Politics
During the 1990s Greece’s political orientation shifted from Papandreou’s 
Eurosceptic socialism to Simitis’ Europhile modernisation, and this shift brought the 
country’s present political cleavage and intellectual polarisation between inward- 
looking patriotic factions and outward-looking modernists. Among major issues being 
debated were social dissatisfaction with the government’s austerity policy required for 
Greece joining the Economic and Monetary Union, and whether EU political and 
cultural integration was the best way to pursue Greece’s interests vis-a-vis the 
“national issues”. The old class-based ideological dichotomy between Left, Right, and 
Centre is increasingly affected by a new “civilisational” dimension that cuts across the 
political spectrum and brings alliances between old enemies over whether or not 
Greece should follow the Brussels directives.
In this turbulent atmosphere of political and cultural disorientation, certain 
Neo-Orthodox personalities enjoying unprecedented popularity had risen to powerful
13 See Kolmer 1982, pp. 19-21.
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positions in the “patriotic” struggle against Simitis’ modernisation (see 5.3). This 
section focuses on the Neo-Orthodox positions regarding democratisation (e.g. 
Church-State separation), secularisation (e.g. reforms in education), and the prospects 
for the Greek-Orthodox identity in the EU’s attempt to forge a supranational culture.
When attempting to assess the Neo-Orthodox position on the above subjects it 
must be clarified that the movement’s ideology does not lend itself easily to analysis, 
because it posits an entirely new cultural logic designed to discredit the established 
ideological frameworks as parochial and obsolete. For example, although on certain 
matters (e.g. irredentism and national issues) Neo-Orthodoxy’s radical patriotism and 
the extreme Right’s chauvinist nationalism are very similar, it would be wrong to 
expect a consistent overlapping of interests in other areas (e.g. reforms in education). 
Neo-Orthodoxy is actually diametrically opposed to the conventional ideology of 
nationalism as it has grown out of Enlightenment rationalism: “The nationalist States 
in the Balkans are responsible for the disintegration of the multi-ethnic Orthodox 
ecumenicism, the uprooting of native populations from their ancestral lands, and the 
horrific genocide associated with the horrors of ethnic and religious cleansing.”16
Yannaras goes further and rejects the ideological manipulation of the 
connection between Christian Orthodoxy and Hellenism, traditionally treated by the 
Right as the backbone of Greek ethnic identity: “Look around you and see how 
Orthodoxy today is treated as an element of ‘ethnic homogeneity’. For most of us 
modern Greeks ecclesiastical tradition has nothing to do with its spiritual essence of 
giving meaning to life and death. Sterile imitation of the fusion between Christianity 
and politics in the west (i.e. Christian Democrats) gave us the dictators’ tragic slogan 
‘Greece of Christian Greeks’... as a result, whoever dares today to advocate the 
paradigm of the Greek ecclesiastical tradition is automatically stigmatised as a
• 1 7‘nationalist’, ‘Neo-Orthodox’, ‘anti-European', or even a ‘neo-fascist’.”
What, then, is Neo-Orthodoxy’s elusive political logic? Although its radical 
patriotism includes none of the conventional cultural strategies of relations between 
Greece and Europe (Eurocentrism, nationalism, etc.) it seems to appreciate the 
challenge of EU integration. Yannaras says: “There are westernised Greek-Orthodox 
fundamentalists whose Helleno-Christianity is a typically nationalist ideology. Their
16 Yannaras 1996, pp. 18-19.
17 Ibid., p.20.
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perception of Greekness and Orthodoxy is totally western, despite their claims of 
fighting against the west and the European Union. On the other hand our ‘progressive’ 
intelligentsia, this naive mixture of leftist internationalism and an Enlightenment of 
the Greek kind, observes with panic the provincial misery of the Greek State and 
asserts that only through unconditional Europeanisation can we reach a level of 
elementary reliability... Greek identity is not jeopardised in the context of a supra­
national Europe simply because it ceased to exist at a collective level. Bavarian 
bureaucracy and the legacy of the Greek Enlightenment have institutionalised the 
Greek State’s cultural alienation. They failed to make us ‘Europeans’ and here we are, 
left estranged from both Europe and what used to be a Greek way of life, a laughable 
derivative of omnivorous consumerism and narcissistic arrogance about our ancestral 
aura.”18
Having rejected the two main poles of antagonism, Yannaras then explains 
why the challenge of political and cultural integration with Europe is necessary for the 
future of Greek identity. His belief is based on the firm Neo-Orthodox conviction that 
cultural identity forms the backbone of politics, inasmuch as it shapes the particular 
character of political decision-making in a given national context: “Since Greece has 
joined the EEC we have been obsessed by the prospect of rising to the same level as 
the flamboyant European idols of our admiration. Without being aware of it, this 
decision entailed an extremely valuable unintended consequence. We made the right 
choice not because Europe is our natural space, nor because Greece is the cradle of 
civilisation that gave birth to Europe. Beneath that populist rhetoric lies the inevitable 
consequence of the European challenge, a count-down that will determine whether we 
shall survive and integrate our Greek-Orthodox identity into the European ‘unity in 
diversity’, or witness the final demise and pseudo-westernisation of Hellenism.”19
Yannaras considers that the Greek ethnic identity’s estrangement and 
alienation is due to its deep inferiority complex versus western achievements: “The 
European challenge embodies a vitally important dilemma: either Greece becomes a 
miserable European province, or a cultural super-power ... there is no middle way... 
Greece cannot exist unless she offers her civilisational alternative and teaches Europe
18 Ibid., p.21.
19 Ibid., p.22.
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how Orthodox Hellenism can challenge the deep spiritual and social crisis of the 
west.”20
Moving beyond a strictly spiritual critique of the west, Neo-Orthodoxy’s 
cultural logic underscores the importance of ethno-religious identity in such diverse 
issues as the Greek State’s economic deficit, the inadequacy of its welfare institutions, 
the under-development of Greece’s civil society, and the clientelistic/corrupt nature of 
the professional and political establishments. As the movement is becoming more 
positively appreciated by a growing section of Greek society and can now claim 
proponents from the political Left, Right, and Centre, the modernists are accusing the 
Neo-Orthodox of undermining society’s rational modernisation and perpetuating 
conservatism.
Yannaras has reversed the charge and accusing the modernists of political 
shortsightedness due to having been estranged, “de-Hellenised”: “Conservatism is to 
close your eyes to the fact that for the past 170 years we have been desperately trying 
and failing to become Europeans. Have they not been properly educated in the 
modem values of Euro-American rationalism, all those Greek premiers who got 
Ph.D.’s and taught in leading western universities, only to return home in order to 
consolidate and enhance the status quo of populism? Did our internationally 
acclaimed economists and Ministers of Finance ignore western rationalism when they 
plunged our economy into black holes and huge deficits? What we are objecting to is 
the prolonged antagonism between State and society. The Greek State is foreign, 
irrelevant to the needs and sensitivities of our society. Structures, institutions, 
organisations and systems have all been imposed from above and do not correspond to 
our needs. They were imported and enforced by the Bavarian monarchy and are still
9 1maintained by a de-Hellenised, myopic political leadership.”
With regard to concrete suggestions or reforms for the “re-Hellenisation” of 
the Eurocentric Greek State, Neo-Orthodoxy is quite careful not to offer solutions that 
are based on the secular grand narratives of emancipation (neo-Marxism, neo­
liberalism, etc.): “There are no fixed recipes for bridging the gap between the citizen 
and the State. We must put aside all ideologies and revitalise the ways of our 
collective survival during the 3,500 years of Hellenism’s historical course. Beneath
20 Ibid., p.23.
21 Ibid., p.24.
216
the ephemeral solutions of political decision-making lies the existential quest of 
identity. The Greek-Orthodox identity always reflected our heterogeneity, a mutually 
inclusive relationship with both the West and the East. Especially today this quest for
99heterogeneity is crucial to our future prospects.”
5.2.2 Neo-Orthodoxy and Huntington’s Civilisation Paradigm
Samuel Huntington’s civilisation paradigm has generated enormous interest in
Greece and stirred up heated debates about whether or not he is right to position
9 TOrthodoxy and Greece on the non-western, non-democratic civilisational fault line. 
Huntington bases his argument on the fact that Greece had no original experience of 
the defining historical phenomena of western civilisation: western Christianity, 
Scholasticism, Feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment. 
In addition, all of the distinctive features of western civilisation (the classical legacy, 
separation of Church and State, rule of Law, social pluralism, representative bodies, 
individualism) have been imported from the west and imposed rather formalistically 
on Greek Orthodox culture. Huntington provides a clear-cut and convincing answer to 
the puzzle exercising West-Europeans: “Greece is not part of Western Civilisation, 
and despite being the geographical location of classical civilisation and intimately 
entwined with the West... (Greece) is also an anomaly, the Orthodox outsider in 
western organisations. It has never been an easy member of either the EU or NATO 
and has had difficulty adapting itself to the principles and mores of both.”24
As Huntington’s ideas were becoming increasingly cited in the US and EU's 
“Balkanist” policy-making during the Bosnian war and Greece’s support for Orthodox 
Serbia, the Greek public sphere responded in a vociferously defensive manner that 
reflected the eminent confusion about the country’s role in the West. In this climate of 
embarrassment Neo-Orthodoxy was perhaps alone in welcoming Huntington’s 
assertions, given that they confirm the movement’s views about the incompatibility 
between Orthodox culture and the Greek State’s western orientation: “As modern 
Greeks we should feel deeply grateful to Huntington. His challenge is quite a useful
22 Ibid., p.25.
9 9 For a more detailed evaluation of Huntington’s ideas, see Chapter 7, Conclusion.
24 Huntington 1996, pp. 162-63.
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one. Can you imagine our ‘progressive’ intelligentsia’s astonishment when a widely 
acclaimed western commentator asserts that Orthodoxy is the definitive Greek 
characteristic determining the country’s place in the international political arena? So a 
marginalised or completely ignored factor, one we have desperately tried for 170 
years to undermine as a secondary folkloric resource, is treated by a western scholar 
as our identity’s quintessential element.”2'’
Both Huntington and Yannaras are agreed, therefore, that the persistence of 
Orthodox culture and Greece’s absence from the constitutive historical and 
intellectual features of western civilisation are pertinent to the country’s slow pace of 
modernisation. But whereas Huntington correlates Orthodoxy with an extensive 
democratic deficit, Yannaras conversely asserts that such shortcomings emanate from 
arbitrary modernisation and the Greek establishment’s stubborn adherence to the 
West.
For Yannaras, the difference between the Greek case and Huntington’s 
“Procrustean etiquettes” of fundamentalist or “torn countries”26 is that Orthodoxy’s 
resurgence is neither theocratically imposed from above, nor reactionary popular 
traditionalism: “In this respect, Huntington's paradigm is somewhat simplistic... Since 
the time of King Otto the profound Eurocentrism of the country’s intellectual and 
political establishment has had the consent of most Greeks. Nevertheless, repeated 
modernisation projects failed to instill the values and mores of western civilisation. 
So, despite their nominal political convictions, Orthodox Greeks find it very difficult 
to come to terms with rationalism, individualism, and the other western ethical
principles. There is obviously an unconscious process at work manifesting the
11contradiction between what they profess and what they really are.”
The only way out of this is to recognise what lies at the root of the 
contradiction. Greeks should both deconstruct the reasons for their stubborn insistence 
on becoming veritable westerners, and reconstruct what it means to live life as an 
Orthodox: “Recognition of our civilisational identity will simultaneously resolve the 
apparent incongruity and the cleavage between politics and culture in Greece; being
2:> Huntington et al, 1998 p. 167.
26 See Chapter Seven (Conclusion).
27 Huntington et al, 1998, p. 170.
conscious of your identity means to become aware of the things that really matter to 
you, and to act accordingly.”28
According to Metallinos, at the same time that Huntington is marginalizing 
Orthodoxy and Islam, the West embarks on merging its minor cultural differences so 
as to present a homogeneous Euro-American Christian superpower. This is to say that, 
parallel to a process of institutional-geopolitical integration, the west is forging an 
anthropological-ontological integration at supra-national, Euro-American level. For 
Metallinos this undermines the integrity of the one Orthodox culture in the EU and 
NATO by virtue of according the pope the privilege of being the chief spiritual 
representative of its cosmopolitan vision: ‘This new Euro-American anthropological 
model does not include us ... culturally we belong to the East ... in our case cultural 
integration leads to an inevitable civilisational holocaust, to a homogenisation of the 
European whole in which Orthodoxy was the only alternative voice for a more 
spiritual, and less individualistic existence ... Make no mistake, the Pax Americana 
today leads to a new Pax Romana with the pope and Bill Clinton walking hand in 
hand.”29
Rather than rejecting unification in toto, Metallinos concludes that Orthodoxy 
can contribute its communitarian-spiritual alternative to the new order that has 
succeeded the grand narratives of emancipation and capitalism’s post-modern crisis: 
“Seeing that Amitai Etzioni and many others put forward a western 
communitarianism as the only viable social ethic after the collapse of communism and 
the post-industrial crisis of capitalism,30 I believe the time has come for us to 
disseminate our Orthodox spiritual communalism. The Orthodox community model is 
the most perfect communism in history -  a spiritual communism, not a materialistic 
one.”31
Huntington’s civilisation paradigm, therefore, confirms Neo-Orthodoxy’s 
conviction that there is antagonism and incompatibility between the Orthodox side of 
the Greek identity, and the EU’s attempt to forge a supra-national western culture: “It 
is one thing to feel Greek in Europe, and quite another to feel European in Greece. By
28 Ibid., p. 171.
29 Elmazis 1998, pp. 34-35.
30 Compare Tony Blair’s, “Back to basics!"
31 Ibid., p.37.
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cultivating integration at the expense of our cultural sovereignty, EU internationalism 
presents a threat. Behind the EU’s discourse on cultural pluralism and tolerance lies 
an organised attempt to de-Hellenise the very fabric of the Greek nation. So the Greek 
State is obliged to comply with Brussels directives giving equal status to several 
minorities on Greek soil that are diametrically opposed to our spiritual tradition. From 
marginal ideologies in Greece the Jehovah's Witnesses, Protestants, and Catholics are 
now promoted to the same Greekness as Orthodoxy. This condominium logic makes a
T9mockery of Hellenism....”
Neo-Orthodoxy sees the future as bleak because it considers that we are 
witnessing the final stage of the disintegration of Hellenism: “Legal-formal 
acquisition of the Hellenic identity should not be confused with the spiritual one. 
Historically and spiritually all Greeks are Orthodox. But the confusion of spiritual and 
formal/nominal Hellenic identity, and its equation with a variety of foreign ideologies 
and subcultures, have contributed to Hellenism’s alienation and spiritual demise.”33
5.2.3 Neo-Orthodoxy and Human Rights
The human-rights question exemplifies the idiosyncratic logic by which Neo- 
Orthodoxy approaches socio-political issues. The notion of human rights reflects how 
the post-Enlightenment paradigm of modernity informs individual and collective 
identities. The rights of the individual are considered a fundamental, natural 
presupposition for the realisation of a free and democratic society. Neo-Orthodoxy 
devotes much of its discourse to refuting the association between the exercise of 
individual rights (freedom) and a rational-meritocratic society (truth). Yannaras 
argues that priority of the individual over collective rights is an important factor in 
today’s crisis of modernity. “The [western] interpretation of rights through an 
individual-centred utility logic institutionalises and unleashes a dynamic that 
disintegrates society.”34
The same Orthodox features that Huntington identified as a clear indication of 
a “human-rights deficit” Neo-Orthodoxy celebrates as forms of resistance to the 
alienating modem ethic of individualism -  by giving priority to interpersonal relations
Metallinos 1987, p.37
33 Ibid.
34 Yannaras 1998a, p. 8.
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over meritocracy, and the inability to integrate with impersonal organisational 
structures or with rationalistic productive relations. Neo-Orthodoxy’s political 
ideology of radical patriotism must be seen as a variant of nationalism that places 
collective-majority rights above individual-minority ones. “The patriotic criteria are 
axiomatically subjective and partisan. Through the compatriots’ privileged treatment, 
patriotism does away with the undifferentiated version of a natural, de-contextualised 
human agency of universal rights. This logic of national self-protection bears the 
inevitable consequence of marginalising or completely ignoring the rights of non­
nationals.”35
Compared to a nationalist ideology from a Protestant or a Catholic 
background, (neo-)Orthodox radical patriotism is, according to Yannaras, not 
ideological-totalitarian, but ontological-anarchic: “Orthodox patriotism insists on an
*5 z:
existential-ontological, rather than an ideological-pietistic social affirmation.” For 
Yannaras, the pejorative anti-Orthodox discourse of the West corresponds to no living 
Orthodox reality; it is the secular nation(alist) State, rather than Orthodoxy, that 
manipulates religious symbolism, and institutionalises Orthodox patriotism for the 
State’s own geopolitical expediency. Historically, he concludes, Orthodoxy was 
always much more ecumenical and tolerant than the Protestant and Catholic cultures 
which, despite their contemporary facade of “supra-national political correctness”, not 
only gave birth to chauvinist nationalism but were actually responsible for some of the 
worst atrocities ever committed against humanity.
Neo-Orthodoxy claims that it is erroneous and misleading to go on using the 
criteria of western rationalism and individualism to assess human rights in the 
Orthodox political culture. For Yannaras, Greek modernists doing so have caused a 
kind of cultural schizophrenia, so that the country vacillates between trying to 
overcome latent Orthodox predispositions and combining a nationalist/irredentist 
religious discourse with a Eurocentric modernisation project. This has resulted in a 
flamboyant if naively narcisistic enthusiasm for the Byzantine and classical era (in 
which modern Greeks are poorly educated) and an inferiority complex vis-a-vis 
western development.
35 Ibid., p. 154.
36 Ibid., p. 159.
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The Neo-Orthodox cure for the present malaise prescribes resisting the 
hegemonistic western “new world order". Such opposition is dictated by our 
alternative, spiritual needs rather than simply another rationalistic and impersonal 
ideology of emancipation: “An Orthodox Christian who does not comply with the 
individualistic, pietistic, and ideological western criteria only confirms the menace 
identified by Huntington... not because Orthodoxy is incompatible with the values of
t 7
tolerance, pluralism and human rights, but rather because the person-centred and 
communal Orthodox priorities reflect a universal need for a more meaningful and 
spiritual quality of Life. So it is neither freedom nor democracy that are challenged by 
(Neo)-Orthodoxy, but rather the ideological manipulation and de-contextualised 
projection of such principles on Greek Orthodoxy for the purpose of legitimising the
o o
‘superiority’ of western civilisation.”
Implicit in the above Neo-Orthodox argument is a critique of the liberalist- 
political foundations of the human-rights notion: “Liberalism provides an impressive 
freedom of individual rights and choices, but minimises the citizens’ capability to 
engage in reciprocal, interpersonal relations ... [in] societies based on solidarity, 
brotherly love and altruism.”
Neo-Orthodoxy refutes yet another basic element in the human rights 
discourse: “Political correctness is the institutionalised tolerance and universal 
acceptance of the right to assert your difference. Diversity and pluralism have 
colonised the totality of social behaviour, from gender relations to religious 
convictions...every possible diversion or perversion is considered an inalienable 
natural right, regardless of whether the social context in which it is situated is inimical 
to such a behaviour.”40 In other words, relativisation of ethics in an all-encompassing 
subjectivity, tolerance, and pluralism, is undermining the integrity of a hitherto 
dominant cultural tradition. Yannaras continues: “Pluralism imposes the mandatory 
"disarmament’ of society’s main body ... it strips community of its disposition to 
defend the endemic functions that would guarantee its coherence and dynamism.
i n •
“Person-centred”: The human being as a unique personal consciousness rather than 
an undifferentiated agency of individualistic-utilitarian rights.
38 Ibid., p. 142.
39 Ibid., pp. 170-71
40 Ibid., pp. 192-93.
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Irrespective of whether a certain subculture resorts to propaganda or other 
sophisticated methods of ideological indoctrination or religious proselytism and 
bribery, the pluralist culture recognises no limits to establishing a sterile unity in 
diversity -  at the expense of the richly endowed structure of familiar social and 
spiritual foundations.”41
The Neo-Orthodox critique on human rights is part of a wider intervention in 
matters affecting community and State relations. Their general theme is that the 
State’s economistic logic has gradually colonised all communal and interpersonal 
relations: “the Enlightenment utopia of civil society imagined the State as an 
institutional expression of the citizens’ collective rights to equality and meritocracy. 
In late modernity, however, the State Leviathan is an autonomous, uncontrolled entity 
and its relations with the citizens are mainly materialistic... State services do not work 
from the premise of consolidating and enhancing human rights and duties, but are 
primarily an impersonal technocratic network of financial transactions.”42 Many of the 
services and institutions that epitomise modern western democracy (the welfare State, 
human rights, political parties, the parliament) are repudiated by the Neo-Orthodox 
discourse as possessing mere formalistic value devoid of any emancipatory essence, 
and subjugated to the antagonistic logic of materialistic expediency, ending up “with a 
legalistic consolidation of nominal human rights that produces a paradoxical and 
dehumanising totalitarianism.”43
The Neo-Orthodox quest for revitalisation of the preconditions of communal 
experience cannot advance unless society breaks the connection between three 
interrelated phenomena: the centralisation of State-economic services the increasing 
urbanisation and massive population concentration in metropolitan consumer Meccas, 
and the ecological and ontological implications of such degradation for the quality of 
life. Although the Neo-Orthodox ideal of a self-managed community has certain 
similarities with other attempts to challenge the capitalist way of life (e.g. 
communism, anarchy), Yannaras explains that because of their impersonal- 
rationalistic foundations those endeavours quickly manifested a totalitarianism of their
41 Ibid., pp. 194-95.
42 Yannaras 1998a, pp. 210-11.
43 Ibid., p.215.
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own. By contrast, the human-community ideal in contemporary Greece can only have 
a spiritual, post-rational foundation... rooted in our people’s long-lasting person- 
centred experience, the Greek-Byzantine tradition associates politics with ontology 
and permeates the impersonal State infrastructure with Orthodox sensitivity.”44
Yannaras here follows the historian Svoronos, to substantiate the 
contemporary relevance of Byzantium’s community-based social structure. Several 
features of the Byzantine world are brought into the Neo-Orthodox discourse as a 
modern alternative to capitalism’s democratic deficit. For example, there is special 
emphasis on Byzantium’s flexible interpretation of Roman law according to each 
local community’s conception of right and wrong. Moreover, the interpenetration of 
religion and politics, “misunderstood by the West”, signifies Orthodoxy’s immunity 
to the rationalistic absolutisation of truth. In contrast to the relentless western logic of 
an undifferentiated canon, the subjective and always contextual appropriation of 
political debate makes for a much more humane political system.
Turning now to how such convictions show themselves in the Neo-Orthodox 
stance on the government’s educational policy, we find the government’s attempts at 
modernisation challenged at four interrelated levels in order to (i) boost peoples’ 
awareness of their “Hellenicity” as an alternative orientation to Eurocentrism; (ii) 
enhance their Orthodox cultural sensitivity in opposition to the alienating modern 
phenomena of consumerism, urbanisation, and individualism; (iii) protect the richness 
of the Greek language (archaic and Byzantine) and resist its infiltration by media 
colloquialisms, foreign words etc.; and (iv) capitalise on the Hellenic identity in the 
fields of aesthetics, architecture, music, literature, the arts etc.
The Neo-Orthodox critique of education starts from the premise that western- 
type State mechanisms responsible for education are essentially alien to the needs of 
the Greek people, and exacerbate the country’s estrangement from its own social and 
cultural institutions. It opposes both the modernisation reforms undertaken by PASOK 
in the 1980s, and the corruption of civil servants who abuse State power for their 
private purposes.
A persistent Neo-Orthodox practice is to associate the main geopolitical 
tragedies of Greece’s past with the arbitrary westernisation of the national education 
system: “The loss of northern Cyprus, the ongoing de-Hellenisation of northern
44 Ibid., pp. 224 -25.
224
Epirus [southern Albania] ... are mere misdemeanours compared to the crimes 
committed against Greek education.”45 Elsewhere, Yannaras advocates that “Greece 
should follow Israel’s example of compulsory military service at the age of 
eighteen... There are vital national reasons that necessitate this social preparation 
before entering the university.”46
He is presumably implying that the learning experience of military service at 
the relatively immature age of eighteen is imperative as a preparation for the 
communal mores and patriotic values of the Greek-Orthodox way of life and as a 
protection against the iconoclastic influences of university education.
For Neo-Orthodoxy the contentious relationship between secularisation and 
patriotism manifest in the field of education. Its critique denounces the repeated and 
arbitrary projects to modernise Greek education that have deprived the country’s 
youth of its endemic cultural resources. Yannaras contends that this “de- 
Hellenisation” starts in primary school: “The ten volumes of primary-school language 
textbooks initiate the Greek child into a faceless society possessing neither identity 
nor tradition, neither history nor collective memory and metaphysical hope. The 
textbooks allude to an impersonal society, one that is deprived of the eternal verity of 
communal experience...The word ‘motherland’ is virtually absent and the main 
figures of the Greek revolution are conspicuously marginalised...”47
The charge is, therefore, that the State is deliberately neglecting the virtues of 
self-sacrifice and patriotism in favour of its modernising discourse. For example, 
Yannaras says, the exuberant pride of texts about the heroic Greek wars has been 
replaced by carefully designed references to the modem imperative for peace, and the 
need to cut down the arms race with Turkey in order to meet EMU criteria.
When it comes to specific policies, however, Neo-Orthodoxy has kept its 
direct political interference exclusively for the “national issues”. Although education 
and Church-State separation do attract the movement’s interest, this has been confined 
to oratory and has not taken the form of active power politics. When in 1987 for 
example, PASOK included certain education reforms in its wider attempt to separate 
Church from State (Law 1700), Neo-Orthodoxy adopted a somewhat ambivalent
45 Yannaras 1996, p. 138.
46 Ibid., p. 144.
47 Yannaras 1998b, p. 114-15.
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stance. On the one hand, its spokesmen praised minister Tritsis’ readiness to go 
beyond the narrow private expediencies of his predecessors, and for envisioning the 
modern Orthodox message in its rich spiritual essence, rather than as a nationalistic 
ideological pretext. On the other, they criticised him for lack of integrity vis-a-vis 
PASOK, and for his excessive political rationalism. On Law 1700 Yannaras 
commented: “Just like the clergy so politicians have vested interests in the proposed 
rationalisation of the management of Church properties, but both have chosen to 
marginalise or completely ignore the ecclesiastical community, the only legitimate 
proprietor that created the property in the first place and now ought to benefit from 
it.”48
According to Neo-Orthodoxy, therefore, the aforementioned element of 
political manipulation undermined NS HOO's democratic features, and caricatured 
Tritsis’ genuine intention to bridge the gap between State and society. Yannaras 
asserts that Greece’s democratic deficit derives from the increasingly antagonistic 
relationship between the citizen and the State. Any political reform alien to Greece’s 
cultural predispositions not only fails to bring democratisation, but also exacerbates 
the people’s alienation from their collective representative. This viewpoint moves the 
emphasis from rational property management to Church-State interpenetration as the 
age-old bond unifying Hellenism and Greece’s social cohesion.
Although in principle Neo-Orthodoxy is against the ideological manipulation 
of Orthodox symbolism, the movement tacitly promotes its own brand of the Church- 
nation-State triad, and opposes the separation between Church and State in mainly 
nationalistic terms: “While it is indeed erroneous to subjugate religious experience to 
the expediencies of national survival.... it nevertheless shows political wisdom on the 
part of the State to acknowledge and wish to incorporate in its structure the 
quintessential element of Greece’s civilisational identity and national unity.”49
5.3 Neo-Orthodoxy as a Patriotic Political Intervention
In the late 1990s, several Neo-Orthodox personalities and some of the
movement’s basic convictions came to play important roles in Greek public life.
48 Yannaras 1992, p. 107.
49 Ibid., p.237.
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Political parties, civil-society groups, media barons and religious prelates all joined 
forces under the umbrella of the patriotic faction. Their joint advocacy of Helleno- 
centrism made them a powerful alternative to the governing Eurocentric faction. Now 
that Neo-Orthodoxy’s basic goal seems to be realised, the movement may fade out. In 
stark contrast to the undisputed cultural Eurocentrism of the 1970s and 1980s, the 
question of the Greek people’s civilisational identity has penetrated the mainstream 
political discourse and can no longer be ignored.
5.3.1 Network 21 and Civil-society Politics
Neo-Orthodoxy’s liaison with the civil-society group Network 21 reflects the 
movement’s political strategy and ideological profile. The relationship is particularly 
instructive because the Network represents a coherent body of ideas and practices that 
remains relatively independent from Church patronage or party structures. Its 
objective is to boost people’s awareness of national issues, scrutinise geopolitical 
processes, and prevent Greece pursuing subservient policies. Prominent Neo- 
Orthodox personalities like Metallinos. Yannaras and Zouraris are among those 
associated with it, as well as senior army officers, politicians, businessmen, 
journalists, academics, diplomats, lawyers, and members of the clergy. Their modus 
operandi is to organise forums of discussion and subsequently try to address larger 
audiences through the media. Pursuing a lobby-group strategy, Network members are 
able to influence the decision-making centres in their different professional fields.
The group’s insistence on the need for a “national awakening” is not due to 
conventional nationalism but a radical quest for Hellenism’s self preservation in a 
(post)-modern, global geopolitical context. As its founding declaration expresses it: 
“With Hellenism surrounded by increasing military pressure, and resurgence of 
Turkish irredentism threatening to shrink it further, our national awakening seems to 
be an imperative.”50
The Network’s appeal for supra-partisan legitimacy is based on the assertion 
that any escalation of hostility in the area would make Greece’s awakening a matter of 
survival rather than a subject for disscusion. Apart from geopolitics, the Network’s 
founding declaration clarifies the group’s stand towards the EU: “National awakening 
does not refute European Union, but is rather a precondition for Greece’s equal
50 Network 21 1998, p.4.
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membership and integral participation. The EU is not a supra-national State substitute, 
but a family of sovereign nation-states with autonomous religious, linguistic, and 
civilisational heritages. EU integration serves the convergence of national interests, 
not their abolition.”51 Network 21’s raison d ’etre, therefore, is to fill the gap 
generated by “forces riddled with subservience”, reverse the patriotic deficit, and 
organise the citizens’ resistance to those “who have led Hellenism to the brink of 
extinction.”52
By putting the stark alternative of "resistance or subjugation” before the Greek 
people, the Network sought to influence public opinion on a number of national 
issues: Greco-Turkish relations, the Cyprus conflict, the problems of Thrace and 
northern Epirus, the Macedonian question, the issue of the Pontus, and last but not 
least the creation of a Balkan-Orthodox alliance. Socio-cultural concerns such as 
education, language, the Greek diaspora, and demographic problems like Greece’s 
low birth rate are also considered questions of prime national importance. In the 
struggle against western cultural imperialism and Islamic aggression, special 
emphasis is given to the Orthodox spiritual heritage.
Relations with Turkey are the Network’s focal point and the common 
denominator in each of the above agendas. To break with the “defeatist” policies of 
the past, the group suggested radical political, military, and diplomatic strategies. 
Although its declaration sets out peace as their only motivation and an imperative 
condition for Greece’s progress and development, a brief assessment of the Network 
tactics will show that beneath the pretext of deterring Turkish aggression lurked the 
irredentist vision of a Greater Greece acting as a peripheral superpower. The most 
effective strategy was asserted to be identifying and exposing Turkey’s 
vulnerabilities, rather than granting concessions and working out solutions through 
dialogue and compromise. With respect to Cyprus the Network was quite 
uncompromising: “Either we fight to overthrow the result of the 1974 invasion, or we 
accept it. There is no third way.”53
The group used religion and history as instruments to sensitise public 
awareness with regard to national issues. A certain country or community is identified
51 Ibid., p. 5.
52 Ibid., p. 6.
53 Ibid.
228
as friendly or hostile depending on whether it has a culture compatible with Greek 
Orthodoxy (tactic of exclusion). The sucess of any stratagems for national security 
depends on the unifying power of a common religious-historical background (tactic of 
inclusion). We shall see later how Network 21 and the Archbishop worked hand in 
hand in the matter of the Thracian Muslims' high birth rate, and sought ways to 
increase the Orthodox population before it became outnumbered (tactic of exclusion). 
On the other hand, the ultimate goal of deterring Turkish intervention in that area was 
pursued by offering incentives for Muslim to integrate with Greek society (tactic of 
inclusion). Cultural geopolitics of this nature also informs the Network project to 
effect “strategic communication” with three Orthodox-Balkan countries -  Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Romania. Given that NATO's “new order” remains neutral towards 
Greek-Turkish disputes, a complementary geopolitical alliance based on common 
Orthodox antecedents would be welcome. In stark contrast to the practice of 
compromise through dialogue supervised by the West, the Network asserted that a 
Balkan Orthodox liaison has no stake in pleasing Turkey, and can thus vindicate the 
Greek side. Moreover, such an approach would enhance Greece’s role in the West as 
the only EU and NATO member trusted in the Orthodox countries.
Neo-Orthodox ideas have created a totally new perspective towards the 
strategic importance of the Greek diaspora. Traditionally, foreign affairs have always 
relied on the lobbying manoeuvres of prominent and wealthy Greek communities 
living in the West. Following the East Bloc’s collapse however, Network 21 adopted 
Neo-Orthodoxy’s stance concerning the remote, isolated, and poor communities of 
Greek origin living around the Black Sea. Seventy years of Soviet rule have virtually 
de-Hellenised those people in terms of formal education, language, and religion. Now 
following the Greek State’s reliance on support from the prosperous Greek-American 
lobby, Network 21 turned to Neo-Orthodox interest in the Hellenism of the Black-Sea 
and Pontic region. In the Neo-Orthodox context, the persistence of Greekness there 
reflects the dynamism of the Orthodox way of life as a spiritual and communal 
experience rather than as a scale of materialistic progress. In parallel with this 
romantic notion of Hellenism, the Network also saw in it a formidable opportunity to 
gain specific geopolitical goals. By means of the cultural vehicle of Orthodoxy the 
region could be “re-Hellenised” and serve Greek interests in a number of ways. The 
resurgence of local identities now being viewed as a basic human right and enjoying
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international support, such re-Hellenisation could enhance Greece’s role in a 
particularly important key area (a propos of Caspian oil). It would also create another 
minority problem for Turkey, and further highlight her democratic deficit and lack of 
human rights. Lastly, a regular population flow to mainland Greece would help solve 
Thrace’s demographic problem, and increase the number of Orthodox compared to 
Muslim inhabitants.
In May 1998 Network 21 help a two-day conference entitled “National 
defence, Leadership, and Public opinion", when Neo-Orthodoxy’s leading figures 
(Metallinos, Yannaras, and Zouraris) were responsible for presenting the group’s 
Helleno-centric political orientation. The conference’s major objective was to 
denounce Prime Minister Simitis’ supposedly conciliatory stance on national issues. 
Behind the government’s subservient geopolitical strategy, they argued, stood a “de- 
Hellenised” elite whose blind devotion to their Euro-American patrons left no space 
for the development of a veritable Hellenic-Orthodox democracy. The alternative was 
neither conventional right-wing nationalism, nor anti-imperialistic socialism.
In terms similar to Habermas’ concept of civil-society,54 and congruent with 
the late-modern notion of a “third way”, Neo-Orthodoxy stressed the importance of 
unfettered citizens, free, informed, and willing to set up alternative democratic groups 
to stand between the citizen and State. The difference between the two approaches is 
that Neo-Orthodoxy interprets freedom by a privileged historic-religious heritage and 
a pre-Rationalist, person-centred social structure, whereas Habermas’ view is still 
indebted to the post-Rationalist human rights of the Enlightenment and the supra­
national principles of globalisation. Supported by the powerful new Archbishop 
Christodoulos, Neo-Orthodoxy envisions a civil society made up of “free persons” in 
the authentic classical tradition (not in the western sense) and living the Orthodox 
spiritual paradigm. The combination of freedom as a classical democratic value with 
the cultural logic of entrenchment inevitably gave rise to some inconsistencies. For 
example, when Network 21 discussed membership eligibility, most participants 
favoured a flexible group, open to anyone interested. For all that, they reserved the 
right to refuse admission to individuals who either had expressed anti-Greek opinions,
M cf. Habermas 1989.
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or defied the values of the democratic polity.53 The fact that these two viewpoints 
might be mutually exclusive apparently did not occur to any of them.
A brief discussion of Network 21’s position on specific geopolitical 
developments will further substantiate its striking affinity with Neo-Orthodox logic. 
According to the Network’s consultant professor Yallouridis,56 the major criterion of 
social legitimacy in today’s Greece is how each political force viewed the NATO air 
strikes in Kosovo. The war’s impact on the political culture, he argues, has introduced 
a totally new perspective whereby the old ideological dichotomies had to give way to 
new coalitions, depending on whether or not government and parties endorsed the 
NATO military intervention and its “new world order”. Whereas socialist Europe 
adopted a much more cynical stance, epitomising the final demise of Enlightenment 
humanism and the resurgence of Realpolitik, Greece displayed remarkable uniformity 
in opposing what was perceived as proud (i.e. Orthodox) resistance against western 
imperialist aggression. Yallouridis welcomes this phenomenon of a Helleno-centric, 
anti-western alliance that for the first time brings together forces as diverse as the 
Neo-Orthodox, nationalists, conservatives, socialists, social democrats, Euro-socialists 
and hard-line communists. This remarkable patriotic upsurge, he argues, divides 
Greece’s political culture into two factions, and the modernists will have to abandon 
their naive enthusiasm for globalisation, and reconsider the vaunted generalisations 
about Greece’s “unproblematic” integration into the western world. The Network 21 
commentator strongly denounced the modernists’ subservient strategy that “goes as 
far as to welcome Greece’s economic and geopolitical dependency.”
Such questioning of national sovereignty is now a recurrent theme within the 
Greek political culture. In this sense, Yallouridis does not deviate from the 
conventional populist discourse that is particularly sensitive to how much of national 
sovereignty can be conceded to supra-national organisations. So Simitis’ government 
was exposed to a wave of serious political dissent by forces claiming that he and the 
modernist faction showed a dangerous zeal in fulfilling their EU and NATO 
commitments at the expense of national interests. Inasmuch as such questions operate
55 Ibid., p. 24.
36 Yallouridis was also special consultant to the ministry of defense, when he put 
forward and implemented the idea of a Unified Defense Doctrine between Greece and 
his native Cyprus.
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as barometers of political costs and indicate the degree of the government’s social 
legitimacy at any one time it is not erroneous to claim that one of Greece’s main 
problems is a peculiar and confusing formalism vis-a-vis national issues and the 
country’s international commitments. The opposition charges the government with 
treason and of cultivating an atmosphere of geopolitical insecurity in order to pursue 
its narrow power ploys. The government, on the other hand, adopts a Janus-faced, 
catch-all strategy aspiring to keep the domestic Cassandras dormant while hoping to 
prolong its international immunity on issues of modernisation.
There can be no doubt that the role NATO and the EU have played in former 
Yugoslavia has strengthened Helleno-centrism in Greece. Leading Neo-Orthodox 
personalities agreed with several parties and organisations (including PASOK’s 
“patriotic” faction) that found the decision to endorse the air strikes fertile ground for 
systematically undermining the government.
What is the stand of Network 21 on the Neo-Orthodox geopolitical 
problematic?
In terms similar to Yallouridis’, Yannaras has asserted that the pretext of the 
cold war was not enough reason to justify US support for Turkey’s military regime. 
Even after it came to an end, he argued, US policy remains provocatively indifferent 
to Turkey’s violation of western values (political liberalism, human rights, minority 
protection). He does not agree that the EU and NATO are a relatively homogeneous 
geopolitical entity, and charges that the US is trying to control the EU by bringing 
into Europe a country which is (a) inimical to its moral/cultural foundations, (b) 
democratically deficient and problematic, and (c) one of the US’s most loyal and 
submissive allies. Henceforth, Greece should not put her faith in “earthquake 
diplomacy”57 and should take whatever steps are necessary to disengage from her 
current subservient strategy.
Yannaras’ style of critique is demonstrated by his scorn for foreign minister 
Gioros Papandreou’s American-accented English, as if this proved him to be an
^  A rapprochement between the people of Turkey and Greece was obtained as a result 
of two catastrophic earthquakes that had struck the two countries in 1999, and the 
mutual relief efforts. This was accompanied by renewed optimism regarding the 
geopolitical disputes.
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American agent of some kind. Remote as this personal offensive may be from our real 
field of interest, it does reflect the Neo-Orthodox logic of merging culture with 
politics. Similarly Giorgos Papandreou’s poor record in respect of Greek-Orthodox 
education was supposed to make him an agent of foreign interests. Modern Greece’s 
disconnection from its solid Orthodox roots is held responsible for leaving the country 
without the necessary spiritual infrastructure to defend its inalienable sovereignty: 
“Just as NATO managed to present its horrific crimes against humanity as a triumph 
for human rights, Simitis describes Greece’s geopolitical shrinkage as benevolent 
modernisation... How can we stand firm against NATO’s brutal directives when our 
civilisation has given away its ability to be critical and to resist? ... The neo-nazi 
leaders of the new order insist that the Kosovo massacre will prevent a Greco-Turkish
co
war. Let us not be so naive...”'
Papandreou was criticised in much the same terms by Zouraris, who objected 
to his collaboration with NATO, the EU and Turkey to reach a viable solution for the 
country’s national issues. The minister had called his strategy “aggressive”, in the 
sense of breaking new ground and challenging long-lasting stereotypes of hostility, 
which triggered a vociferous reaction from the “patriots”. Zouraris’ comments also 
serve to epitomise Network 21 ’s maximalistic position. He argued that “aggression” is 
indeed what Greek policy needs, and precisely what it lacks. In his view “aggressive” 
should mean demanding that Albania, NATO, and the EU permit Greek troops to 
leave the areas of secondary importance in Kosovo and be re-positioned in northern 
Epirus where the Greek-Orthodox minority needs immediate protection. Moreover, he 
declared that since Greece is the richest and most advanced of the Balkan nations, her 
troops should be given a larger area of responsibility. Aggression was also needed, he 
said, to put pressure on Turkey to finally compensate Greece for the genocide of the 
Orthodox population in Asia Minor in the early 1920s. By exposing Turkey’s brutality 
Greece would enhance its negotiating position and could demand from the UN 
implementation of a special clause by which the Ecumenical Patriarchate will become 
autonomous from Turkey’s military regime. A third point raised by Zouraris was to 
shift government priority from joining the EMU to solving the Cyprus problem: “If it 
is ostensibly democratic to remind the US and the EU that it took 25 days for the
‘ Yannaras, newspaper Kathemerini, 9 May 1999.
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ethnic Albanians to return safely to their Kosovo homes ... then 25 years seems more 
than enough for the Cypriots to make the short journey back home.”59
Although the Neo-Orthodox members of Network 21 have grown in 
popularity, the group as a whole suffered a major blow as a result of its dubious role 
in the arrest of the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan. Together with Greek 
paramilitaries, several Network 21 members were allegedly involved in Ocalan’s 
protection against Turkey and the CIA. Following his arrest, the case evolved into an 
international fiasco for Greece’s foreign policy, and exposed Network 21’s scandalous 
participation in a case of international terrorism. In a domestic climate of 
unprecedented social opposition towards those responsible, the prime minister sacked 
several members of the government, including foreign affairs minister Pangalos. 
Subsequently the Network engaged in a relentless legal battle in an attempt to restore 
its public image. This still ongoing dispute has virtually eliminated Network 21’s 
political capability.
5.3.2 Neo-Orthodoxy and Socialism: PASOK’s “Patriotic” Faction, 
Charalambidis’ New Party, “Orthodox” Communists, and the “Red” 
Archbishop
The Ocalan case, as well as the clash between Orthodox Serbs and Muslim 
Albanians in Kosovo raised questions about Greece’s role in the West and, in the 
context of whether Greece should endorse Nato policy, set the climate for the 1999 
Euro-elections. In the heated debates on these matters Neo-Orthodoxy played a major 
role. Virtually all the opposition parties as well as PASOK’s “patriotic” faction 
launched a concerted campaign against Simitis’ decision to remain with NATO.
The protagonist of the government's internal opposition was former minister 
Papathemelis. Although he and the rest of the “patriots” may be viewed as part of the 
larger “presidential” faction, the leader of the “presidentials”, Tsohatzopoulos 
(defence minister, and number two in PASOK), has only rarely allowed himself to 
appear as an uncompromising patriot. In other words, whereas Tsohatzopoulos cares 
more about maintaining a catch-all ideology, Papathemelis is eager to confront the 
modernists, whatever the cost.
~9 Zouraris, newspaper Eleftherotypia, 4 Aug. 1999.
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Papathemelis is a very good example of an uninhibited Neo-Orthodox 
politician whose ideology aspires to synthesise Orthodoxy, socialism and nationalism. 
A prolific writer, he has published extensively about the liaison between Orthodoxy 
and socialist politics.60 Before joining PASOK in the early 1980s, Papathemelis was 
involved with the small Christian Democratic party.
Denouncing Simitis’ role in the Ocalan case and the Kosovo air strikes, the 
patriotic political faction managed to launch a quite effective campaign. Their chief 
target was to undermine the government’s public legitimacy in its handling of the 
national issues. Collaborating closely with the Archbishop, Network 21 members, and 
other Helleno-centrists from the whole range of the political spectrum, Papathemelis 
wanted to create an anti-western patriotic front. Neo-Orthodoxy had now gone beyond 
its traditional class-based socialism to espouse “civilisational materialism”. While 
maintaining their goal to emancipate the have-nots, they now emphasised how 
globalisation constitutes a new form of cultural imperialism -  with western policy no 
longer aiming at peace or human rights, but at a new geopolitical arena where 
NATO’s omnipotence will guarantee the interests of America and the most powerful 
of her allies.
Neo-Orthodoxy attracted PASOK's “patriots” in a discourse about Balkan 
independence and sovereignty. This stated that only the people’s movement can 
consolidate human rights and bring about the end of national borders, and that 
modernisation/westernisation are alien concepts to the Balkan peoples who have an 
indigenous Orthodox civilisation far superior to that enforced by western military 
aggression.
The Helleno-centric Neo-Orthodox ideology brought together extremely 
heterogeneous political and cultural forces ranging from the far Right to extreme Left. 
In his capacity as leader of PASOK’s patriotic political faction, Papathemelis 
epitomises this convergence. As a calm, cultivated, and experienced politician, having 
served in several ministries during the Papandreou era, Papathemelis is widely 
acclaimed for his integrity and benign personality, acclaimed by “patriots” from the 
entire political spectrum. The unprecedented popularity of Archbishop Christodoulos 
and his warm friendship with Papathemelis, Zouraris, and Yannaras, affirmed the 
Helleno-centric connection between political patriotism, the Church, and Neo-
60 Papathemelis 1979.
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Orthodoxy, so creating favourable circumstances for its social dissemination. Apart 
from their common liaison with Network 21, these influential individuals worked 
hand in hand to bridge the gap between religious indifference among patriots of the 
Left and the a-political clergy. In this direction, the Archbishop wrote an enthusiastic 
prologue to Papathemelis’ patriotic manifesto “This homeland belongs to all of us”.61
In his prologue Christodoulos points out that Greece is about to experience a 
period of escalating geopolitical aggression for which her political leaders are grossly 
unprepared. The solution to this unsatisfactory situation requires something more than 
individual skills and delicate political handling. The first and foremost ingredient of a 
successful geopolitical strategy depends, according to the Archbishop, on the extent to 
which Greek politicians possess the necessary patriotic ideals to reach a “nationally 
dignified solution”. In Christodoulos’ view, his dear friend Papathemelis epitomises 
such quality: “he is not susceptible to subservience, nor does he serve Graeculism.”62
Papathemelis applies the Archbishop's contentions to a specific geopolitical 
paradigm. He identifies Greece’s contemporary situation as a crucial showdown 
between the advocates of “de-Hellenised internationalism” boosted by the dynamics 
of Euro-American interests, and a more context-sensitive force that does not hesitate 
to oppose globalisation in order to uphold Greece’s national/historical rights. It does 
not suffice to put our faith in the power of international organisations that have 
consistently failed to vindicate the Greek side. The EU, UN and NATO are incapable 
of deterring Turkish aggression in Cyprus, the Aegean, Kurdistan, or elsewhere. 
Fostered by powerful western interests, Turkey’s immunity to international law and 
order is equally alarming. America’s myopic human-rights policy (i.e. double 
standards) demonstrates common interests with Turkey.
Papathemelis, is convinced that this bleak geopolitical picture can only change 
if Greeks rediscover their age-old essential self. The profound devaluation of 
Orthodoxy, patriotism, heroism, altruism, and communalism has left its imprint on the 
political culture. This deficit has resulted in a subservient political logic that renders 
Greece vulnerable to globalisation, consumerism, and Euro-American supremacy. In
61 Papathemelis 1998.
62 Ibid., p. 10. As explained in previous chapters a “Graeculus” is a Greek who, as a 
result of behaviour incompatible with the true values and mores of being Greek, does 
not merit his Greekness.
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stark contrast to Simitis’ moderate/pro-European foreign policy, his party’s 
“patriotic” faction boycotts any reconciliation between Turkey and Greece within the 
context of EU integration. Inasmuch as such integration is a pretext for western power 
interests, Turkey will use it as a formidable opportunity to offer strategic alliance with 
the West in exchange for permission to exercise her role as a regional superpower. 
Henceforth, Turkey will continue to demand that Greece grant concessions in what 
have been perceived by “patriotic” politicians as “Greece’s inalienable rights in the 
Aegean and Cyprus.” Prompted by the EU and US partisan decision to pamper 
Turkey, Papathemelis defied the established doctrine of Greece’s perennial ties with 
the West, and sought to unify patriots from all parties through idiosyncratic political 
reasoning that could appeal to Greek spiritual sensitivity and national pride.
Religious exclusivity and cultural particularity are the two main Neo-Orthodox 
parameters appropriated by PASOK’s “patriotic” politicians, both to criticise the 
shortcomings in the modernist policy and to suggest alternative geopolitical strategies. 
Papathemelis asserted that only a strategic alliance with Orthodox brothers from
A3Russia could effectively deter Turkey’s claims in the Aegean.
Apart from collaborating towards a “spiritually legitimate” geopolitical 
strategy, Neo-Orthodoxy and PASOK’s patriotic politicians share an inflexible 
orientation with respect to Greece’s claims regarding Macedonia and Cyprus. Their 
opposition to the more conciliatory (Europeanist) strategy of the modernists also
extends to the latter’s policy of imposing drastic cuts in rearmament in order to
correct the welfare system’s huge deficit and bring Greece in line with EC directives 
for peace and co-operation. In short, echoing Neo-Orthodoxy’s political-cultural 
convictions, Papathemelis envisions the emulation of the Israeli model, where religion 
and history cement socio-cultural cohesion, while a robust military guarantees the 
country’s geopolitical integrity and pride.
A second example of the affinities between Socialism and Neo-Orthodoxy
involves former PASOK member Charalambidis. As a member of the group that 
founded PASOK and co-author of the movement’s founding declaration, 
Charalambidis served continuously on PASOK’s central committee from 1974 to 
1995. He then left PASOK because of serious political disagreements, and
63 Ibid., p. 16.
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subsequently founded the Democratic Regional Union in an attempt to create a 
patriotic-Socialist alternative to PASOK's alleged neo-liberalism and Eurocentrism.
The new party’s programmatic declarations are strongly influenced by Neo- 
Orthodoxy. For example, Charalambidis envisions a supra-national alliance among 
the peoples of the Balkans and Asia Minor (Orthodox plus Kurds) against Turkish 
military aggression, Euro-American geopolitical imperialism, and cultural hegemony. 
Western countries, he asserts, prefer to have the Turks as regional interlocutors, allies, 
and business partners rather than such indigenous historical peoples of the region as 
Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds. They will not allow the autonomous historical and 
national re-establishment and re-composition of this particular geo-political and geo- 
economic sphere whose dislocation they began during the crusades. Charalambidis 
wonders whether western encouragement of the new sultanic Turkish barbarity will 
continue as a permanent pressure to compel the collaboration and compliance of 
“heretic” Greece. A solution to the new eastern question through an alliance of new 
crusaders and new sultans, he concludes, will once more precipitate a holocaust 
amongst the ancient indigenous peoples, and the destruction of the cultural centres of 
the region: “Unfortunately, due to Greek political and cultural inadequacies, this 
major issue concerning European foreign policy ... has been omitted from the 
Maastricht agreement64 and the various NATO meetings.”65
Such bleak prospects create the pressing need for cultural and political 
initiatives towards a different type of historical consciousness. Indeed, Charalambidis’ 
new party encompasses an unprecedented degree of Euro-scepticism “...without 
western European snobbery, egotism, and colonial slyness; without Greek provincial 
attitudes or the Euro-greediness that characterises the majority of a third-world type 
of Athenian political and intellectual ‘elite’; and without emotionally charged and raw 
anti-West bombast or alibis.”66
In contrast to traditional right-wing irredentists, Charalambidis does not focus 
on a simplistic and populist manipulation of Greece’s historical traumas in order to
64 The treaty leading to a more economically and politically integrated European 
economy, signed in 1992 by Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Germany, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Great Britain.
^  Charalambidis 1998, p.25.
66 Ibid., p. 26.
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evoke sentimentalism and attract votes. As a Neo-Orthodox, he asserts that Greece’s 
unresolved national issues are a prelude to a new Hellenic political consciousness. He 
promised to introduce an indigenous socialist discourse, and reconcile the Left with 
the “tragic particularity” of Greece’s socio-historic reality in relation to that of the 
West. Due to its cultural provincialism, the Left identified Greek socio-historic reality 
with that of northern Europe, and as a result socialism in Greece has failed to 
understand that Greeks do not enter politics the way Europeans do -  through the 
conflicts, problems, and needs created in the process of capitalist accumulation. 
Greeks acquire their political consciousness in an atmosphere of foreign imperialist 
presence and intervention, social dynamics that dismantle their country, their 
economy, their civilisation, their environment, and their historic homelands.
The second and very similar Neo-Orthodox point of convergence between 
politics and culture is described by Charalambidis as the refugee nature of the Greek 
working class. The socialist cultural-political domain has failed to comprehend that 
the Greek proletariat did not develop through capitalist processes (e.g. in large 
factories), but by the people being driven out of their historic homelands and 
becoming refugees. Their tendency to import western discourses of emancipation 
rather mechanistically, or even to welcome European and American patronage, may 
be partially associated with their fear of yet another holocaust. Unaware of Greece’s 
distinctiveness, the Greek working class came to believe that the country would 
automatically become European and would no longer have national problems. The 
Greek satellite-State, as ignorant of its own heritage as of the insidious western 
interests, failed to defend the integrity of eastern Hellenism: “Due to this 
(Eurocentric) doctrine, the patriarchate has been regarded by the Athens government 
as a parochial Church. Because this yielding cultural-political tribe pretends to be 
European, I suggest a comparison: imagine the Italians abandoning the Vatican and St 
Peter’s the way we abandoned the Patriarchate and St Sophia!”67
Charalambidis’ ultimate hope is to pave the way for a political movement that 
can put an end to many years of kow-towing NATO’ compromises on the national 
issues. Due to NATO’s doctrine of the “integrity of Turkey”, any cultural let alone 
political reference to the Greek-Orthodox homelands in Asia Minor was considered a 
threat to the Turkish State’s integrity and the general security of the area: “We thereby
67 Ibid.. p. 71.
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underwent a national cultural mutilation. This explains why the history of Orthodox 
Hellenism in Asia Minor is absent from the textbooks in Greek schools. This doctrine 
created gaps in our own historical memory and knowledge... gaps that, in today’s 
period of globalisation and integration, were papered over by re-writing history.”68
In contradistinction to the establishment’s Eurocentrism, Charalambidis saw 
an opportunity for important initiatives in the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
the Middle East. He outlined a new national plan focused on how to check Turkish 
expansionism, and put it forward as the paradigm for “a new diplomacy course” and 
“a new line of resistance”. This defence against Turkish expansionism would include 
many peoples united either by common traditions (Slav Orthodoxy) or by their 
struggles to overthrow the Turkish yoke in the past (Armenians and Pontic Greeks) 
and present (Kurds). In this context, Charalambidis declares, the new moral role of 
Greece in the region is ecumenical and deeply humanistic. It is a patriotic course that 
intersects with a pacifist and internationalist arc.
Considering that PASOK’s “patriotic” faction could not bypass Simitis, and 
that Charalambidis’ new party was essentially a tentative political intervention, the 
marriage between Neo-Orthodoxy and the Greek communist party (KKE) is a 
spectacular confirmation that the civilisational debate penetrates all of Greek society, 
even the highest ramparts of political secularism. The KKE is one of the few 
remaining communist parties in western Europe that survived the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the concomitant depreciation of Marxism-Leninism as a grand 
narrative of emancipation. Apart from a minor shift in orientation away from the 
imperative nature of a workers’ revolution and towards complete recognition of 
parliament, the KKE has persisted in its basically class-based ideology, and its 
strategy of confrontation with the “privileged”. Denouncing discourses on tradition, 
the national issues and religion as the “opium of the masses”, the party has always 
considered itself the avant garde of progress. Specifically tradition was considered 
pure invention, disseminated by coercive States to break the unity of the proletariat 
and to channel its revolutionary energy into such false ideologies of obedience and 
conformism as nationalism and religiosity.
68 Ibid., p. 72.
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Recognising no religious authority, always suggesting a strategy of 
internationalism in Greece’s geopolitical disputes, this atheist population, in favour of 
historical materialism that dared to dismiss the pomposity of the Hellenic myth was 
relentlessly persecuted by the right-wing establishment. Both sides claimed to have 
played a protagonistic role in a series of heroic Greek struggles. The communists did 
fight heroically against the German occupation, but their defeat in the subsequent civil 
war, and 25 years of cold-war anti-communism, left them with little social legitimacy. 
The party’s failure to fortify the impersonal communist ideology with indigenous 
elements from the Greek-Orthodox past and tradition dramatically changed in the late 
1990s, culminating in their historic decision to embrace Neo-Orthodoxy. The KKE’s 
initiative to enlist leading Neo-Orthodox figures as candidates in the 1999 Euro- 
elections in more than an opportunistic alliance indicates the Greek political culture’s 
polarisation between “patriots” and modernists. Almost overnight, the old brutal 
dichotomy between Left and Right had become a heterogeneous anti-western front (of 
communists, Neo-Orthodox, fascists, fundamentalists and Helleno-centrists 
confronting an equally heterogeneous Eurocentric establishment (of the dominant 
modernising factions within PASOK, ND, and the Coalition of the Left and Progress).
In the climate of tension after the government’s endorsement of NATO’s 
invention in Kosovo, the KKE organised public dissent against the air strikes into a 
coherent political protest. Daily appearances in televised debates and discussion 
panels of Zouraris, Yannaras, and Metallinos clarified the sophisticated Neo-Orthodox 
discourse at the popular level. The KKE also recruited, the ultra patriotic journalist 
Liana Kanelli. Through her daily programs on the TV-channel “Alter 5” and her 
magazine Nemesis, Kanelli is known for her uncompromising views on the national 
issues.
Bringing Zouraris and Kanelli into the KKE ranks strongly affected the party's 
public image. For one thing, freed of its “anti-Greek” stigma it appealed to a much 
greater section of the populace. Even the far-Right Golden Dawn was charmed by the 
KKE’s Neo-Orthodox volte face, and noted that “only members of KKE stood against 
the NATO tanks.”69 At this time participants in numerous pro-Serbian anti-war 
demonstrations and concerts were reported to be holding red flags next to yellow 
Byzantine ones with the two-headed eagle. When in the city of Larissa, fascist
69 Newspaper Chrysi A v g i , 2 July 1999.
241
demonstrators from Golden Dawn joined the KKE ranks and burned a Turkish flag,
70there was no reaction whatsoever.
On the other hand, the KKE’s Neo-Orthodox affiliations prompted one of its 
most respected MPs to resign. Mitsos Kostopoulos justified his decision to abandon 
KKE in terms of upholding his integrity as a communist, active trade unionist, and 
one who suffered persecution and torture at the hands of nationalists and chauvinists: 
“It would be a mockery of historical truth to accuse communism, and the great 
thinkers who associated themselves with it, of nationalism and chauvinism...the 
communists never scorned our people’s religious sentiment; they respected it and 
relied on dialogue to teach that every one of us is the ‘creator’. But never did they 
give themselves away to fundamentalists and obscure ‘Networks’... to those who 
relentlessly manipulate the religious sensitivity and pure patriotic feelings of our 
people to serve their narrow power games ... they never gave themselves away to 
those who cover their grandiose nationalism and imperialistic irredentism with a 
facade of Hellenic civilisation and spirit... those zealots who pompously trumpet their 
‘progressive Orthodox discourse’.”71
The KKE general secretary Aleka Papariga did not back down, however. 
Kanelli and Zouraris being able to attract votes from a sector of the population for 
which communism had had no appeal whatsoever, here was a unique opportunity for 
the KKE becoming a protagonist on Greece’s patriotic political front. There were 
plenty of voters from all kinds of backgrounds ready to express their disaffection with 
PASOK and ND. Papariga considered Neo-Orthodoxy a formidable means for 
transforming the party’s obsolete anti-Americanism into Helleno-centric, anti-western 
communism. During the election campaign of 2000 Zouraris questioned the patriotic 
foundations of the governing faction and said that “Yet once more the communists did 
not back down ... Just as they did against the nazis and their local collaborators, so the 
KKE is now leading the fight against Simitis and his pseudo-socialist NATO 
puppets.”72
70 Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 19 Sep. 1999.
71 Newspaper Ta Nea, 22 Feb. 2000.
72 Ibid.
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The “patriotic” political faction could not have hope for a more valuable ally 
than Archbishop Christodoulos. Amid the tension and turmoil surrounding Kosovo, 
he pursued a twofold strategy of political interference. Although the higher clergy 
generally remained neutral and reluctant to engage in political debate, he took 
advantage of the fact that he was repeatedly voted the most popular personality in 
Greek public life. In his capacity as a media star, Christodoulos made daily headlines 
expressing partisan geopolitical convictions. His profound social appeal provided him 
with immunity from government censure, and enabled him to work hand in hand with 
Network 21 and Neo-Orthodox politicians. Neo-Orthodoxy, on the other hand, 
welcomed his interference and the idea of a politically active Archbishop.
Christodoulos introduced a totally new strategy of political interference. In 
appearances specially tailored for media consumption, he ignored the Church’s 
traditional attachment to the political establishment, and addressed the ordinary 
people on why modernity and globalisation are a threat to Greek culture. Borrowing 
from sources as diverse as Chomsky and Orthodoxy, he said that “Globalisation is 
nothing more than a synonym for American socio-economic and cultural imperialism. 
It paves the way for the end of ethnic identity and the disintegration of sovereign 
national states. American interests are like those of separatist terrorist groups ... both
73benefit from using human rights as a pretext for their pursuit of power.”
The Archbishop, commenting on the gradual colonisation by the mass media 
of politics and private economic interests, concluded that the increasing concentration 
of power in a handful of individuals facilitates the hegemonic control of ideology and 
cultural production. Up to a point Christodoulos’ quasi-Marxist observations are 
consistent with the spiritual values of emancipation, peace, and freedom, but his 
interpretation of them goes a lot further than spiritual guidance and cultural criticism.
The dispute over Thrace -  between the “patriotic” forces (the Archbishop. 
Neo-Orthodoxy, Network 21, Papathemelis. Charalambidis and other Helleno-centric 
politicians) and the government -  shows the increasing polarisation in contemporary 
Greek political culture. The modernists, are becoming more Eurocentric and, in order 
to solve problems with Turkey, ready to make some concessions. The “patriotic” 
forces do not recognise any Turkish claims, feel betrayed by Europe’s tolerance of 
Turkish aggressiveness, and denounce Simitis’ conciliatory policy as making Greece a
73 Newspaper To Vima, 18 Sep. 1999.
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satellite of American and Turkish interests. With so many pending disputes and 
traumatic memories systematically blown out of proportion by both State and Church, 
these issues evoke strong emotions and are usually debated so heatedly that even 
one’s public image as a proper Greek patriot may be affected.
Not surprisingly, the most vocal reaction against the government’s intention to 
implement a more moderate policy towards Thrace’s Muslim minority has come from 
the Church rather than the parliamentary opposition. Christodoulos, in an uninhibited 
political move, wrote to the education minister demanding revision of a clause 
introducing the Turkish language into the secondary-education curriculum in Thrace. 
Since the province also has two additional Muslim groups (Gypsies and Pomacs), the 
Archbishop also suggested the re-introduction of their languages so as to deter Turkey 
from annexing those populations into her control zone. Fear of the same kind of 
separatism as in Kosovo prompted him to approach the Network 21 group on joint 
educational projects designed to boost Gypsy and Pomac consciousness at the expense 
of a Turkish orientation.
Bypassing State jurisdiction, Christodoulos next attempted to alter Thrace’s 
demographic composition. He offered a special grant from Church funds to Christian 
families with more than two children. Fear that Muslims will outnumber Christians 
prompted him to pursue an eclectic human rights policy. Thracian Muslim MP 
Moustafa criticised Christodoulos for undermining Thrace’s peace and stability, as 
well as being guilty of discrimination. The Archbishop, he argued, shortsightedy 
ignored Thrace’s social problems that needed a better welfare policy, not “ethnic 
cleansing” as a solution. The higher clergy considered Moustafa an apologist for the 
official Turkish line and replied asking him to account for a series of human-rights 
violations against Christians in Turkey: “Mr Moustafa should lecture on social 
cohesion to those who brutally violate basic human rights like freedom of speech and 
religious tolerance.... the Church is both older than and independent of the democratic 
Hellenic State, and among her constitutional rights are decisions on how to 
appropriately serve and protect the vast majority of the Greek people.”74
The Coalition of the Left and Progress Party defended its Muslim MP, and 
upheld the party’s principles of secularism, democratisation, and Church-State 
separation: “The holy synod’s practice of discriminating against non-Orthodox Greek
74 Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 12 March 1999.
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citizens is totally opposed to the objectives of the Greek polity, as well as to 
Christianity itself.”73 Concerning Christodoulos’ accusations against Moustafa, the 
Coalition replied that such smear tactics are usually employed when there is 
unwillingness to address the real issue: “It is ludicrous to suggest that just because 
Moustafa is Muslim he is also an agent of Turkey’s military regime ... The sensitive
7 r
region of Thrace has nothing to gain from Christodoulos’ partisan policies.”
Another characteristic example of Christodoulos’ extreme Neo-Orthodoxy was 
his objection to Pope John Paul’s intention to visit Greece. As already outlined in 
Chapter 3 the Archbishop’s stance created an awkward situation for the government. 
In the ensuing clash, Orthodoxy and the State once more competed for the consent of 
the people. Even the President of the Republic was drawn into the controversy. He 
declared that Eastern and Western Christianity constitute one unified world, and 
upheld Greece’s commitment to multiculturalism. Nevertheless, fear of anti-papal 
demonstrations led to the cancellation of the Pope’s visit. Yet again the Church 
prevailed over the State’s desire to be regarded by Europe as a westernised country.
15 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ORTHODOX ACADEMY OF CRETE
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6.1 General Profile and Departments (EYC, ITE)
Founded in 1968, the Orthodox Academy of Crete (OAC) is a religious 
foundation. It reports to the Diocese of Kisamos and Selinon, and operates under the 
spiritual aegis of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.1
OAC funding comes from neither Church nor State, and in fact the academy has 
no regular financial income but relies on contributions received from conferences and 
donations from its well-wishers. The land it stands on was a gift from the Gonia 
monastery, and in 1964 the Central Evangelical Office for Aid and Development in Bonn 
donated 1.2 million DM towards building the academy, and gave an additional 240,000 
DM in 1968 for operating costs. The donation was a good-will gesture by Germany’s 
Protestant Church as a form of compensation for the damage caused by German 
occupation forces during World War II. Currently there is an Athens-based, six-member 
financial committee responsible for raising funds for the OAC’s running costs.
Members of the OAC are the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, other prelates 
and higher clergy of the Orthodox and other Christian Churches, as well as eminent 
personalities from Greece and abroad.
The main purpose of the OAC is to effectuate dialogues between Orthodoxy and 
the modern world, and the practical participation of the Orthodox believer in a dialogical 
manner of living and thinking, meeting with fellow citizens in self-reflection, 
interpersonal reconciliation, and a responsible attitude towards divine creation. According 
to the OAC director general, “the institution, consolidated in the Platonic tradition of 
Symphllosophein and in the universality and ecumenism of Orthodoxy, does not set 
limits, nor does it accept restrictions in that dialogue.” As an offering from the Orthodox 
Church to modern society, the academy remains open to all schools of thought and is 
accessible to everyone without discrimination.
1 Like the monastery of St. John on the island of Patmos, the Dodecanese, and Mount 
Athos, the Church of Crete remained independent from the autocephalous (independent) 
Church of Greece, and is under the auspices of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 
Constantinople.
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The Institute, which functions throughout year, has many areas of interest and activities. 
Listing them may help to provide a more specific context for the subsequent discussion of 
the OAC’s attitudes to questions pertinent to the subject of this thesis.
Conferences are organised on the local, national and international level, each 
lasting from 2-3 days up to three weeks, and amounting to 250-270 conference days per 
year. In the first 30 years of its existence (1968-1998) more than 1,400 such conferences 
were held, 20% of them dedicated to the dialogue between science, ecology, and 
development on the one hand, and religious ethics on the other. Of the first 1000 (until 
1988) 300 were local, 121 pan-Cretan, 137 pan-Hellenic, 310 bilateral (participants from 
Greece and one other country), and 132 international. At 346 conferences the subject 
matter was theological (ecclesiastical/inter-ecclesiastical/ecumenical), at 153 mixed 
(quasi-theological, quasi-socio-political), the remaining 501 were specialised.
Special programs for Christians of other confessions who wish to become familiar 
with Orthodoxy are coordinated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as well as co-operation 
in inter-cultural and inter-religious matters of peace, ecology and social problems.
A program for the awakening of parish consciousness encourages active participation 
of the laity in the life of the Church at local level and more generally. Part of this program 
is the formation and promotion of the Fellowship of Cretan Theologians, which aims at a 
more effective testimony to Orthodoxy in education and society.
There is promotion of women’s organisations and trying to motivate women to actively 
participate in Church and community life. Through active collaboration with women’s 
groups in Crete the OAC’s is working towards women’s integration and equal 
participation in the professional and social life of the community.
A broad agriculture and cattle-raising development program, includes intensive training 
of farmers, the establishment of co-operatives, as well as the study of specific problems 
and the introduction of new forms of agriculture. In this direction, the OAC, the local 
diocese and the monastery of Gonia have established the Centre for Agricultural 
Development in the village of Kolymvari. assist farmers in the application of new 
methods of cultivation, the improvement of animal feed, and all their development 
initiatives.
The OAC advances new forms of alternative tourism (based on a deeper reflection of
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development models) pursuing a higher quality of life in relation to the basic problems of 
social justice. The participants collaborate on a European and international level, and 
concern themselves with ameliorating North-South relations, special emphasis being 
given to third-world situations in their own society. Problems and perspectives in the 
relations between Greece and the EU are also discussed.
Seminars are held for Greek teachers living abroad, in co-operation with national 
services and other institutions. These programs include hosting children from the Greek 
diaspora, as well as supporting Greek workers abroad who wish to repatriate.
War-related problems are studies especially with respect to resolving crises in the Balkan 
and Mediterranean areas.
Critical consideration is given to Orthodoxy and other ideologies, proposals and 
challenges, and exchanges of views are arranged between conflicting groups through 
inter-party political participation.
The OAC organises international scientific conferences on the attitude of the 
Orthodox Church on developments in medicine, biology, genetics, physics and 
astronomy.
Education is the broadest area of OAC activities and includes a systematic higher- 
education program for adults. Co-operating with national and international high-school 
and university-student communities, the academy offers a variety of seminars for students 
and educators in several fields. It also organises specialised teachers’ conferences, as well 
as establishing a foundation for financially supporting students from rural areas and 
young workers.
In the framework of inter-Church communication activities undertaken by the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, the OAC hosts official theological debates. It co-operates with 
the World Council of Churches, the Conference of European Churches, and the 
Association of European Academies. It has also developed a special educational program 
entitled Living Orthodoxy, designed for non-Orthodox clergy who wish to become 
familiar with Orthodoxy.
The basic features and lifestyle of the Euro-Mediterranean Youth Centre (EYC) 
resemble those of a traditional Cretan village -  based on the principles of fellowship 
(koinonia) and creativity. The EYC exists to serve young people on the local, national
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and international ecumenical level.
The name “Euro-Mediterranean” is not exclusive; it merely shows that the main purpose 
of the centre is the problems, needs and challenges of young people in Greece, and her 
general Mediterranean environment. The EYC devotes itself to today’s young people in 
the Euro-Mediterranean region who, according to the EYC committee, are confronted 
with new forms of spiritual and cultural identity that often result in ideological 
disorientation and confusion, social antagonism, unemployment, and insecurity. Unless 
they are given effective help to find a deeper meaning in life, they may reach for the 
ephemeral solutions of consumerism, chauvinism, and other escape mechanisms.
A great many of the young people are aware of this and ready to participate in 
projects designed to encourage a new life-style of real communication and the creative 
realisation of individual talents and mutual learning. They are ready to work for 
reconciliation, peace, brotherhood, justice, and responsible co-operation to protect all life 
on the planet. The EYC makes it possibile for young people from different countries and 
cultural backgrounds to come together, to share, learn, confront problems together and 
look for suitable solutions. Specialised departments in the EYC focus on issues -  i.e. 
family counselling, the care of marginalised or exploited young people, young 
handicapped, etc.
During the first eight years of the EYC’s existence, approximately 8000 young 
people from over 40 countries have participated in its various activities.
The Institute of Theology and Ecology (1TE) was founded by a 1991 decision of 
the OAC Board, following a proposal by director-general Papaderos in response to a 
request from Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew calling on everbody to become aware of 
the world’s ecological problems. The Institute works in collaboration with the Church, 
universities in Greece and abroad, and international organisations with similar objectives. 
The mission of the institute has been mainly:
• The publication of texts of ecological interest (lectures, studies) that have already 
accumulated at the OAC.
• A compilation of texts of ecological interest from the Holy Scriptures. A modern 
Greek translation and commentaries will accompany the original text so as to
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make it more accessible to wider audiences, in particular students.
• Translation and publication of foreign theological and other texts with ecological 
content.
• Compilation of a comparative dictionary of theology and ecology. It will contain 
basic ecological terms, with analysis and comparison of their content as 
understood by the ancient Greek and the Orthodox tradition on the one hand, and 
modern science, technology, and political theory on the other. Such a dictionary is 
considered essential for the effective inter-scientific dialogue and the general 
study of ecological issues.
• Intensification of the ecological dialogue between theologians, technologists, 
economists, politicians and others, taking into account related inter-ecclesiastical 
and other initiatives and decisions (the ecumenical summits of Basel, Seoul, and 
Canberra, the World Council of Church’s program on Justice, Peace, and Integrity 
of Creation (JPIC), similar programs of the UN, etc.).
• The development in particular of an inter-Orthodox dialogue on ecological issues 
under the guidance of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
• The endeavour to establish and develop inter-faith ecological dialogues -  mainly 
between Christianity, Judaism and Islam -  on the complexity of ecological 
problems of the Mediterranean so as to draw up a joint ecological charter of the 
Mediterranean, listing basic ethical principles and mutual affirmations for long­
term co-operation toward the area's ecological protection.
• The teaching of ecological theory and practice, especially in the framework of the 
international-ecumenical activity of the Euro-Mediterranean Youth Centre.
Th is interlinking of theology and ecology mainly aims at encouraging Orthodox 
theologians to develop an interest in the protection of life in all its forms and of the 
natural environment generally, taking into account the relevant developments in science, 
technology, economics and politics.
It is also hoped that it will act as a creative challenge to scientists, technocrats, and 
politicians not to restrict themselves to a technocratic consideration of ecological 
problems but to look equally at the deeper ethical and spiritual dimensions -  especially as
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they affect the ecology of Crete and the broader Mediterranean region.
6.2 The OAC and Democratisation
Unlike other Orthodox organisations which define and justify their raison d ’etre 
in terms of restoring or protecting the true and exclusive message of religious life, the 
OAC’s founding principles are by definition opposed to entrenchment, favouring a more 
inclusive and outward-looking strategy. This makes it more difficult to identify 
ideological and structural boundaries, since the more obvious ones are mostly rejected. 
However, the outward-looking strategy of the OAC is reflected by the parameters through 
which its affinities with democratisation will be assessed.
Although decision-making in the OAC is mostly controlled by high-ranking, 
middle-aged, (and of course all-male) Orthodox clergy and elites from the local and 
international community, the extent to which the laity is involved in its activities is 
significantly higher than one would expect in a relatively fixed and hierarchical 
institution. Both in the OAC’s theological discourse and the multitude of its organised 
activities, a recurrent theme is the commitment to indiscriminate and popular 
participation. It seems more appropriate, therefore, to assess the concept of 
democratisation in relation to the inclusiveness of the opportunities provided for lay 
participation in the OAC’s organised activities, rather than by looking at a possible 
democratic deficit in terms of accessibility to the internal administration.
The OAC’s theological discourse makes frequent use of the key Orthodox term 
diakonia (service), which epitomises its approach to democratisation and the ground on 
which a variety of special programs are is based. As we have seen, these include such 
varied concerns as the emancipation of women, ecological awareness (ITE), the 
integration of refugees and immigrants, poverty, racism, war and many others -  diverse, 
but all concerned with social injustice. Let me clarify the active concept of diakonia 
before focussing on how such endeavours are realised and perceived by lay participants 
in the OAC.
The ancient Greek concept of diakonia means waiting at table and, in its extended
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sense, providing for the maintenance of life. This was originally considered a lowly 
activity, suitable only for slaves. However, when it became related to the polis (as the 
service a citizen owed his city-state, or of a statesman carrying out the task entrusted to 
him without discrimination), to the cosmos (in the sense of what human beings as 
microcosm, must do so as not to disturb the unity and harmony of the whole world, the 
macrocosm), or to God (the wise man as God’s servant, instrument, and witness), the 
term diakonia took on a broader meaning which soon appeared in early Christian writings 
and patristic literature. But diakonia in the sense of sacrificing oneself for the sake of 
another was still in its embryonic phase; to rule rather than to serve was still regarded as 
what best-befitted man. “How can a man who has to serve another possibly be happy?” 
asked the Sophists.
According to the OAC’s director, what Jesus seeks is rather a service of spirit, a 
service by which men are declared innocent, which surpasses in glory anything known in 
the past. Diakonia as a basic Christian concept, means love for one’s neighbour. It is 
itself the fruit of God’s love for humanity, which in Jesus Christ and his sacrifice has 
revealed the essence of the true deacon. In this universal love diakonia is neither simply a 
distribution of alms nor service in the other's welfare, though this too is frequently 
recommended in the New Testament as an expression of love. True diakonia is the very 
essence of Christian love in action, a genuine service to all the human needs, material, 
emotional, and spiritual.
It is in this sense that diakonia applies to the Christian community’s mission in the 
world. The OAC’s ordinance for democratisation through the participation of the people 
as “Christ did not judge and discriminate, he identified himself with the hungry, the 
thirsty, the stranger, the naked, the sick, the prisoner. ‘Listen, you nations, listen 
carefully, you Christians! It is not with his own voice that the Lord speaks but through the 
mouth of slaves’. ” "
An occasion in which such peoples' participation was most vividly demonstrated 
in the OAC’s struggle for democratisation was during the summer of 1981. Ten years 
earlier the Greek Archbishop Ieronymos, appointed by and closely associated with the
2 Basil the Great quoted in Papaderos 1978, p. 21
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junta and a leading member of the brotherhood Zoe, had violated the independent status 
of the Church of Crete and transferred Eirenaios, the too liberal and troublesome director 
of the OAC, to Germany. The dictators’ regime collapsed in 1974, and in 1981 the 
metropolitan seat of Kisamos and Selinon become vacant again.
Instead of Eirenaios, who was willing to return, the Cretan synod elected a less 
“radical” Bishop. This resulted in a strong wave of popular dissent, culminating in the 
occupation of the OAC, the headquarters of the diocese, and its several departments, by 
hundreds of villagers from the area. On 25 June Eirenaios’ supporters elected a “struggle 
committee” and appointed representative groups from all villages to prevent access to the 
OAC on a twenty-four hour basis. Two days later the committee suspended services to 
the OAC and evacuated all employees from the premises. Greek and German television 
channels broadcast the events.3 A German news reporter commented: “The despots, as 
the Greeks call their Bishops, did not take the people into account. The people want 
Eirenaios. Only Eirenaios can open this door. Today, on Saturday the 30th of August 
1981, in Kastelli, headquarters of the Bishop, there is agitation. Even in the Bishop’s 
home it’s the breath of conspiracy that’s blowing, not the Holy Spirit. People have come 
in trucks from villages all over the province, ready to fight the Church of the despots on 
behalf of the Church of the people. ”
The reporter then interviewed some of the demonstrators. They were adamant: 
“We want Eirenaios!”, and “Only Eirenaios is going to be Bishop here", and “All the 
people want him... no body else. The entire diocese wants him. He’s their father, their 
soul. He loves us. ... We all love him, he’s done so much good!”
Eventually, pressure from non-ordained clergy and efforts by the local authorities, 
combined with the sheer determination of the common people, succeeded in restoring 
Eirenaios to his position as metropolitan.
Another democratic feature through lay participation are the monastic- 
communitarian interactions of the academy's life. Regardless of whether one of the 
conference participants is the President of France (as was the case when Mitterand 
visited) or a lay farmer from a nearby village, all may sit at the same table and share the
3 The German television company gave the OAC a videotape of the events.
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same food. The conferences are designed in such a way that most of the time no scientific 
qualifications are needed to participate, so making them more accessible to lay people. A 
few examples will show how the OAC conferences promote democratisation, both in the 
choice of subject matter and in the way they are organised (i.e. by engaging and 
encouraging participation by ordinary people).
Of the approximately 700 conferences that took place between 23 Janury 1978 
and 4 August 1988, no less than fifty were directly or indirectly related to finding ways of 
increasing women’s participation in the economic and social life of the area. The OAC 
worked hard to ensure the practical implementation of conference resolutions by 
incorporating them in its projects. For example, in September 1980 the ministers of 
agriculture and foreign affairs came to the academy to address a congress on the 
introduction of a new, more productive species of olive tree. For thousands of years 
harvesting the olives was a particulary onerous task, undertaken mainly by women who 
were down on their knees in the winter rain, picking up the fruit. The question had been 
discussed at the regular meetings of Cretan women and the OAC, and eventually it was at 
the September 1980 congress that women, farmers, and politicians, reached a decision. 
Taking into account that the previous situation was against the dignity of women “who 
have the right to carry their heads as high as heroines of Crete”, the old olive trees were 
replaced by a new “emancipated” type that can be harvested by men and women standing 
upright.
There are many other such examples of OAC initiatives concerning the general 
population -  young people (EYC), the unemployed, foreign immigrants, the old, the poor 
and other underprivileged groups.
In the relationship of the OAC with other Christian denomination and religions, one of its 
founding principles is the promotion of inter-Church communication through the 
ecumenical endeavours of the Patriarchate, the World Council of Churches, and the 
Council of European Churches. For all that, things have not always gone smoothly. 
Papaderos, who considers the ecumenical movement a challenge second only to that of 
the godless governments in many countries today, compares it to a gadfly on the body of 
the Church, stinging, irritating and troubling it as Socrates once did the conscience of the
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ancient Athenians. The reasons why the ecumenical movement discomfits Orthodox 
conventional wisdom have to do with the sensitivity historically surrounding relations 
between Orthodox East and Latin West, and the fact that the political outlook of 
ecumenicism challenges certain vested interests of Greece’s religious, economic and 
political establishment.
The first point of friction is deeply rooted in the defensive nature of Orthodox 
nationalism, hardened in long historical experience. Since the crusades and then the 
Reformation, the meeting between Christian West and East have met mostly in the realm 
of proselytism, sometimes conducted by force or by exploiting the desperate conditions in 
which the Orthodox have found themselves since the fall of Constantinople in 1453. 
Given this historical background, the director-general explained, the process of 
reconciliation is, not surprisingly, sometimes undermined by those who view inter- 
Church communication and aid with suspicion and mistrust. The second point arises out 
of the first and concerns the political essence of inter-Church diakonia.
The OAC’s ecumenical projects usually entail direct political implications (e.g. 
the fight for a better quality of life for the poor, for immigrants, etc.), which may 
occasionally clash with politico-economic forces and vested interests that depend for their 
own legitimacy on the prolongation of asymmetrical social relations and a status quo of 
prejudice. Let us give a few examples by way of illustration.
Between 1971 and 1975, the OAC invited a group of Mennonites from Europe 
and the US to cooperate with the local diocese in the establishment of a centre for 
agricultural development.4 Due to the specificity of their religion, the Mennonites rely 
almost exclusively on farming for their subsistence needs and have developed very 
sophisticated techniques of cultivation. The visiting groups found that the land that was to 
be brought under cultivation seemed ideally suited to growing cucumbers and tomatoes 
under glass. However, the area was practically depopulated because the one means of
4 The Christian cult of the Mennonites reject the culture of industrial and technological 
development and follow a life-style that has remained unchanged since the 18th century. 
One of the OAC’s former scientific advisors devoted his Ph.D. thesis to relations between 
the Mennonites and the local population. See A. Vallianatos 1992.
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survival for the people there was to find work abroad. The OAC invited the few farmers 
still living in the area to an initial information seminar for which they chose the title 
‘‘Hope in the Desert”. A second seminar followed, then a third and many more, until the 
project had become a resounding success. Together with the European and American 
Mennonites and the local farmers, the academy formed a co-operative, hoping to 
persuade Cretans abroad to come home, now that there were jobs again and the chance to 
make a living. Many of them have done so.
The threefold orientation of the academy -  ecumenicalism, ecology, development 
-  met with considerable opposition from elites, wholesalers and even the middlemen who 
pocketed the bulk of the profits. This was the time of the military dictatorship in Greece, 
when any collective effort was regarded with suspicion as a possible communist plot. The 
wholesalers joined forces with a few junta sympathisers among the local clergy, and 
circulated a memorandum that charged the OAC’s co-operative with being crypto­
communist, and their collaboration with Mennonites as anti-Orthodox and heretical.3 The 
charges were eventually dropped, mainly as a result of the co-operative’s enormous 
economic success and its popularity among the vast majority of the Cretans, as well as 
due to the fact that most of the alleged communists were US citizens.6
At the inter-Orthodox level, the OAC hosted numerous meetings and contributed 
to the general improvement of relationships among Orthodoxy world-wide, as well as 
between Orthodoxy and other religions. At the meetings of the Orthodox Task Force (in 
Crete, Nov. 1978), and Just Development for Fullness of Life: An Orthodox approach (in 
Kiev, 1982), the OAC representatives put forward a new concept of macro-diakonia 
(service to societies and their structures) and micro-diakonia (service by and to individual 
members) as a prolongation of the communion service, or as “a liturgy after the liturgy”.
3 The close relations between the archbishop of Athens and the junta allowed such
accusations to take firm hold.
6 If the Mennonites were communist sympathisers, the CIA (which incidentally 
controlled the colonels in Athens), would not have allowed them be there in the first 
place. Once they had received permission, however, the heresy charge could do very little 
to send them away.
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This new form of service is seen as part of the Church’s influence on all aspects of 
society, social, economic, cultural, and political. “The Churches have a special God-given 
duty to work for the realisation of justice and peace, for the development of peoples and 
nations, and should be ready to defend human rights and condemn their violation.”7
Moreover, such involvement challenges, at least in part, Huntington’s 
increasingly cited civilisation paradigm which relegates the Orthodox political culture to 
the non-democratic civilisation fault line, mainly as a result of its absence from civil- 
society politics. It may be argued, of course, that the OAC, like the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate’s outward-looking cultural logic, is an exception to the rule among the 
Orthodox Churches, with no significant resonance in the wider Orthodox context.
Concerning relations between the OAC and the official Church of Greece, the 
academy’s strongest allegiances are with the Church of Crete, which includes five 
dioceses with their five Bishops. Interviewed by the author, director Papaderos said that 
the best relationships are with the Bishops of Chania and Heraklion, both of whom are 
OAC members. He also admitted that the two dioceses of Rethimno and Agios Nicolaos 
keep well away from the work of the academy, identifying more with the Archbishop of 
Athens and All Greece. Although none of the academy’s members expressed any direct 
criticism with the Athens hierarchy, the OAC's overall practice and ideology stand as an
indirect indictment of Church-State interpenetration, particularly since this prevents the
• • • 8Church from performing its democratic duties in civil society.
With the Neo-Orthodox movement the OAC has had regular contacts, especially 
in the early 1980s when two conferences were held to examine the relationship between 
Marxism and Orthodoxy. The OAC president Bishop Eirenaios described them as a 
positive exchange of ideas with Greek intellectuals, and part of the academy's effort to 
“merge faith and gnosis”.9
7 Vallianatos 1992, p. 102.
o
In my interview with the OAC scientific advisor Zorbas, I was told not to expect open 
criticism of the official Church ideology, since that might allow certain people to label 
OAC members as radical, heretics, or anti-Orthodox. Interview of 22 Jan. 1998.
} Interview 24 Jan. 1998.
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Later in the 1980s and during the 1990s, this communication was discontinued, 
largely as a result of the Neo-Orthodox shift of emphasis towards a more nationalistic 
interpretation of Orthodoxy. The OAC has had virtually no contact with the brotherhood 
Zoe or any other fundamentalist group in Greece, chiefly because of their close liaison 
with the junta regime.
Finally, under the auspices of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the OAC organised 
two conferences on its premises, devoted to dialogue with Islam. The participants from 
both religions found it a very fruitful experience in terms of getting to know each other 
and breaking down the walls of prejudice and misunderstanding, but a more substantial 
mutual diakonia has not been possible because of the hidebound political strategy of the 
governments of both Greece and Turkey.
In addition to these intra-faith instrances of working towards democratisation, the 
OAC is also arranging activities beyond religion, by making special efforts to bring about 
a more responsible and pluralistic presence of Orthodoxy in the social fields of ecology, 
science, the arts, and development.
Its Institute of Theology and Ecology (ITE) has consistently tried to find specific 
ways to increase people’s awareness of the issues of ecology and peace. Its approach is 
interdisciplinary and ecumenical, because it believes that only through rapprochement of 
different areas of attention on a cross-cultural/ecumenical basis can there be a holistic and 
effective solution to both the ethical/spiritual and the technological/scientific dimensions 
of the problems in question.10
The late Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios (who was succeeded by Bartholomew in 
1991), in a message on 1 September 1989 drew attention to the serious problem of the 
protection of the natural environment. He asked that every year the first day of September 
-  already the start of the ecclesiastical calendar -  be the day on which the Orthodox 
Church offers prayers for the protection of the environment. Two years later, in 
November 1991, the Patriarchate organised a pan-Orthodox conference on the
The ITE was the academy’s response to certain pioneering initiatives by the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate to show that Orthodoxy cannot ignore ecological problems.
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environment at the OAC. Apart from Bishops, theologians and environmentalists, the 
conference was also attended by various influential personalities including Prince Philip 
the Duke of Edinburgh, who delivered the opening address.
This was followed by two other major ecological symposia, one on the island of 
Patmos (1995) to commemorate the 1900th anniversary of St. John’s Book of 
Revelations11 and one on a ship travelling around the Black Sea (1997).12 Both symposia 
attracted the participation of widely acclaimed scientists, environmentalists and 
theologians, all over the world, and were attended by leading members of the 
international community (e.g. Prime Ministers, Presidents of Republics, EU 
Commissioners, etc.).
Parallel with the worldwide reach of these symposia, much more localised and 
practical activities by the OAC combined Orthodox ethics with ecology, science, 
pacifism, the arts, and development. Apart from the awareness campaign undertaken by 
the ITE (mentioned earlier in this chapter), specific problems were tackled through the 
OAC's co-operatives at the Centre for Agricultural Development. For example, the small 
Cretan sheep were cross-bred with larger sheep from northern Europe in order to obtain a 
new type that is better adapted to the climate of the island, and which provides more 
milk, meat and wool than the indigenous breed. In another venture, Holstein cows were 
brought to Crete and fed not only on hay and straw (relatively scarce) but also on leaves 
from olive trees. Meanwhile products from the model farm are either sold through the co­
operative all over Crete, Greece, and Europe, or they furnish the tables of the OAC, the 
EYC, and other episcopal establishments. According to German television, the OAC is 
comparable to Protestant and Catholic academies in Germany and elsewhere in terms of 
what subjects it concerns itself with and the manner of it doing so, but also quite 
different. As stated in its by-laws and the way it “serves”, the OAC’s micro-diakonia
11 The proceedings of the symposium were published by the “Patmos Circle”, a small but 
quite powerful and effective NGO in support of the Patriarchate.
12 The title of the second symposium was “Religion, Science, and the Environment: The 
Black Sea in Crisis.
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consists of a specifically Christian-Orthodox education of priests and ordinary people in 
the framework of patristic spirituality, so they can bear living witness to the Gospel in the 
modern world.13
On its 44 acres of land, thousands of young people from more than forty countries 
have come and gone to work and train in a variety of craft workshops, while living two 
central Orthodox concepts: fellowship and creativity. According to the head of the EYC, 
the guiding principle is to provide space and motivation for inter-faith and inter-cultural 
learning, and for the exercise of tolerance and mutual respect.
To much the same end the OAC has associated itself with the cause of 
demilitarisation and hosted the 44th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs in 
June-July 1994, with the theme “Towards a War-free World”.14 The conference was 
attended by 139 natural scientists, social scientistsm, and public figures from 43 
countries, as well as 25 members of student/Young Pugwash groups, and received papers 
to be read from then-UN secretary-general Boutros Ghalli, Greek Prime Minister Andreas 
Papandreou, and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. The OAC director in his own 
address described the academy’s objectives as parallel to those of Pugwash.
In this framework, the OAC also organised a specialist conference on Bioethics 
(Oct-Nov. 1997), to examine how advances in biomedical methodology have created 
bioethical dilemmas. The speakers were theologians, biologists, doctors, jurists, and 
sociologists, and special emphasis was placed on the Orthodox attitude to the human 
body.
A major interest of the OAC is the relationship between political ideologies and 
religion, as well as among one ideology and another. Many of its conferences focus on a 
critical consideration of ideological proposals and challenges, as well as on the 
facilitation of social dialogue between conflicting groups through inter-political
13 Information based on a videotaped German television documentary and a Greek 
translation of the German text.
14 Pugwash is a Nobel prize-winning scientific organisation devoted to the struggle 
against proliferation of nuclear weapons and the promotion of the ideals of pacifism.
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participation. This pre-supposes a position of neutrality towards all the forces of the 
political/ideological spectrum which, combined with the OAC’s active commitment and 
involvement in existing socio-political problems, becomes an extremely difficult and 
sometimes even dangerous task. In effect, the academy’s commitment to social diakonia 
implies a rejection of a particular type of neutrality which, though it seems to be above 
parties, in fact is essentially partisan since it "allows the status quo to appear to be just as 
legitimate as the emancipatory basis of Christian commitment.”15
According to Papaderos, “thanks to the social and political commitment of the 
World Council of Churches, and the theology developed as a result of wrestling with this 
commitment, many of us have come to see that Jesus’ message was a clear rejection of 
the status quo and is directed to all human beings who are ‘poor’ or who have nothing 
and are nothing”.16
An example will follow of how the OAC’s political commitment to social 
liberation both encourages social dissatisfaction with those higher up on the social scale, 
and at the same time implicates the academy in a dangerous political game vis-a-vis the 
status quo. During the junta years, one of the OAC projects concerned the marketing 
system for citrus fruit. About 6000 families in Western Crete live mainly on the proceeds 
from growing the region’s famous oranges. Both the farmers and the OAC were well 
aware of the fact that the market was controlled by wholesalers and middlemen who kept 
most of the profits for themselves, leaving the orange growers barely able to provide for 
their families.
When the academy begun to discuss a co-operative marketing system with the 
farmers and organised a public vote in a number of villages to decide the matter, the 
colonels’ government and the wholesalers unanimously condemned this action as un- 
Christian and crypto-communist. Several priests expressed doubts as to whether this kind 
of involvement was really Christian at all and, in the absence of American Mennonites to 
make nonsense of the charge of crypto-communism, the project had to be abandoned. It 
was as a result of this kind of political antagonism between the OAC and the dictatorship
13 Papaderos 1980, p. 90.
16 Ibid.,
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that the President of the Academy and Bishop of the area was transferred to Germany.
Following the return to democracy in 1974, the OAC established communication 
with all parliamentary parties and organised regular meetings with party representatives 
in order to seek common solutions to the area's problems. In particular, the late Andreas 
Papandreou, founder of PASOK, and ND’s honorary president and former Prime Minister 
Mitsotakis, were regular contributors to OAC conferences. With respect to the political 
Left, the academy initiated a constructive dialogue between Orthodoxy and Marxism, in 
which the stereotypes of Christian anti-communism and Marxist atheism were challenged
17in the context of Neo-Orthodoxy.
6.3 OAC and Secularisation
The conflict between Church and State surrounding NS1700 on church property 
was essentially a bitter political dispute over the consequences of secularisation for 
Greece’s national identity and political culture.
A crucial point that sets the OAC apart from the Church-State conflict is not that 
it avoids the issue of secularisation -  which in fact occupies a central position in the 
academy’s problematic -  but rather that the OAC is relatively autonomous from both 
Church and State. It is instructive, therefore, to furnish not only the OAC’s views on the 
secularisation debate, but especially to examine its position with regard to the political 
games of Church-State interpenetration. In doing so it should be remembered that, by not 
being economically and administratively dependent on either of the two institutions, 
OAC was able to adopt a much more moderate and objective position.18
This independence is in sharp contrast to the academy’s position on questions that 
could challenge the Church-nation connection. Whereas for example the OAC is mildly 
critical of Church-State interpenetration inasmuch as it creates a democratic deficit in the 
Church’s administrative structure, it is very much more so about the implementation of 
secularisation policies in education which might challenge the Church-nation connection
17 The minutes of these meetings were published in book form. See Makris 1983.
18 The OAC receives no financial support from the State and it is affiliated with the 
Church of Crete, which enjoys autocephalous status.
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(i.e. the tradition that quintessentially Orthodoxy equates with the Greek national 
identity).
This is reflected in the views expressed by the OAC’s monthly information 
bulletin Dialogues o f Reconciliation (Dialogoi katalagis). The publication gave extensive 
coverage to the crisis of 1987, and an editorial in each issue stated the academy’s views. 
The editor, who said nobody who was familier with the real issues at stake and with the 
people involved was surprised by the conflict, then argued that it could be solved 
creatively only if the two sides committed themselves to a responsible and honest 
dialogue instead of seeking superficial arrangements and political deals (between 
Archbishop Serapheim and Prime Minister Papandreou). “There is no doubt that the crisis 
came as a result of accumulated ecclesiastical problems that had remained unresolved for 
decades. Vested interests in both institutions are responsible for the creation, 
prolongation, and accumulation of those problems, as well as a deep and extensive 
estrangement and alienation from our traditional and familiar institutions and way of life. 
This has resulted in a deep crisis in our national consciousness.”
By shifting the emphasis to the Church-nation connection, be clearly suggests 
that, apart from problems related to the Church associating with the ideological- 
economic-political projects of the State (which Church-State separation would 
presumably end), the Church’s role in the people’s national consciousness and in “the 
fundamental institutions of this country” should be undisputed and inviolate. This implies 
that Church-State separation is not in fact feasible because historically the Greek people’s 
national consciousness owes too much to the Church.
Reverting to his criticism of Church-State interpenetration, the editor urged the 
Church hierarchy to comply with the constitutional legislation, since failure to do so 
would be perceived by the public as a deliberate attempt to defy, not simply Law 1700, 
but the democratic process itself. Equally unacceptable to the State would be the 
enforcement of an obscurantist and outdated system of control over the Church’s internal 
structure and administration. Invoking the decisions reached by the Cretan synod on the 
crisis, the editorial said this was “on the right track” and that its decisions reflect the 
views of “thinking Christians”. The synod text echoed the academy’s contention that
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there are limits to secularisation. The OAC considered it misguided to reduce “this 
revolutionary opportunity for dialogue” to a legalistic debate about constitutional rights 
and political advantages. The integrity of the Church relies primarily on the “spiritual 
constitution” that is offered by the Holy Bible. This, the editor argued, is the highest 
criterion and reference that could “protect the leadership of the Church and the faithful 
against the highly attractive temptation to succumb to a completely secular set of criteria 
and motivations”.
The editorial concludes with two propositions: “Our Church, clergy and people, 
are called upon to reassemble their forces, not to fight a ‘battle of the giants’ with the 
State that is struggling to entrench its power and authority, but rather to revitalise the 
contemporary message of Orthodox spirituality and diakonia, which presupposes the 
modernisation of structures, methods, convictions, and mentalities in accordance with the 
only legitimate authority of the Church, Jesus Christ; and that the State should be obliged 
to rethink its own responsibility for the distressing state of our ecclesiastical affairs. We 
should dissociate ourselves from the sterile, legalistic way of dealing with the national 
and cultural identity of our people and ask: Where is secularisation to end? How far can 
they push the secularisation process of our ecclesiastical life without serious 
consequences to the life of the people and the future of the country?”19
6.4 The OAC and European Integration
The position of the OAC towards European integration -  as that towards 
secularisation- again owes much to the academy’s relative autonomy from the position 
that informs the State-nation-Church interconnection. Affiliated with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate, the WCC and the local diocese, the OAC has been able to embrace an 
outward-looking strategy and a pluralistic logic on such issues as EU integration, foreign 
immigration, and the national issues. This does not mean that it openly opposes either the 
State or the Church approach to the above subject. It rather endorses a moderate version 
of the Church-nation liaison and clearly acknowledges the pivotal role of Orthodoxy in 
the survival of Hellenism through the centuries. On a more tactical note, however, the
19 Dialogues of Reconciliation, pp, 33-34, April 1987.
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OAC is well aware of the fact that an overtly iconoclastic strategy and a complete failure 
to comply with the official, “national” line, would have serious repercussions and might 
result in the Academy’s marginalisation.
The comments and suggestions of its members, therefore, range from complete 
endorsement of the official political strategy (e.g. on the Cyprus question) to an indirect 
criticism of its implications for the political culture (e.g. re nationalism, populism, and 
racism). Overall, unlike the OAC’s direct involvement and active participation in other 
civil-society fields its strategy concerning the so-called national issues is on a more 
theoretical note.
While Huntington has pointed to a modern clash of civilisations as inevitable, the 
Ecumenical Patriarch as the spiritual patron of the OAC and a member, has invited 
representatives of many of those civilisations to a conference on peace and tolerance.20 
His opening address reflects very well also the academy’s line of reasoning. With respect 
to nationalism he noted that it “began as a positive force - it offered a new logic for the 
construction of democratic states. But it turned out to be ... the most destructive force in 
human history, killing 75 million human beings between 1914 and 1945 alone. We must 
ask ourselves boldly and honestly: Is it not time to rein in the excesses of nationalism?" 
At the time of this statement the war in Bosnia was in full swing.
On the role of the clergy the Patriarch said: “We are not immune to the forces of 
history but neither are we helpless before them. We must answer the fratricide and 
fragmentation of nationalism with the brotherly love and integration of ecumenicism. We 
must teach our people a tolerance that is ultimately based on respect for the sanctity and 
rights of individual human beings. Indeed, if there is one place where the spiritual and 
secular universes converge, it is in the individual, in the human person. We as people of 
faith have something to teach our secular colleagues: culture may be relative, but 
humanity is not. The modern way to bring about unity and peace is to extend the 
European Union, to open our borders to one another, and let people, capital, ideas and
20 The global importance of this conference (in Istanbul, in Feb. 1994) can be seen in the 
messages of support from US president Clinton and Turkish president Demirel, as well as 
the secretary general of the UN.
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products flow. Much has already been achieved in the political world, but politicians 
alone cannot heal the rifts brought about by extreme nationalism. Religious leaders have 
a central and inspirational role to play; it is we who must help bring the spiritual 
principles of ecumenicalism, brotherhood and tolerance to the fore. Indeed, this is a way 
that we of the cloth can help our colleagues in government. Our deep and abiding 
spirituality stands in stark contrast to the secularism of modern politics. The shortcomings 
of anthropocentric ideologies has left a void in peoples lives; the frantic pursuit of the 
future has sacrificed the stability of the past."
The first occasion in the history of the Church when a synod was convened with 
nationalism/racism as the sole item on the agenda was as early as 1872 when the Great 
Synod of Constantinople officially condemned nationalism as a heresy and cause of 
schism.21 Of course, one can point to specific geopolitical and tactical reasons from both 
the past and present for the Patriarchate’s cosmopolitan outlook.'"' Regardless of the 
historical details responsible for that condemnation, the decision is of particular interest 
for our study because in stark contrast to the State Orthodoxy of the Church of Greece, 
the OAC has a solid and legitimate theological, ecclesiastical and legal basis on which it 
could have safely and effectively answered the nationalistic interpretation of Greek 
Orthodoxy. It is true, of course, that the decisions of synods as well as the OAC’s 
functions in civil-society are bound to remain largely ineffective unless they touch the 
overall secular context and directly affect matters concerning the lives of peoples and 
nations. As the OAC director-general said, if these are to be vital forces for effecting 
major structural changes they must be appropriate to each circumstance"."
To this end, and while taking into account certain restrictions due to political
T 1" The concept which the synod used to describe this phenomenon was ethnophyletismos, 
a term which includes both nationalism and racism.
" See chapter 1, Historical Background, on patriarchal opposition to Greeks and others 
who declared independent Churches and so stripped the Patriarchate of most of its power. 
Besides, since the Patriarch is a Turkish citizen and operates on Turkish soil this clearly 
rules out a more Greek-nationalistic approach.
2j Papaderos 1978, p.36.
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sensitivity, the academy has hosted numerous conferences on how to meet the evils of 
nationalism and racism. At the pan-Orthodox conference of 1978, the agenda included 
the following item: “The contribution of the local Orthodox Churches to the 
implementation of the Christian ideals of peace, freedom, fellowship and love among the 
peoples of the world, and to the elimination of racial discrimination.” In February 1986 
the inter-Orthodox preparatory commission dealt with the subject in depth, and prepared 
a paper in which, citing Biblical and patristic anthropology, it stated: “The Orthodox 
Church does not accept racial differences ... proclaiming the pressing need for total 
removal of discrimination and for ... combating all discrimination that is to the 
disadvantage of various minorities.” The paper stresses that “appeals for solidarity among 
the peoples and for mutual fellowship remain empty words as long as hunger and 
absolute poverty destroy the dignity and sanctity of the human person, [while] the 
economically well-developed Christian world administers and distributes material goods 
unjustly, often even criminally, and so affronts not only God’s image in all human beings, 
but God himself who has identified himself with them.”
Recognising the extent of the OAC’s efforts to promote tolerance and European 
integration without discrimination, the Greek Association of the United Nations has 
issued a Cretan Declaration on Peace and Life (March, 1992). Together with 
representatives from the OAC, the Churches of Cyprus, Germany, England and Australia, 
the association appealed among other things for “justice in the relations between East and 
West, especially after the rearrangement of large parts of Europe; and at the same time 
justice in the relations between North and South; and justice for the countless numbers of 
refugees and populations who have been uprooted from their ancestral land by poverty, 
injustice, violence and fear. We firmly believe that for the construction of the house of 
Europe, which we all envision and wish for, every ‘stone’, old and new, must find its 
proper place. If it remains based on these foundations and is built with the best that each 
one can provide, the house of Europe will be secure and spacious, and its people will be 
able to maintain their inner spiritual unity, without endangering their rich 
distinctiveness.”
Our last example of conferences at the OAC for peace is “Peregrine Europe”, a 
five-day international conference (March 1998) on migrants and refugees sponsored by
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the EU program Giving a Soul to Europe. The problem it examined was the fact that, 
although EU member-states are legally obliged to protect the basic rights of all the 
peoples in their territory, in many instances they have not done so -  especially when 
refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers are concerned. The broader meaning of European 
citizenship will be badly damaged and could even be lost if the tradition of Europe as a 
refuge for foreigners in need should be weakened. When the OAC was organising the 
conference it was in the hope that the participants would come to share the academy’s 
belief “that beyond the necessary legislative and other measures, the first requirement is 
a philanthropic spirit.”
The widely tolerant position of the OAC, must not however, be confused with 
syncretism or an acceptance of globalisation. Its director rejected both a discourse of 
cultural imperialism and the isolationism/entrenchment that born out of fear of cultural 
syncretism: “The whole world is exposed to a strong tendency towards cultural 
uniformity and appears to be moving in the direction of the so-called ‘great society’ 
which will undoubtedly be accompanied by serious cultural impoverishment. The initial 
phase of this process coincided with western colonial and cultural expansion, 
accompanied step by step by the western Church missions. Inspired by the dream of 
westernising the world, the deliberate intention was to spread the western pattern of 
civilisation and ideals of life.”24
Papaderos instead advocated a more realistic approach based on political 
pragmatism and Orthodox humanism. “[The point] that is important here is typically 
‘western’: to escape from underdevelopment, the semi-peripheral nations must take a 
definite path, and this path involves the adoption of quite specific ideals, behaviour 
patterns, and methods -  such as individual success, social advancement, material 
prosperity, an achievement-oriented educational system, expansion of levels and patterns 
of consumption, and so on.”23
With respect to the imperative nature of the aforementioned ‘ideals’, he 
emphasised the need for modernising Orthodox institutions to enable them to present a
24 Ibid., p.37.
25 Ibid., p.38.
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meaningful alternative to the spiritual impoverishment and alienation that accompanies 
the culture of industrialisation, competition, rationalism, and individualism: “Politicians, 
technocrats and development strategists are quite uninhibited. They are undeterred by the 
inevitable human cost of such progress, by the destruction of traditional rhythms of life, 
expensive social structures, overstrain, the rat-race mentality, restlessness, insecurity, 
loneliness, subordination of all aspects of life to centres of power that are barely visible 
let alone amenable to control -  in short, by the loss of the meaning of life. The threat is so 
radical that it calls for an equally radical change on our part if the Church is not to be 
pushed to the sidelines of history
6.5 The Theological Dimension
The OAC’s commitment to social action rests on elaborate theological premises. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the most recurrent concepts are those of diakonia 
(service) and katalagl (reconciliation): "Faith in Christ without diakonia loses its 
meaning... All other efforts to see Christ as a real presence, without coming into contact 
with the needy, is pure theory.”27
According to the academy’s spokesman G. Lemopoulos, this missionary 
relationship with the needy, is an indispensable expression of Christian fellowship, a 
liturgy after the liturgy that could lead to the revitalisation of the testimony of each local 
Orthodox Church. It could mean the discovery of new forms of evangelism and testimony 
in missions to pluralistic societies, the diaspora, socialist contexts, developing Churches. 
This could be a starting point for deepening questions about the relationship between 
Church and society, Church and culture, faith and secularisation, and for more missionary 
initiatives like those of the OAC.
Always basing itself on the Gospels, the academy proclaims its commitment to 
social justice and liberation in theologically emphatic terms. This may be seen not only as 
a veneration of Orthodox theology, but also perhaps as a safeguard against interest groups 
that in the past have accused the OAC of adopting anti-Orthodox and even heretical
26 Ibid., p.39.
27 Maximos the Confessor PE 91 655, in Lemopoulos 1987.
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positions and practices. This Christological consideration is evidenced in the way certain 
passages from the Bible have been rationalised in the context of the academy’s views
 ^Rtowards ecological awareness," and of its denunciation of racial discrimination: 
“Orthodoxy utterly condemns the inhuman system of racial discrimination and the 
sacrilegious affirmation that is in harmony with Christian ideals. To the question, ‘And 
who is my neighbour?’ Christ replied with the parable of the Good Samaritan. Thus he 
taught us to abolish every dividing wall of hate and prejudice.... Every community should 
be free to develop its talents. Pluralism should be a rule in the life of every country. The 
unity of a nation, a country, or a state should be understood as encompassing the right for 
human communities to be different.”"
OAC director-general Papaderos describes the OAC’s formative principle as the 
‘liturgical principle’: “It expresses the quintessence of the Orthodox awareness of itself, 
of humanity, and the world. I realise, of course, that when isolated from the total context, 
such a concept can be misleading and even degenerate into a mere cliche and the 
fashionable use of certain words (e.g. ‘eucharist’, ‘spirituality’). But I believe we can use 
the term ‘liturgical’ to show why and in what sense every Christian diakonia to the world, 
to culture, to politics, to human beings, must be a liturgical diakonia.”30
By the term liturgy Papaderos does not simply mean a form of public worship or 
the collection of formularies for its conduct, but a distinct life-style which while rooted in 
the holy-communion service of the Church, also embraces a person’s entire life, being ‘a 
liturgy after the liturgy’. He relates the academy’s approach to the Church Fathers, saying 
that liturgy means bringing heaven to earth, as St John Chrysostom described after 
hearing the angels’ heavenly choir in the very midst of the things of time. In the liturgical 
life-style “the Christian experiences in a very special way his or her personal participation 
in the koinonia, the fellowship of Christ. He knows that he is not to order his life around 
some ‘law’ or to carry out certain ‘commandments’, but to rise to a new way of living, in
-) o
" The OAC’s interpretation of the Bible in a way that emphasises ecological awareness is 
available in the academy’s Institute of Theology and Ecology.
29 Lemopoulos 1987, p.369.
J° Papaderos 1978, p. 22.
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Christ... to be crucified with Christ (Gal. 2:19). to be raised and up and made alive by him 
(Eph. 2:6), to put on Christ like a garment (Gal. 3:27), to share as a child of God in the 
inheritance of God (Eph. 1:5, Rom. 8:15. Eph. 1:14, Pet. 1:4). He knows that he is 
embodied in a worldwide fellowship.”31
The OAC’s theological commentary puts forward a specifically Orthodox 
understanding of that fellowship without this affecting its ecumenical orientation. In the 
Orthodox liturgy after the liturgy “the Christian learns that she or he does not stand in the 
presence of God as an individual, concerned only with his or her own justification 
(Augustinian-Reformation anguish of mind). On the contrary, he/she stands as a person 
(prosopon) who exists in loving interpersonal communion with fellow human beings and 
therefore with God.”32 In functionalist terms, it is clear how the OAC adopted ancient 
forms and patterns of social life and filled them with new meaning in order to meet 
various needs and new social structures. The main characteristic of this rationalistic 
process is a solidarity in practical service which, despite the corrosive effects of 
secularisation and individualism, is perceived by the academy as a persistent feature of 
Orthodox social life that should be enhanced by a distinctively modern spiritual approach. 
The ancient Church, says Papaderos, and even monasticism, promoted a rich variety of 
forms and patterns of solidarity, whereby social as well as purely economic concerns 
could be satisfied in brotherly mutuality, often in surprisingly modern ways. In the 
Byzantine and post-Byzantine period of Ottoman occupation, “our people developed this 
coenobitic tradition further with remarkable success. Think of how even the modern co­
operatives, so important for economic and social development generally, in many places 
originated and found their inspiration and creative power in precisely this coenobitic 
spirit and can still find it today, as a number of contemporary examples here in Crete can 
demonstrate.’03
For the OAC, the commitment to social justice and liberation is best illustrated by 
the Church Fathers. Papaderos argues that the first lesson we must learn from them lies in
31 Ibid. p. 25.
32 Ibid, p. 26.
33 Ibid, p. 27.
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the very way their texts were written, “simply, directly, without high-flown rhetorical 
language.”34
Then all of us should emulate the Church Fathers’ sense of diakonia. “They sided 
uncompromisingly with the hungry, the persecuted, the debtors, the oppressed, the 
deprived. They were not preoccupied with Church privileges, its stability, its good 
relations with the economic and political powers, not even with their own lives, which 
exposed most of them to persecution, martyrdom and death. A Church which is no longer 
willing to risk anything has perhaps already lost everything.”33
The OAC also directly addresses the core of the rationalisation problematic that 
has for centuries polarised the Christian East and West with two opposing views on the 
mission of the Church -  apophatic spirituality versus rational pragmatism. For the OAC 
the dilemma of contemplation versus commitment is a pseudo-dilemma: “To a false 
question no correct answer can be given.”36 Papaderos clearly rejects the stereotypical 
view that Orthodoxy emphasises mysticism at the expense of missionary activity: “There 
is an over-readiness on the part of some to leave the theory, the contemplation, to us of 
the Orthodox persuasion, not without complicity on our part, and an equal readiness to 
corner ‘action’ for themselves.” He distinguishes between the ascetic-mystical values of 
Christian monasticism that are necessary for separating secular from everyday reality and 
obtaining a higher level of spirituality through contemplation, and the principles 
regarding the life of the Church as a whole, but recognises that “many of us make the 
mistake of turning such [monastic] recommendations into general principles.”37
This does not mean that the OAC director subscribes to either position. His 
intention is to establish a “communicative bridge” between the monastic/ascetic life and 
the much more worldly vocation of the Church’s overall mission: “It cannot be said that 
this [contemplative] spirit is completely irrelevant to the solution of our problems. But on 
the other hand the cry of the hungry, the sick, the enslaved, the political refugees, the
34 Ibid. p. 28.
35 Ibid. p. 29.
36 Ibid. p. 33.
37 Ibid. p. 30.
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disillusioned, the desperate of this earth gets louder and louder. Can the Orthodox Church 
ignore this cry, in the name of God? Is this a true dilemma or only an apparent one? Do 
we really have to choose between these two alternatives? When we Orthodox employ a 
Trinitarian terminology and speak of the mysteries of prayer, we often give the 
impression that we are irresponsibly turning our backs on the world, shutting our eyes 
and ears to it. Many of us when confronted with concrete tasks too easily take refuge in 
the twilight areas of mysticism and seek support for this in the monastic principles of 
apophatism, ignoring the testimonies of the opposing sense, also drawn from the ascetic
■j o
life.’' Although he does not specifically mention it, the OAC director presumably here 
refers to, among other examples, the harmonious relationship between the ancient 
Monastery of Gonia and the academy, who have been working hand in hand in a 
Christian diakonia that is committed equally to spirituality and to action.
6.6 Biographical and Autobiographical Notes on Three Orthodox Leaders
Through personal narrative and biographical information this last sub-chapter 
gives an outline of three key personalities of the OAC whose life histories epitomise the 
academy’s approach to Orthodoxy and modernisation.
Alexandros Papaderos, director-general o f the OAC (1968- ), was born in Crete 
in 1933. As a ten-year old boy he witnessed the destruction of his village by the German 
occupation forces, and was captured and imprisoned for two years. In 1952 he graduated 
from the Ecclesiastical School of Crete and then studied theology at the Aristotelian 
University of Thessaloniki (1952-56). In 1958 he was awarded a scholarship by the 
World Council of Churches and pursued post-graduate studies in the Theological School 
of the German University of Mainz (1958-64). The subject of his Ph.D. thesis was the 
intellectual debate between the Greek Enlightenment and Orthodoxy in the works of 
KoraVs and Oikonomos.39
Throughout his studies, Papaderos participated in numerous missionary activities
38 Ibid, p. 30.
For details on this see chapter 1.
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and developed strong ties with the WCC and the ecumenical movement. In 1965, he was 
appointed special advisor to the Pedagogics Institute of Greece, which is part of the 
culture ministry. In 1967 the junta suspended his duties there and he went back to Crete 
where he worked with his local diocese on setting up the OAC. In 1974 the new 
democratic regime appointed him to the post of special advisor for ecclesiastical affairs, a 
position he held uninterruptedly until his resignation in 1984.
We shall now draw on Papaderos’ own account of certain formative experiences 
in his life, that are particularly pertinent to this study. The first one illustrates his early 
commitment to the values of ecumenicalism and diakonia.
“The day in October 1956 when I heard I had passed my final exam at the 
University of Thessaloniki was a red-letter day. What better excuse for a party! Some of 
my fellow students and I were enjoying ourselves thoroughly when another student 
suddenly burst into the middle of the fun shouting, “Buddha wants you! Hurry!” 
‘Buddha’ was the nickname for our elderly professor of the history of religions who only 
a short time before had been congratulating me warmly on my final results. He had even 
awarded me a distinction. Somewhat surprised I went to his study, where I found a 
nervous group of fellow students, general agitation and a stern-faced ‘Buddha' with 
nothing of nirvana about him. He was in a rage and shouted at me: ‘you’ve failed my 
exam and you’ll never pass it. Get out of my sight!”'
“What had happened? After two years it had belatedly come to the ears of our 
normally good-humoured professor that some of his students were working with 
Protestants, distributing clothing, food, medicine etc. to various parishes in the town. In 
his view this could mean only one thing: surreptitious infiltration, prosyletism of his own 
theological students, no less. For him it seemed that the hour of the Antichrist had come. 
When he questioned the other students about ‘collaborators’ and discovered that I, his 
favourite student, had actually been the instigator of the outrage, his disappointment 
boiled over. The background was this: A few years earlier some American 
Congregationalists had started an aid campaign in Thessaloniki. The city was struggling 
in the miserable aftermath of the war and the civil war that had followed it. As the Bishop 
of the city had entrusted me with the task of preaching in one of the worst hit areas of the 
city, I was confronted almost daily with an anomalous situation. I was trying with little
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success to persuade the people to accept the strangers’ gifts, which they feared would 
harm their immortal souls. With the Bishop's blessing I set about organising social work­
groups among the students and continued to lead it until I finished my studies.”
“After a somewhat stormy interview with me and a lengthy telephone call to the 
Bishop, he informed me not without visible signs of disapproval that I had passed after 
all. At that time, too, the American Farm School run by Quakers in Thessaloniki gave us 
eggs to distribute with the other goods. ‘Buddha’ was the first but certainly not the last to 
suspect these ‘Protestant eggs’ of proselytism and to paint the students social 
commitment ‘red’ even though those eggs came from ‘capitalist sources’.” 40
The American writer Robert Fulghum, offers a vivid account of Papaderos’ 
personality, and also provides a brief description of the rationale that permeates the OAC 
activities.
“An offer that comes at the end of college lectures and long meetings is 'Are 
there any questions?’ 1 usually ask the most important question of all: ‘What is the 
meaning of life?’ You never know, somebody may have the answer and I’d really hate to 
miss it because I was too socially inhibited to ask. But when I ask, it’s usually taken as a 
kind of absurd move, people laugh and nod and gather up their stuff, and the meeting is 
dismissed on that ridiculous note. Once, and only once, I asked that question and got an 
answer. One that is with me still. At the last session of the last morning of a two-week 
seminar on Greek culture, led by intellectuals and experts in their fields who were 
recruited by Papaderos from across Greece. Papaderos rose from his chair and made the 
ritual gesture: ‘Are there any questions?’ So 1 asked, ‘Dr Papaderos, what is the meaning 
of life?’ The usual laughter followed, and people stirred to go.”
“Papaderos held up his hand and stilled the room and looked at me for a long 
time, asking with his eyes if I was serious and seeing from my eyes that I was. Taking his 
wallet out of his hip pocket, he fished into a leather billfold and brought out a very small 
round mirror, about the size of a quarter. And what he said went like this: ‘When 1 was a 
small child, during the war, we were very poor and we lived in a remote village. One day, 
on the road, I found the broken pieces of a mirror. A German motorcycle had been
40 Slask 1986, p. 92-93.
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wrecked at that spot. I tried to find all the pieces and put them together, but it was not 
possible, so I kept only the largest piece. I began to play with it as a toy and became 
fascinated by the fact that I could reflect light into dark places where the sun would never 
shine. As 1 became a man, I grew to understand that this was not just a child’s game, but 
a metaphor for what I might do with my life. 1 came to understand that I am not the light 
or the source of light. But light, truth, understanding, knowledge, is there, and it will only 
shine in many dark places if I reflect it. I am a fragment of a mirror whose whole design 
and shape I do not know. Nevertheless, with what I have I can reflect light into the dark 
places of this world, into the dark places in the hearts of men, and change some things in 
some people. Perhaps others may see and do likewise. This is what I am about. This is the 
meaning of my life’.”
“Much of what I experienced in the way of information about Greek culture and 
history that summer is gone from memory. But in the wallet of my mind 1 still carry a 
small round mirror. Are there any questions?'*41
Metropolitan Eirenaios (Galanakis), President o f the OAC (1968- ), was born in 
Crete in 1911. Eirenaios (which means ‘peaceful’ in Greek) studied theology at the 
University of Athens (1933-37). In 1940 he declined a scholarship for post-graduate 
studies in Germany in order to join the resistance against the Nazi occupation. In 1943 he 
was arrested by the Germans and sentenced to death, saved only by the personal 
intervention of the Bishop of Crete. In 1946 he became a priest and taught at the 
Ecclesiastical School of Crete. Between 1950 and 1954 he was in Paris and Germany on 
a scholarship for post-graduate studies in practical theology and sociology. Back in Crete, 
Eirenaios edited the ecclesiastic magazine Anagenesis (‘Rebirth’) and engaged in several 
missionary activities. In 1957 he was elected Bishop of the diocese of Kisamos and 
Selinon, where in 1965, prior to the OAC. he founded five ecclesiastical boarding 
schools, a school for agricultural education, a technical school, a school of printing and a 
school for the disabled.
In addition, Eirenaios associated himself with pioneering efforts to strengthen the
41 Fulgham 1989, p. 172-177.
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Cretan economy through forming large co-operatives. Prompted by the disastrous sinking 
of the ferryboat Heraklion in Dec. 1965, he spoke of the necessity for the creation of a 
Cretan shipping line, and led the discussions which finally resulted in ANEK, the 
Maritime Company of Crete. The venture proved to be an enormous economic success 
and the model for many more co-operatives that followed, bringing the management of 
Cretan economic resources closer to the people. Such overtly democratic convictions and 
practices prompted the junta to eject Eirenaios from the metropolitan see, which led to his 
fleeing to Germany. This triggered a wave of public dissent that ended with his eventual 
return and re-enthronement in 1981.
As early as 1962, at the third general summit of the WCC in New Delhi, Eirenaios 
voiced strong concern for the promotion of ecumenical dialogue. Since then most of his 
efforts have been realised through the framework of the OAC. Although in his late 
eighties, Eirenaios is still remarkably active and passionately committed to his 
responsibilities both in the diocese and the OAC. In a brief interview with this author he 
expressed the need to “re-enchant the world" through the co-operation of the people of 
faith and their dialogue with a new dynamic wave of Greek scientists and intellectuals 
who are “more open-minded than their seniors’', and therefore “more likely to find a 
space for Orthodox spirituality in the 21st century.”42
Patriarch Bartholomew, Member o f the OAC. His All Holiness Bartholomew, 
Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome, and Ecumenical Patriarch is first among 
equals of the branches of the Orthodox Church, whose world-wide congregation totals 
approximately 200 million believers. Son of a Greek barber, he was born Dimitrios 
Archondonis on Gokceada (Imbros in Greek), a Turkish island near the Dardanelles. 
Bartholomew, aged 59, was enthroned in January 1991 as the Church’s 270th Ecumenical 
patriarch. Like his predecessors Athenagoras in the 1960s and Dimitrios in the 1970s and 
1980s, Bartholomew’s primary concern is to continue the dialogue and reconciliation 
with the western Churches, as well as the overall modernisation of the Orthodox 
Church’s outlook to society and diakonia. Although widely acclaimed as a remarkable
42 Interview conducted on 20 Jan. 1998
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personality and a powerful orator whose agenda includes regular contacts with leading 
world figures (e.g. former President Clinton), his authority is strongly affected by two 
circumstances. The first is the fact that the Patriarchate is officially an institution of the 
Turkish state and is hence vulnerable both to anomalies in Greco-Turkish relations, and 
to manipulation by the internal political games of the Turks to sustain the nationalist 
contention that more freedom to Orthodoxy may jeopardise Turkish national sovereignty. 
The second serious obstacle is the tendency of the Orthodox Church, nourished by the 
idea of its nation-based autocephaly, to slide into intolerance and rabid nationalism. We 
have seen how even in Greece, for a long time the Church’s western, non-communist 
outpost, Orthodox officialdom remains vociferously against any change to the country’s 
constitution that would grant equivalent status to other creeds. The ability of the Patriarch 
to discourage such leanings gives him a critical role to play in Europe’s future, and 
Bartholomew has indeed devoted himself to the enhancement of the Patriarchate’s 
ecumenical outlook by speaking out strongly against nationalism and cultural intolerance.
The excerpts from various interviews that follow show that Bartholomew's basic 
positions have a striking affinity with the OAC approach.43
On the dialogue and reconciliation with Rome, the Patriarch argued: 'The 
dialogue clearly has as its further aim the union of these two ecclesiastical traditions. We 
reiterated it [this desire] in our meeting with the pontiff in Rome in 1993. The point at 
issue is not whether one or the other will compromise their position, but rather that we 
should come together on common fundamentals and try to expunge those factors which 
led to the separation in the first place. There are great expectations that the year 2000 
should culminate in certain actions by Christian Churches. This expectation is directed 
with particular intensity to the Churches of the Elder [the Vatican] and the New Rome 
[Constantinople].”
To the question from Time magazine "What are some of the major challenges the 
Orthodox Church faces as it heads into the third millennium?” the Patriarch replied: “The 
greatest problem for the Churches in the hitherto communist countries is that they must
43 Excerpts from interviews with Time magazine (5 May 1997), Greek television, channel 
1(14 Jan. 1996), and from Olivier Clement's book La Verite vons rendre libre (1996).
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encompass whole masses of people who have been saturated with the ideology of an 
atheistic totalitarianism. Our venerable brother Patriarch Pavle of Serbia has recently 
spoken on this very point, saying if his country and his Church have been living in 
tragedy as a result of the fratricidal war in the former Yugoslavia, it is because these same 
people lived for decades without any Christian ideals. We want to make clear that the 
Orthodox perception of ‘nation’ contains no element of aggression and conflict among 
people. We condemn all nationalistic fanaticism as it can lead to divisions and hatred 
among peoples, the alteration or extinction of other people’s cultural and religious 
particularities, and repression of sacred rights and human dignity.”
Later the Patriarch was asked to comment on where the Orthodox Church stands 
on issues that attract so much attention in the Catholic Church such as contraception, 
abortion and the ordination of women. He said: “According to a long-held tradition, the 
Orthodox Church avoids dictating or making categorical decisions of a social or ethical 
nature.” Elsewhere, he rejected “the dictation of ethics, the prohibitions, the indiscreet 
invasion of unmarried elders in the private life of couples.” Such positions “cannot but 
negatively interfere between contemporary people and the message of the Bible.” 
Regarding abortion he suggests that it is better to avoid it, but he acknowledges that in 
certain circumstances of extreme despair, an abortion might be the less damaging 
solution.44 As concerns the ordination of women, Bartholomew referred to an OAC 
conference in 1989 which focused on the position and role of women in the Church: 
“Among a variety of perspectives was an advocacy for the reinstatement in our liturgical 
practice of the order of deaconesses. However, the ordination of women presents a 
problem that extends across historical, canonical and theological considerations. 
Therefore, the Orthodox Church is not in a position to accept it.” Time journalist Wilde 
then asked, “Why are you called the ‘Green Patriarch’?” Answer: “We are deeply 
troubled by the paradox that although global consciousness has been raised and numerous 
efforts are in progress, the environmental crisis has reached alarming proportions. We 
must choose, either to make it [the environment] reflect greed and ugliness, or to use it in 
such a way that its beauty shows God’s handiwork through ours.” He then referred to the
44 Interview in Le Monde and Clement, 1985 see 6.2 above.
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various initiatives undertaken by the Patriarchate, like the proposition that September 1st 
each year should be a special day of prayer for the environment, and the two large 
international ecological symposia that have been held.
Finally, Bartholomew was asked to comment on relations between the 
Patriarchate and the Turkish government. At a time when there is an alarming resurgence 
of institutionalised nationalism in Greek political culture as well as in the Greek Church 
itself, his reply presents a challenge: “We have lived side by side with Muslims and Jews 
and we have developed trusting relationships with both. It is our belief that Orthodox 
Christians have a special responsibility to assist in East-West rapprochement. Like the 
Turkish Republic, we too have a foot in both worlds.” Later on, referring to certain 
unresolved issues, such as the closing-down of the theological seminars on the island of 
Halki near Istanbul, he expressed the idea that the seminary’s reopening would be very 
positive for the European image of Turkey, a sign of genuine respect for religious 
freedom.
The final question was: “There was a time when the Patriarchate operated in a 
state of paranoia vis-a-vis the Turkish state. Is this still true?” And the reply: “I am for 
glasnost. 1 have created good relations with the Turkish people, businessmen, journalists, 
artists, and politicians. Why not? I speak freely and openly. If the Church faces a threat in 
Turkey today, it comes not from the State or from the Muslim mainstream but from the 
handful of fundamentalists. Fundamentalism is a danger not just in Turkey, but in 
Oklahoma City, Paris and Tokyo. A war in the name of religion is a war against religion. 
Religious extremists and terrorists may be the most wicked false prophets of all. They 
steal more than life itself; they undermine faith, which is the only way to break the cycle 
of hatred and retribution.” Of course, when the Patriarch addresses a Greek public his 
moderate views are cautiously presented in a framework of Realpolitik negotiations, 
rather than solid faith in the Christian ideals of peace and reconciliation. For example, in 
an interview on Greek television, he spoke on the advantages for Greece in the political 
and economic sphere if a more moderate policy vis-a-vis Turkey is sought and 
implemented. When the interviewer noted, “You spoke openly in favour of Turkey’s 
entry in the EU, but this has met with rather ambivalent sentiments in Greece,” the 
Patriarch replied: “Simply with Turkey in the EU, automatically, or at least quite easily,
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all the big and serious problems troubling the Patriarchate and the Greeks in 
Constantinople would be resolved. [With Turkey in the EU] we shall see many more 
Greeks coming back to rejuvenate the ancient Polis 45, a community now on the brink of 
extinction.” He also mentioned the Greek entrepreneurs who would be able to take 
advantage of a new and vast market. Finally, Bartholomew praised the late Turkish 
president Ozal for his actions in this direction and invoked his contention that “friendship 
and cooperation” between Greece and Turkey must start with the commercial and tourist 
branches and then gradually move to cultural exchanges and finally to political progress.
43 Greeks refer to Istanbul either by its Greek-Byzantine name Const antinoupolis or 
simply as the polis, expressing their perennial conviction that Constantinople is the 
greatest and so the prototype polis (city) for the whole world.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: GREEK-ORTHODOX POLITICAL CULTURE
AND MODERNITY
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The aim of this last chapter is to furnish an up-to-date account of modernity with 
respect to the Greek-Orthodox political culture. Based on our empirical research, it will 
show how the integration of political culture and religion, specifically eastern-Orthodox 
Christianity, is affecting the process of modernisation in Greece.
We shall begin with a summary and comparison of the arguments presented in 
Part I and Part II, explore how they link up with each other, and finally examine the 
extent to which our findings raise broader issues concerning the three basic concepts 
employed throughout -secularisation, democratisation, and westernisation. The following 
questions will be asked:
- What is the relevance of our findings on Greek political culture for a general theory 
of secularisation?
- What is their relevance for a general theory of the nature of democracy in modem 
Greece?
- To what extent are religion and Orthodoxy responsible for the existence of a wider 
democratic deficit in the Greek political culture?
- Similarly, to what extent is political interference responsible for a lack of 
institutional differentiation in the Greek political culture, and by extension for the 
inability of the Greek Church to play a more constructive role in the development of civil 
society along modern, democratic and pluralist terms?
- What is the relevance of our findings for the general concept of modernity and 
modernisation? Should modernisation and westernisation be differentiated?
- Is there any inherent incompatibility between eastern Orthodoxy as a religious 
system, and civil society as an ideal-typical communicative logic in a modem democratic 
pluralist discourse?
Last but not least, the concluding chapter will attempt to identify new topics for 
research by identifying new opportunities in the analysis of Greek political culture.
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7.1 Concise comparison of Part I and Part II.
The overriding theme in both parts of the thesis is to show major interconnections 
between Church and politics in post-dictatorship Greece, and perhaps contribute to a 
dialogue on how Orthodoxy can constructively participate in Greece’s future within 
Europe.
The most important theoretical implications of the thesis for the Greek case are 
(i) revision of the secularisation and modernisation project and (ii) the primary 
importance of the concept of political culture, and the need for a rigorous analysis of the 
role religion plays in political culture. These questions were analysed in terms of their 
theoretical presuppositions and empirical reality.
In Part One, the historical background of the Greek-Orthodox political culture and 
the subsequent analysis of Church-State relations during the 1980s and 1990s demonstrate 
that the origins of today’s complex relationship between Orthodoxy, politics and the West 
go back to Byzantine and Ottoman times. Some of the historical events and traumas that 
unfolded during that period are still reflected in the modern Greek political culture.
As the Greek-Orthodox culture gradually became estranged from its Latin western 
counterpart, and while religion affected the constitution of other institutions including the 
State, the tenets of Orthodoxy were manipulated to cement social order and promote 
nation-building. The religious and ethnic nationalism that emerged in the Ottoman period 
and brought Europhile modernists and Orthodox traditionalists into conflict during the 
Greek Enlightenment is still alive as part of the cultural-identity debate (western versus 
Orthodox) that has been going on for the last 60 years and today affects the issues of 
secularisation, democratisation, and westernisation.
More specifically, although the PASOK socialist government attempted to change 
Church-State relations through liberalising social legislation and restructuring the 
organisation of the Church along participatory, democratic lines it's catch-all tactics 
limited its success. It proved too confusing to combine deep and profound changes 
towards socialism with keeping intact Orthodoxy’s traditional role in the national 
constitution of Greek society. The situation has become even more difficult for the State 
since 1995, when a spectacular change in the leadership of the Church coincided with a 
change in the leadership of the government and its orientation towards a more Eurocentric 
political and cultural strategy. The charismatic new Archbishop is openly defying the 
government’s purview to define the nation's eurocentric strategy, and by advocating
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nationalistic political ideas leaves no doubt of the political power of the Church to 
influence Greek public life.
The Archbishop’s uncompromising tactics have brought to the surface the power- 
balance between Church and State, the two most important Greek institutions, and has 
provoked a profound re-examination of the meaning of national identity in contemporary 
Greece. In short, the Simitis government's modernisation and Eurocentric stance has 
engaged the Archbishop in a major debate over his right to express political views, and 
pointed the need for reforms within the Church towards democratisation, modernisation, 
and harmonisation with the rest of the EU. His successful resistance to Eurocentrism and 
secularisation has made it very clear, however, that modernisation and Europeanisation in 
Greece cannot avoid the involvement of the Church and cannot disregard the privileged 
position of the Orthodox religion in the people’s consciousness.
In Part Two these historical and theoretical presuppositions and observations were 
evaluated in the context of three case studies of contemporary Church-related movements, 
fundamentalist, Neo-orthodox and cosmopolitan respectively. Analysis of these three 
versions of the Orthodox political culture again illustrates how in Greece politics and 
religion are inextricably interconnected, with Church and State the primary institutional 
fronts for defining what it means to belong to the national collective.
As the result of interrelated reasons -  such as the unprecedented popularity of the 
Archbishop’s eurosceptic nationalism, public insecurity with regard to globalisation and 
EU cultural integration, and the effects of a massive influx of non-Orthodox immigrants 
into Greece -  fundamentalist politicians and religious groups no longer identify only with 
the extreme Right, and have become incorporated into the mainstream political and 
cultural picture, under the new umbrella of the “patriotic” social faction that cuts across 
the political spectrum. This introduces a totally new dimension, inasmuch as the 
traditional parties, ideologies, coalitions and rivalries are reshaping themselves according 
to their position on the role of the Church in Greek politics, and the role of Orthodoxy in 
foreign policy.
This merging of political culture and religion in Greece means that identity issues 
and cultural dilemmas have become entwined with ideological and extraneous issues, 
such as foreign policy. Inasmuch as the Archbishop and the patriotic political faction 
manage to attract popular support and media attention, forces claiming allegiance to 
political Orthodoxy will inevitably influence relations between Greece and the West.
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Under the Archbishop ’s leadership and the patriotic political umbrella, the Neo-Orthodox 
thinkers and their concepts also provided support for opposition against the prevailing 
attitude within the government to resort to what is criticised as a conciliatory strategy on 
national issues (e.g. reaching a compromise with Turkey over Cyprus, or closing the 
“Macedonian question”).
Perhaps the most striking instance of Greece being a prime example of the 
interpenetration of religion and political culture is the transformation of the hitherto 
internationalist communist party into part of the “patriotic” Helleno-centric faction. Neo- 
Orthodox politicians and intellectuals mediated this transformation, seeing it as the 
combination of a critique of the western paradigm with a leftist quest for independence 
and a nationalist quest for a pure authentic culture. As a leading member of this coalition, 
the Archbishop cultivates strong ties with Neo-Orthodoxy and has no compunction to 
unite with communists, nationalists, and anarchists in an “unholy” front against 
westernisation and globalisation.
A different embodiment of the Orthodox political culture, not negative vis-a-vis 
the West and fostering a positive role for the Church in a largely secular and multi­
cultural environment, is the Orthodox Academy of Crete (OAC). Independent of both the 
Athens Church hierarchy and the State, it co-operates closely with the Patriarchate, the 
World Council of Churches and the Council of European Churches.
As regards secularisation and democratisation, the OAC encourages lay 
participation in its activities and has developed a wide network of co-operative efforts 
with civil-society on matters of ecology, science, education, and gender equality. It 
strongly advocates the concept of Christian fellowship as an antidote to nationalism. The 
academy’s inter-faith dialogues make it a mediator between the Orthodox Church and 
international politicians, and this alternative aspect of the Orthodox political culture is 
endorsed by the Greek government’s Eurocentric forces.
The OAC’s version of Orthodoxy is less influential however than the one 
championed by Archbishop Christodoulos. Fear of political costs and the clientelist 
structure on which most Greek politicians rely means that Orthodox activism that does 
not base itself on Church-nation-State interpenetration will not receive the political 
support it needs to have any real impact on the Greek political culture.
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7.2 The Secularisation Thesis in the Greek Context
What is the relevance of our findings on the Greek political culture for a general 
theory of secularisation? In brief: they affirm the increasingly cited contention that 
secularisation constitutes a “doctrine more than a theory”, based on “presuppositions ... 
rather than a systematic set of interrelated and empirically tested propositions.” 1 We have 
seen that in Greece religion plays a strong role in a supposedly secular society and that 
secularisation is far more useful as an ideal type than as a description of Greek reality. As 
Casanova has shown, religion has re-emerged as a vital force in the world political order 
which is a further indication that “... religious traditions throughout the world are 
refusing to accept the marginal and privatised role which theories of modernity as well as
' j
theories of secularisation had reserved for them.”
The main problem explored in the thesis is the Church’s ability to control the 
government’s secularising policy, and the tendency of major political forces to rely on 
Church support in return for professing anti-secular political convictions. The political 
development that encapsulates the secularisation debate relates to Church-State 
separation, which involves socialisation-nationalisation of Church property, liberalisation 
of the Civil Code (e.g. introducing civil marriage), and implementation of reforms 
towards a more secular education.
Secularisation in terms of institutional differentiation through Church-State 
separation in Greece has until now been conducted so equivocally that Church and State 
here managed to reach a compromise: the official bond between the two institutions 
remains unimpaired, while some reforms are conceded in line with EU policy. Another 
interesting circumstance in attempting institutional differentiation between Church and 
State in Greece is that the threat of abolishing the Church’s official status has actually 
strengthened its position in politics, so that it can successfully mobilise its resources to 
oppose certain reforms.
This raises concern over the desired outcome of separation, given that the 
Church’s campaign against secular reforms was based on the mainly political sentiments 
of patriotism and the Orthodox identity of the Greek political culture. This means that if 
the Greek government decided to implement Church-State separation, it could unleash a
1 Hadden 1987; cf. Casanova 1994, p.7.
2 Casanova 1994, p. 5.
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reaction in the relations between religion and the Greek identity that might result in 
unprecedented political interference of the Church in public life. The Greek case seems to 
confirm Dahrendorf s contention that, compared to the USA, the entire European political 
system was characterised by state superimposition, wherein one institutional system 
overlays another and each had a hand in the other. Church, state, education, welfare, the 
law, and the like were so intertwined that separating them caused a significant shock to all 
sectors of the system from which religion was not immune.
The interpenetration of religion, the state, and civil society has had a profound 
impact on religious movements and organisations arising in Greece, not surprisingly from 
within the existing political and cultural framework. Their advocates did not attempt to 
denounce worldly affairs in favour of religious practices but actually attempted to 
redefine and control politics. Contrary to the situation in western Europe and the U.S., the 
three case studies of Part Two are not new religious movements expressing a new wave of 
religious pluralism (e.g. New-Age groups), but principally quasi-secular reform 
movements addressing essentially political issues through Greek-Orthodox viewpoints. 
Greek secularisation, therefore, does not mean institutional differentiation and the 
independence of civil society from religion, but the collision of the secular and the 
religious, and the concomitant colonisation of the spiritual by the political and vice versa.
It is not that the findings of the thesis invalidate the effects of secularisation, but 
rather that they situate the debate in the context of advanced modernity. Officially, the 
Greek Church may no longer presume to impose its views either in public affairs or 
concerning individuals. To ensure that he is heard, Archbishop Christodoulos introduced 
a new, quasi-religious/quasi-political discourse to match the political and cultural 
dilemmas. The Orthodox Church and its affiliated movements have had to explore new 
alliances, particularly with the political Left and the anti-globalisation group, on the basis 
of their mutual aversion towards capitalism, consumerism, and the “new world order”.
The literature on post-dictatorship Greek politics and history largely endorses the 
assumption that Orthodoxy and the Church were relatively insignificant in affecting the 
nature of Greek modernity and democracy. In this view modernisation equals 
secularisation and the concomitant marginalisation of religion. In short, secularisation 
emancipates society from religious and irrational control over human reason by
3 Dahrendorf 1959.
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marginalising traditional values and replacing them with rational concerns and efficient, 
meritocratic, and specialised forms of social life. With its rational, structural and 
functional differentiation of the social system, secularisation renders faith a matter of 
individual choice from among a range of worldviews and belief systems.
Implicit in the secularisation thesis is the normative assumption that secularisation 
and the reduction of the Church’s authority are outcomes of politics and a result of the 
growth of civil society. Notwithstanding the formative influence of the secularisation 
project on the understanding of Greek history and politics, the prevailing conditions of 
secularity and modernity are not peripheralising religion. On the contrary. The historical 
and contemporary affinities between religion, the State, and the political culture have 
allowed their deep interpenetration and initiated a process of dynamic transformation 
resulting from their mutual interaction.
Moreover, due to their common participation in the construction of a concept of 
collective identity that includes unresolved inconsistencies related to the imperfect co­
existence of secular and religious aspects, any attempt by either State or Church to change 
its role vis-a-vis the other could be interpreted by the public as a destabilisation of those 
psychological, emotional, and cognitive bonds that constitute the national collectivity. As 
the thesis has shown, the most contentious episodes in Church-State relations under 
PASOK were interpreted precisely in these terms by the principal actors on each side, 
which helps to explain the failure to bring about institutional change and emphasises the 
capacity of Orthodox culture to determine Greek politics.
7.3 Democratisation, Westernisation and Modernisation
What is the relevance of our findings for a general theory of the nature of 
democracy in modem Greece and to what extent are religion and Orthodoxy responsible 
for a wider democratic deficit in the country’s political culture? How do these findings 
affect the general concept of modernity and modernisation, and should we differentiate 
between modernisation and westernisation?
Similarly, to what extent is political interference responsible for a lack of 
institutional differentiation in the country's political culture, and by extension for the 
ability of the Orthodox Church to play a more constructive role in the development of 
Greek civil society along modem, democratic and plural terms?
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The above questions were assessed by exploring the concept of Greece’s 
democratisation at three levels. Firstly, an internal dimension concerns the reaction by the 
Church and its associated movements to the government intention to upgrade the role of 
laity, and promote a gradual Church autonomy from the State and a generally more 
inclusive internal Church structure; secondly, an external dimension of democratisation 
relates to the degree of Church tolerance towards religious and ethnic minorities; and 
thirdly, a purely political dimension of democratisation intended to reduce political 
interference in Church issues.
This four-way interpenetration of Church, nation, State, and political culture 
means that human and civil rights derive from the State and are not inherent in 
individuals. The limited conception of citizenship and the rights of the individual, which 
results from such an inflated understanding of the role of the State has commensurately 
affected the Greek culture’s attitude to democracy and politics. Implicit in the logic of the 
powerful State-Church relationship is a conception of democracy that accords limited 
value to the role of institutions as structures mediating between the state and the citizen 
(i.e. an active civil society), shows a distinct preference for small and familiar structures 
compatible with reciprocal personal relationships (clientelism), and has a formal rather 
than a substantive understanding of the mores and values of democracy (formalism). This 
idiosyncratic view of democracy and the defensive modernisation of Greek society are 
common characteristics of late-developing societies. They reflect the political culture’s 
ambivalence towards the liberal, western model of socio-economic change, and manifest 
themselves in a search for “alternative” routes to modernity, giving further credence to 
Eisenstadt’s assertion that “Modernity and Westernisation are not the same thing.”4
Another basic conceptualisation relates to the position of the Church and of 
Church-related movements towards westernisation, which was again investigated at three 
levels -  the complex issue of modern Greek cultural and religious identity as it emerges 
from the wider affinity between tradition and modernity; the position of the Orthodox 
political culture vis-a-vis the prospect of EU integration and globalisation; and specific 
foreign policy issues (i.e. the so-called “national issues”) -  in order to assess whether 
Orthodoxy has an important role in Greek political culture, and the extent to which the
4 Eisenstadt 2002, pp. 2-3.
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existence of an Orthodox political culture presents serious obstacles to the country’s 
western political orientation (i.e. commitments within NATO and the EU).
While partially overlapping, these three levels are analytically distinct and may 
vary independently. For example, Church-State separation is not an essential precondition 
for democratisation of the Church and vice versa, and westernisation does not inevitably 
lead to the marginalisation of religion. In Greece, the links between religion and politics 
are reflexive and mutually transformative as the interpenetration of religion and politics 
makes itself strongly felt in informing and articulating cultural concepts of collective 
identity.
7.4 The “Civilisation Paradigm” in the Greek Context
On the model of the ancient Greek polis and Habermas’ notion of the public 
sphere, civil society may be defined as a “non-state sphere comprising a plurality of 
public spheres which are legally guaranteed and self-organising”, and as the “public space 
where citizens discuss politics and form public opinion, [and which] acts as a control 
upon the ruling structure organised in the form of the state”. In other words, civil society 
has three constitutive features: autonomy from the state, emphasis on the public rather 
than the private, and conscious pluralism or toleration of a multiplicity of organisations 
and interest groups representing a range of worldviews.?
Assuming that civil society is of pre-eminent concern for democracy and taking 
the above three elements as necessary for the construction of a vital civil society, it is 
possible to explore the question of whether or not there is any inherent incompatibility 
between eastern Christianity as a religious system on the one hand, and civil society and 
democracy on the other. Moreover, careful consideration of this issue might generate 
some useful alternatives to Huntington’s “civilisational paradigm” which, although it 
barely pays attention to eastern Christianity, still manages to locate societies with an 
Orthodox tradition on the negative side of the democratic/non-democratic fault line.
Huntington’s basic hypothesis is that, now that the cold war is over, the 
fundamental source of conflict will be neither ideological nor economic, “The great
? Prodromou 1994, p. 120.
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divisions among humankind will be cultural/’6 Among the factors that differentiate one 
culture and one civilisation from another he identifies religion as the most important of 
all.
The growth of civilisation-consciousness is enhanced by the ambiguous role 
played by western values. The West today in faced with a non-West that increasingly has 
the desire, the will, and the resources to shape the world in non-western ways. In the 
past, the elites of non-western societies were usually people who had been involved with 
the west through having been educated at western institutions where they absorbed 
western attitudes and values. At the same time the ordinary people in those non-western 
countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. These relationships 
are now being reversed, and a de-westernisation and indigenisation of elites is occurring 
in many non-western countries, at the same time as western cultures, styles and habits are 
becoming more popular among the mass of the people. As argued earlier in the Historical 
Background chapter and in two of the case studies, to a certain extent this progressive de- 
westernisation of the intellectual elite has indeed been the case in Greece.
Another point mentioned by Huntington is that cultural characteristics and 
differences are less mutable and hence less easily conciliated and resolved than political 
or economic ones: “In class-and ideological conflicts, the key-question was ‘Which side 
are you on?’ and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts 
between civilisations the question is, What are you? That is a given that cannot be 
changed. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively 
between people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab; it is more difficult to be 
half-Catholic and half-Muslim.”7
The central theme of Huntington’s ideas is that culture and cultural identities are 
currently shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict. Global politics are 
both multi-polar and multi-civilisational; modernisation is distinct from westernisation 
and is producing neither a universal civilisation in any meaningful sense, nor the 
westernisation of non-western societies. Non-western civilisations generally are 
reaffirming the value of their own cultures and choosing their own route to 
modernisation. The less governments and groups are able to mobilise support or form
6 Huntington 1998, p.22.
7 Ibid., p.27.
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coalitions on the basis of ideology, the more they will attempt to do so by appealing to 
common religious and civilisational identities.
A propos the Greek political culture Huntington has argued that with the 
disappearance of the ideological division of Europe, the continent’s cultural division 
between western and eastern-Orthodox Christianity has re-emerged: “The velvet curtain 
of culture has replaced the iron curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in 
Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at
O
times a line of bloody conflict.”
As we have seen, public opinion as well as the media and the political 
establishment in Greece have on a number of occasions adopted a quite similar logic. 
Several examples have been discussed. For instance, the fervent support of Serbia, 
despite the damage it inflicted on Greece's relations with the EU, was internally 
legitimate for reasons of historical, cultural, and religious empathy. The shelving of the 
“Macedonian question” is due to the fact that its resolution seems to entail too high a 
price for any Greek government ready to “dare to consent to a non-Greek people who 
will bear the sacred name of Macedonia." The perennial conflict between Greece and 
Turkey is handled by both governments in such a way that it will not upset the fragile 
status quo of internal legitimisation that rests on historical, religious, and cultural 
sentiments of difference, pride, and hatred.
Huntington agrees that much of western culture has indeed superficially 
permeated the rest of the world, but at a more basic level western concepts differ 
fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilisations. Western ideas of individualism, 
liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, the rule of law, democracy, the 
separation of Church and State, often find little resonance in, for instance, Orthodox 
cultures.9 In fact, efforts to propagate or enforce such ideas produce a reaction against 
what is seen as Euro-American cultural imperialism and reaffirm traditional values 
instead. This can indeed be seen in Greece in the support for religious spirituality among 
a growing section of the younger generation.
According to Huntington, some countries have a fair degree of cultural 
homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilisation or
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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another. These are “torn countries”, and their leaders typically wish to pursue a 
bandwagon strategy and make their countries members of the West, yet the history, 
culture, religion, and traditions of these countries are non-western. He points out Turkey, 
Mexico, and Russia as characteristic examples of such torn countries. To redefine its 
civilisation identity, a torn country must meet three requirements. First, its political and 
economic elite has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move; 
second, its public has to be willing to acquiesce in the redefinition; third, the dominant 
groups in the receiving civilisation have to be willing to welcome the new convert.
To what extent is Greece a “torn” country?
Greece, 98% eastern-Orthodox and with a culture that is proud to declare her 
Byzantine heritage, occupies an ambivalent position in Huntington’s schema. For the 45 
years the iron curtain was the central dividing line in Europe, Greece belonged to the 
ideological and geo-political camp of the ‘Tree” world, to western civilisation.10 “This 
line has moved several hundred miles East. It is now separating the peoples of western 
Christianity on the one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the other.”11 
Greece’s Orthodox affiliations render her non-western and non-democratic, according to 
Huntington. The development of a plural-democratic political culture (i.e. autonomous 
modernisation) is clearly mediated by religio-cultural conditions: “Developments in the 
post-communist societies of eastern Europe are shaped by their civilisation identities. 
Those with western-Christian heritages are making progress towards economic 
development and democratic politics; the prospects for economic and political 
development in the Orthodox countries are uncertain; the prospects in the Muslim 
republics are bleak.”12 This is a reversal to the well-known core, semi-periphery, and 
periphery typology, redefined in terms of religious and cultural affiliations. At the bottom 
of the evolutionary ladder is Islam, in the middle stands Orthodoxy, and at the top 
western Christianity. Although his reference to post-communist countries does not 
include Greece per se, Huntington clearly identifies the Orthodox culture as an obstacle 
to the development of civil-society.
10 Huntington (1996), Map 1.2, p.24-25.
11 Ibid., Map .3, p.27 and 1.1 p.29.
12 Ibid., p.29.
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In modem-Greek, official historiography classical Greece, Byzantine Orthodoxy 
and modern Greece constitute a continuum conditioned by the language and the culture 
of Hellenism, but Huntington’s categorisation of Greece as Orthodox = non-West = 
undemocratic sharply differentiates between ancient and modern Greece. As a result he 
does not see any compatibility between the cultural classicism of the western 
Enlightenment and the attempt by the Greek Enlightenment to appropriate it 
meaningfully. By identifying the divergence of cultural traditions as the common 
denominator that gives rise to heterogeneous types of modernisation, Huntington’s 
civilisation paradigm does, however, recognise that there are different roots to different 
modernities.
As was repeatedly observed throughout the thesis, there is an increasing tendency 
in Greek politics, media, and the public discourse to put forward a type of nationalism 
that consists of Neo-Orthodox, neo-classicist as well as Eurocentric aspirations to 
modernisation as equally important elements. The dynamics between such diverse 
cultural strategies operate as a political barometer of legitimisation and consent for the 
government’s handling of the “national issues”. Indeed, as was noted in the context of 
the “patriotic” Helleno-centric political/cultural faction, such historical sensitivities 
constitute a major means of internal legitimisation. The interesting point is that in modem 
Greece such seemingly contradictory values are compatible and constitute an ensemble, 
whereas for Huntington they are incompatible, mutually exclusive, and inherently 
problematic as regards the development of civil society and democratic modernisation.
Another distinctive feature of the West is the rule of law. It is this which, 
according to Huntington, has laid the basis for constitutionalism, meritocracy, and the 
protection of human rights. In the Greek-Orthodox culture, however, law and rationalism 
have been much less important factors in shaping thought and behaviour than reciprocal
13personal relationships, community welfare, honour and kinship.
Lastly, there is social pluralism. Most western-European societies historically 
consisted of a relatively strong and autonomous aristocracy, a substantial peasantry, and a 
small but significant class of merchants and traders. Together they formed a unique type 
of associational pluralism that was later supplanted by class pluralism. The strength of
lj More is found on the Orthodox anthropology of personhood in chapter 5 on Neo- 
Orthodoxy.
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the feudal aristocracy and the merchant class was particularly significant in limiting the 
extent to which absolutism was able to take firm root in most European countries. For 
Huntington, this European pluralism contrasts sharply with the poor civil societies, the 
weak aristocracies, and the strong centralised bureaucratic empires that existed in 
Orthodox Russia and the Ottoman territories (including that of the occupied Orthodox 
Greeks). Huntington concludes that many of the above features of western civilisation 
contributed to the emergence of a unique sense of individualism and a tradition of 
individual rights and liberties.
On the subject of how non-western societies responded to the West and 
modernisation, he notes that the political and intellectual leaders of these societies either 
rejected both modernisation and westernisation, embraced both, or embraced the first and 
rejected the second. Huntington understands “rejectionism” as a non-western strategy that 
permits only limited forms of modernisation. He also describes a second possible 
response to the west (which he calls “Kemalism”) 14 which is based on the assumption 
that, although modernisation and westernisation are both desirable and necessary, 
advocates of the cultural logic assert that the local culture is incompatible with 
modernisation and must be radically transformed and fully westernised if it is to 
modernise successfully.
A third choice is to attempt to combine modernisation with preservation of the 
central values, practices and institutions of the society’s indigenous culture. This is the 
strategy of “reformism” and has understandably been the most popular one among non- 
western elites and intellectuals.15
Having set his theoretical framework -  modernisation does not necessarily mean 
westernisation; non-western societies can and have modernised without abandoning their 
own cultures and adopting wholesale western values, institutions and practices; and in 
fundamental ways the world is becoming more modern and less Western16 -  and having 
already situated Greek Orthodoxy on the non-western, non-democratic fault line, 
Huntington then attempts a more direct assessment of certain cultures. If indeed 
Orthodoxy and modernity are mutually exclusive, must we conclude that Greece too is a
14 Huntington 1996, p. 73.
15 Ibid., p. 74.
16 Ibid., p.78.
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torn country? Huntington is either reluctant or uninterested to examine this correlation in 
the case of Greece. The uneasy symbiosis of an elite fixation with the classical legacy, a 
traditionally Orthodox popular sensitivity, a western-oriented geopolitical/ideological 
project, and an Ottoman-founded institutional structure, combined with the more recent 
experiences of consumerism, the proliferation of media culture and the resurgence of 
nationalist chauvinism and traditionalism, suggest a type of modernity which it seems 
almost impossible to imagine.
In Huntington’s view the defining historical phenomena of western civilisation 
(western Christianity, Scholasticism, feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and 
the Enlightenment) together with their distinctive features of religion, Western culture, 
separation of Church and State, rule of law, social pluralism, democratic representation, 
and individualism, were imposed on the Greek people quite mechanistically and 
formalistically. The one possible exception, he says “is the classical legacy which, 
however, came to Greece via Byzantium and hence was quite different from that which 
came to the West directly from Rome.” 17
An assessment of Huntington’s comments on the Greek-Orthodox culture must
recognise that his civilisation paradigm gives a simple and unequivocal answer to the
question asked by western Europeans: “Where does Europe end? Europe ends where
western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin. Greece is not part of western
civilisation, and despite being the geographical location of classical civilisation, and
intimately entwined with the west, is also an anomaly, the Orthodox outsider in western
organisations. It has never been an easy member of either the EU or NATO and has had
1 8difficulty adapting itself to the principles and morals of both.”
7.5 Proposals for Future Research
In conclusion of this thesis it is suggested that future research might make a more 
systematic study of the concept of political culture, or rigorously analyse the role of 
religion in the country’s political culture.
Ever since modernity and modernisation became sociological concepts they have 
been criticised for their emphatically Eurocentric nature. Whether one looks at Parsonian
17 Ibid., p. 140.
18 Ibid., pp. 162-163.
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neo-evolutionism and its application to the study of third-world development, or at more 
recent works of Giddens and S. Hall, all of them manifest a strong tendency to view non­
western developmental trajectories in terms of “what happened in the West.”19 
Commentators who react against Eurocentrism may loosely associate with E. Said’s key- 
work, Orientalism, which has exerted considerable influence on critical perspectives of 
modernity as a political project. This brings up the question whether one can have 
modernisation, technology, urbanisation and bureaucratisation but without the cultural 
baggage that goes with it, this baggage being essentially a post-Enlightenment system of 
thought. Generally, the Eurocentric view of the Christian-Orthodox political culture can 
be encapsulated in the notion that the social structure of the Orthodox world was 
characterised by the absence of a civil society, that is by the absence of a network of 
institutions mediating between the individual and the State. It was this which created the 
conditions for clientelism, patronage, despotism, statism, populism and other indicative 
features of a “democratic deficit” in the Greek political culture. The ideal type of civil 
society would entail a prolific network of institutions -  Church, family, club, guild, 
association and community -  lying between the State and the individual and 
simultaneously connecting the individual to authority while protecting him/her from total 
political control and ideological manipulation. The notion of civil society is therefore 
fundamental to the definition of political life in democratic societies.
In speculating about the origins of the modern (western) world, social 
philosophers from David Hume onwards have been impressed by the impact of world 
religions on shaping the modem cultural identity. Within the sociology of religion, the 
ascetic Protestant sects were regarded as fundamental in the push towards rational 
modernity. Max Weber has shown us how the inner-worldly asceticism of Calvinistic 
Protestantism transformed western culture towards a rational, disciplined life-world. He 
dealt with two major issues in his famous thesis. First, he tied the idea of instrumental 
rationality to modernity. To become modern, a society had to undergo and embrace the 
disciplines of goal-directed rational conduct. Second, he gave a privileged position to 
north-western Europe as the cutting edge of this global process, and by casting the West 
in that role, the Orient became “the other”. In terms of our own study, the consequence 
has been to place Orthodoxy in a problematic relationship to rationalist modernity and to
19 Mouzelis 1997, p .l .
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the Christian West. This has been evident from accounts of attempts at the 
modernisation/westernisation of the Orthodox Church, as well as in showing how Greeks 
view the West when discussing the official (i.e. pro-western) State ideology and anti­
western discourses.
Bearing in mind Huntington’s explicit categorisation of Orthodoxy in the non- 
westem-democratic fault line (due to specific historical and cultural conditions “which 
happened in the Christian West and did not happen in the Orthodox East”), it is 
appropriate to examine further the logic of Orientalism in the context of future research 
into the Greek political culture. Even more important is an examination of the flip-side of 
Orientalism -  of how Greeks perceive the West (Occidentalism).
The analysis of power/knowledge in the work of Foucault provides the basis for 
Edward Said’s influential study of Orientalism as a discourse of difference, in which the 
apparently neutral Occident-Orient contrast is an expression of power relationships. 
Orientalism is a discourse of “what happened in the East” as a comprehensible, 
intelligible phenomenon, within a network of categories and concepts by which the 
Orient is simultaneously defined and controlled. Orientalism created a typology of 
characters from the rational westerner at one end of the scale to the lazy Oriental at the 
other. In Said’s analysis, the crucial “fact" about the orientalist discourse was that we 
know and talk about the Orientals while they neither comprehend themselves nor talk 
about us. This language of difference apparently had no equivalent discourses of 
Occidentalism. Western society has a privileged possession of a set of essential features -  
rationality, progress, democratic institutions, economic development -  which other 
societies lack or possess only rudimentarily. These features account for the particular 
character of western society and explain the defects of alternative social formations. One 
of the formative questions of classical sociology, why industrial capitalism first emerged 
in the West, is consequently an essential feature of an “intellectual accounting system” 
that hinges on the basic otherness of East and West. Within this occidental-oriental 
contrast, Orthodox Greece constitutes a politically and culturally idiosyncratic entity for 
the western accounting systems. Considering Eisenstadt’s notion that the best way of 
explaining the contemporary world is to regard it as a story of continual constitution and 
reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs and cultural patterns of modernity,20
20 Eisenstadt 2002, pp. 1-2.
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the cultural implications of Greece’s interjacent position between Occident and Orient 
deserve the full attention of future researchers as an interesting example of an alternative 
path to modernity.
Greece embarked on its course of modernisation almost two centuries ago, and 
since its foundation as a modern nation state has been organically connected to the West. 
Yet the dialogue between tradition and “change”, between Orthodoxy and westernisation, 
has occupied and still occupies a central role in intellectual political discourses. Various 
forms of Occidentalism have emerged since the Schism 600 years ago, the latest of which 
has been named “Modernisation Now!” by Prime Minister Simitis. However, Huntington 
is right in saying that the Greek political culture with its Orthodox tradition, “The 
Orthodox outsider who had and has difficulty adapting itself to the values and mores of 
the West”, is an anomaly.
The resurgence of religion in political culture is a phenomenon of vast 
consequences and has not yet been thoroughly investigated. As a concept, political 
culture is identified with growing interest in the study of political systems by means of 
analysing their “irrational” character -  essentially, the role of the unconscious in politics 
to the detriment of reason. The purpose of employing the conceptual tool of political 
culture is to make more context-specific use of theoretical insights, and to enhance our 
understanding of important but little explored aspects of both western and non-western 
political systems that focus on values, symbols, and beliefs.
Forces as distinctive as the recrudescence of Islamic fundamentalism and 
Christian-Orthodox nationalism have shaped the politics of developing or recently 
emerged countries. The pervasive vitality and dynamism of religion in the constitution of 
political culture has created a new challenge for sociologists who try to understand the 
affinity between religion and political transformation, and for politicians trying to 
manage the tension and turmoil around this dynamic affinity.
Changes in the conceptualisation of both religion and politics have generated a 
renewed interest in the meaning of secularisation and modernisation, the secular and 
religious sources that inform and articulate national culture. The Greek case is a prime 
example of a situation where the secular and modernising forces proved unable to 
overcome the resistance of potent rival interests associated with the traditionalist order 
and to dislodge them from many of their centres of power. The inability of either side to 
prevail and the resulting co-existence of two separate cultures, each with its own universe
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of meanings, shared assumptions, and symbolic content, has produced a deep and 
enduring division in Greek society and politics.
The complex nature of the transition to modernity may be better understood via
• • 91the concept of “critical juncture”. The term refers to a disrupting and disorienting 
encounter by a prevalent order with a novel force, which has a long-term impact on the 
development trajectory of a given society. The utility of the concept is that it helps to 
underscore the importance of particular sequences in the unfolding of change, and to 
heighten appreciation of successful strategies or, conversely, missed opportunities on the 
part of the actors involved in the process. A “critical juncture” helps to conceptualise a 
reorientation in the developmental trajectory of a given society, and the creation of a new 
trajectory, distinct from the old one but obviously interacting with it. The case of Greece, 
and her dual, catch-all political and cultural strategy towards secularisation and 
modernisation fits well into the general paradigm of “critical juncture”. Given the 
fundamental political and cultural reorientation in State-society relations entailed in the 
process of European integration, it generated intense social, political and cultural 
struggles in which potential beneficiaries and potential losers in the redefinition of power 
relations within Greece played the central role.
The lasting historical and political legacy generated by this critical juncture was 
the emergence of two powerful and sharply conflicting cultural traditions, embedded in 
the novel (western) and antecedent (traditional) elements of modern Greece which 
reproduced themselves through ongoing and overlapping processes of interaction, 
accretion, assimilation, and adaptation. A major distinctive feature of this dual political 
culture is their traversing character, their tendency to cut across Greek institutions, classes 
and political parties and not become exclusively identified with any particular structure. 
The older of the two co-existing political cultures reflects the historical experiences of 
Greece. It is a culture marked by pronounced introvertedness; an occasionally militant 
anti-western stance; a powerful Statist orientation coupled with profound ambivalence 
towards capitalism and the market mechanism; a decided preference for paternalism and 
protection and a lingering adherence to pre-capitalist practices; a multitude of moral 
sentiments, including parochial and primordial attachments and intolerance of anything
21 As expounded by Lipset and Rokkan 1967 and elaborated by Collier and Collier 1991, 
pp. 27-39; cf. Diamandouros 1994.
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alien; a latent authoritarian orientation fostered by a powerful historical legacy that Weber 
aptly termed a “sultanistic regime”; and a diffident attitude towards innovation.22 The 
significance of the history of Orthodoxy for the development of this political culture has 
been stressed throughout the thesis. As we have seen, its the main feature is a pronounced 
xenophobia that involves a conspiratorial interpretation of events that is rooted in a 
defensive perception of the international environment and divides the world into “phil- 
Hellenes” and “Greek-haters”. A sharp sense of cultural inferiority towards the western 
world is coupled with an inflated and distorted sense of the importance of Greece in the 
history of western civilisation; and there is a tendency to identify with other collectivities 
perceived to have suffered from western inequality.
A direct by-product of this is the shared contention among most politicians and 
commentators with only a superficial knowledge of Greek Orthodoxy that, because of its 
close continual collaboration with the State, the Church has not been able to claim an 
independent political stand against the secular authorities. The State, by means of 
constitutional provisions and historical precedent, is supposed to have exerted such 
pressure on the Church as to render it politically almost entirely subjugated. While 
measures of this kind have indeed curbed the power of the Church as an official political 
institution, they have not eliminated its indirect ability to influence Greek politics. In fact, 
because of its resources and its unique position in Greek society, the Church is re- 
emerging today as a powerful and extremely popular institution that intends to play a 
crucial role in Greece’s future within Europe.
This study has shown that without a doubt the Greek Church, both through 
obstruction and co-operation, has affected the socialist government's initial aspirations to 
implement radical changes towards secularisation, as well as the ostensibly Eurocentric 
orientation of Greek foreign policy. Conversely, the government has been unable to 
present a consistent and uniform strategy with respect to the Church’s role in Greece’s 
political culture. Its ambivalent dual strategy of tolerating or even enhancing the Church- 
nation-State triad, while simultaneously upholding the country’s character as that of a 
modern secular EU democracy, affirms and perpetuates the problem.
The weakness of Greece’s civil-society, and its minimal autonomy from the State, 
together with the equally important weak capacity of the State to respond to the political-
29 . ,
" Diamandouros, Ibid
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economic and cultural exigencies of modernity, have generated a legitimacy crisis for 
both institutions. As the institutional representatives of this collective identity, the 
Orthodox Church and the State were linked in a symbiotic relationship that, in balance- 
of-power terms, avoided giving one institution priority over the other, and so made the 
legitimacy of both conditional. The autonomy of Orthodoxy as an actor in civil-society 
was severely circumscribed because of its institutional dependence on the State. 
Achieving some degree of ecclesiastical autonomy became a condition for the Church to 
collaborate with the State in both domestic and foreign-matters. In short, Church 
legitimacy was compromised when its spiritual message and ecclesiastical development 
were subordinated to secular-political prerogatives and ideological considerations.
Therefore, the civil society distinction between Church-State and Church-nation, 
and the conflation of them in the case of Greece, have constrained the public place of 
Christian-Orthodoxy in democratic Greece and encompassed both institutional and 
cultural considerations.
The 1980s and the PASOK government's approach to Orthodoxy made a very 
clear distinction between the need for Church-State separation and the preservation of the 
identities of Church and nation. The dual nature of this approach helps to explain the 
government’s legislative change to the civil code, and also underlies the stagnation in the
9 Tmatter of the controversial Bill 1700, the centrepiece of PASOK’s Church policy. As a 
result, the Church-State and Church-nation distinctions were unsuccessful in resolving 
the legitimacy questions embedded in the history of Church-State interpenetration in
24Greece within the context of building a pluralist democracy.
Since both Orthodoxy and the Greek political culture in general are increasingly 
defined and understood in alarmingly nationalistic and chauvinistic terms, it is extremely 
important to avoid the Eurocentric notion of modernity that opts for a radical 
reformulation of Greek-Orthodox identity along the cultural lines of globalisation and 
supra-nationality. This is, quite simply, irrelevant to the Greek case, and rather 
misleading from both the point of view of academic research and political 
implementation. In quite schematic terms, a conceptually sound, context-sensitive and
9 9' Prodromou (1994), p. 134. The aim of the Bill 1700 was to rearrange the vast Church 
property in favour of State ownership.
24 Ibid.
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empirically viable study of Orthodox culture in modern Greece should first and foremost 
recognise and interpret the instrumental role played by the political project of nationalism 
in the make-up of modem Orthodox institutions and discourse. In doing so, the focus 
should be on Greek nationalism. This being the key defining feature of modern Greek 
identity, nationalism should be carefully investigated to reveal what social forces 
facilitate its power and what forces resist it.
Of course, the process of making a civil-society entails a variety of elements, all 
of which should be dealt with. However, the extent to which Greek society is vulnerable 
to sentiments of nationalistic chauvinism seems to me a key feature determining the 
quality and type of modernity in the country’s conduct of both foreign affairs and 
domestic ones.
If, therefore, we assume that Huntington’s civilisation paradigm adopts an 
Orientalist-Eurocentric standpoint which rejects in toto a potentially compatible relation 
between Orthodoxy and democracy, then it would have to be recognized that key 
institutional elements of the modernisation process can be found in less developed form 
in several non-westem civilisations. In this sense western modernity is neither unique nor 
necessarily the model which should be emulated, for it is precisely the futile attempt to 
emulate “western superiority” and its inevitably unsuccessful, belated, arbitrary, and 
ultimately disuniting outcome that informs the non-democratic cultural forces of national 
chauvinism and reactionary localism (i.e. the “tom” countries). At the same time 
however, regardless of whether the West is more democratic or not, it is a fact that certain 
elements of western modernity tend to have (in their centralised nation-State system), and 
perhaps ought to have (in the concept of civil society) a trans-cultural character today.
There are several interconnected factors that may account for the existence of this 
kind of political domination in Greece and other late-developing countries (such as a 
history of subservient relationships with the West, or absence of an indigenous middle- 
class), but for us the focal point is how the Orthodox tradition and Enlightenment 
nationalism collided in the field of Greek political culture. As far as the affinities 
between cultural populism and Orthodoxy are concerned, we have reiterated throughout 
this chapter that Church-State interpenetration has affected the legitimacy of both 
institutions, and tied them both to the ideological aims of nationalism, political 
manipulation and control.
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We have argued that the standard western conception of Orthodoxy as the motive 
force in the development of reactionary nationalism and traditional non-democratic 
political culture suffers from a methodological weakness, which undermines larger 
theoretical claims about the incompatibility of Orthodoxy and democracy. In the form of 
a critical response to the arguments of Samuel Huntington, who has laid out a conceptual 
framework which classifies Orthodoxy on the non-democratic civilisation fault-line, the 
chapter points to methodological and empirical factors which suggest that past and future 
possibilities for a constructive engagement between Orthodoxy and democracy in Greece 
depend on the application of a conceptual framework for analysing the Orthodox political 
culture in terms of civil society; the ways in which the nationalist projects of the Greek 
State have led to the appropriation of the Church and Orthodoxy for political purposes; 
and finally, the ways in which different groups and organisations within the Greek- 
Orthodox realm have attempted to renegotiate Orthodoxy’s role in the public domain in 
Greece.
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List of Abbreviations
CEC Council of European Churches
DD Democratic Defence
DIKKI Democratic Social Movement
EEC European Economic Union
ELKIS Greek-Orthodox Salvation Movement
EMETH Committee for the Study of Religious Issues
EMSPE Committee for the Study of Church-State relations
EMU Economic and Monetary Union.
EU European Union
EXON Greek Christian-Orthodox Socialist Youth
EYC Euro-Mediterranean Youth Centre, (in the OAC)
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ITE Institute of Theology and Ecology, (in the OAC)
JPIC “Justice, Peace, and Integrity of Creation”, a WCC program
KKE Greek Communist Party
LAOS Popular Orthodox Alert
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MP Member of Parliament
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ND New Democracy Party
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OAC The Orthodox Academy of Crete
ODEP Organisation for the Administration of Ecclesiastical Property
PAK Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement
PAM Pan-Hellenic Liberation Front
PASOK Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement
UN United Nations
VPRC Institute V for Project Research Consulting
WCC World Council of Churches
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HISTORICAL TIMELINE
313 Conversion of Emperor Constantine the Great to Christianity.
324 Transfer of capital of the Roman empire from Rome to Constantinople.
800 Pope Leo III crowns Charles the Great Emperor of Rome in the West.
858
Schism between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople as a result of 
the dispute over the appointment of Patriarch Photius (Photian Schism).
1054
Final Schism between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople.
Pope Leo IX and Patriarch Michael Cerularius excommunicate each other.
1071
Byzantine army led by emperor Romanos IV Diogenes decisively defeated 
by the Seljuk Turks at Manzikert.
1096
First Crusade roused by the preaching of Pope Urban at the Council of 
Clermont.
1147 Second Crusade.
1190 Third Crusade.
1204 Fourth Crusade results in the capture and sack of Constantinople.
1274
Union of Lyons. Emperor Michael VIII pledged ecclesiastical union with 
the West and acknowledged Papal supremacy, despite popular and 
Patriarchal opposition.
1393 Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, son of Murad, besieges Constantinople.
1397 Ottomans capture Thessaloniki and Athens.
1439
Attempted union of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches at the 
Council of Florence.
1453 Fall of Constantinople to Ottomans under Sultan Mehmet II.
1454
The Byzantine scholar George Scholarius (Gennadius) becomes the first 
Patriarch under Ottoman rule. Sultan Mehmet II reaffirms and even 
extends the prerogatives .of the Orthodox Church.
1571 Battle of Lepanto and destruction of the Turkish fleet.
1589 Patriarchate of Moscow is founded.
1821
Uprising against Ottoman rule in the Peloponnese. Beginning of Greek 
War of Independence.
1822 Greek declaration of Independence -  First provisional constitution.
1833 Autocephalous Church of Greece created.
1833 Arrival of Bavarian Prince Otto as Greece’s first King.
1834 Capital of Greece moved from Nauplion to Athens.
1843
Greece becomes a semi-constitutional monarchy after popular demands for 
a constitution.
1862 King Otto deposed and replaced by the Danish prince King George I.
1897 Brief war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, which Greece loses.
1907 The Orthodox brotherhood Zoe is founded.
1911 Eleftherios Venizelos becomes Prime Minister.
1912-1913 Balkan Wars.
1914-1918 First World War.
1919-1922 Greco-Turkish War.
1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Population exchange between Greece and Turkey.
1936-1940 Metaxas dictatorship.
1941-1944 Germany and Italy occupy Greece.
1944-1949 Civil War between communist and government forces.
1952 Greece becomes a member of NATO.
1965 Catholic and Orthodox churches lift excommunications of 1054.
1967
Coup of army colonels leads to the establishment of military dictatorship 
(junta) in Greece.
1967 Ieronymos appointed as Archbishop of Greece by the junta.
1968 Orthodox Academy of Crete (OAC) is founded.
1973
Student occupation of Athens Polytechnic protesting against the junta is 
terminated by armed force.
1973
Power struggle within the junta leads to the appointment of Serapheim as 
Archbishop of Greece.
1974 Attempted coup in Cyprus leads to Turkish invasion.
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1974
Greek junta falls and democracy is restored. Referendum held on the 
future of Monarchy -  70% vote against.
1974 Nea Demokratia under Konstantinos Karamanlis wins the elections.
1981 Greece becomes a full member of the EEC.
1981 PASOK under Andreas Papandreou wins the elections.
1985 PASOK under Andreas Papandreou wins once again the elections.
1989 Coalition government.
1990
New Democracy Party under Konstantinos Mitsotakis wins with a slight 
majority after three attempted elections.
1991 Bartholomew enthroned as the 270th Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul.
1992 Greece signs the Maastricht Treaty.
1993 PASOK Party under Andreas Papandreou wins elections.
1996
Death of Andreas Papandreou. PASOK, led by Konstantinos Simitis wins 
the Elections
1998
Death of Archbishop Serapheim. The Holy Synod elects Christodoulos in 
his place. Death of Konstantinos Karamanlis.
1999
Greek and Turkish political leaders initiate a new era of friendship and 
cooperation
2000 PASOK Party under Konstantinos Simitis wins elections again.
2000 Schengen Agreement ratified by Greece.
2001 Greece joins the Eurozone.
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